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
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
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MDCCCCIII

BUDDHISM AND CHRISTIANITY

T. W. RHYS-DAVIDS

LONDON

WE can scarcely be surprised that comparisons drawn between Buddhism and Christianity should have proved so attractive to many writers. The cravings, good, bad, and indifferent, to which such comparisons appeal, have a somewhat abiding influence over the minds of men.

There is, in the first place, curiosity—happily, be it said, an almost universal characteristic of men and women alike. And, in fact, as will be seen, some of the resemblances are very curious indeed. Then there is the craving, very natural no doubt, to make out, quite convincingly, how very superior one's own views are to those of other people. And this has led to the not altogether tasteful exhibition of a salaried official of one faith picking out, with an air of triumph faintly veiled under a show of impartiality, the weak points, as they seem to him, in a rival creed. Then, again, there is the desire, laudable enough if it could only ever be satisfied, of finding a short cut to the truth by tracing out those points on which all the faiths agree. We find this vain hope cropping up in the most widely separated fields. It lies at the root of the "*quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus*" of the Catholic theologians; and has been used, with no permanent effect, but in very seductive arguments, by the most determined opponents of the claims of the Catholic priesthood. Finally, such comparisons have actually been made to prove the astounding thesis that, in spite of the long centuries between them, in spite of the widely different histories which lay behind them, in spite of

the divergent cultures of which they are the outcome, all the famous religious teachers and leaders in the world,—the Buddha and Confucius, the Christ and Paul, Zoroaster and Plato, even Muhammad and the Bâb,—have really, in their esoteric teaching at least, taught the same doctrines, so that all faiths are at root the same,—the same, oddly enough, as the mediæval beliefs of India. This reminds one of the deeper fallacy that human nature is always and everywhere the same—a dictum so often put forward without the necessary limitations, that one is entitled, perhaps, to complete it by saying,—the same as that of the folk in the Ganges valley in the twelfth century after Christ.

The present article will attempt none of these higher flights. It is simply intended to satisfy a very natural and very laudable curiosity, and to do so from a strictly historical standpoint. It will merely set out, as shortly and clearly as possible, what the resemblances actually are between the two most widely extended creeds. And it must be confined to those resemblances that are found in the earliest documents of each. For the history of Buddhism is the history of the greater half of the civilized world for nearly two and a half millenniums; the history of Christianity is the history of the other half for nearly two millenniums. To compare all Buddhism with all Christianity would be a colossal, and within the limits of this paper, an impossible, task. Only the *Nikâyas* on the one side, and the New Testament on the other, will, therefore, be considered.

Even within these narrower limits only a selection can be made. There are very numerous passages which are either strikingly similar or (what is equally important from the historical point of view) strikingly contradictory. It will be best, perhaps, to give, in the first place, a selected number of such passages, choosing those that are typical examples of the different varieties of thought or experience, and then, secondly, to make a few suggestions as to the conclusions that may already be drawn, and as to the directions in which further inquiry is desirable.

Now, firstly, there are many suggestive points of comparison in the expression given in these two sets of documents to what one may fairly call advanced ethics. Elementary ethics,—not to murder or steal or commit acts of sexual excess,—is taken for granted in each of the two. But religious reformers, in incorporating into their teaching the moral code current in their time and locality, have endeavored to add to it and to strengthen it, and to appeal, in support of it, to other and deeper feelings than those then appealed to in the world.

It is unnecessary to consider how far morality had previously been united to religion. Very probably the evolution of each had originally

gone along distinct lines. But before the times we are here concerned with a union of a sort, though of a different sort, had been already brought about, both in the valley of the Ganges in the seventh and sixth centuries B. C., and in the eastern basin of the Mediterranean in the centuries preceeding the Christian era. It is enough that both Buddhism and Christianity accepted that version, tried to accentuate it, to raise the whole question of ethics onto a higher plane, and to give newer, more emotional, deeper expression to what appeared to each to be ethical verities.

We are not the least concerned as to whether the supposed verities were really so or not. The point is merely as to the resemblance or otherwise, either in theory or in expression, between the two collections of writings we are here comparing :—

“For the wages of sin is death.”—Romans, vi., 23.

“The zealous die not, the careless are as dead.”—Verses of the Law, 21.¹

In both cases this is a figure of speech. The Christian writer does not mean to suggest that sin will bring about bodily death, or even that, after bodily death, it will bring about the death or annihilation of the soul. Some, indeed, have accepted this last interpretation, which would harmonize with the context. But it is not in accordance with other passages; and, in any case, this is a matter rather of theory of soul than of ethics. The Buddhist doctrine, on the other hand, is quite plain. And this is only one of many hundred passages in which, by almost every conceivable figure, among which this is perhaps the strongest, that want of earnestness which is the result of mental torpor is condemned as perhaps the stiffest obstacle to the attainment of the higher life. The Christian doctrine is similar, but it is not quite the same. It contains the Semitic idea of sin (an offence, not against one's self or one's neighbor, but against a god), and it does not contain the Indian Aryan idea that moral sin is due to mental torpor, that goodness is a function of intelligence.

Both the similarity and the difference of the two conceptions appear also in other allied passages. So, for instance, in the following :—

“That we, being dead to sins, should live unto righteousness.”—I. Peter, ii, 24.

“They in whom the Intoxications (the lusts of the flesh, the lust of life, and the defilement of ignorance) are destroyed, they, full of light, are dead to the world (yet free, that is, even while in the world).”—“Dhamma-pada,” 89.

To take a simpler case :—

“Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a man ; but that which cometh out of the mouth, this defileth a man. * * * For out of the heart proceed evil

(1) *Dhamma-pada*, 21, taken from *Jātaka*, v., 99.

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thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, false witness, blasphemies : these are the things which defile a man."—Matt., xv., 10-20.

"Destroying living beings, slaying, torture and bonds, thefts and lying speech, trickery and fraud, the study of low books, adulteries—these, and not the eating of flesh, are defilement. * * * Neither the eating of flesh nor the habit of fasting, not nakedness or matted hair or tonsure or dirt, not the wearing of rough robes, not the cult, forsooth, of the sacred fire, not the divers penances that never end in the world, not hymns or sacrifices or oblations, not observance of set times—these are not things that purify a man who has not conquered the doubt in his heart."—"Sutta Nipāta," ii., 4, 4-11.

In both cases the question is as to ceremonial impurity ; in both cases the doctrine is laid down,—to the horror of the Brahmins in the older case, and of the Pharisees in the later one,—that it is the heart that should be cleansed. The two doctrines seem wonderfully alike. And so they are. But a closer study reveals suggestive differences. The place of blasphemy in the one case is taken in the other by the study of low books ; and the protest against sacrifices and hymns which finds its very appropriate place in the doctrine of Kussupa the Buddha would run perilously near to what the later writer would probably, *mutatis mutandis*, have regarded as blasphemy.

This comparison, it will be noticed, is made between a Gospel narrative and a doctrine ascribed, in the Buddhist text, too, not to Gotama himself, but to one of the prophets of old, one of the previous Buddhas. But we are bound none the less to acknowledge the validity of the comparison for the doctrine, and the very expressions, ascribed to the Buddhas of old, have been frankly adopted into the early Buddhism we are considering. The contrary case often occurs. Doctrines and expressions found in the Old Testament are adopted in the New, and have their parallels in the Buddhist canon.

Thus the description of salvation as a pearl of great price (Matt., xii., 46) is glossed in early Christianity by a reference to the appeal of the prophet of old for the folk to come and buy wine and oil without money and without price (Isa., lv., 1), and both ideas find eloquent expression in the Buddhist lyric entitled "The Jewel," which every neophyte has to learn.

"Who are they that, going forth with steadfast mind from lusts, have attained the aim in the system of Gotama? They who have plunged deep into the Ambrosia of Arahatsip, and are enjoying (now) the emancipation gained without price. This is the glorious jewel in our order. In this truth let there be weal!"—"Ratana Sutta," verse 7.

So we find the analogous figure of the treasure in both literatures.

“Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon earth, where moth and rust doth corrupt, and where thieves break through and steal : but lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven.—Matt., vi., 19.

“The treasure thus hid is secure and follows after a man. Though he leave the fleeting riches of the world, this a man takes with him—a treasure in which no other can claim a share, which no thief can steal. Let the wise man do good deeds, the treasure that follows of itself.”—“Nidhi-Kanda Sutta,” 8, 9.

How little the theory, the dogma, if the term is preferred, seems to matter. The idea of heaven, in the one system, is a place of eternal bliss, to attain to which is the ultimate aim. In the other system heaven is a transient delight, inevitably fated, like all sorrows and all delights to pass away, and to long for it is a sign of weakness. In the one system it is a soul, supposed to dwell during life within the body, that will, after escaping from the body, enjoy the eternal bliss. In the other system it is an essential point, to use the words of a constant refrain, “Void is this of soul, or of aught of the nature of soul.” Or to quote another passage: “And since neither soul, nor aught of the nature of soul, can in very truth be accepted, is not the speculation which holds: ‘This is the world, and this is the soul. I shall continue to exist in the future, permanent, immutable, eternal, of a nature that knows no change, yea, I shall abide to eternity!’ is not this simply and entirely a doctrine of fools?”¹ Yet the same figures are used in both systems to appeal to the same sort of emotions. And who can doubt but that they were used with very similar ethical results?

One might compare the ideas, “In the spirit and not in the letter,” “Work out your salvation with diligence,” “The whole armour of the faith,” “Many are called, but few are chosen,” “Man is born to sorrow,” “As ye would that men should do unto you, do ye also to them,” “I say unto all, watch,” all of which are found in both literatures, and come under the same category as the resemblances previously adduced.

Some of them go far down to the essential roots of the higher ethics, and are very suggestive as evidence of the method of development of the religious, or perhaps one should rather say of the ethical, belief and practice. But it is desirable to go further and to endeavor, at least to make our comparison quantitative as well as qualitative, having ascertained,—as there are resemblances to ascertain,—what proportion they bear in each case to the whole system of ethical teaching. We are here met, however, by the difficulty, on the Christian side, of determining what the whole system is.

(1) See, for authority, Mrs. Rhys-Davids' *Buddhist Psychology*, p. 36.

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There are scattered, no doubt, through the New Testament a number of passages describing the ideal character of the good man, pointing out mental or moral dispositions, qualities, characteristics, which it should, on the one hand, include, or on the other hand, exclude. But these statements are not systematized or classified. Different writers in different parts of the collection of books we call the New Testament, or occasionally the same writers in different passages, seem to lay different stress on different parts of the Christian character. It is sufficient to quote, as one instance out of many, the varying importance attached to faith and works—a deep reaching question which has its parallel, too, in the Buddhist writings.¹ We find, in consequence, that the great fathers and leaders of the Christian church do not always take precisely the same view of the Christian character. And through the centuries the differences have been accentuated, not diminished. Each new prophet reads his own views into the sacred writ. The Friend lays stress on points different from those emphasized by the Romanist. The general summary as given, say by James Martineau, is not the same as that given by Jonathan Edwards, and both their pictures vary from the picture drawn by the author of the “Imitation of Christ.” The aim has been edification rather than historical accuracy. The personal equation has impaired the scientific, not the religious, value of the exposition.

Then, again, it is not always easy to distinguish the ethical from the dogmatic doctrine. The theory of soul is woven, almost inextricably, into the theory of ethics. And this was necessarily so. The soul theory was so constant a factor in the mental conceptions of the writers that it colors the ethics. Granted the existence, inside the body, of an extremely fine and subtle entity, which would fly away from the body, and was compelled at death to do so, to inherit an eternity either of bliss or of woe,—granted this belief, whether accurate or not, is not now the question,—the fact was so overwhelmingly important that it tended to influence, and even overshadow, any other idea.

In spite of these difficulties it is possible for the historical student to make a fairly complete summary, for his comparative purposes, of New Testament ethics. And the Buddhist ethics lie before in a few carefully thought out groups, or classifications, in the sacred writings themselves. In comparing those two, the importance attached to conversion, to a constant spirit of unworldliness, to a change of heart, to inwardness, to meditation, to humility, and to love,—and these are all essential matters,—are apparently identical. These are coincidences, not amounting to identity, in numerous phrasings, in the doctrine as to faith and works, as

(1) See my *Buddhist Suttas*, p. 11.

to the final assurance of the saints, as to the peace that passeth understanding, as to the felt joy in the sense of victory won. And the feeling of the New Testament about wealth, like the feeling of many later Christians as to preference, in the highest religious life, for the unmarried over the married state, might be matched with passages from the Buddhist scriptures.

But the Buddhist ethical phrases never have the connotation, always present in the Christian phrases, of an implied theory of a soul. And taking the thirty-seven constituent characteristics of Arahatsip, of the man who has reached to Nirvāṇa, I find about half of them cannot, in my opinion, be matched in the New Testament. And probably, if we had an authoritative statement of thirty-seven ethical qualities making up the character of the ideal Christian, about half of them would not be represented in the Buddhist ideal.

* * *

Another point of comparison, between the Nikāyas and the New Testament, which has attracted a great deal of attention, is the relation between various episodes in the lives of the founders of the two religions. And when we are told that a large number of Gospel episodes,—such as the immaculate conception, the temptation, the transfiguration, etc.,—are found also in the Buddhist texts, this seems very striking. Twenty years ago Professor Rudolf Seydel, of Leipzig, published a whole volume devoted to the exposition, in detail, of such similarities; and the number of passages in the Gospels to which he adduces parallels from Buddhist sources amounts to no less than two hundred and twenty-three.¹ Many of these seem, however, to me to be very far fetched; others are simply just the sort of thing one would expect to find related by his followers, of any founder of a new movement; and in most cases the Buddhist parallel adduced is taken from a book many centuries later than the rise of Buddhism,—not seldom, indeed, from a book much later than the Christian era.

It was impossible at that time to do otherwise. Only fragments of the Nikāyas had then been published. But the method adopted is surely enough to invalidate the conclusion favored in the concluding remarks—the conclusion, namely, that the Christian ideas were borrowed from the Buddhist. It may be thought, perhaps, that though the examples adduced by Seydel were insufficient, yet that the new factors since discovered, through the publication, by the Pali Text Society, of the Nikāyas, may

(1) See his work, *Das Evangelium von Jesus, etc.*, Leipzig, 1882.

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still make that conclusion possible. We shall soon see. An American scholar, Mr. Edmunds of Philadelphia, is on the point of publishing a complete set of comparisons between the Nikāyas and the Gospels, adducing later materials only by way of comparison and carefully distinguishing them from the earlier documents.

In the meanwhile let us look a little closer into the suggested comparisons. As is well known the doctrine of the immaculate conception is not referred to in the oldest of the Christian documents, the Epistles attributed to the original apostles and to Paul, nor in the oldest of the Gospels, that according to Mark. In St. Luke's Gospel at the time when Mary was engaged to be married, but not yet married to Joseph, an angel announces to her that she shall have a son. Mary says, "How shall this be seeing I know not a man." Then the answer comes, "The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee, and the power of the Highest shall overshadow thee," etc., (Luke, i., 31-35). In St. Matthew it is to Joseph, not to Mary, that the angel comes, and that only in a dream (Matt., i., 20-25). It had previously been found that Mary was with child of the Holy Ghost (Matt., i., 18).

The Buddhist legend is not found in the oldest documents. It occurs neither in the chapter on "Wonders and Marvels" (namely, at the birth of a Buddha) in the Majjhima-nikāyas, nor in the sublime legend in the Dīgha-nikaya.¹ These two passages agree nearly word for word, but in the "Wonders and Marvels," probably the later of the two, a line or two is added (p. 121) to the effect: "When a Wisdom-being (a Bodesat, that is, a being who will become a Buddha) has descended into its mother's womb no thought of lust as regards men arises to her, neither can she be affected, in the way of lustful thought, by any man." This passage, thus introduced, may be the germ of the later development.

The earliest document in which the idea of an immaculate conception has as yet been traced is the Mahā Vastu (the Sublime Story, to wit, of that particular Wisdom-being who became the historical Buddha). This is long subsequent to the two passages just referred to, but must be older than the Christian era. In it there is a long account of what happened at the birth of the Buddha. His mother, before the conception, retires to keep the fast; and in complete chastity sleeps surrounded by her women. Her husband is not there. As she sleeps she dreams a dream; and in her dream it seems as if a white elephant enters her side. This is the conception. But there is no suggestion that the mother was a virgin at

(1) In Pali, the *Acchariz-abbuta-dhamma Sutta Majjhima*, vol. iii., pp. 118, foll.; and *Mahāpadāna Suttanta, Dīgha*, vol. ii., pp. 1, foll.

the time. And there is no reference to any previous prophecy which might have given rise to the legend. There is no necessity to quote the later versions, the legend growing fuller and fuller with the lapse of time. It may be mentioned, indeed, that in a later poem, the mother is actually called the Divine Virgin. But this idea seems to have fallen flat. It is not now believed, so far as I know, among modern Buddhists. And the belief in an immaculate conception, in her turn, of the mother herself, has never arisen anywhere among the Buddhists. They believe, however, that the mother of a Buddha could never have any other child. She always died a few days after the birth of a Buddha—a belief probably derived from the historical fact in the case of Gotama. The Chinese and Japanese Buddhist images, with so striking a resemblance to Catholic images of the Virgin and Child, represent the deity Kwan Yin who has no connection with Māyā. It may be interesting to remind the reader that the earliest mention of Buddha in the West is in this connection. St. Jerome (about 200 A. D.) has preserved a tradition then current there, that the Indians worship one they call Bodo, whom they allege to have been born of a virgin. Even so late as that the western ideas on the subject were, therefore, neither very full nor very accurate.

Considerations of space prevent any other episodes being here discussed at any length. The Christian transfiguration story is told in almost identical words in the three synoptic Gospels. "And he was transfigured before them, and his raiment became shining, exceeding white as snow, so as no fuller on earth can white them" says the old translation of Mark, ix., 2-3. Then the souls or ghosts of Elijah and Moses appear and talk to him of his approaching death, and a voice from a cloud is heard, saying, "This is my beloved Son: hear him."

The Buddhist story is in the Book of the Great Decease.¹ It occurs also just before the death of the Teacher when on his last journey. It says simply, after describing Tukkusa's gift of a set of robes of cloth of gold, burnished and ready for wear, how, not long after Tukkusa had gone, Ananda placed that set of robes on the body of the Exalted One, and how the gorgeous robes appeared to have lost their splendor. The implication is that the body of the Exalted One became so glorified that the splendor of the robes paled in comparison. But this is only an implication, though it must have been present to the writer's mind. It is not stated, or the expression transfiguration used. There are no ghosts. No voice is heard. And there are no later versions of the legend giving either of the missing links.

(1) See my *Buddhist Suttas*, p. 80.

The Buddhist story of the temptation, on the other hand, has many variants, and is now, and always has been, believed among all schools. It would be impossible, here, to attempt to deal with this history, complicated and difficult on both its Buddhist and Christian sides. Professor Rudolf Seydel has treated it at length, and since then Hofrat Dr. Ernst Wundisch in his "*Māra und Buddha*" has discussed, with admirable soberness and insight, the earlier forms of the Buddhist legend. I must venture to be content to ask the reader to accept, for the purposes of our present argument, the proposition that the resemblances are about as great—or as little—as in the two examples just given.

* * *

What, then, is the conclusion we can fairly draw? We must distinguish between the ethics and the episodes. As to the former the Brahmins did not pretend to be teachers of ethics. The standard books they used when Buddhism arose (the so-called *Brāhmanas*) are the most unmoral literature imaginable. They only claimed to be able to perform accurately certain sacrificial rites which would ensure to the sacrificer desirable results—cattle, sons, wealth, or victory. Neither did their lives tend to show that there was the slightest necessary connection between the cult of the gods and purity of life. But there had been, nevertheless, much progress in ethics. This was carried on chiefly, no doubt, by the Kshatriyas. The founders of both Buddhism and Jainism, and the first propounders of the grander ideas in the Upanishads, were all Kshatriyas, that is to say nobles, the higher ranks of laymen. But some of the priests took part in the movement of thought. They became members of the two great orders, and they admitted the Upanishads to their sacred books. There was a widespread seeking of intellectual activity. Many schools practised mystic rites and taught esoteric speculation. And the people, ever eager for some new thing, heard them all, if they would only speak, gladly. Buddhism profited largely from this general movement. Save for three things—the emancipation from the soul—theory, the Noble (or perhaps Aryan) Eightfold Path,¹ and the manner in which these two ideas were made to dominate the whole system, there is little or nothing in Buddhism not held also by one or the other of the rival schools.

In the West, on the shores of the Mediterranean, the condition of things was not unlike this. There, also, the pagan priests were not teachers of ethics. Demokritos and Pythagoras, Herakleitus and Plato, Mar-

(1) In Pali, *Ariyo atthangiko Maggo*.

cus Aurelius and Seneca, were Kshatriyas. And even among the Jews it was to the prophets, rather than to the priests, that any forward steps in ethical theory or practice were due. Before the Christian era the whole of the districts on the western coasts were seething with a new movement, an uplifting of thought. Small mystic and esoteric communities were numerous. And though sophism and theosophers abounded, there was a real earnestness and vigor which made its mark.

Surely this general similarity in the previous intellectual conditions must have been, after all, the dominant factor in the general similarity, so far as it goes, of the ethical result. Why, then, in strange forgetfulness of the well known law of parsimony, seek further for a cause that is not required, and postulate a borrowing for which there is no historical evidence? No one would even suggest for a moment that any borrowing is possible in the case of early Buddhism. Why suggest that in the case of early Christianity such borrowing is not only possible but probable?

The case of the episodes is very different,—so different at least that it is best to discuss it always apart from the question of ethics. In the ethics we find really certain deep reaching similarities on points of essential moment. In the episodes the resemblances are very much on the surface. If the suggestion be that there has been imitation the word “resemblance” seems out of place. The later should rather be described as a travesty or a mockery of the earlier. And the Jesuit missionary would not be so far wrong when he thought of the Tibetans that the Devil had deceived them with a blasphemous imitation of the religion of Christ.

Now the two main factors in building up the later legends of a Buddha,—for the legends apply to every other Buddha as much as they do to Gotama,—were two ideals current in India when Buddhism arose, the ideal of the Wise Man of old, the Seer (the Buddha or the Rishi), and the ideal of the King of the Golden Age (the Cakkavattin). Both were beautiful conceptions, and with the later were mingled the ancient glories of the sun god. The union of these two was to the early Buddhist what the union of the two ideas of the Messiah and the Logos was to the early Christians. The ideas were in many respects quite different. But in both cases the two overlap one another, run into one another, supplement one another. In both cases the ideas cover the same ground only as far as the different foundations of the two religions will allow. And it is the Buddha-Cakkavatti circle of ideas in the one case, just as it is the Messiah-Logos circle of ideas in the other, that has had a larger influence than the real facts in formulating the views held by the early disciples as to the person of their master. In each case it seemed

perfectly natural and proper that the revered teacher should resemble what they held, and no doubt rightly held, to be noblest and best. They were not critical scholars concerned with historical accuracy. They were earnest men grappling with the deepest problems of life and concerned with edification, with purity and nobility of life.

There were other factors, and in no instance are the results the same. They are only so far alike as they are the result of similar causes. What we want here, also, is a quantitative statement, paying at least as much attention to the remarkable differences as to the very bleared and shadowy resemblances, and stating, as accurately as possible, what is the actual proportion between the two. Of intentional borrowing or imitation there is not, I venture to think, the slightest trace.

I may be allowed, in conclusion, to quote, with an alteration or two, some observations which I made now some twenty years ago, in which I invited attention to an important aspect of this most interesting historical question.

“We shall be better able to enter into the feelings which prompted the early Buddhists in their application of this ideal (of the King of the Golden Age) to Gotama, if we call to mind the manner in which the Jewish ideal of a Messiah influenced the minds of the early Christians. The two ideals are not the same in detail; for they grew out of different experience, and were clothed in words drawn from different literatures. But they are so far alike, both in the sources, political and spiritual, from which they sprung, and in many essential features, that the comparison of the two cannot fail to be historically instructive.

“In the first place just as the Messiah whom the Jews expected was very unlike him to whom the word was afterwards applied, so the King of the Golden Age was very unlike what Gotama really was. The ideals existed before their supposed fulfilment. And they were only fulfilled by being put to a use so unthought of by those who had held them, that they ceased, as ideals, to exist. The Christian Messiah is as much higher and more noble than the previous conception of the Jews, as the Buddhist King of Righteousness is higher and more noble than the previous Indian conception of the King of Kings.

“One may be allowed to say this without being supposed to detract from the great beauty of those earlier conceptions. We cannot but sympathize with that natural longing, to which Carlyle gave so varied and so vigorous an expression, for the Great Man whose hand shall cut the Gordian knot of the complicated difficulties of life, and set all things straight. And when we find that peoples so distant and so different as the Jews and the Indian Aryans, when imagining what kind of man such a man must be, built up fancies as grand and glorious as those of the Messiah and of the King of Kings, it can only strengthen our faith in humanity.

“But it was surely a truer instinct which guided the early Christians and the early Buddhists, when the eyes of their minds had been opened by the new teaching to put the *Teacher* in the place of the *King*, and to look for the ideal kingdom in a kingdom of righteousness in the hearts of men. It was a change greater even, per-

haps, than they really saw. For it made the motive power, the strength, the hope, of the new kingdom to lie in the change of character in the individuals. It really replaced, by implication, the vain craving after a *deus ex machinâ*, in the guise of a benevolent despot, by the sure and certain hope of a wise philanthropy in the gradual elevation of mankind.

“* * * But secondly—and here the early Buddhists were the creatures of the spirit of their time—they allowed their ideal of the King of Kings to influence as to the actual facts of the outward condition of Gotama’s life. The petty chief, his father, became a powerful monarch over widespread dominions, though the very details of the geography of the legend show to the slightest criticism how limited was really the extent of the class over whom he held only a modified chieftainship. The modest dwelling in which Gotama was born becomes a palace. And he is supposed to have grown up amidst every dignity and luxury which the minds of the Buddhist poets can conceive.

“There are unmistakeable traces in many of these details (into which I have no space to enter, and which grow in magnificence as the interval of time grows greater) of the ancient glory of the sun god. And they also seem to me to afford undesirable evidence of a desire in the hearts of the relators of these legends to express—in the same spirit as has inspired many Christian writers—the greatness of the Buddha’s renunciation. This is the motive which has led them to raise to the highest pitch the glories of the position that he abandoned when he is said to have left his father’s throne, to which he, the only son, was heir; to have left his young wife and his only child behind him; to have left his bright home, with all its glories and delights; and to have gone out into the darkness of the night, to become a despised mendicant, a lonely, homeless wanderer. The gorgeous descriptions of what he had resigned are indications, not only of the sources of Buddhist poetry, but also of the fact that the deepest impression he made upon his disciples was the lesson of self-renunciation, of that annihilation of self which one also of our latest prophets says ‘is justly reckoned the beginning of all virtue.’

“And when we call to mind the process of thought through which it has become possible for a Christian poet to sing of the carpenter’s Son :—

‘His Father’s home of light,
His rainbow circled throne,
He left for earthly night,
For wanderings sad and lone,’¹

we shall be able to read between the lines of these Buddhist legends of the King of Kings, and to recognize in them, not merely empty falsehoods, the offspring of folly or of fraud, but the only embodiment possible, under those conditions, of some of the noblest feelings that have ever moved the world.”

(1) *Hymns Ancient and Modern*, 239.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FRENCH DRAMA

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SO LONG as the drama was wholly within the control of the church, it had the same qualities throughout all Western Europe; and the earlier passion-plays, written in Latin, do not widely differ from each other no matter where they were presented, whether in Italy or in Spain, in Germany or in England. But just as soon as the church gave up the drama to the laity and the vernacular of each of the several peoples was substituted for the uniform tongue of the clergy, then at once there began to be a divergence, which did not cease until the drama in each of the modern languages was strikingly representative of the racial characteristics of those who spoke that language. Indeed, there is no art in which national traits are more clearly revealed than in the drama,—not only in what is said and done on the stage but also in the very form of the play itself.

From the common stock of the mystery, universal throughout medieval Europe, Spain evolved a type of drama quite different from that evolved in England during the same centuries; and the Spanish play with its ingenious surprises, and the English play with its energetic directness, are not more sharply differentiated from each other than each of them is from the French play, with its decorous reserve and its psychologic subtlety. The French followed the bent of their own genius, just as the Spanish had done, and the English, and this led them in time to a drama not so energetic as the English; and not so full of surprises as the Spanish, but surpassing them both in the symmetry of its structure and in the logic with which its action was conducted. The rigidity of form which became in time one of the most marked peculiarities of the French drama was no doubt due mainly to the French liking for restraint, to a hereditary preference for rules of guidance; but it was also caused, in some measure, by the circumstances of the evolution of tragedy out of the miracle-play.

When the mystery was turned out of the French churches, it set up out of doors and in the public square its long platform, with its row of mansions at the back, to suggest the more necessary of the successive places where the episodes of the gospel-narrative were to be shown in action. In Paris, the miracle-plays, being at last entrusted to the control of the Brotherhood of the Passion, a band of burghers united for this special purpose, there was no special change in the method of representa-

tion when the performances were taken indoors once more and established in the Hotel de Bourgogne. Just as the earliest English theatre was copied from the courtyard of an inn, because the strolling actors were accustomed to that, so in France and for a like reason, the earliest theatre was modeled on a tennis-court. It was long and narrow, and it had a shallow platform at one end. This stage was decorated with such unrelated mansions as the play might require, and its limited space must have been as badly crowded as the chancel of the church had been when the original stations began to multiply in number.

The disadvantage of this massing of many places all at once on the stage would be greatly increased when the well-known Bible story, and the legends of the saints, almost equally familiar even to the spectators who might see them for the first time, ceased to supply the sole material for the anonymous dramatists and when chronicle-plays began to be made out of the semi-legendary lives of heroes and out of the wholly fictitious romances of chivalry. A throne under a canopy was enough to suggest the palace of Herod, if the playgoer already knew that such a king had once reigned; and so a gate in a wall would serve for Jerusalem if the audience was already aware that a part of the action would take place in that city. But when imagined heroes, wholly unknown to the public, had adventures in wholly imaginary castles and cities and forests, and when these unfamiliar castles and cities and forests were all muddled upon the stage at once, each of them not actually represented but merely hinted at,—a tower for the castle, a gate for the city, a tree or two for the forest,—then was chaos come again.

It was in the neutral ground surrounded by these emblems of various places, that the actors played their parts; the castle or the city or the forest, each in its turn, being used for their entrances upon the stage; and yet it seems as though these short-hand indications of the several locations would be more likely to confuse the spectator than to aid him to realize the successive scenes. Awkward as this arrangement may have been, it was an inheritance from the medieval theatre; and the tradition was so firmly rooted that this composite set was the only stage-setting familiar to the French playwrights for more than a century. Not only does the earliest of French dramatists, Hardy, conform to it, and also his greater successor, Rotrou, but even the first plays of Corneille were conceived in accord with its conditions.

Only the more serious drama was thus encumbered with a complicated stage-setting. The comic drama was free from any vain effort of this sort; its action took place in the neutral ground,—that is to say, on the bare stage, with only a curtain at the back, just as the strolling players had

been accustomed to present a farce on a hasty platform in the market-place. Even in the Renaissance personal and political satires got themselves acted now and again; but the staple of the humorous stage was still the farce with its broad fun and its practical jokes. Not a little of the national ingenuity in handling a situation logically and in extracting from it the utmost of its theatrical effect, is already revealed by these early comic dramatists of France, unknown for the most part, writing directly for the common people, often vulgar, never squeamish, and liberal of Gallic salt rather than of Attic wit. Comedy of a high elevation the French were to wait for, till their native stock had been cross-fertilized by Spanish example. For many years after the Renaissance had brought about a new birth of the other arts in France, the drama, serious as well as comic, did not respond to its influence and remained medieval both in its manner and in its matter.

In those days of dawning promise, the French men of letters, like the Italian men of letters a little earlier, detested the medieval theatre and despised it. They admired antiquity, and they sought to imitate the dramatists of Athens and of Rome, altho they really preferred Seneca to Sophocles. They persuaded themselves that one of their number had written a play, when he had merely prepared a poem in dialogue, often protracted by the introduction of a chorus in the manner of the Greeks. But no one of these French men of letters, whatever their value as poets, was in fact a playwright; and in these dialogued poems there was little or nothing of the truly dramatic. There were no contending passions, no character in the fell clutch of fate, no struggle firmly set forth, no "*scènes-à-faire*." Declamation there was in abundance, words, words, words; and indeed what plot there might be served chiefly to bring a variety of topics for rhetorical treatment or for lyrical expansion. A monolog sometimes filled almost a whole act, and the personages did not converse together,—they delivered lectures to one another.

In these frigid specimens of oratorical verse, there was neither character nor action to reward the effort of professional actors; and this is an added reason why they were performed only by amateurs, by the poets themselves and their comrades, before an audience of their friends and admirers. These chilly imitations have a certain importance in the history of French literature; but they are quite insignificant in the history of the French drama. Mere poems in dialog presented by amateurs before dilettantes on chance occasions, could have little influence upon the actual theatre of the time, and it is only in the actual theatre of the time, however primitive and rude it may be, that any advances in dramaturgic art can be made. A living drama is always

dependent upon an already existing organization of players in a play-house with playgoers used to a certain traditional way of presenting plays. Just as the practice of building houses of some sort necessarily goes before any growth in the art of architecture, so an actual theatre is a condition precedent to a living drama.

No elevation of dramatic literature has ever been accomplished by a poet, however gifted, who scorned the actual theater of his own time and failed to master its methods. Improvements are wrought only by those who are intimate with all the conditions of the object to be perfected. But pressure from the outside has often been beneficial to the theatre; and by purely literary criticism the professional playwright has sometimes been stimulated to attain a loftier level. Perhaps he may even have found his profit in a study of the alleged plays in which the poets failed to carry out adequately the ideas they advocated. And this is what seems to have happened in France toward the end of the sixteenth century, when the Brotherhood of the Passion leased their theatre in Paris to a company of professional actors, who had been performing in the provinces in plays written for them by their own hack-dramatist, Hardy.

The Parisian playgoers were accustomed to the long-drawn action and to the tumultuous humor of the miracle-plays and the dramatized romances devised according to the same formula. This formula Hardy accepted fully, composing his plays to suit a stage decorated with as many mansions as his story might call for. But he was a born playwright; and he had learned by long experience in the provinces how to hold the interest of an audience. He had more of the dramaturgic faculty than any of his predecessors, most of whom had had very little indeed. In his hands the loose chronicle-play was stiffened into consistency and its action was concentrated to bring out more boldly the dramatic passages in which the actors who employed him could most forcibly display their ability. He could evoke character out of situation, altho for the most part his psychology was but summary. For situation itself he had an instinctive feeling like that of his English contemporary, Kyd; but he lacked Kyd's rhetorical fervor. He was not a poet himself, but he was prompt to profit by what the poets had written, both by their precepts and their practice. Like Kyd again, he put his plays in five acts in accordance with the example of Seneca and the advice of Horace. He was led in time to devise the form of play which came to be known as tragi-comedy and which kept its popularity through the first half of the seventeenth century.

This tragi-comedy of Hardy's served as the connecting link between the medieval drama and the true tragedy which was later to be illustrated

in France by Corneille and Racine. This true tragedy was slowly evolved out of tragi-comedy as tragi-comedy had been slowly evolved out of the chronicle-play. Hardy availed himself of the rhymed Alexandrines, which he had found in the unactable plays of the poets who had vainly essayed to revive the classic drama,—just as Kyd and Marlowe had accepted the blank verse of “Gorboduc”; and thus he helped to establish this measure as the only verse form employed by French dramatic poets. Hardy’s own poetry deserves no high praise, but it was more pretentious than any yet spoken in the actual theater. His plays had a certain literary flavor because he drew freely upon the ancients for his plots, upon Vergil, for example, and more particularly upon Plutarch; and this may have made some of his pieces seem almost classic, in spite of the fact that his treatment of these stories was frankly contemporary.

It was apparently due to Hardy that men of culture began to be interested in the living drama, and that men of letters began to write for the actual theatre, accepting its conditions unhesitatingly and striving to give it a more literary atmosphere. More than one court poet ventured to prepare plays to be acted by the company of the Hotel de Bourgogne; and the upper circles of society were led to attend the performances, altho until then ladies had absented themselves from the theatre, in consequence of the coarseness and the vulgarity of the customary entertainment. The frequent presence of women of rank in the playhouse helped along the purifying of the contemporary drama in which the younger poets were engaged. Society was settling down after the long feuds and factional intrigues; and with stability and peace manners were softened and taste was improved. The theatre began to be recognized as an important element of social life even before Richelieu took it under his high protection, ambitious himself to win acceptance as a dramatist. In time a second playhouse was opened in the Marais; and the actors, who managed this, were eager to welcome any novelty which would aid them in their rivalry with the older company.

To supply these two playhouses there sprang up a generation of dramatic poets, following in the footsteps of Hardy altho they possessed less of the native playmaking gift. They were more declamatory and less direct; they were more affected in the conduct of their stories and in the suggestion of the motives of their characters. No one of them equalled Hardy in sturdy common sense or in ingenious invention. And while he had constructed his plays himself, from materials supplied from epics and histories, they began to borrow their plots ready-made from the dramatists of Spain and Italy. At the same time they imported also the rules of the Three Unities, which had been elaborated in Italy by the

critics of the Renaissance and which had been rejected by the practical playwrights of Spain and England. In France these rules met with a different fortune; they slowly established themselves in the literary drama; and they shackled the French stage until early in the nineteenth century.

The critics claimed the authority of Aristotle for these rules, but wholly without warrant. A theorist Aristotle was, no doubt, but he was also a man of the shrewdest practicality, and in codifying his observations of the acted drama as he knew it in Athens, he could not have promulgated as laws, restrictions to which the Greek playwrights had never given a thought. In many Attic dramas we can discover violations of the alleged rules of the Three Unities. These rules required that a dramatic poet should display in every piece the Unity of Action, the Unity of Time, and the Unity of Place,—or in other words that he should treat only a single plot of which the action should not be prolonged beyond a single day and which should be shown in a single place,—that is, without change of scene or without any suggestion of several scenes. In Spain and in England the playwrights had seen no advantage in fastening these fetters on their limbs; and in neither country did the playgoers puzzle themselves about any theory of art or any code of rules so long as the playwright was able to hold their interest, to amuse their eyes, and to thrill their nerves. They made no cavil at any license the dramatist might take so long as he gave them the pleasure which only the theater can give.

One condition of this enjoyment in the theatre is that the spectators shall understand at all times what is shown before them on the stage; and here we have an explanation of the apparent anomaly that the Three Unities were welcomed by the playgoing public of Paris altho the playgoing public of Madrid and of London had been wholly indifferent. In Paris the adopting of the Unity of Place would abolish the clutter of incongruous mansions which the stage of the Hotel de Bourgogne had taken over from the outdoor platform of the miracle-plays. These mansions must have been difficult to distinguish one from the other on the dimly lighted stage; and so far from aiding the imagination of the audience they must have kept the attention distracted during the earlier passages of the play.

How confusing this medieval scenic device might be may be guessed when we learn that in one play of Hardy's the stage was set with a palace at the back, while on one side there was the sea with a ship having masts, on which a woman appeared, and from which she threw herself into the water; and on the other side there was a fine room having in it a bed decked with its sheets. Almost as complicated is the stage-setting requis-

ite for one of the early plays of Corneille, the "Illusion Comique," where a richly decorated palace was in the center, with a park on one hand and on the other a cave for a magician on the top of a mountain. No wonder is it that the audience would welcome a simplification of such a stage-setting and would gladly advocate any theory the application of which would result in a getting rid of this bewildering complexity.

Also to be allowed full weight is the fact that the French are not so individual as the Spaniards nor so self-willed as the English. Rather are they governed by the social instinct, relishing strict order, not to say restraint. Inheritors of the Latin tradition of decorum, they do not dislike rules, nor do they really object to what might seem to the English to be restrictions. Above all are they fond of logic, and of the simplicity which comes of having a single aim; and so far as the adoption of the Three Unities helped their playwrights to attain this end, it was beneficial to their dramatic literature. If we may judge by the history of the theatre elsewhere, we can be certain that the French playgoing public would never have approved of the demand of the literary critics for the Three Unities, if the underlying principle of these rules had not been acceptable to the genius of the race.

Corneille, the first of French dramatic poets, possessed his full share of this national characteristic; and he displayed it plainly in the earliest of his more important plays, in the "Cid," which was derived from a Spanish drama, written by one of the followers of Lope de Vega. Hardy had condensed the medieval narrative in dialog into a succession of striking adventures; and Corneille in turn concentrated all his effort on a single main situation, the very climax of a struggle between desire and duty. He cut out of his Spanish original and cast away all that did not serve to throw into higher relief this final exercise of the human will, always the essential element of a true drama; and thus it was that he fixed once for all the form and the content of French tragedy.

The popularity of the "Cid" with the playgoers of France was immediate and it has been enduring. No tragedy attracts more often in Paris today after almost three centuries; and in the first flush of its novelty the rush to see it was so insistent that seats were set upon the stage. The custom thus introduced into France was already established in England; and it must have increased the tendency toward scenic simplicity, since the sides of the stage were not thereafter serviceable. Yet the "Cid" itself had been devised in accord with the conditions prevailing at the time it was written; and when it was originally produced at the theatre in the Marais, the stage was arranged to represent simultaneously the dwellings of Chimène, the apartment of the infanta, a public square, and

the council chamber of the king. Half a century later this cumbrous complication had disappeared and the play was performed in a room with four doors, that is to say, in a neutral ground with immediate access to the quarters of the king, of the infanta, and of Chimène.

Founded on a loosely constructed Spanish drama and written to suit the conditions of the French theatre as Hardy had modified them, the "Cid" did not obey the rules of the Three Unities, and for this dereliction it was censured at Richelieu's command by the French Academy, which he had founded to be the custodian and the controller of taste. Corneille defended himself as best he could; and in his later plays he sought to avoid giving to the partisans of the Italian theories any occasion to find fault with him. The final establishment of the rules was really due to Corneille's avowed adhesion to them and to his obvious effort to conform. But he himself was never at ease within the limitations which he had felt himself forced to accept. They irked him painfully; they cramped his bold spirit; and he was continually trying to argue himself out of them or to interpret them into harmlessness. Sometimes, it may be, the necessity of wrestling with the difficulty helped him to a more concise and a more vigorous expression;—the history of every art abounds in instances of an obstacle which the artist tried in vain to get around and which at last he was able to use as a stepping stone to a higher achievement.

Quite possibly this was the case with his tragedy of "Horace," in which his power as a dramatic poet is displayed amply and characteristically. The theme was tempting to a man of his temper; it was the conflict between family affection and fervid patriotism. The play was as simple in plot as it was swift in action, the poet presenting only the naked climax, stripped of all accessory episodes. In this directness of movement he was aided by his submission to the rules; and on this occasion the observation of the Three Unities called for no sacrifice. The single plot is presented at its culmination in a single day; and the stage represents a single place,—a room in the house of old Horatius. The first act begins with the entrance of Sabina, with her friend Julia; Sabina is an Alban; and Alba is at war with Rome. She is at once the sister of three Curiatii and the wife of one of the Horatii. She declares her divided feelings, and then departs when Camilla enters. Camilla is a Roman; she is the sister of the three Horatii and she is beloved by one of the Curiatii. She has been to consult an oracle, and has been told that the war will end this very day, and that she and her lover will then be united never to part. Then the Curiatius she loves enters, to inform her of a truce and of a proposal to leave the war between the two cities

to be decided by a combat of three champions chosen from each side. Elated by this good news they depart;—the leaving of the stage without any actors being taken by the audience as notice that the act was ended. As there were spectators seated at the side of the stage, it is probable that no curtain was lowered.

The second act opens with the entrance of Curiatius and Horatius, and the former congratulates the latter that the three brothers have been chosen as the Roman champions. Then comes a friend to announce that the Albans have named the three Curiatii to defend their cause. Horror-stricken as they are, the young men do not shrink from the deadly duty, although Camilla comes on to beg her lover to withdraw as best he can. Soon Sabina appears to urge her brother not to flinch even though his hand is armed against her husband's life. Finally the father of the Horatii comes forward to reveal himself also as a model of noble austerity. He has the last word, bidding the young men do their duty and leave the rest to the gods. In the third act we are made sympathizers with the suspense in the Roman household, while the brothers are fighting, three against three, before the hostile armies. Sabina wishes for the success of her brothers, while Camilla is ardent for the triumph of her lover. The elder Horatius enters to attest again that honor is ever to be held dearer than life; and when Julia brings the dread news that two of his sons have been killed, while the third saved himself by flight, the father grieves not at the death of the two but only at the cowardice of the one. In the fourth act the old man's shame is turned to pride when he is told that the flight of his surviving son was only a device to separate the three opponents, whereby the Roman was able to face them singly and to slay them one by one. Camilla hears the fatal news in silence, but when her brother returns, glorying in his victory, she breaks forth in violent imprecations against Rome, the cause of her lover's death,—whereupon her outraged brother pursues her off the stage and slays her with the sword that slew the man she loved. In the fifth act he is accused before the king; and it is his father who justifies his deed. At last the monarch pardons the murder because of the victory that went before.

The dramatic interest of "Horace" is as indisputable as that of the "Cid." Indeed, we have here the drama reduced to its essence, the stark assertion of the human will, the shock of contending passions, the collision of conflicting duties. The situation at the center of the story is very unusual, not to say most extraordinary; and this is one reason why Corneille liked it. But when once it is granted, he made no further demand upon the indulgence of the spectators; he proceeded to handle his theme with sober logic and to extract from it both pity and terror.

Corneille's characters are larger than life; they are of heroic size, all of them, men and women; and they breathe a rarer air than everyday mortals. But they are consistent with themselves and with each other; their exaltation of sentiment may seem to some of us a little too high strung, yet it is to them perfectly natural; and to the French audiences of the seventeenth century it was more than acceptable;—it was stimulating and satisfying. The Parisian playgoers thrilled with pleasure then, as they do now, when the characters vie one with another in voicing noble sentiments always perfectly phrased. For Corneille was no mere playwright, skilled in building up a plot; he was also a true poet, although very unequal; and he was a past master of versification. He could compact the expression of his emotion into a pregnant word or two; or when he preferred he could express it at length in stately and sonorous couplets, over-emphatic, at times, no doubt, but very rarely open to the reproach of pomposity. His lines have the double merit of polish and vigor.

Racine, who followed Corneille, as Euripides followed Sophocles, took over the form of tragedy which the elder poet had marked with his own image and superscription, altho the younger poet modified it in some slight measure to suit his own powers and his own preferences. Corneille had been over-lyric at times, altho he had been far less epic than many of his predecessors as a playwright; Racine was more rigorously dramatic. Accepting the limitation imposed by the rules of the Three Unities, which were in accord with his temperament, Racine condensed still further the themes he treated. He focussed the attention upon fewer figures; and he simplified again the action until English critics are wont to deem his plays bare and cold, altho in fact a fire of passion is ever glowing within them. He was an adept in construction; and his plots, narrow as they may be, are exquisitely proportioned, revealing the most consummate art in the conduct of the story. Always does he avoid scrupulously all digressions and underplots and parasitic episodes.

The extraordinary situations that Corneille had been delighted to discover in history, Racine rejected altogether, choosing rather to deal with what was normal and natural, the growth of a man's love for a woman who loved another or the consequences of a woman's mad passion for a youth who cared nothing for her. He handled like a master this common stuff of life, which is ever tragic enough in the sight of those who can understand it. In his plays, as indeed often in Corneille's also, the action is internal rather than external; and the moral debate within the heart of man is not always accompanied by mere physical action, visible to the heedless spectator. Racine did not seek to interest the audience in what his characters were doing before its eyes but rather in what these

characters were in themselves and in what they were feeling and suffering. He was an expert playwright as well as a master of psychologic analysis, and this is why he was able to accomplish the difficult feat of making his study of the inner secrets of the human soul effective on the stage. His story might be slight, but in his hands it was always sufficient to express a tensivity of emotion and to command abundant sympathy.

In the tragedy of "Andromaque" the spectator is made to see how Pyrrhus, son of Achilles, is about to abandon his promised bride, Hermione, daughter of Helen, because he is desperately enamoured of Andromache, widow of Hector. On behalf of the Grecian chiefs, Orestes, son of Agamemnon, comes to demand of Pyrrhus the sacrifice of the son of Hector and Andromache. Orestes loves Hermione, who loves the faithless Pyrrhus, who longs for Andromache, who is devoted to her husband's memory. To save her son Andromache weds Pyrrhus, resolved to slay herself as soon as the boy's safety is assured. In the agony of her jealousy, Hermione hints to Orestes that she will be his, if he will slay Pyrrhus before the wedding with Andromache. But when Pyrrhus is killed and Orestes comes to claim his reward, Hermione recoils with horror and reproaches him for his evil deed; and then she rushes forth to put an end to her own life upon the bier of the man she had loved in vain. The death-dealing blows are never given before the eyes of the spectators; and yet this artistic reticence results in no loss of interest, since the attention of the audience is directed, not to the mere doings of the characters but to the effect of these doings, first upon Hermione and then on Orestes.

His conscious possession of the power of arousing and retaining the interest of the playgoers of his own language in his minute discrimination between motive and emotions, may be one of the reasons why Racine was prone to choose a woman as the central figure in most of his plays; and here again is a point of resemblance to Euripides. He was led also to make use of love as the mainspring of his action, partly, perhaps, because the passion of man for woman had not often been considered by Corneille, and partly because this was of all the passions the one Racine himself best understood. A loving woman Racine would ever delineate with delicate appreciation and with illuminating insight. His touch was caressingly feminine; whereas the tone of Corneille was not only manly but even stalwartly masculine. Corneille, argumentative as he was at times and even declamatory, was forever striving to fortify the soul of man, while Racine with a softer suavity was seeking rather to reveal the heart of woman,—to lay it bare before us, palpitating at the very crisis of pas-

sion. As we gaze along the gallery of Racine's fascinating heroines, we observe that desire often conquers duty; but when we call the roll of Corneille's heroes, we behold men curbing their inclinations and strong to do what they ought.

Thus it may be that Racine was the nearer to nature, since it is often a strain upon the spectator to lift himself up to the level of Corneille's exaltation. Racine's language also was more familiar than Corneille's, easier, homelier, and therefore less open to the accusation of being stilted. Not only had Corneille a lyric fervor, but he was also a minter of maxims, an incomparable phrase-maker; Racine sought rather to be simple and never strove for sententiousness, which is not a feminine characteristic. On the other hand, the younger poet had a gift of pictorial evocation; and his verse had often an insinuating and serpentine grace. It was admirably adjusted to the organs of speech; it lent itself to delivery on the stage; and yet there were few purple patches in Racine's plays and scarcely a bravura passage existing for its own sake. The poetry was not something applied from the outside; it was the result rather of a perfect harmony between the sentiment and its expression. Racine's melodious verse is evidence that French is not so unpoetical a language as those have said who cannot feel its music or who dislike its nasal tone.

But even in Racine's hands the rhymed Alexandrine seems to us distended and monotonous. As a dramatic meter it is inferior to the dignified iambic of the Greeks and to our own varied blank verse; and even if rhyme is really needed in a language as unrhythmic as French, it cannot but appear artificial to those who happen to be unaccustomed to it. This impression of artificiality is deepened by Racine's enforced employment of the conventional vocabulary of gallantry to express sincere and genuine emotion. It was the misfortune of Corneille also, that he had to deal with the universal in terms of the particular; and that his plays, like Racine's, were conditioned by the sophisticated taste of the playgoers before whom they were performed. If we contrast the courtly audiences of Racine with the gathering of Athenian citizens to judge a drama of Sophocles, and with the spectators of all sorts thronging to applaud the plays of Shakspeare, we can see one reason why French tragedy lacks the depth and the sweep of the Greek, and why it has not the force and the variety of the English. French tragedy appeared, as Taine has told us, "when a noble and well-regulated monarchy, under Louis XIV., established the empire of decorum, the life of the court, the pomp and circumstance of society, and the elegant domestic phases of aristocracy"; and French tragedy could not but disappear "when the social rule of

nobles and the manners of the antechamber were abolished by the Revolution."

If the manners of the antechamber were the cause of the self-consciousness, we cannot but remark in French tragedy, on the other hand, the empire of decorum was a government under which French comedy could come to its fullest perfection. Molière, younger than Corneille and older than Racine, is greater than either, partly because of his own superior genius and partly because the racial characteristics of the French can find their fullest expression in comedy rather than in tragedy. Indeed, Molière is not only the foremost figure in all French literature, he is also one of the three great masters of the drama, worthy to be set by the side of Sophocles or Shakspeare. And it is Molière, rather than Sophocles or Shakspeare, who has supplied the model for the drama of every modern language. Even though they may not have known it, Sheridan and Beaumarchais in the eighteenth century, Augier and Ibsen in the nineteenth, Sudermann and Pinero in the twentieth, have cast their plays in the mold supplied by the author of the "*Femmes Savantes*" and of "*Tartuffe*."

Altho Molière came at the moment of maturity when the methods of the medieval theatre were modified finally in conformity with modern conditions, it was only very slowly that he attained to a complete understanding of his genius or to a recognition of its limitations. He was an actor, like Shakspeare, and the manager of a company of comedians, who had wandered for years about the provinces and who had settled themselves at last in Paris. His earliest attempts were but trifles, brisk and broad, in the manner of the Italian comedy-of-masks, mere comic imbroglios with no pretence of literature to sustain their very practical joking. Even the brilliantly written comedy of the "*Étourdi*" is as fantastic as these farces of the Italians and almost as mechanical in the ingenuity of its devices. Not until after he had established himself in Paris did he bring out the "*Précieuses Ridicules*," in which he first touched the real life of his own time. It was only a comedietta, but it was based on a solid observation of his contemporaries; and its success encouraged him to seek subjects in the society he saw about him. This is the very material that Shakspeare never cared to deal with; and Molière made it the staple of his work.

Altho his position as the manager of a company of actors led him to return frequently to the Italian formula with its easy extravagance and its liberality of laughter, Molière slowly enlarged his manner as he felt his footing firmer. He brought forth a series of comedies of steadily increasing depth; and as he became more accustomed to handling the

realities of his life, his characters were more boldly drawn, his plots were less arbitrary, and his themes took on a profounder meaning. But he was no man of letters with a purely theoretic philosophy of life; he was a practical playwright, master of all the resource of the theatre of his own time. As a schoolboy he had studied Latin comedy and he knew all that Plautus and Terence could teach. He was nourished on the succulent humor of the old French farces, with their hearty fun and pertinent sketches of character; he had spied out the secrets of the Spanish playwrights, fertile inventors of amusing situations. He had absorbed every device of the Italian comedy-of-masks with its incessant liveliness and its ingenuity of intrigue.

By years of acting as a stroller in the provinces he had taught himself how to hold the attention of the illiterate audience while he was unfolding his plot and while he was carrying on his story. By bitter experience he had learned that a play, however lofty in design or however poetic in expression, is nothing and less than nothing, if it cannot please contemporary playgoers. Timidly at first and tentatively, he began to put something more into his plays than mere amusement. He began to put a serious meaning into the comic drama. He began to use his comedies to express his own feelings and his own opinions about the structure of society and the conduct of life. He recognized that, as a comic dramatist, it was his duty, first of all, to make the spectators laugh; but he was so skilful as to be able to enlarge his manner so that he could also make them think even while they were laughing. He had an imaginative insight into the absurdities, the frailties, the petty faults, and the lesser vices of human nature. What he observed he reflected upon and related to the larger vision of life which was within him; and when he reproduced upon the stage what he had seen in the world his social satire was informed with the shrewdest common sense; and it was sustained by abundant and exuberant humor, by a power of compelling laughter unequalled among all the moderns.

It was this penetration of Molière's humor into the secrets of our common humanity, combined with his mastery of the technique of the theatre, so that there was a perfect adaption of the means to the end, which has made his comedies the perfect model of that "picture of life which is also a judgment." The humorist was a moralist, as all great humorists have been; and he had, moreover, the melancholy which is ever the accompaniment of a profound humor. His nature was really richer than Racine's and deeper than Corneille's, and his vision of life was more piercing; and, therefore, the range of his comedy was far wider than the range of their tragedy. Indeed, he exercised himself in

more different kinds of play than any other of the greater dramatists. Shakspeare is versatile with his histories and tragedies and romantic comedies and farces; but Molière is even more multifarious as he adventured himself in pure farce, the "*Médecin malgré lui*"; in comedy of intrigue, the "*Étourdi*"; in the comedy of manners, the "*École des Femmes*"; in the comedy of character, the "*Avare*"; in romantic comedy, the "*Amphitryon*"; in tragi-comedy, "*Don Garcie*"; in comedy ballet, "*Monsieur de Pourceaugnac*"; in criticism in dialogue, the "*Critique de l'École des Femmes*"; in the satiric interlude, the "*Impromptu de Versailles*"; in legendary drama, "*Don Juan*." No one has ever handled comedy in its various aspects so brilliantly and so broadly as Molière; and he has left us in the "*Femmes Savantes*," the incomparable model of pure comedy at its highest and best, while he presented us with the type of comedy sustained by philosophy in the "*Misanthrope*," of comedy stiffening into drama in "*Tartuffe*," and of comedy gently relaxing into farce in the "*Bourgeois Gentilhomme*."

No one of Molière's comedies is more characteristic than "*Tartuffe*," more liberal in its treatment of our common humanity, braver in its assault upon hypocrisy, or more masterly in its technique. And the technical problem was as difficult as the theme was daring. Bringing before us a man who uses the language of religion as a cloak for the basest self-seeking, Molière devised his situations so artfully that the spectators see through the villain's fair words, and that they know him for what he is, even before he makes his first appearance. The opening scenes deserve the high praise of Goethe; and, indeed, there is no more adroit exposition in the history of the drama. Two acts are employed to set before us the family relations of the credulous Orgon into whose confidence the unscrupulous schemer has wormed himself. We are made acquainted with Orgon's second wife, with his old mother, with his son and his daughter, and with the whole household; and it was the part of Orgon that Molière composed for his own acting.

Tartuffe does not appear until the third of the five acts; and by that time the audience is ready for him and able to see through him at once. His projects are plain even if they are somewhat contradictory,—as the plans of a villain often are. He is seeking to capture Orgon's wealth for himself, to marry Orgon's daughter, and at the same time to seduce Orgon's young wife. However he may disguise his foul purpose beneath pious phrases, the spectators are never in doubt as to his true character; and he has no need of any aside to elucidate his motives. Never does he lower the mask, as Iago does so often, or lay his soul bare in soliloquy. Once we think he has been caught and is about to be exposed; but again

he wins over Orgon by the very extravagance of his self-accusation. Once more he is led actually to betray himself, making love to Orgon's wife with Orgon concealed under the table. And then when he sees that he is found out at last, he stands forth brutally and claims the house as his under a deed of gift. Furthermore, he denounces his benefactor as implicated in a political intrigue; and Orgon finds himself in a pitiful situation with total ruin impending. At the very end of the play, when there seems to be no way out of the difficulty, Molière most artfully unties the knot by the intervention of the King, Louis XIV. himself, who is made to exert his arbitrary power to free the foolish Orgon and to send Tartuffe to prison.

As Molière had his fellowmen for his perennial study, there was never any monotony in what he presented on the stage; in theme and situation and character there was inexhaustible variety. French comedy before Molière had been excessively romantic in manner, with its plots fabricated out of adventures and accidents, and with its personages of tradition and fantasy. Molière brought comedy back to reality, and he dealt directly with life as he beheld it about him. He set upon the stage the men and women of his own time, a wonderful gallery of portraits, vital, vigorous, real, undeniable in their veracity. In this splendid series of comedies the age of Louis XIV. starts again into life, with all its decorum, its social ease, its hardness of heart; and we are permitted to visit the court and the town and to make acquaintance with the nobles and the burghers, with the physicians and the actors and the men of letters, with the lackeys and the serving maids, with the young girls and the prudes and the coquettes.

We can see Molière's wholesome sympathy with youth and love; we can note his kindness and his common sense; and we cannot help remarking his ever growing detestation of affectation and of pretence. In all his larger comedies the dominant note is sincerity, a scorching scorn for sham and humbug, a burning hatred of hypocrisy. He is honest himself and frank; his satire is never mean or malevolent; his attack is always open and direct. His hearty laughter cleared the air; and we love him for the enemies he made. Now and again, it may be admitted, his tone is hard; and it must be acknowledged further that he rarely softens into pathos. Of pathos which is generally the inseparable accompaniment of humor, Molière had as little as Aristophanes. What he had instead of pathos was melancholy,—a puissant and a searching melancholy, which strangely sustains his inexhaustible mirth and his triumphant gaiety. Sometimes while we are laughing at the sheer fun which envelopes his broader comedies, we are allowed to

catch a glimpse of his inexpressible sadness which is at the core of his humor. In his most boisterous farces we are made aware of Molière's seriousness; and in his wildest fantasies we feel the truth of his criticism of life.

Molière is superior to Corneille and to Racine in the variety of his themes, in the breadth of his philosophy, in the ingenuity of his technique; and in spite of the fact that he is a writer of comedies while they both wrote tragedies, and that he did not always use verse, he can be called a greater poet than either of them,—if we may give to the word *poet* its larger meaning. To us who speak English the rhymed Alexandrine is a rhythm too artificial and too complicated to be perfectly satisfactory in the drama; and to many of us French itself is not a poetic language. But even if the French are somewhat lacking in the energetic imagination which ought to inform tragedy, they have special qualifications for comedy. They are easily witty; they are inventively humorous; they have a sharp sense of the ridiculous; they are governed by the social instinct. It is natural enough that the greatest of comic dramatists should be a Frenchman and that we should owe to Molière the final form of comedy. Quite possible the form of comedy which Molière established in French is very like that which Menander had devised for his own use in Greece two thousand years earlier; but, however probable the suggestion may be, and however alluring, there is no proof of it available now, since the plays of Menander are lost to us forever.

Not with Menander is Molière to be measured, and not with Corneille and Racine; his place is rather with the supreme masters of the drama, with Sophocles and with Shakspeare. In pure comedy his supremacy is as indisputable as that of Shakspeare in both romantic comedy and tragedy and as that of Sophocles in tragedy alone. He may be the least of the three, perhaps, but he is the latest also. He has this one advantage over his predecessors; he is not so far distant from us as they are. The society he has depicted is more like the world we are familiar with. Above all, the theatre for which he wrote is almost the same as ours.

It was the special good fortune of Molière that he came forward as a dramatist at the very moment when the circumstances of a theatrical performance had already assumed the aspect to which we are nowadays accustomed. Whereas the plays of the great Greek dramatist were prepared to be performed outdoors, in the hollow of the hills, without either stage or scenery; and whereas the plays of the great English dramatist were intended to be produced in a theatre without a roof and on a stage without scenery, the plays of the great French dramatist were written to

be acted in a theatre properly roofed and illuminated by artificial light, and having a stage supplied with scenery. In the masterpieces of Sophocles we can see the ancient form in its most consummate perfection, strange and remote as that may seem to us today; and in the masterpieces of Shakspeare, mighty as was his genius, we cannot but perceive the disadvantage of the form he had to use, a form which was almost mediæval and which was disestablished even in England only a few years after he withdrew from active labor as a playwright. But in the masterpieces of Molière we have a form which is indisputably modern, and which is perfectly in accord with the conditions of the theatre at the beginning of the twentieth century. The plays of Sophocles and of Shakspeare cannot be shown on the stage of today without many suppressions and modifications; but the plays of Molière can be performed now anywhere without change or excision, absolutely as they were acted by their author and his comrades nearly two hundred and fifty years ago.

So far as the external form of their plays is concerned Sophocles is ancient, Shakspeare is mediæval, and Molière is modern. The large framework of his ampler comedies has supplied a model for the dramatists of every modern language. In France itself it was at once borrowed by those who followed in his footsteps,—by Regnard with his rich and riotous humor, by Marivaux with his delicate wit and his subtle studies in feminine psychology, and by Beaumarchais with his flashing satire and his ingenious stagecraft. To England it was taken over by the comic dramatists of the Restoration, Congreve and Vanbrugh, Wycherly and Farquhar; and in the eighteenth century it was utilized by Goldsmith and by Sheridan. And in the nineteenth century not only the comic drama but often the serious also has been modeled on the pattern of “Tartuffe” and the “Misanthrope.” Augier and Ibsen, Sudermann and Pinero, even tho they never thought about it, have cast the best of their plays in the mold bequeathed by Molière.

THE INFLUENCE OF FOLK-SONG UPON CLASSICAL MUSIC

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ROBERT FRANZ, one of the greatest song composers of modern times, once wrote to the author of this essay, "I believe that our Art began with the Lyric forms, and that it will end with them." In these days, when some of the musical composers are wandering far from all set forms, it is of especial interest to trace historically the truth of the first part of the above sentence, and to wonder whether the latter part will also come true. In examining the music of the past, we shall find the folk-song exerting an enormous influence in almost every epoch and in almost every direction.

The folk-song is the wild briar rose of music; springing up by the wayside of art, it comes into being without any care being lavished upon it, without the artificial aids of the science of music; it represents the natural side of an art that has gradually become scientific. The ploughman at his labor, the soldier on his march, may have been moved to express some topic that was close to the hearts of himself and his companions in poetry and song; the favorite theme speeds from mouth to mouth, perhaps somewhat amorphous at first, but gradually reaching its most fitting shape by a process of evolution; sometimes even assuming more than one shape, as for example, the Russian song, "Troika," which is sung differently in St. Petersburg and in Moscow, although there is quite enough of resemblance between the two versions to prove a single parentage.

With a popular origin, such as is indicated above, it is but natural to find history and folk-lore intertwining in this school of composition, or rather improvisation. The early ballads of England were but simple folk-songs, yet William of Malmesbury, Roger de Hoveden, and a host of old chroniclers built many a chapter upon the information derived from them, nor did all follow the example of the first named writer, and inform their readers when they were stating ascertained facts and when detailing folk-song tradition. The "Anglo-Saxon Chronicle" contains two complete old ballads and parts of about a dozen others. Even in this remote epoch, we find the folk-song growing from the ranks of the common people into a higher plane and being altered and adapted to more classic uses, and we also find men of culture trying to achieve the difficult

simplicity of the songs of the people. Aldhelm, the first abbot of Malmesbury, for example, composed what his biographer calls "trivial songs," and sang them to the people himself, that he might win their attention for his religious themes; and one of these songs, certainly worthy of being called a folk-song, was popular along the country-side for over four hundred years after its creation. The Bishop of Ossory, in the first half of the fourteenth century, made a very practical use of the folk-song, on classical lines, by setting Latin hymns to popular tunes; and the "Red Book of Ossory" contains the names of many of these ancient tunes, such as "Do, Do, Nightingale Sing Full Merry," "Good Day, my Leman Dear," etc.

The tale of King Canute improvising a song, while rowing upon the river Ely in 1017, may be apocryphal, but the fact that a song connected with the river and the monastery of Ely did exist, and was in popular favor for some centuries, may not be doubted.

But if one is to give a history of the religious uses of the folk-song, the beginning must be sought far back of the Anglo-Saxon employment of popular music. The Old Testament itself is well filled with examples of the songs of the people. The folk-songs of ancient Palestine were chiefly of three kinds,—the joyous bridal song, the cheerful harvest or vintage song, and the wailing funeral song,—and one may find many examples of each of these in the Scriptures. As they were not written out, there being no definite notation among the ancient Hebrews, we cannot hope ever to discover the actual tunes that were sung. It is, however, not impossible that the melodies have filtered down through the ages; certain it is that the three schools of singing as described above exist today in Arabia and Syria. Entire villages sometimes unite in a seven day festival of rejoicing similar to the one described in the fourteenth chapter of Judges,—the wedding of Samson.

The Song of Solomon presents an entire book of bridal songs in the popular vein. The lamentation of David over the death of Saul and Jonathan, in the second book of Samuel i., 17-27, is an example of the mourning song. It is somewhat exceptional from the fact of its being rendered by a male singer, for in the Orient the women were always the professional mourners, hired for the occasion. The men might join in the chorus of woe, but the body of the song was always executed by the women, who were not unlike the "Keeners" who have been heard in Ireland, on similar occasions, even in recent times. These mourning women are definitely mentioned in the book of Lamentations, which presents an entire set of funeral songs written in imitation of the professional lays of grief.

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In Amos, Habakkuk, and other books of the Old Testament, one finds further indication of the employment of folk-song, but the most artistic use of such songs is indicated in Isaiah, v., 1., where the prophet begins the cheerful vintage song, and then suddenly changes into the song of lamentation, the funeral lay, a contrast that must have been highly effective.

Much of dramatic action must have been united with the vocal work in the folk-songs as used by the Hebrews; in fact, when the word "dancing" occurs in the Scriptures it generally means only gesture and pantomime. If, in the light of this statement, we read the song of Moses, in Exodus xv., we can imagine Miriam using a folk-song which the Israelites had become familiar with, can fancy her improvising the words, can see the successive gestures of pride, contempt, sarcasm, and triumph, and can hear the multitude joining in the chorus at every opportunity.

This combination of action and singing becomes still more evident in the song of Deborah and Barak, in Judges v.; Herder ventures a conjecture as to the style of the performance of this musical scene; he suggests that "probably verses 1-11 were interrupted by the shouts of the populace; verses 12-17 were a picture of the battle with a naming of the leaders with praise or blame, and mimicking each one as named; verses 28-30 were mockery of the triumph of Sisera, and the last verse was given as a chorus by the whole people." That the tune must have been a familiar one there can be no manner of doubt, and the whole scene, with its extemporization, its clapping of hands to mark the rhythm, its alternation of solo and chorus, would not be very unlike the singing at some of the negro camp-meetings on the southern plantations.

Against these military folk-songs after victory, we can place the minstrel songs of early mediæval times *before* the battle. It was the custom of the minstrel of the Middle Ages to march at the head of a cohort of soldiers, singing ballads of heroism to encourage the men-at-arms, and as he sang he tossed his spear high up in the air, or twirled his sword dexterously. Out of this old custom grew the drum major of modern times, who marches at the head of a procession, twirling his long, silver-knobbed baton, and having no apparent connection with the band or the parade which he precedes.

A song of this kind was sung on English ground on an October morning in the year 1066, when Taillefer strode forth from the Norman camp, just before the battle of Hastings, and sang the old war song, the "Chanson de Roland," to the words:—

"Soldats Français chantons Roland,
De son Pays il fut la Gloire.

Le nom d'un guerrier si vaillant,
Fut le signal de la victoire."

The melody of this, a jovial and rollicking air, is still extant.

The longevity of some folk-songs and their strange metamorphoses can scarcely be exaggerated. The well known bacchanalian melody sung in England to the words of "He's a Jolly Good Fellow," and in America to "We Won't Go Home till Morning," has the most variegated history of them all. Beginning in the Holy Land as a song in praise of a French crusader who lost his life near Jerusalem, the "Chanson de Mambron" took such strong root in the Orient that the melody is sung today in some parts of Egypt and Arabia, where they mistakenly claim it to be an old Egyptian folk-tune. The "Mambron," altered by a French queen into "Malbrooke," gave rise to "Malbrooke s'en va-t-en Guerre," which folk-song was used by no less a composer than Beethoven, in an orchestral work—"The Battle of Vittoria." Crossing the channel, and afterwards the ocean, the song of the old crusader became the carol of the modern rollicker.

At about the time of the first crusade the folk-song was being used in a manner which was of the utmost importance in the evolution of the scientific side of music; it became the core around which the earliest composers wove their counterpoint; already in the twelfth century it was customary for the musician to choose some melody familiar to the people and to combine it with another melody of his own creation. The support of melody by melody (instead of by chords) constitutes counterpoint, and it is not too much to say that the earliest skilful music of this kind sprang directly from the folk-song.

The composers at this time (always excepting the Troubadours and Minnesingers) were almost all in the direct service of the Church. In the wedding of melodies as above described (too often, at first, a "*més-alliance*") they sought to accentuate their skill by using sacred words only in the parts that they added as counterpoint, preserving the original words in the folk-song that they had chosen to embellish. Thus it was not impossible to hear in the church service the tenor trolling out a love song while the other voices sang "Kyrie Eleison" or other sacred texts. In a little while certain songs became especial favorites for contrapuntal setting, and occasionally different composers would enter into direct competition by choosing the same melody as the core of their masses, each one trying to excel the other in the ingenuity of his added parts, or counterpoint.

There was one *canto fermo*, as the chief melody of counterpoint is called, that was an especial favorite with the great composers during the

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fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. This was the old folk-song entitled "L'Homme Armé." A host of composers, extending from the time of Dufay to the epoch of Carissimi, and including Palestrina, Des Pres (who wrote two masses on the theme), Busnois, Tinctor, and many others, composed masses of which the simple folk-song was the core. The origin of the old "chanson" cannot now be determined. Some imagine it to be an old Provençal folk-song, others believe that it was the original melody of the "Song of Roland" quoted above. The only fragment of its words left to us does not clear up the mystery, for they are neither Provençal nor do they make mention of Roland. They run:—

"Lome, lome, lome armé,
Et Robinet tu m'as
La mort donnée
Quand tu t'en vas."

Some two hundred masses are said to have been composed with this old folk-song for their central theme.

It must be remembered, however, that in this early musical epoch the melody was not of such supreme importance as at present, for it was given, not to the highest voice, then called discant, but to the tenor. We find an indication of this in the names given to the parts themselves. "Bass" (*basis*), meant the fundamental part, the foundation; "Alto" (*altisonus*), the high-sounding part, for it was then sung by men, and was, of course, in the highest register; "Discant" (*dis cantus*), a part derived from the melody; "Tenor" (*teneo*), the part that held the melody.

In an old part-song book the present writer once found the following verses defining the duty of the voices in the contrapuntal quartettes of the sixteenth century; he has translated them from the German:—

Ye little youths and maidens neat,
We want your voices high and sweet.
Your study to the discant bring;
The only part that you should sing.

The alto suits to nice young men
Who can sing up and down again.
This surely is the alto's way,
So study at it night and day.

The tenor has the following verse:—

In middle paths are all my arts.
The holder of the other parts.

They lean on me through all the song,
Else all the music would go wrong.

Finally the bass states :—

My station is a lower lot.
He who to middle age hath got,
And growleth like a bear so hoarse,
Why let him sing the bass of course.

Throughout the time of the Reformation this was the regular distribution of parts in choral singing; of the use of the folk-song at that time we have already spoken in these pages¹ and we need only reiterate that there was no epoch when it had greater power or exerted more influence upon the highest religious forms of music.

But even after the melody had been placed in the upper voice we still find many a folk-song in the chorals. The change of distribution of parts and the giving of the tune to the highest voice, which now changed its name from discant into soprano (from *sopra*—above) was made in 1586 by Lucas Osiander, who says, in introducing his new system :—

“I know well that hitherto composers have led the chorale in the tenor. If one does this, however, then the melody is not well recognized among the voices. Therefore I have given the melody to the discant, that it shall be easily known, and that every layman may sing along.”

Hassler gave his adhesion to the new system and other composers were not slow to follow.

The German composers followed the lead of Luther in the employment of the folk-song in the highest branches of composition. Bach, for example, in his “St. Matthew Passion Music,” made repeated use of the melody of a popular love song by Hassler. Its original title was “Mein G'müth ist mir verwirret” (“My Spirit is Distracted”) but no one feels any sense of unfitness or irreverence, when, after being enriched with noble counterpoint, it becomes “Oh, Sacred Head Now Wounded.”

Beethoven did not enter as deeply into the spirit of the folk-song as other German composers; possibly his deafness prevented his intimate acquaintance with much of the unwritten song of Austria, yet, in his “Seventh Symphony,” in the trio of the scherzo, we find an old folk-theme used, and we shall see, a little later, that even foreign folk-songs were studied by him.

(1) See article on *Music in the Church*, in *The International Monthly* for August, 1901.

The actual creation of a folk-song can rarely be ascribed to a composer; there is a difficult simplicity in such a work that is often beyond the skill of the classicist. It is, therefore, exceptional when we find Weber, Mozart, and Mendelssohn producing songs which must be classed among the folk-music of Germany. In the case of Weber, it was the fervor of a great poet, a veritable Tyrtæus, that lit the flame. It was the young Koerner, who died on the battle-field at twenty-two, who in the shadow of a premonition of his early death, wrote the poem called the "Sword Song," picturing the wedding of the warrior and his weapon. On this theme Weber produced one of the most fiery folk-songs in existence. Mozart achieved the simple directness of the people's music in some parts of his "Magic Flute," and Mendelssohn caught up the spirit of the folk-song not only of Germany but of Scotland.

Germany's folk-music extends in many directions; it is sentimental, as in "The Lorelei," it is military, as in the "Sword Song," it is bacchanalian, as in "Wohlauf noch getrunken," but probably its wildest expression is reached in the student songs, which have been the delight of the universities for years and even centuries. Even these have not been denied entrance into the classical field, for Brahms has built his "Academic Overture" upon three of them, "Wir hatten gebauet ein stattliches Haus," "Der Landesvater," and "Was kommt dort von der Höh," the latter one of the most jovial songs of the entire repertory.

Incidentally one may recall the fact that many German folk-songs have entered the American repertory of popular music; thus "O Tannenbaum" (sung in Germany to both German and Latin words) has become "Maryland, my Maryland," and, strangest metamorphosis of all, the wild student song in praise of a fiery punch, "Crambambuli," of which the following is an excerpt:—

"For pain in chest, for every ache,
My strong Crambambuli I take;
All medicines I let them be
And stick to my Crambambuli,"

has been changed, in the United States, into a song for the kindergarten, and is sung to the words:—

"Oh come, come away,
From labor now reposing,
Let busy care, awhile forbear,
Oh come, come away!"

It would be unjust to leave the topic of German folk-song without paying tribute to Friedrich Silcher (who died as recently as 1860), a man

who brought forth more successful folk-songs than any other recognized composer.

Scotland has ever been the leader in characteristic folk-music; the national character of Scottish music is so pronounced, yet so versatile, that it has exerted a greater influence upon composers than the popular music of any country. There are many reasons for this. It is very ancient and takes us back, in some of its numbers, to the most primitive scale forms; if ever we are to comprehend how the old Greek music could charm so powerfully even without the aid of harmony, it will be by a study of the old Scottish music, which may come nearer to the old Hellenic style than is suspected. The Scottish folk-music is more closely interwoven with national history than that of any other nation. It has the aid of a remarkably tender and expressive poetry. It is a music that sounds every note in the gamut of human emotion from deepest gloom to wildest merriment, from mournful dirge to rollicking Strathspey. It is not wonderful, therefore, that the composers of many different nationalities have come under its spell, that the folk-music of Scotland has exerted the greatest influence upon the classical school.

At the head of the list we find Beethoven gladly undertaking the arrangement of a whole series of folk-songs for a Scottish publisher,—Thomson, of Edinburg. Beethoven, we may add, also used a Russian folk-song in one of his string quartettes. We find Schumann and Robert Franz endeavoring, though vainly, to achieve the Scottish lilt in themes taken from Burns and others, and made into German "Lieder." We find the Swiss composer, Niedermayer, and the Frenchman, Boieldieu, using Scottish themes in their operas. We find the German, Volkmann, making both a national and a chronological error by introducing the melody of "The Campbells are Comin'" in his overture, "Richard III.," in the final battle-scene,—a Scot's tune composed in 1568, in an English battle fought in 1485!

The modern German composer, Max Bruch, has come most thoroughly under the Scottish influence. He once assured the present writer that he knew by heart some four hundred Scottish folk-songs! Not only has he written a Scottish fantasie for violin and orchestra but his "Fair Ellen," a cantata founded upon the relief of Lucknow by the Scottish regiments during the Sepoy Mutiny, introduces a wonderful development of the tune of "The Campbells are Comin'."

It must be confessed, however, that not one of the above cited instances of attempts of foreign composers to employ the Scottish song has proved thoroughly Gælic in spirit. To one German composer only was it given successfully to imitate the Scottish muse; Mendelssohn in

his "Scotch Symphony," especially in the lilting scherzo, has actually created a Scottish theme, and we fancy that many a Scotsman would accept the tender duet, "Oh, Wert Thou in the Cauld Blast," as a true example of his own native music.

The Irish and Welsh folk-songs have not yet come into their just inheritance in classical music, although Dr. Villiers Stanford has used some Celtic themes (notably "The Red Fox") in his "Irish Symphony," and F. H. Cowen has made some employment of Welsh tunes in his "Welsh Symphony."

Music is often the child of sorrow, national or individual, and it is but natural to find, among the more oppressed of civilized races, a folk-music of especial emotional power. This is emphatically the case with the music of the Bohemians, Russians, Poles, and Hungarians, and, when these mines are more thoroughly explored by the classical composers of the world, much virgin gold will be discovered to be worked into musical jewels by the skilled artificer. The older Bohemian music is almost obliterated, for the unhappy nation was scourged into silence by thirty years of war, and almost all of its songs succeed that dreadful epoch. Yet there are some startling exceptions. There exists, for example, a folk-song with the following words:—

"Glare of the flames was all around ;
Under the tree the maid was bound.
Soon did the fire around her glow,
Sadly and sore our tears did flow.

"Wildly the youths did all bemoan
As the flame claimed her for his own.
One only stood with air severe ;
Only that false one shed no tear."

This song evidently dates back to the old pagan times when Cernebog was worshiped by the Slavonic race with a human burnt offering, generally a youth or maiden.

Only in recent times did the renaissance of Bohemian music take place; it was Smetana who first wrote in classical forms founded upon the folk-songs of his country. The music of this composer is intensely national, and shows what a wealth of expression lies in the melody of his native land. A cycle of six symphonic poems bearing the expressive title "Ma Vlast" ("My Country"), are models of the use of folk-melodies in the higher forms of instrumental composition, and are often heard in European and American concert rooms today. The composer died insane May 12, 1884.

Fortunately he had a pupil whom he imbued with his own love of national music, and Antonin Dvořák, although not so intense as his preceptor and friend, has carried the banner of Bohemian music over all the world.

The Hungarian music has its roots in the songs of the Gipsies. Weird and strange musicians are these wandering sons of the muse. In Buda-Pesth the present writer has often heard a band of Gipsy musicians, most of them with stringed instruments, giving fully harmonized music without a scrap of notation to guide them, improvising the orchestral settings as they played them, but always having as their theme some national melody familiar to them all, and to most of their audience. The leader, standing a little apart, would begin a sorrowful strain, built upon a minor scale which may be represented by the following notes: C, D, E flat, F sharp, G, A flat, B, and C. Deeper and deeper would grow the gloom enshrouding the melody and the harmonies which the band wreathed around it. If ever heart-break was pictured in tones it could be found here. This was the "Lassan." It grew slower and slower and finally came to a pause, not a complete ending. Now the leader suddenly seemed transformed; he drew himself up with resolute air and sent forth a bold and fiery theme. This was but the beginning of the "Friska." Like a set of dancing dervishes, the Gipsies seemed to grow frenzied over their own music, and quicker and quicker went the whirl of the theme until it ended in wild delirium. Exactly this contrast of folk-themes is employed by the Magyar master, Franz Liszt, in his "Hungarian Rhapsodies," which are now known all over the civilized world,—a notable instance of the skilful composer using the folk-song, his own native heritage, in an advanced orchestral guise.

What Liszt did for Hungary, Chopin did for Poland, and the contrasted frenzy of the Slav's gayety and gloom of despair, is heard in the nocturnes, the polonaises, and the ballads of this prince of the piano. The strong contrasts of Slavonic or Czech music lend themselves admirably to the forms of the modern concert room.

It must be remembered that hand in hand with the folk-songs of a musical nation are the dances of the people. It is impossible to exaggerate the influence of these upon classical music, for not only have they entered freely into orchestral and even symphonic works, but they have in some degree influenced the very shape of suite and symphony, so that it is no exaggeration to say that dancing is the mother of musical form. In the thirteenth century the Troubadours and Minnesingers obtained the two chief elements of musical form, symmetry and contrast, by uniting the quick dance of the peasantry with the slow dance of the aristocracy,

ending as they had begun with the more rapid movement. The earliest suites and partitas were evolved (about A. D. 1600) by placing several dances in contrast with each other.

In modern times we find all composers keenly sensitive to the effect produced by folk-dances; Beethoven introduces the hop-waltz into his "Sixth Symphony," Brahms enriches an entire series of Hungarian dances with noble harmonies, Liszt freely employs the czardas, a species of Hungarian jig, in some of his most effective passages.

In Norway there exists an acrobatic dance for men, which is executed in a barn to the accompaniment of one or two fiddles. In this dance the participants try to kick the beams and rafters overhead, and the leaping, straining, shouting, and general excitement are something never to be forgotten by those who have once witnessed it. This is the "Halling," and one cannot fail to identify its robust two-four rhythm in more than one classical work by Grieg. Russia affords a similar dance, called the "Kamarinskaia," which Tschaikowsky has freely introduced even in his symphonies.

When the name of Russia is mentioned, the investigator of folk-song may well pause, astonished at the vast extent of the repertory spread out before him. Russia is a world in itself, and the same may be said of its folk-music. Yet the wonderful mine has scarcely been opened even by Russian composers. Glinka, who died in 1857, may be called the pioneer of Russian national music, and in his operas he freely introduced the folk-music of his country. The last half of the nineteenth century, however, saw the constant striving of a new school of composers to build up a repertory of advanced music upon the foundation of the folk-music of Russia. "Para Domoï" ("Let us get Home," i. e., let us be our natural selves) has been the watchword of the neo-Russian school of composers in freeing themselves from German musical influences, and they decline to accept Rubinstein as representative, and even denounce Tschaikowsky as too cosmopolitan, because both are tinged with the Teutonic musical culture.

The surface of Russian folk-music has scarcely been scratched as yet; the songs of the Cossacks have not been collected, the repertory of Little Russia has not been printed and classified, and the published list will probably receive accessions from many quarters for years to come. If the statement that the complex musical forms are built upon the simpler, the classical upon the popular, means anything, the future of musical Russia, with such a fund to draw upon, must be very bright, and it is not too much to predict that the Muscovite may yet wrest the sceptre of musical supremacy from the German.

In conclusion one may ask where America stands in the field of folk-song and its development. Like Russia, our country is a world in itself, but many of its sections are necessarily destitute of true folk-music because commercial prosperity, by effacing original types of character and of life, by introducing a conventional mode of existence, tends to obliterate the folk-song. The banking house, the flour mill, the cloth factory, cannot inspire music. Yet in our country one can find some phases of existence that have brought forth popular music. The plantation life of the South, for example, is romantic enough to give rise to expressive music, and has done so. There is a large repertory of the negro music which has not yet been collected, and is well worthy of preservation.

One may ask if this is not rather African than American music, but the response would be that the negro could not have brought forth this music save for his life upon the southern plantation; it is the product of American life and surroundings.

There exist, also, some beautiful folk-songs founded upon this phase of existence, yet composed in the North by a Pennsylvanian. America should ever be grateful to Stephen C. Foster for creating a series of folk-songs as typical, as expressive, as beautiful as any in the world. His southern descent may have caused him to vibrate in sympathy with the southern life which he has portrayed as justly as it has been done in the repertory of the plantation itself.

Few Americans have as yet used this material; no composer of eminence has hitherto employed Foster's themes in symphony or sonata; yet Mr. G. W. Chadwick has effectively developed some distinctly American themes in two of his symphonies, being the first eminent composer to elevate our folk-song into the symphonic domain; and the Bohemian, Dvořák, knowing well how much depends on nationality in music, taught our native composers a lesson, during his short sojourn in America, by using plantation themes in both symphony and in classical chamber music.

The Indian music of America, the aboriginal music of the country, has received more attention from the scientific investigator than from the composer. Jesse Walter Fewkes, John Comfort Fillmore, Theodore Baker, Alice Fletcher, Frank H. Cushing, Henry E. Krehbiel, and a number of others have arranged, classified, and transcribed the Indian songs and chants, but only one prominent composer has founded a musical work upon the unpromising material; E. A. MacDowell has written an "Indian Suite" of much merit, for orchestra, that not only portrays several phases of Indian life, but is largely founded on aboriginal themes.

It would be impossible to give an adequate idea of Indian music in a single essay. It is the music, not of a nation, but of many different nations. Some of the tribes were quite unmusical, others achieved a reasonably good musical system and interesting and sometimes impressive melodies. Scarcely any of the melodies were known over any wide domain of territory; they were rather local themes without sufficiently unified characteristics to constitute a "school."

Another barrier to the use of this music in classical composition lies in the fact that much of it is intoned in a scale which cannot be accurately represented upon our keyed instruments or exactly conveyed by our notation. Probably the most scientific investigator of the topic of Indian music has been Dr. J. Walter Fewkes, and he has dwelt strongly upon the deflections of some of the aboriginal scales from our recognized musical intervals.

The Moquis, Zuñis, Omahas, and Ojibways, have a fairly large repertoire of songs; the Apaches, Comanches, and Iroquois have much less music and all of it of a more primitive character. Dancing (not merely gyrations, but pantomime, dramatic action, and vigorous gesture) very frequently forms an adjunct of the music. It is possible that some of these war dances, snake dances, or ghost dances may yet be used in concert selections, but the music would be unfamiliar to American ears; the Russian, the Scot, the Welshman, the Bohemian, the Irishman, each is at home in his own folk-music; the American would not recognize the Indian tunes of his own country; they would come to him as a strange, a foreign product.

The above facts are sufficient to show that even if our composers avail themselves of the Indian musical material, it cannot become a national music as the folk-music of European countries has often done; it is an exotic even in the land which gave it birth.

It is possible that a newer school of folk-music may yet arise in the United States out of the free and unrestrained ranch life of the West. There is much in such an existence to inspire music, but as yet this life has not been shared by a music-producing race. It may be that in the future the descendants of the miners, the cowboys, the farmers of this section of our country, will create a music that shall reflect the bold and untrammelled life of the West, and add it to our scant repertory. And it is not too much to hope that out of our own typical music there shall eventually grow a great symphony and a school of advanced composition that shall be known as definitely American.

THE "PARTITION" OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

EMIL REICH

LONDON.

IN the last two years an increasing number of statesmen, politicians, journalists, and publicists, have openly declared their belief that the old monarchy of the Hapsburgs was on the eve of dismemberment and partition. In writings, ranging from articles in newspapers to elaborate works of over four hundred pages¹ that gloomy view has been maintained in England, France, Germany, and in Austria-Hungary itself. In Germany there is to the minds of most people of that bookish race scarcely a doubt about the collapse of the Danubian Dual Monarchy in the near future. They take it almost for granted that the German speaking Austrians are soliciting absorption by the Germans; and likewise, that the Slavs of Austria, being "an inferior race," may be left out of consideration altogether. The only rider the Germans condescend to admit is this,—that they will allow Austria-Hungary to stand as it is so long as Francis Joseph, its present ruler, is alive. No sooner will that monarch close his eyes, than the Pan-Germanists will appropriate his vast empire, or at any rate its Austrian section, and so realize the dream of German imperialists to extend Germany from the North Sea to the Adriatic.

If such ideas were held by some irrepressible Teutonic only, or even by some Austrians who, *more patrio*, suffer from the pessimism of weakly idlers, it would scarcely be worth any one's while to treat the question seriously. However, such views are now all but general, and their effect on the minds and politics of nations may be very serious. Austria-Hungary is still the second largest state in Europe (Sweden and Norway, although somewhat larger than Austria-Hungary, consisting of fifty-four per cent unproductive land), and from its central situation is one of the most vital organs of the European balance of power. If Austria-Hungary should be partitioned up,—as was Poland, in the latter half of the eighteenth century,—the whole policy of Europe would undergo convulsions so terrific as to be comparable only to the events of the French Revolution; and since the United States cannot at present afford to strike an attitude of indifference to profound alterations in the politics of Europe, the collapse and partition of Austria-Hungary would literally be an international event of the gravest calibre.

(1) Such as André Chéradame, *L'Europe et la question d'Autriche*, Paris, Plon-Nourrit, 1901, pp. 452, and numerous maps.

It is here intended to show that there is, in spite of strong appearances to the contrary, no serious reason to apprehend the near ruin or dismemberment of the Hapsburg Monarchy. Far from threatening ruin, the violent commotions and seeming anarchy in Austria, in and out of parliament, are only the first beginnings of a public national life, such as has not been vouchsafed hitherto to the races of Austria. Politics, as Americans well know, is at once the noblest aim and the vilest occupation. At all times it has largely been a game of tricks and feints; a plotting of men unscrupulous and violent; a machinery kept in smooth motion by the oil of lies, and the blood of victimized dupes. Yet at all times it has worked, directly and still more indirectly, for the good and the great qualities of man. So entirely true is this, that Austrian patriots, far from sickening at the turbulent or uncouth scenes in the Vienna Reichsrath or Imperial Diet, ought rather to be indignant at the academical tameness of most of those "scenes." At the risk of appearing to ride paradoxes, we submit that all history teaches us that wholesale reforms of a state organism, such as are contemplated by the German speaking and Slav speaking races of Austria, cannot be settled by mere screaming in ungentlemanly fashion, or by the free flinging of inkstands at the heads of opponents. More is needed, and it is rather for the lack of more violent measures than as a consequence of what has so far happened in Austria, that the Austrian peoples have as yet altered nothing but the puny stock of their political vituperatives. Neither in England, in France, nor in the United States, have great political reforms ever been carried out without movements infinitely less dilettante than are the brawlings of Austrian leaders in politics. It will scarcely be credited in America, that there is, to the present day, no weekly or monthly review in Austria in which, as is the habit in all truly political countries, important political questions are discussed at length and elaborately. Of all countries Austria is most "paper" ridden, but the papers are all dailies, or otherwise merely abstract, theoretic publications. Austria is not Germany. In Germany, it is true, political initiative ever came from above, as Bismarck once remarked. Germany counts no such two nations as are the Bohemians and Poles in Austria, who form an integral and very large portion of the entire Austrian population, and who still retain the memories of their political greatness in the past. In Germany, the people as such have had no *political* greatness of their own before the present time. They are getting it now; they never had it before. In Austria-Hungary it is quite different. There the Magyars have conserved their secular political power, and the Poles and Bohemians can and never will give up the hope of regaining theirs. In Austria, therefore, there must

be political life starting from below, not from above. In Germany, the monarch may be, and as a matter of fact is, the prime mover of national politics. In Austria, the monarch can be only the ideal centre of gravity determined by the differently leaded and weighted political components of his people. What Austria suffers from is, therefore, a lack of true, if violently agitated, political life, and not from an excess of such a life. So far, however, as the late disturbances in Austria do indicate an approach to intense political activity of the nation, it is, we repeat, not a sign of decadence, but of greater ripeness, of growth. A few considerations will bear out this statement to the full.

II.

As in all great questions of politics, so in the case of Austria-Hungary, he alone can hope to grasp the causes and drift of events who comprehends best the country's history. And in order to reduce this preliminary historical sketch to its smallest dimensions, and to place it in the clearest possible light, a comparison of the growth of the Austrian with the Prussian monarchy may be here premised. Both began as small powers, the Austrian in the tenth, the Prussian or rather Brandenbourgian in the thirteenth century. Both acquired straggling "enclaves" or outlying districts that prevented any convenient rounding-off of their integral territory. The Austrian archdukes, however, soon (in the thirteenth century) acquired the imperial crown, and so cherished ambitions far beyond those of the Brandenbourg electors. In 1525 the Austrian territory was, if intersected, broken, and not continuous, at least inhabited by peoples who were almost entirely of the same nationality, that is, German speaking people,—South Germans. So were, on the whole, the inhabitants of the Brandenbourg territories of that time. In the next year, however,—in 1526,—a most important change came over the complexion of the Austrian population. In that year both the crown of Bohemia, with its dependencies (Moravia and Silesia) and the crown of Hungary, with its dependencies (Transylvania, Croatia, Slavonia, etc.,) came to be peaceably acquired by Ferdinand I., Archduke of Austria, brother to Emperor Charles V. In the kingdom of Bohemia as well as in that of Hungary, there were German speaking people indeed, but in Bohemia proper and in Hungary, especially there is a very small minority. So while Prussia continued to be homogeneous in her population, Austria since 1526 had implanted in her organism two foreign bodies that by old historic and insuperable antagonisms, could not assimilate themselves with the original people of Austria. In the eighteenth century, Frederick the Great of

Prussia added, by a ruthless and successful war, the large Austrian province of Silesia and also East Frisia to the old Prussian stock, both finally acquired in 1745. Through those additions Frederick gave his realm the size of a great power without introducing a foreign and antagonistic people into his German body politic. For the same reason Austria, by losing German Silesia to Frederick, still more reduced the number of her German, and so naturally increased the proportion of her non-German, population. The then ruler in Austria, Maria Theresa, the greatest that country has ever had, rightly considered the loss of German Silesia a fatal blow to the inner balance in her empire, and for that most legitimate reason she never rested until she had by endless negotiations concluded vast alliances, chiefly with Russia and France, against Prussia. The result was the famous Seven Years' War (1756-1763), in which she defeated Frederick's armies as often and as signally as he did hers; in which Frederick's lands were terribly devastated, while Austria, except Bohemia and part of Moravia had not to suffer from any *soldateska*. Yet the war ended in a *statu quo*, that is, in failure. In 1763, therefore, Prussia was still a great and homogeneous power, at any rate in her population; Austria, on the other hand, although not very sensibly reduced in territory, lost such a number of German subjects as to give to her non-German elements a position of numerical preponderance which was very likely to develop into political ascendancy.

Only nine years after the termination of the Seven Years' War, Russia, Prussia, and Austria found means to complete the first partition of Poland, by which Frederick the Great did indeed add a considerable non-German population to his German subjects, but not in a measure to threaten the healthy homogeneity of his people. Austria, on the other hand, both in 1772 and in 1775 added, through the partition of Poland and by a treaty of cession with Turkey, a huge Polish-Ruthenian territory together with the likewise non-German people of the Bukovina, to her already very heterogeneous population. From that time onward Austria constantly added new peoples, but invariably non-German nations; so in the third partition of Poland, 1795; in 1814-15 (Italians); in 1846 (the Polish republic of Cracow); in 1878 (the Slav-Bosnians and Herzegovinians). Against all these vast acquisitions, partly lost in 1860 and 1866 (the Lombard districts), we find as a German offset only the "Innviertel" a small strip of German settlement along the lower Inn River, acquired by Austria in 1779. Prussia, on the other hand, had the strange luck to win by the loss (in 1815) of most of her Polish acquisitions, in that she had thenceforth a population still more homogeneous than before; and when, in 1866, she added huge tracts to her realm (over one thous-

and, three hundred German square miles with over four and a half million people), the addition consisted exclusively of Germans proper. So that by 1871 Prussia was a great power both by the extent and wealth of her territory, and a national power by the national unity of her population. In America,—where the assimilative power of the Anglo-American element has long proved of such intensity as to make a “Yankee” of any immigrant whatever within an astonishingly short period,—in America one does not quite realize the tenacity with which people in Europe will cling to their nationality; nor from the American standpoint, can it be easily understood what an immense leverage is possessed in Europe by a state consisting of one homogeneous nationality.

It will thus be clear that Austria has, for nearly four centuries, constantly gravitated towards the conglomeration of divergent, disunited, and antagonistic nationalities, and that the empire could not, therefore, terminate in a state after the model of Prussia.

One more consideration will give us the final clue to the situation in Austria.

The strange medley of unassimilated peoples forming the great Danubian Empire had, as that similarly constituted polity, the Byzantine Empire in the Middle Ages, its centre of gravity outside rather than inside its boundaries. In view of the constant friction and increasing conflicts at home, nothing short of pressure from abroad was able to give the Austrian Empire a show of consistency. Foreign policy was to the Hapsburgs of far greater importance than home policy. They were bound to keep up the pressure from the outside as at home they were necessarily subservient to the Catholic Church, the one homogeneous institution in their monarchy. Now it so happened that that pressure from the outside was freely furnished to the Hapsburgs from 1618 to 1815. By a series of immense wars lasting almost without any interruption excepting two or three short periods (1718-1733, 1748-1756, and 1763-1779), the Hapsburgs were involved in gigantic international wars, carrying their not inglorious arms from the Tagus to the mouth of the Danube, and from the Skaw in northernmost Denmark to the lovely cliffs of Sicily. In the wars against the French Revolution they bore the brunt of the formidable French armies from 1792 to 1805 in hundreds of battles and engagements; and when this epic period of Napoleon was terminated, Austria's chief minister, Prince Metternich, was universally held to be Europe's most influential statesman for at least twenty-five years, till 1840.

Under the stress of those European struggles the discordant elements of Austria were easily held in check by the iron necessity of defending their dynasty lest foreign conquerors should reduce them to a status still

poorer than what they were vouchsafed under the Hapsburgs. When, however, pressure from abroad ceased, when, in the forties of the last century there was nothing to be dreaded from either France or Prussia, the long pent up discords and inner tensions very soon broke out into the great revolution of 1848, an upheaval that went like an earthquake through the whole of the vast empire of Austria. The Hapsburgs, by the aid of Russia, were still able to quell that first great revolution. After 1866, however, when Austria had been finally ousted from Italy and worsted in battle by France in 1859, and Prussia in 1866, so that Austria could no longer think of undertaking its former huge military enterprises abroad; after 1866, the latent conflicts at home, so long repressed by pressure from the outside, at once showed in a series of ominous "problems" of nationality. The Hungarians under the ablest statesman, Francis Deák, soon convinced the Austrian government that nothing short of dualism would satisfy the dominant race in the eastern portion of the empire. Nor was Francis Joseph I., then a ripe man of thirty-seven years in 1867, slow to see the justice and force of the Magyar proposal. Accordingly, Deák and Count Beust framed that peculiar, in a way novel, relation between the Austrian and the Magyar half of the empire, which has always been the political good of Hungary, and which, if properly constructed, is the only possible solution of the secular "problem" of Hungary *versus* Austria.

Since that time Hungary, having regained her absolute internal independence on a basis of exclusively Magyar self-government, has made rigid strides towards a material prosperity and political consolidation that renders her one of the most promising states of Europe. In fact, it may be stated without any exaggeration that no modern state has, in the last forty years, outstripped its neighbors in point of profound alterations and improvements both economic, educational, and political, as has Hungary. In territory larger than Austria, in population somewhat smaller, Hungary has had, so far, to suffer from no serious internal disruptions. The various nationalities in Hungary, Rumanians, Servians, Slovacks, Ruthenians, etc., have caused the Hungarian government no serious trouble. This is owing chiefly to the remarkable ethical attraction and assimilative power of the Magyars, who have only two rivals in the power of winning sympathy,—the French and the Yankees. For the purposes, then, of the present article, Hungary's home affairs may very well be left out of consideration. Hungary is now the steady, well ordered, and united portion of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The most troublesome, if not tragic, problems of that empire are to be found in the Cisleithan or Austrian half; in that half which, strange to say, has no legal name other than "The

countries represented in the Reichsrath or Diet," ' the name *Austria* having no legal recognition whatever. There is an Austria-Hungary; there is a Hungary; there is, legally, no Austria.

Let us now inquire into the Cisleithan or Austrian half of the Danubian Monarchy.

III.

It would be impossible and, for our purposes, it is practically unnecessary to give here a sketch of the internal history of Austria since the beginning of the constitutional period, that is, since 1867. The conflicts between the various German, Cech, Polish, Croatian, Slovenian, and Italian nationalities in Austria have given rise to innumerable local brawls, provincial uproars, newspaper controversies, and parliamentary affrays of the most embittered kind. Ministry after ministry tried in vain to grapple with the problem of reconciling the demands of those different nationalities. Nor were the nationalities themselves able to group or weld their constituents into solid and powerful political parties. To the change of ministries corresponded an almost kaleidoscopic shifting of parties; and nothing will give the reader a better and quicker insight into the anarchic condition of Austrian political life than a conspectus of the present party system of the non-Magyar half of the Dual Monarchy, together with the state of those parties in 1897.

STATE OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN AUSTRIA PROPER.

(A) German Liberals	1897.	1902.
1 Constitutional Landed Proprietors	28	28
2 German Radicals	49	41
3 German Popular Party	42	51
4 Schoenerer Group	5	21
5 Kronawetter (democr.)	1	
6 Democrats	1	
Total,	126	141
(B) 7 Social Democrats	14	10
(C) German Conservatives		
8 German Clericals	30	37
9 Catholic Popular Party	15	
10 Christian Socialists	28	23
Total,	73	60
(D) 11 Federalist Great Proprietors . .	16	16

(1) *Die im Reichsrath vertretenen Laender.*

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

(E) Cechs	1897.	1902.
12 Young Cechs	60	53
13 Radical Young Cechs	1	4
14 Clerical Cechs	1	2
15 Agrarian Cechs	1	6
Total,	63	65
(F) Poles		
16 Polish Club	59	60
17 Stoyalovski Group	6	
18 Popular Polish Party	3	11
Total,	68	71
(G) Slovenians		
19 Clerical Slovenians	11	16
20 Radical Slovenians	5	
Total,	16	16
(H) Italians		
21 Liberal Italians	14	19
22 Clerical Italians	5	
Total,	19	19
(I) 23 Croatians	11	9
(J) 24 Serbs	2	9
(K) Ruthenians		
25 Ruthenians	6	11
26 Young Ruthenians	5	
Total,	11	11
(L) Rumanians		
27 Rumanians	5	5
28 Young Rumanians	1	
Total,	6	5
12 national groups, 28 parties.	Total, 425	425

This is bewildering enough. When one adds to this the external picture of the Austrian parliament, a statement of its internal skein of tendencies and programmes (platforms), one cannot help feeling that Austrian home politics is chaotic beyond any possible remedy. One

group, number four, wants to merge Austria into the German Empire; another set of groups, the clerical (numbers eight, ten, fourteen, nineteen, twenty-two), wants to reintroduce the concordate, or clericalization of schools, parishes, and church life. Another set of groups, again, desperately claims absolute national autonomy on lines determined by old, historical demarcations of territory. The Poles, more united than the rest, have already obtained what is practical autonomy and national self-government in Galicia. The Cechs or Bohemians, together with the Moravians, claim the same territorial autonomy in what was in older times the Bohemian kingdom. These claims are intersected, honeycombed, and gerrymandered by claims and counterclaims socialistic, democratic, anti-Semitic, economic, and chiefly and principally linguistic.

Austria is one of the great polyglot countries of the world. Relatively few persons can speak only one language, and many, very many, Austrians can speak, with equal ease two, three, or four of the languages used by the peoples of Austria. Under these conditions one might expect that rabid insistence on the public use of one certain idiom only would be the last thing that Austrians would trouble about. Yet the fact is, that nowhere has the claim to the public use of a given national idiom been put forward with greater emphasis, nay even fanaticism, than in Austria. The Cechs want their language to be paramount in the kingdom of Bohemia; the Germans demand that theirs shall be; the Slovenes, again, claim linguistic superiority in parts of Styria and Carniola; and the Italians and Poles insist on the sole use of their beautiful idioms in the Italian and Polish provinces. Language has of late become the most debated, most hotly contested political issue of Austria. Nor can it be denied that language in Europe, and more particularly in Austria, is so intimately bound up with nationality that to give up one is to surrender the other. When Minister Badeni, in May, 1897, made his famous "language ordinance" giving the Cech language a virtual preference to German in the ancient kingdom of Bohemia, he threw thereby all the parties into such hopeless confusion that parliamentary life came to a complete standstill, and the emergency paragraph of the Austrian constitution, paragraph fourteen, had to introduce temporarily what was practically absolutism.

The acerbity and chaotic nature of Austrian party strife is fitly illustrated by a view of the leading politicians. One of the most powerful of the German reactionary party is Lueger, Burgomaster of Vienna, in his way the counterpart of Mr. Chamberlain in England. A powerful orator, an unscrupulous agitator, an exceedingly clever parliamentary hand, Lueger has made himself a power in Austria for a long time past

without having in reality any serious or efficient plan whatever for the reconstruction of the public life. Schoenerer, the head of the ultra-German party and also an anti-Semite *ad lib.*, is devoid of any constructive political power. Mr. Wolf, who up till recently was the spokesman of the Germans in Bohemia, is a political Cyrano de Bergerac run wild, while Prince Aloys von Lichtenstein, the leader of the Christian Socialists is a dilettante dynamiter carrying his bombs in the leaves of unctious tracts. It is quite evident that men of that stamp, men more boisterous than efficient, men whose chief equipment for politics is in the vigorous muscles of their lungs or arms, can in the end contribute very little to an abiding solution of the Austrian problem. On the other hand, it would be, we take it, quite unhistorical and unjust in the extreme, to deny those men a very substantial amount of merit in the political resuscitation of Austria. Lueger has infinitely more verbiage than insight; yet his is the merit of having roused Vienna from her secular slumber in the arms of those sirens of graceful Sloth and artistic Pleasure that have, no doubt, added very much to the charms of life at Vienna, to the growth of Viennese art, and to the fame of the Vienna *cuisine*, but that have, at the same time, benumbed all virile forces of Austrian manhood, and made of them, in spite of the gigantic military enterprises of their rulers, the effeminate Phæacians of Europe. Drastic drugs were needed for the Austrians to bring them to a sense of their political dignity, and as Wilkes in oligarchical England of the eighteenth century, so Lueger in Austria, together with his no less grotesque contemporaries above mentioned, were the necessary antecedent to a really business-like public life in Cisleithania.

By this time, however, their preparatory work is done, and for more than that they are unfit. Now, after thirty years' ugly tuning of the instruments, the real overture ought to commence. The leading ideas of the political regeneration of Austria cannot appear quite impossible of discovery to him who has followed Austrian history with due care. A comprehension of those ideas will also enable us to dispose, once for ever, of the scurrilous idea of a near partition of Austria.

IV.

States like private individuals end in failure chiefly when they misread their real vocation, or, in other words, when they get themselves into a false position. *Non possumus omnes omnia*. One state can freely expand into a national state proper, although, as is the case with the United States, it is composed of the most heterogeneous nations. Another state

easily, because naturally, consolidates itself as a territorial state, or a confederation, or a city state, or a strange medley of various forms of state. In Austria-Hungary a national state is possible only in Hungary; it is impossible in Austria proper. Nor can the Austria-Hungarian Empire, although larger than Germany, constitute a confederacy after the German model. For the past, that integral portion of all present, is against it. It is, therefore, quite within reason that the Danubian Empire is destined to form a state of its own, a state *sui generis*; and it is from misreading that peculiar nature of the body politic on the middle Danube, from reading it in the light of states constructed on a totally different pattern, influenced by entirely different circumstances, that the problem of Austria has been judged in a hopelessly inadequate manner.

For reasons, a discussion of which is alien to the present occasion, the Austrian rulers have ever been unable to unify the various peoples of their realm in one common bond of nationality. The Cechs are, in point of national consciousness, where they were in 1620 when Tilly, the general of the Hapsburgs, defeated them on the White Mountain, near Prague. So since 1772 are the Poles, the Slovenes, and the Austrian-Italians. Each of these nations has long had its provincial diet or Landtag. The question then arises: Is the structure and drift of the Austrian body politic such as to admit of a parliament like that of England; or is it more adapted to the peculiar nature of Austria to give her common or central parliament (Reichsrath) powers considerably smaller, or at any rate less numerous than those possessed by parliaments of truly national states? Shall questions affecting the weal of single provinces be settled in the diets rather than in the imperial parliament? In short, shall the sphere of action of the diet be enhanced?

Undoubtedly, the imperial parliament in Austria cannot, in the nature of things, be more than the British parliament is with regard to the legislatures of the British colonies. Any attempt to endow the Austrian Reichsrath with powers such as are possessed by the parliament of France, or even with such as are vested in the Reichstag of Germany, would only tend—as it has tended so far—to a perpetuation of anarchy. The state of Austria, as against the various diets of that realm, can never be more than a political machinery for the amelioration of the legal, economic, and educational wants of its people. It is, as we have long ago suggested, a Sachstaat, or a state meant to do technical business rather than political, as far as Austria's home affairs are concerned. The language question, together with all similar questions of a purely nationalist character, must be left to the diets, and eventually to that peculiar supreme court in matters administrative which in Austria is termed Reichs-

gericht, and a complete analogy of which does not exist in any country except in America, where its rôle is played by the Supreme Court of the United States. As soon as national or questions of home politics proper are submitted to the imperial parliament at Vienna, as they have been hitherto, they must necessarily turn abortive and worse. Already Prime Minister Taaffe has said, that all that he could do was "unpolitical politics"; and the present Körber ministry in Austria is a ministry of technical experts rather than a political cabinet. So it ought to be. In home matters the real centre of gravity is not in Vienna; it is in Prague, in Lemberg, in Gratz, in Laibach, etc.; Austria, as *one* state can be in home affairs no more than an institute, an *Anstalt*, and not a real political organism. Austria as an organic cluster of old, historic individualities, on the other hand, can very well have a political, if decentralized life in its various provinces. To try and electrify a mere institute into an organism by blotting out the life of the diets, must necessarily end in fiasco, and it has thus far.

It is quite different with the foreign policy of Austria. At the present moment, neither the Austrian Reichsrath nor the Hungarian parliament as such have any appreciable influence on the trend of Austrian foreign policy. For that purpose there is a committee of both parliaments, called the Delegations, meeting rarely and for a very short time only, that are entrusted with distinctly academic powers and they formally pass upon the foreign policy of the Dual Monarchy. Now it is evident that where a highstrung people is debarred from having a hand in the foreign policy of their country, while being given free scope in handling their home affairs, they will inevitably spend too much of their energy on the latter and so abuse their powers. If foreign policy were, as it ought to be, amenable to discussion in the two parliaments of Austria and Hungary, it would naturally act as a solvent, in the first place on the formation and grouping of the parties, and thus on a healthier parliamentary life. If one remembers how infinitely important foreign policy is, especially to Austria-Hungary, one cannot but be amazed that the peoples of that empire have not insisted more seriously on being given an ampler share in the discussion of questions so vital to them. Foreign policy is, and has always been, the political axis of Austria-Hungary. From a share in the shaping of that most momentous factor the Austrians are, however, excluded. What wonder that, having no unity at home, and no influence abroad, their parliamentary quarrels quickly degenerate into uncouth and absurd scuffles and local bickerings?

While, therefore, the imperial Reichsrath at Vienna must necessarily be denied some of its powers over provinces in favor of the provincial

diets, it ought, on the other hand, to be given far greater powers over the direction of Austria's foreign policy. The now misplaced surplus of untutored political energy would then be applied to what constitutes Austria's most vital problems. The people of Austria would then see that the Triple Alliance, which Austria-Hungary now forms with Germany and Italy, is of no imaginable use to Austria, and in effect only saps its very foundations. It is, as we have expressed it long ago, a Cripple Alliance, not a Triple Alliance. An inland and internally heterogeneous state like Austria-Hungary must owe its tranquility not to alliances, but to its own strength. The interests of Germany, chief of which is the occupation or *exploitation* of Asia Minor, are diametrically opposed to the vital interests of Austria-Hungary, while Italy can be a source neither of fear nor of utility to the Dual Monarchy. The Triple Alliance is, therefore, obsolete, objectless, hurtful. Not a few members of the Delegations have expressed themselves to this effect, and it is an open secret that the Triple Alliance has been recently renewed principally to please the aged Emperor. His death will be the death of the Triple Alliance, not of Austria. On the contrary, once the great Danubian Monarchy has released itself from its bondage to Germany, it becomes, almost automatically, the friend or ally of France and England, both of whom are eminently needful of a strong, eventually aggressive Austria-Hungary. The old Danubian Empire is, what most people ignore, the resultant of vast and secular European currents of history. It was not pieced together by chance or by accidental marriage manœuvres. *Tu felix Austria nube*, is a proverb invented by the enemies of Austria, by her detractors. Nobody waged more wars than Maximilian I., "à propos" of whom that silly "tag" was launched into the world. Four powerful monarchs strove for centuries to build up a Danubian realm—the Bavarian dukes, the kings of Bohemia, the kings of Hungary, and the archdukes of Austria. The latter alone succeeded in spite of exasperating defeats and reverses. In their success there was scarcely an element of haphazard. To him who really seizes the great currents of history from the thirteenth century downward, there can be no doubt that Austria-Hungary is as well a necessary resultant of forces historical and geo-political, as are the Alps an outcome of forces historico-geological. The Alps cannot be displaced nor partitioned, unless new geological forces make their way to the agitated surface. Nor can Austria-Hungary be displaced or partitioned without novel historical forces appearing on the stage of Europe. Of such novel forces there is, however, not the slightest trace. England has very good reasons to keep quiet for some time to come; France is now the least aggressive of great powers; so is, as far as Europe is con-

cerned, Russia and, likewise, Italy. There being no new historical or political forces forthcoming, Austria will no more be partitioned at the death of her present ruler than she was in 1740, when Prussia, France, Bavaria, and several minor powers essayed to displace the Alps of European history.

INTER-PSYCHOLOGY
THE INTER-PLAY OF HUMAN MINDS
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THE field of psychology is so vast that, in attempting to cultivate it all, we must necessarily divide it into separate sections. One great principle of division presents itself from the very start, and demands a clear definition. The *ego* or *self* is a point of intersection for two portions of universal life. Upon it there converge, as upon their point of destination, the manifold processes of physiological life and the subtle workings of the nervous system, in their relationships with all the forces of nature; and, while by these biological and physical relationships it is a receiving station, it is also, from another point of view, the social point of view, a dispatching station. From it start and ray out in all directions the manifold creations of social life; and these in turn contribute strongly toward nourishing, unfolding, and expanding it to the fulness of its power.

So, if we may grant that, setting aside its physiological life on the one hand, and its social life on the other, the self is nothing, and that psychology thus shorn of all its roots and branches does not deserve to be called a science; it is also certain that, when brought into relationship with its vital conditions on the one side, and its social conditions on the other, the self appears as one of the richest, fullest, most fruitful realities, worthy to be the object of two sciences that will complement each other: physiological psychology and social psychology.

But this expression, "*social psychology*," or its equivalent, "*collective psychology*," does not satisfy me. In the first place it is ambiguous, since it has been abused by mystic spirits who have given currency, under this name, to a certain conception of society—making of it one gigantic brain composed of our smaller brains, with a *social self* distinct from each individual consciousness. Moreover, even taking it in its most positive sense, this expression has the disadvantage of being vague and confused, and signifying only one species within a larger genus which still remains to be distinguished and defined. It presupposes in fact the existence of what is called a social environment, that is, a social group already formed and numerous enough for each individual self to receive in it, from the mass of the other selves joined in one confused whole, a suggestive influence which has become somehow impersonal and anony-

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mous, and which, moreover, is usually reciprocal ! But this fact,—very frequent, to be sure, in the life of adults in a civilized country, without even there being continuous,—is only the last term of a series of events which have preceded it and gradually made it possible, in the mental evolution of childhood, adolescence, and youth, and of primitive societies ; and, when this final term is separated from the evolutionary series which alone can explain it, it is rendered absolutely incomprehensible. In truth, it is always—and necessarily—through a psychology of two, then of three, four, five minds and through an inter-mental action which is at first uni-lateral—not reciprocal as yet—exercised by one, two, three, four, or more, adults, upon the brain of the child, that the child rises little by little toward social life, toward that psychology of a thousand, ten thousand, ten million, a hundred million minds, in which the communications of mental states become reciprocal to a certain degree, and are generalized. No one has understood this better than Mr. Baldwin, in his book on “Mental Development in the Child.” Just so at the beginning of the genesis of societies, so far as we can judge, it was by the uni-lateral, authoritative action of the strong mind of a chief upon a very small number of receptive minds in direct and personal relation with him, in the narrow circle of the primitive household or rather cavernhold, or of the primitive warrior band,—it was by this hard mountain path, along which the guide helped each traveler, one after the other, to climb, that humanity arrived, stage by stage, at the broad plateaux of our modern nations, in which immense masses elbow each other and crowd together, in which the out-rayings of mutually exchanged examples cross and re-cross, more manifold and more various than the vibrations of light in the firmament.

That is why I think we should substitute for the study of social or collective psychology, a term as complex as it is confused, the study of a science at once more general and more exact, which may be called inter-mental or inter-cerebral psychology, but which I should prefer (in spite of my horror of hybrid words) to call, more briefly, *inter-psychology*. I say, first, that this term is more general, because it includes not only all social relationships, looked upon subjectively (setting aside intercorporal relationships)—but also many inter-cerebral relationships which are in no way social. Not all inter-psychic relationships are social phenomena. To be social, these relationships must be or imply the action of one self upon another or others. Suppose I watch the movements of a living being, animal or man, that does not see me ; I seek to guess, from its movements, the course of its ideas, its intentions, its desires. This is a mental relationship with other minds. But what is there

in it that is social? And supposing that half of humanity should curiously observe the other half in this manner, without reciprocal action, would these two halves form or begin to form one society? Even if each of these two halves should alternately become an object of the other's curious observation, would the case be changed? No. In order that there may be a *social* phenomenon, and at the same time a *social bond*, one living being must act mentally upon another living being. If he acts only vitally, physically, or mechanically, upon this other living being, by silent and brutal sex intercourse, or by warming him, or by pushing him, you can no more call this a social relationship than you can say that a blacksmith comes into social relationship with his hammer or his anvil.

But is it enough that the action of one living being upon another should be psychical, in order to give us a social phenomenon and social bond? There is psychical action of one man on another when the former, through gestures or expressive signs understood or felt by the other, or by his attitude or glance, or by his mere presence, modifies the mental state of the second, brings disturbance into it or rouses appetite, awakens anger, fear, hope, hatred, sympathy, or the wish to obey or to command, or gives rise to an idea, a plan, or a purpose. Now, many of these inter-mental actions, so far from being, in themselves and considered separately, social phenomena, are rather obstacles to the social bond: as for example, the suggestion of hatred, or of cannibal appetite, or of fear, or of a cruel scientific or political experiment to be made *in anima vili*. It is quite otherwise with the suggestion of sympathy, of confidence, of obedience. When a living being, by his mere presence, fascinates or tames another, even of a different species, a social bond begins to be forged between them, at first uni-lateral. And that is why,—let me say by the way, even at the risk of repetition,—every social bond consists, directly or indirectly, in the reflection at a distance of one self in another self, that is in imitation. For, in order that this uni-lateral sympathy may be strengthened and developed into mutual sympathy, so as to strengthen and complete the social bond, what further is necessary? It is necessary that it be expressed. By being expressed, it takes root in the heart that experiences it and becomes there a passionate habit; and is likely also to touch the heart of the fascinator. And, before the invention of speech,—which presupposes a somewhat advanced period of social growth,—how could sympathy be manifested? It could not as yet be by credulity, by the disposition to admit what the master thinks and teaches, for the master's thoughts still remained almost incommunicable. But docility to the master's desires, such as can easily be guessed from the natural and

dumb language of his movements, could already act. So the tamed creature began to follow the tamer, to walk behind him, to do as he did, to copy his gestures. I do not see how otherwise sympathy could have been expressed before the invention of speech. And I do not see either how speech, destined to multiply the power of imitation and extend it until it included even ideas, could have been invented except by living beings, grown accustomed to repeat the intonations of one among them, to reflect his expressions of pleasure or pain, and to communicate their cries and gestures to each other contagiously, as do flocks of birds and tribes of mammals.

Thus social psychology, of which sociology is the out-growth and the objective complement, is only a *part* of inter-psychology, the part dealing with imitation, which, indeed, strongly tends to enlarge its domain. The inter-mental is the key to the social, and explains it, but at the same time overflows the bounds of it. Thus I have shown that inter-psychology is a more general term than social psychology. I add, secondly, that it is more exact; for it marks clearly wherein consists the character peculiar to the facts vaguely studied by social psychology, and to other facts also, once they are freed from all ontology. This character consists in their being psychological phenomena produced in one mind by its encounter with *another mind*, not with *any* natural agent.

Maine de Biran, who like most psychologists has worked only on individual psychology, has studied very carefully,—and he was among the first to do so,—the successive discovery by the child of its limbs, its organs, all its body. He has shown that when the child thus began to feel of itself, to look at itself, to listen to its own talk or crowing, these experiences of touch, sight, and hearing, in which it felt itself at once subject and object, stood out in high relief from the ordinary impressions of touch acting upon foreign substances, and from the usual impressions of sight and hearing. And this distinction did indeed deserve to be definitely stated and worked out. But what Maine de Biran did not see, is this: that stranger still, and standing out yet more sharply on the background of our external perceptions, is our perception of other people. I wonder if the child does not begin to be struck with the reality of other people and their deep similarity to him, before he discovers the whole of his own body. According to Hölfding, children “toward the end of their second year, have been seen to offer a biscuit to their own foot,” as if they thought it an independent being. Now, long before the second year, the child has become conscious, so to speak, of the consciousness of others, of the small number of personalities that surround him and interest him in the highest degree. Thus the child knows the self of others, before he knows his own body.

We may say that the self remains enveloped and in embryo so long as it has not entered into contact with other selves. Or rather, having from the time of birth never been long alone, it is through this constant contact with other people that the self has acquired or, in the course of time will acquire, the power to escape in some degree from their contagion and look on nature face to face. People, as Professor Giddings has so well said, are sharpened by rubbing together like knives. If the child happens to be alone in his cradle before the most beautiful landscape in the world, he slowly looks to the right and left and it all seems to mean very little to him; but if among all these inanimate objects that fill his field of vision a familiar face appears, that small but brilliant point at once eclipses for him all the rest; he has found in it his living rhyme, his psychic resonator, which reënforces his poor little personality and makes it clearer and stronger by reflecting it. It is by an intermittent relationship with the two or three people about him and also with some domestic animals, far more than by a continuous relationship with physical agents, that the child's mind unfolds little by little.

If anyone doubts the advantage of taking up these inter-psychic relationships separately and devoting to them a special branch of study, it should suffice to suggest the following consideration. No matter how thoroughly you study, by analytic methods, in a laboratory, the visual or other impressions produced upon an isolated self by different colors, forms, or movements, and the changes which these impressions cause in circulation, respiratory rhythm, or muscular force; no matter what laws you formulate for such action of external agents on a mind plunged by hypothesis in complete solitude, like that of Rousseau's "Émile," will the combination of these laws ever allow you to conjecture in advance the force and nature of the suggestive action which an attractive or repulsive human face exercises on this mind? Assuredly not. Yet this face has in it nothing, in the way of visual elements, which is not familiar to the mind in question. It is only a synthesis of these elements, but it is a new and living synthesis. And, I ask again, could you ever foresee, from the mere observation of a man in isolation, the nature of that attack of timidity which will appear in him, if he is born timid, when he finds himself in the presence of a certain number of his fellowmen, no one of whom separately, perhaps, would have been intimidating to him? Could you foresee, for instance, that in the case of the violinist who has stage-fright, that this timidity will sharpen the tone of his notes?

It is, I think, because the human face is infinitely more striking to primitive man, as it is to the child, than all the visible objects of nature; it is because the relationships of mind with mind, therefore, seem to him

alone worthy of attention, that primitive man irresistibly tends to people nature with fictitious souls. The savage, like the child, can take no interest in nature until it appears to him composed of human minds in disguise,—minds that are continually concerned with him, amusing themselves by giving him terrible enigmas or rebuses to guess. In certain ways these imaginary spirits by which primitive man is haunted in his agitating isolation, act on him as if they were real. He is sometimes intimidated or embarrassed before them. He adores them or hates them, glorifies or insults them. And, reciprocally, he thinks he can act upon them by prayer and sacrifice, and by observing the thousand daily prohibitions of the *taboo*. The life of the animist passes in a long dialogue, a long struggle, a long exchange of services with an innumerable crowd of imaginary interlocutors, enemies, and allies. In the higher religions the life of the mystic may, from our point of view be compared, thus: the difference lies here,—that the mystic, instead of imagining his interlocutors outside of himself, in the vast Universe, thinks he hears within himself the divine Speaker, the divine Wrestler, the infinite Self with whom he ceases not to hold intercourse, to struggle, and to coöperate, in the tumultuous immobility of the state of prayer, that illusive doubling of his solitude.

And, from this point of view, mysticism and animism evidently present themselves to us as two interesting chapters of inter-psychology, dealing with imaginary inter-psychology, which is, perhaps, not least in importance for our understanding of the past. But that is not what I wish to deal with here.

II.

To bring out my thought, it may be useful to compare the science I am speaking of with another science which might also be created, under the name of *inter-psychology*, or *inter-biology*, one which would be the symmetrical counterpart of inter-psychology. In fact, we may say that this branch of biology already exists, and has grown wonderfully in the past half century. All scholars who, before and especially after Darwin, devoted themselves to studying how the different animal and vegetable species of one region adapt themselves to each other and use each other, have worked on inter-psychology. The genesis of species, if it took place in accordance with the Darwinian principles of the struggle for life and of natural selection, would be one great and continuous inter-physiological process (certainly not an *intra*-physiological one,—as some deep naturalists are beginning to think). The study of microbes, in their relations with each other and with larger organisms, is yet another branch

of inter-psychology, now very flourishing and destined to a great future.

As a matter of fact, the merely vital relationships of living things with each other are generally very far from attaining a true harmony. Parasitism seems to be the chief inter-vital relationship of living things.¹

It is rarely mutual. The mutualists, according to Van Beneden are, for instance, those insects that live in the fur of animals or in the down of birds, and free them from their pellicles. The most frequent, and also the most remarkable, of these cases of mutual use, is presented by the visits of insects to the flowers which feed them and which they fructify. The harmony between the arrangement of the corolla in orchids and the form of their winged go-betweens is such that Darwin himself in amazement almost despairs of explaining it.²

We must admit, however, that there is but very little left of the inter-vital if we separate it from the inter-mental, with which it is often confused. Properly speaking, there exist no inter-vital relationships between living organisms but those of cannibalism and sexual intercourse. All the others are merely mechanical, physical, chemical or psychical relationships, between living bodies that use each other as they would use inorganic substances,—or else which form animal societies. A bird makes his nest in the hollow of an elm or an oak, as he would in the corner of a wall, and the choice seems to be indifferent to him. A living being,—that is, one endowed with animal life,—as such, has attraction or repulsion for every other living being. But is it true that a living thing,—a plant for instance,—as such, has attraction or repulsion

(1) Animals are of use to each other for lodging, clothing, transportation and food. Van Beneden politely calls guests,—I shall call simply parasites,—the animals which, as he says, “now set themselves on their neighbor’s back, now at the entrance to his mouth or the passage of his victuals, or of his excrement, now take shelter, under the cloak of this host from whom they receive aid and comfort.” There is a fish, of slender and graceful form, the ophidion, which seeks its fortune in the intestine of the holothuria where it levies a dinner on the product of its host’s fishing. The remora, or sucker, fastens itself to the shark, and is carried with him through the seas, using him as we do the horse. Few animals there are without parasites. Man is preyed upon by some twelve different kinds of parasites, not to mention the microbes that sometimes kill him, and the flies and gnats that torment him.

(2) We may ask ourselves, in this connection, whether in the inter-biological world also, as in the social world, the relationships which have now become reciprocal did not at first begin by being uni-lateral, and whether the uni-lateral relationships do not tend to become reciprocal in the long run, vitally as well as socially. At first sight it seems to be so,—with this reservation, however, that the tendency toward becoming reciprocal is much less pronounced in the vital relationships of living things than in their social relationships.

for every other living thing? It may be so (and it would be an interesting point to investigate) but it is not yet proven. We know that men, after having used, first, men and then animals for transportation and other labors, are turning more and more to vegetable and physical agents, as steam and electricity, for such services. Is there nothing similar to be noted in inter-biology? Does not an organism tend to ask rather of inanimate forces the purely material services that it previously asked of another organism? It would be interesting to have an answer to this question from the naturalists. I will simply call attention to the fact that it is especially the lower animals, the invertebrates, that use other animals for their protection, as frequently happens in the case of insects, while the higher animals, the vertebrates, prefer to take vegetable substances or inorganic matter for such use. Darwin tells us that the tendrils of climbing plants fasten themselves without choice to an object of iron or of wood, and twine equally about a bush or a bronze column. Yet these delicate organs are not without discernment; it is remarkable that as a rule, so the great English scholar informs us, tendrils do not twine about other tendrils of the same plant. The bryony vine and the grape-vine sometimes offer exceptions to this remarkable rule.

So I shall be very careful not to deny that members of the vegetable kingdom may have ways of sympathizing with each other that are peculiar to them. The transition is so indistinguishable, from the mysteriously harmonious relationships that different organs of the same organism bear to each other, to the apparently clearer relationships of two or more living things,—as for example the two sexes, first brought together in the monœcious plants, and then separated in the dioecious,—that we may be allowed to suspect something of the obscure and deep nature of the former to be hidden under the apparent clearness of the latter.

But, once more, if we look at things positively, living creatures do not seem to have any vital relations, properly so called, with each other, except those of eating each other or of sexual intercourse. Moreover, it often happens that a living creature which eats another uses him just as he would a similarly nutritive chemical substance. Sexual intercourse would therefore remain the only incontestably vital relationship of living creatures. After all, it must be admitted that we have no very clear idea of what life is or of what a vital relationship consists. We understand, or think we understand, only the mechanical or the psychical relationships between living beings.

So inter-physiology, if some day it does become an exact science, will never become a science comparable in clearness, or in explain-

ing power, to inter-psychology. It can only be a bringing together of more or less unexplained facts. There is another reason, namely, that its principal object is far less *real* than the principal object of inter-psychology. Inter-physiology, if it existed as a separate science, would be to the fauna and flora,—the local groupings, more or less ill-defined, of animals and plants,—what inter-psychology is destined, in my opinion, to be to human societies. But these aggregations of animal or vegetable species, which, coëxisting and either destroying or helping each other unconsciously in one locality, make up its fauna or flora or both, have assuredly less *reality* than a nation. It is a case of juxtaposition, rather than association, of species; and most of them are foreign to each other. Compared with a nation such as France or England, the French or English flora seem like a mere entity. That is why no one ever thought of founding a faunology or a florology, while the need of a sociology, and even earlier of an ethnology, has made itself felt.

III.

But we have carried far enough this comparison between two branches of sciences, one of which need not occupy us further. Let us now finish what we have to say of the other.¹

And first, new distinctions must be made. * * * When the object of our perception, thought, or will, is itself a perceiving, thinking, and willing subject, the case is already, as we know, highly differentiated from all acts of perception, thought, and will, which have for their object an inanimate thing. But further, when the person whom we perceive, is perceived by us as perceiving us; when we conceive the person we think of and seek to understand as thinking of us and trying to understand us; when the person we wish to possess or master appears to us as striving to master us and use us for his own ends,—then a second step has been taken, as significant as the former. It is by this step that we enter fully into the field of inter-mental action. To look at a person who is looking at us, to scrutinize one who scrutinizes us, to measure one who measures us, to love one who loves us, hate one who hates us, wound one who wounds us,—these are marvelous phenomena of psychio-symmetry, like that of two mirrors which reflect each other and so give to each other the mutual illusion of infinite depth.

Here idealistic scepticism stops. This is the rock upon which it breaks; for I cannot deny the reality of this object-subject which is so

(1) I devoted to inter-psychology, under another name, the whole of my first course at the Collège de France, two years ago; in the present article I confine myself to a summary of the general plan I have laid out for its study.

strangely like me, of this not-self which is another self, without denying my own self. And moreover, a reënforcing of my consciousness of self necessarily accompanies my irresistible faith in the reality of other consciousness. When I look at a flower, a mountain, a tree, I can entirely forget myself in the object. But I cannot do so when I look at a man, or even one of the higher animals. I cannot see him without being conscious that it is also possible for him to see me, and the idea of this possibility usually tends to make me desire its realization, unless my desire is arrested by the feeling that some danger or disadvantage to me might result if the person seen should in turn see me. When I am passing through the streets in a large city, if all the people I meet and see should stop to look at me, I should find it exceedingly unpleasant. But if I meet an acquaintance, I do not like to have him pass without seeing me. Instinctively, in such a case, and quite apart from any special desire to see the person in question, one's impulse is to make some sign and try to draw his attention. And, even as regards the great mass of strangers that crowd against me on a Paris side walk, however little I may feel myself concerned with them, it is none the less on account of them that I bear myself erect, think of my dress, and do not allow myself the freedom which, in the country, I should prefer. This very effort *not* to attract their attention is one way of being conscious of one's self on account of them, and serves to prove that their presence reënforces our consciousness of self. The escape from this multiple reflecting of one's self is an element in the relief of mind which we feel in the country, after several months spent in town.

The relationships of mind with mind are distinguished from the relationships of mind with things, by the nature of the effects they produce. The action of mind upon mind is an action without contact; and, through it, there is realized an original causality, which consists not in the incomprehensible production of a heterogeneous effect quite different in kind from its cause, (as occurs when the vibrations of the ether produce in us, or rather give rise to, sensations of color), but in the *reproduction*, sometimes by its opposite, of the cause itself, which thus leaves its own imprint and sign upon its effect. I express an idea, and immediately that idea, or one exactly opposed to it, takes shape in the consciousness of another. It is either repeated there, or contradicted.¹

(1) A man in a crowd shouts: "Hurrah for X . . ." And immediately the crowd is divided into two unequal parts; those who also shout: "Hurrah for . . .", and those who cry: "Down with . . ." Or, in an uprising, some one seizes a torch to set fire to a palace; some follow him, others go for the firemen. It is true that the effect is often more complex. Some of those who see the incendiary

Moreover, the coming in of this higher causality begins the transition from an action which cannot be other than direct and uni-lateral, to one which, for the first time, may become reflex and reciprocal. When the self is in the presence of the sea or mountains, or even of the plants or lower animals, it is acted upon by them but it does not act upon them; or if by chance it does modify them in turn, there is no relationship between these two kinds of modification; one is not an answer to the other; there is nothing reciprocal in the relationship. But when two men talk or discuss together, they make an impression upon each other, reciprocally. It remains true, however, that even in the case of inter-mental causality the uni-lateral precedes the reciprocal—a fact which has been too often forgotten.

Elementary inter-mental action has been thoroughly studied, on its abnormal or pathological sides, by the hypnologists; and they may be considered the earliest founders of inter-psychology. The case they deal with, in which one person has irresistible power of command or persuasion over another, without reciprocal action, brings us back to the very origins of the social bond. Alienists and criminologists, who have produced such interesting monographs on double insanity, and double suicide or crime, have also made exact contributions toward elucidating this fundamental problem. But the abnormal, in any order of phenomena, can be rightly understood only when it is brought into relation with the normal. If therefore we wish fully to use and rightly to interpret these fragments of morbid inter-psychology of which I have just spoken,—and some others I might have mentioned, such as the studies on timidity and especially those on crowds,—it is essential that we give them their place in the outlines of a psychology of the sane and normal; and these outlines we must first lay down. Like *intra*-psychology (or, if you prefer, individual psychology) *inter*-psychology has its own divisions and methods. From the genetic point of view, it begins with the study of the infant from the time of its first mental relations with people about

neither imitate nor oppose his example; a photographer will think of taking a snapshot; a reporter, of working up a good “story”, which means that, in most cases, the tendency to imitation or counter-imitation which is the direct result of the sight of an act, has been arrested by the indirect result joined with it, namely the associated ideas of quite different acts which it calls up. But were not these quite different acts, and their corresponding ideas, first learned and produced through imitation? And is not speech itself, through which it has been possible to transmit these ideas and acts, essentially a phenomenon of imitation, from the very cradle? In this sense, then, we may truly say that the essential character of all social acts is that they are imitative, even though not all inter-mental actions, between members of one society, can be reduced to the mere communication of examples.

it; and the evolution from this inter-psychology of the infant to that of adults is of the highest social interest. From the theoretic and general point of view, we should study in the abstract, and separately, the action of sense-impressions upon sense-impressions, or of will upon will, and of intelligence upon intelligence.

It is to be noted in this connection that sensations, and the concepts of sensations, are by no means communicable as such; but only ideas, plans, beliefs, and desires. So long as we deal only with an isolated self we can persuade ourselves, with Condillac and all the psychologists of the eighteenth century, that sensation is the fundamental phenomenon out of which all else comes, through combination and transformation. This illusion disappears when we find that the profound difference in sense-impressions of one person from another,—of the color-blind from the ordinary man, or of the deaf from the blind,—and the uncommunicability of their sense-impressions, are no bar to the communicability and identity of their thoughts and wishes, or their complete understanding in matters of religion or politics. If I attach an extreme importance to belief and desire, it is because they are in the highest degree communicable from mind to mind, while sensations and concepts are in themselves essentially uncommunicable. The degree of communicability or uncommunicability of different psychological phenomena is for our purposes their most interesting characteristic. At a dinner, the guests, however numerous, taste the savor of the food just as they would if they were alone—except possibly that the appetite of each one may be slightly sharpened by the presence of the other guests, and from this may come a certain indirect sharpening of the impressions of taste; but if they converse, the ideas which they express are directly and strongly reënforced in each one of them by the agreement of others, and the more numerous they are, the higher the ardor of opposed convictions and the heat of discussion will rise. It is not sensations, it is emotions that are easily communicable from man to man, because into the formation of most emotions and feelings there enter many implicit judgments and plans, ideas and desires, communicated by others; as for example in the case of laughing or being shocked. In a group of people, we, quite sincerely, laugh at or are shocked by many things at which, if we were alone, would not appear to us as shocking and laughable. “Laughter,” says Mr. Bergson, very justly, “seems to need an echo.” Feelings, then, are to inter-psychology what sensations are to individual psychology. Thus we find also that the psychological phenomena of the highest order are the most contagious, the most capable of socialization; only up to a certain point, however, for the most exquisite of the feelings or even intuitions that each one of

us attains to are inexpressible, ineffable, and never brought into social circulation. Therein lies the deep reason of that higher individualism which is born of social life itself, and which rises up to resist society when society threatens to engulf it.

IV.

Let me develop further the thoughts above suggested. Take an example. When you speak to an audience, you know very well that your *idea*,—meaning by that word the whole content, peculiar to yourself, of concepts and memories, and perceptions properly so-called, which your words signify to you,—does not pass in its totality and complexity, and in the peculiar form which makes it yours, and as such can never pass, into the personality of your hearers, any more than an air played on the violin or piano can retain its tone-quality and its over-tones when it is played on the flute or hautboy. You know that the words you use rouse in them different concepts, different sensations, and that if in spite of this difference the relationship of these sense agents remains intellectually about the same in them as in you, this likeness can be after all only a very imperfect one. But one thing you are certain of, and that is that whatever the difference between their *way of sensing* your idea and your own way of sensing it, their *way of believing* in it, if they adopt it, is identical in nature with your own way of believing in it. There are twenty, indeed there are a hundred ways of seeing a red or blue object, of hearing a musical note, of smelling an odor, of perceiving a landscape, even of conceiving the thought of Kant or Spinoza; but the color-blind, and those who are not so, have a like belief in the reality of the color which they see differently, of the landscape which they perceive differently, and in the truth or error of the system which they understand differently. The distinction between green and red may be felt by John in one way, by James in another; but the distinction between *yes* and *no* is the same for everyone. The same may be said of desire, and first of that desire to sense, or to perceive, or to conceive, which is called attention. John and James, Peter and Paul, do not see or hear alike, but they do look and listen similarly; they do not perceive the same odors, but they do smell similarly. We may desire the most heterogeneous things, as roses, fruits, honors, a sum of money, etc.; but through all these changes of direction, desire remains desire (repulsion likewise remains repulsion) and is always recognizable. There is no state the identity of whose nature, from one end to the other of psychological evolution and of the animal scale, seems to all creatures more incontesti-

ble than that of desire and its opposite, from the appetite of the earth-worm to the ambition of the conqueror.

So, when we come into mental opposition with each other, it is always through our contradictory convictions or opposed desires, never through our sensations.¹ This is equally true when one of us comes into opposition with himself. Hence the logical—or teleological—need of bringing our beliefs and our desires into harmony with each other, whether in a social group, or in each individual mind; and this is why that need plays in social or individual life a rôle far greater than the quite different æsthetic need of bringing our sensations into harmony with each other.

It is worth while to notice that the need of logical argument in the social group made itself felt before the need of logical agreement in the individual brain. Logic was first conceived, in the time of the Greek sophists, as the art of converting others, of communicating one's convictions to other men, before it was conceived by Socrates and his school as the art of converting one's self, of correcting one's own errors and illogicalities, and of advancing from truth to truth. If this inter-mental logic,² which preceded and gave rise to intra-mental logic, operates long in a group of men, its result is to bring them all into *unison* of belief. If intra-mental logic, that is, logic properly so-called, operates long in the solitary meditations of an individual mind its result is to create there an agreement of *harmony* rather than of unison among all the different thoughts of that mind. These two logics are the complement of each other. It may likewise be said, that inter-mental teleology preceded and gave rise to intra-mental teleology. Long before Socrates founded ethics, that is to say, the harmony of desires within the individual soul and their convergence upon one ideal, the statesmen of Greece—kings, tyrants and popular orators—had laid the foundations of a science of politics, and reflected upon the best means of unifying the desires of the citizens or subjects, and of binding together their different personalities, united in the same desire for safety, or conquest, or military glory by an indissoluble bond. The political unison of desires in the state was conceived long before the moral harmony of desires in the individual con-

(1) In sensations there is no other opposition than that which desire, positive or negative, introduces into them, when it is combined with them in the form of pleasure or pain.

(2) This inter-mental logic is after all *rhetoric*. The scientific study of rhetoric dates from Antiphon, who taught it at Athens. It was at once logical and teleological, but rather logical, for it served much more as a rule for thought and speech than for conduct.

sciousness. This consideration, on which I of course do not need to insist here, would be enough to show that I have not exaggerated the importance of inter-mental action in psychology.

But to return. What is certain, is that, through the contact of individuals with each other, their sensations are infinitely less reënforced or reduced, infinitely less modified, than are their ideas and their desires, their beliefs and their passions. There are many less hallucinations, that is to say suggested sensations, than there are conversions. Cases are cited, but they are very exceptional, where, in crowds or in religious sects mutual contagion has gone to the extent of reciprocally communicated hallucination. For example, La Réveillère-Lépeaux, in the first volume of his "Memoirs," tells how, at the beginning of the French Revolution, he saw in Anjou more than eight thousand people of all ages gathered together before a sacred oak, many of whom said they saw an apparition of the Virgin, which he himself could nowise see. The Goncourts, in their Journal, tell of a case almost as strange which took place in Paris in 1870-71; in which many people in a crowd said they saw, in a newspaper office, a despatch (which was not there) announcing a great victory over the enemy. But, once more, these are very rare exceptions produced by extraordinary circumstances.¹ Usually, however full and enthusiastic a theatre may be, the spectators in the poorer places do not see or hear

(1) Here is a still more striking example which I have found in the *Revue Scientifique*, for October 28, 1899; Mr. Slosson reports, in the *Psychological Review*, the following experiment which he made at the University of Wyoming in 1899; "I had prepared a bottle filled with distilled water carefully wrapped in cotton and packed in a box. After some other experiments in the course of a popular lecture I stated that I wished to see how rapidly an odor would be diffused through the air, and requested that as soon as anyone perceived the odor he should raise his hand. I then unpacked the bottle, poured the water over the cotton, holding my head away during the operation, and started a stop-watch. While awaiting results I explained that I was quite sure that no one in the audience had ever smelled the chemical compound which I had poured out. * * * In fifteen seconds most of those in the front row had raised their hands, and in forty seconds the 'odor' had spread to the back of the hall, keeping a pretty regular 'wave front' as it passed on. About three-fourths of the audience claimed to perceive the smell, the obstinate minority including more men than the average of the whole. More would probably have succumbed to the suggestion, but at the end of a minute I was obliged to stop the experiment, for some on the front seats were being unpleasantly affected and were about to leave the room." In this case evidently, it is as a thing asserted and willed by suggestion, and not as a sense-experience,—since he himself did *not* smell it,—that the imaginary odor was spread. Here lies the explanation of the apparently paradoxical phenomenon, that imaginary sensations can be so contagious, when real ones are not. This curious experiment only proves to what extent the power of suggestion over people assembled together,—the more suggestible as they are more numerous,—may go.

any better, there is for them no hyperæsthesia. On the other hand, their enthusiasm,—which is made up at once of belief and desire, of judgment and conviction regarding the skill of the actors, and of an earnest desire to have this judgment shared by others,—is highly intensified through mutual suggestion. They see or hear badly, but they are carried away none the less. Political history abounds in such cases, such blind infatuations. And not only in ordinary crowds, but even in reunions of scholars there are frequent occasions to observe this intensified reëchoing of the opinions of all in the opinion of each.

Not but what the individual, as a result of his contact with his fellowmen, undergoes great changes in the manner of his sense-impressions. But these modifications are not due to any direct contagion from the sensations of others. When one who has authority over his pupils, his readers, his admirers, acts upon their sense experience, it is by making them look at what they would not have thought of looking at, of themselves; but this is all; what they see is just what they would have seen if their look had of itself turned in that direction. In the same way every great painter, every great poet, draws the attention of the public to aspects of the sky or sea, to beauties of nature or of the human body, which would always have escaped the careless glance of ordinary men, but which once seen they will always admire sincerely, just as if they had themselves been the discoverers. Every great artist thus contributes toward bringing likeness, unison, and harmony into our sense impressions, but not in the same way that every great religious thinker contributes toward harmonizing men's intelligences, and every great statesman toward harmonizing their wills.

Feelings, as I said above, are to inter-psychology what sensations are to the psychology of the individual. Sensations are a tangled skein, complex and confused, which the individual brain unravels as best it may, and from which it draws its ideas of space, time, matter and force,—not to mention the antithesis of pleasure and pain. Feelings are another skein, far more complex and richer yet, which the life of society both produces and disentangles, and from which it draws the social categories of right and duty as well as the great antithesis of good and evil. We must note, by the way, that this antithetic character is far more marked in feelings than in sensations. The former contain oppositions (joy and sorrow, love and hatred, fear and anger, etc.) which are not possible in the latter. This is because feelings are combinations in mental chemistry where the belief element and the desire element play a far larger rôle than in the formation of sensations. It is for the most part through inter-mental action, it is through our relationships with

people much more than with things, that our feelings, of whatever nature, are formed and developed. No doubt our emotions are influenced by organic states, by disorders of circulation or innervation; but they are not derived from them, they are derived from changes which we experience or foresee in our relations with our fellowmen.

Feelings may be divided into two classes, according to whether the dominating element in them is, on the one hand, expectation or *belief*, either confirmed or contradicted, or on the other hand, *desire*, either satisfied or disappointed. The belief-feelings are, notably, pride and humility, admiration and contempt, indignation and esteem, etc. The desire-feelings are, for example, anger and fear, love and hatred, etc. But both classes are social in their origin. We laugh only at things connected with humanity; we are shocked only at human acts. We constantly bear within us a sort of invisible and infinitely delicate thermometer which warns us of the rise and fall of our social value, of the esteem in which others hold us. Our faith in ourselves is immediately and very strongly affected thereby; and everything which tends thus to raise or lower our belief in our own power, merits, riches, or rights, moves us characteristically. From the cradle, in our contact with mother or nurse, and later on in our games and little battles with our schoolmates, in our manifold disagreements or sympathies with our friends or with the public, we are always enlarging the keyboard of these higher sensations, which we call feelings. The contagious character of feelings is easily explained from what has just been said. They are capable of socialization the more easily because they are social in their origin. Color-blindness, or any other peculiarity of sight, smell, hearing or touch, is never found to be propagated by example in a country; but nothing is more common than to see pride, envy, hatred, enthusiasm, fear, thus communicated through contagion. There are cases of collective infatuations, of violent gusts of stupid vanity or mad ambition, which, caused often by the action of a single man, seize upon a whole nation, and hurl it to ruin.

Let us add that feelings are signs of our social relationships, just as sensations are signs of our physical relationships with natural agents. Sensations of heat or cold, of sweet or bitter, warn us of the objects which we must avoid or seek, just as feelings of admiration or contempt, of love or hatred, of esteem or indignation, of anger or fear, warn us of the social attitude which we must take toward other men. Through colors and sounds, we judge of the physical distance of objects from us, as through the degree of our sympathy or antipathy we judge of the social distance between ourselves and other men. This is what Professor

Giddings calls *the consciousness of kind*. Moreover, we naturally objectivize our feelings as we do our sensations. Just as we tend to believe that the *color* of objects is inherent in them, although it is only a subjective phenomenon, so we are inclined, and yet more irresistibly, to believe that the *criminality* of certain acts is inherent in them, although after all it consists simply in the general indignation which they arouse at a given moment and in a given environment. It is true, nevertheless, that there is an objective difference (other than color, but revealed through color) between a red and blue object; and likewise there is an objective difference, other than that of arousing esteem or indignation, between a virtuous and a criminal act.

Sensations are of use not only to give us information; they also encourage or restrain us. They are accompanied by an increase or diminution of physical force, which can be measured by the dynamometer, and they cause motor-reflex actions which adapt us to the conditions of our physical life. Just so, feelings are heightenings or depressions of force, and inspire us with words, gestures, acts, fitted to adapt us to the conditions of our social life. Feelings, in fact, are useless to the individual, apart from all relations with his fellowmen. Of what use would love or hatred, admiration or contempt, esteem or reprehension, be to Robinson Crusoe without his man Friday? But they are of evident social utility. They are useful, on the one hand, to the social group rather than to the individual living in it, on the other hand, to the individual living in society rather than to the social group. The former class comprises the feelings which are usually called "good": modesty, love, respect, gratitude, admiration, indignation. The others are the "bad": pride, contempt, the desire for vengeance, envy, etc. Which are the more contagious? That depends upon time and place. They are all contagious, but very unequally so. The same revolutionary crowds which, at one moment, mad with anger, set out to destroy a man,—a supposed monopolist, for instance,—on mere suspicion, can be turned inside out like a glove by a popular orator who works upon their feelings, and will carry the wretch in a triumphal procession, or dance with him around the very tree to which they were going to hang him.

V.

If this study could be anything more than a mere sketch designed to give some idea of my vast subject, it would now be in place to take up the following questions: first, why some feeling are or are not propagated in a given environment, at a given moment; second, how they are pro-

pagated, and by what methods; third, the transformations they undergo in the process.

We can only touch lightly on these three aspects of the problem, by way of giving an example of our method.

First, we must lay down the principle that any feeling whatever, expressed by any person whatever before another person, tends, if the mind of the second person is for the moment a blank, to communicate itself to him, and in fact does so communicate itself. The abundant and conclusive proof of this principle is furnished by experiments in hypnosis, which, precisely, place the subject in the conditions of our hypothesis. Hypnosis makes the consciousness of its subject a blank, or very nearly so. And thus, what all hypnotists most unanimously bear witness to is the extraordinary compliance of the hypnotized subject, his *passive imitativity*. He believes all that is told him, he does all that is commanded, he guesses, from the least gesture of his model, what the latter wishes or thinks, and reflects him in everything. By exception, however, he sometimes resists certain criminal orders; but that is because these orders, contradicting too deeply his most essential habits and tendencies, reawaken them. On this subject we are familiar with the passionate discussions which have arisen concerning the reality of *suggested crimes*.

Moreover, just so far as the subject is emptied of his previous feelings, ideas, and desires, he is the passive reflex of the hypnotizer, reproducing without distinction his anger or his fear, his hatred or his love, his indignation or his admiration, etc. So the young child, whose mind is likewise almost a blank, reproduces almost passively the impressions of his environment; and hypnosis is marvelously well-fitted to explain to us the inter-psychology of childhood.

But, later in life, this is no longer so. For the feeling we express before an adult always meets in his personality a mass of deep-rooted feelings, ideas, memories, and tendencies, by which it is either arrested, or reënforced. These psychological conditions which reënforce or arrest the transmission of a feeling from one person to another are of two kinds: first, some are of extra-logical order, that is to say they are *extrinsic* reasons, which do not depend upon the nature of the feeling itself, but on the physical appearance, agreeable or disagreeable, of the person who expresses it, and on the more or less sympathetic expression he gives to it, by his gestures, voice, and facial expression; second, the others are of a logical order, *intrinsic* reasons, and depend upon the nature of the feeling itself, according to whether, looked on in its belief-aspect, it confirms or contradicts the convictions already established in the subject;

or whether, looked on in its desire-aspect, it brings help or hindrance to the ends pursued by the subject, to his passions, to his ideal.

Now, these two kinds of causes, the extrinsic and the intrinsic, both act together only in the direct relations of man with man, in assemblages and crowds; and then they sometimes act together and reënforce each other, and sometimes partially neutralize each other. A given feeling of hatred or envy expressed by a popular orator should logically propagate itself in his audience, to the advancement of his revolutionary ideas. But, on the other hand, this orator may be so ridiculous or so repugnant that there is nothing communicative in his eloquence. A given preacher may urge feelings of piety and adoration which should logically be communicated from his heart to the hearts of the worshippers who hear him, but his voice may be so rough and his face so unpleasing that the audience is very little edified.

But, when the action of one person upon another takes place at a distance, as is the case with the novelist, or with the journalist, the extrinsic causes disappear, or are reduced to their minimum, and leave the causes of a logical order to act alone or almost alone. So, in the same environment, the same feelings are very differently contagious, according to whether they are propagated in a *crowd* or in a *public*. And, since the era of the press, inaugurated in our century, has prodigiously increased the importance of the public compared with the importance of the crowd, and therefore has increased the importance of the propagation of feelings in the public compared with that of their propagation in a crowd, we here lay a finger upon the prime importance of the rôle of journalism in the formation of the social heart. We see, too, that this increasing action of the press has had for its result,—whether for good or ill,—to give more and more power to the logical influences (or the teleological, the utilitarian—which after all amounts to the same thing) over the extra-logical influences, in the propagation of feelings—we might add too, in the propagations of beliefs and desires, ideas and will. The press thus appears as one of the great agents of *social logic*, and nothing is better fitted to explain how irresistible and irrevocable is its expansion, its overflowing power,—as fructifying normally as it is devastating at times.

We must not forget the principle from which we started, namely, that every feeling communicates itself unless it meets in the mind of the one communicated with, the hearer or the reader, an antagonistic feeling, idea, or desire, which contradicts and arrests it. Now, it is first and above all in the family and in the school that these restraining, inhibitive feelings, ideas and desires can be inculcated. Hence, the prime

importance of questions of education and teaching. But, next to the family and the school, books and newspapers contribute most strongly towards shaping the character of the young. It is the press which must act as its own restraint; and, if it fails in this mission, the logical result of our principle is that the young are exposed defenseless to the most detestable,—and henceforth irresistible,—influences.

To proceed methodically, we ought now to distinguish, in the contagious propagation of feelings, five cases: first, the direct and personal action of individual upon individual; second, that of an individual upon any crowd or assemblage; third, that of an assemblage upon an individual; fourth, that of an individual upon a public, a scattered crowd; fifth, that of a public upon an individual. Here would be matter for as many distinct studies. The first case includes, first of all, *conversation*—that infinitesimal, but continually and universally acting, cause of all social developments and changes, not only linguistic,—that is a matter of course,—but also religious, political, economic, æsthetic, and ethical developments; a slow but sure coral-formation, we may call it, the importance of which has been so deeply misconceived. The founders of religious orders alone seem to have understood the transforming power of this elementary inter-mental action, and that is why, to assure the immutability of their institutions, they have imposed the rule of silence,—always ill observed, to be sure. I have tried elsewhere¹ to sketch the history of conversation, to analyze its causes, its variations, its consequences, but I am very far from having made such a vast subject my own; I have at the most explored it.

The second case has given rise to works upon crowds. There still remain in this subject enormous gaps to be filled: we are far from having studied sufficiently, and in detail, the crowds of different nationalities and of different epochs; according to their different classes, in waiting, manifesting, and acting; or crowds pious, fanatic, hating, avenging, etc. The history of crowds remains to be written, and is even more important than the history of sects or of corporations; it would be interesting to learn, by comparing their historical evolution in different countries, whether it is always in one direction that they develop, whether they become less and less or more and more frequent and numerous, more and more or less and less easily persuaded and obedient to their leaders, more or less proud, passionate, or orderly. * * * The transformation of crowds into a public, the relationship of the public with crowds, and with sects, also call for original research. The subject offers great difficulties. On the

(1) In *l'Opinion et la Foule*, 1901.

one hand, we habitually find that crowds, and not seldom regular assemblies even, act in the mass with less intelligence than the individuals which compose them would do separately. This fact has long been noticed. Apropos of an absurd decision by the Sarbonne, in 1767, Voltaire wrote to Madame du Deffand: "I do not know how it is that assemblies say and do more amazingly foolish things than individuals; it is perhaps because an individual has everything to fear, while assemblies fear nothing. Every member casts the blame on his colleagues." Voltaire observes the fact, and imagines he has explained it by his little psychology, somewhat inadequate and superficial, but that of his time. In this phenomenon there are depths which his great mind, in spite of all its luminous good sense, could not suspect. But, on the other hand, if individuals had always lived apart, each one by himself, we know that the highest would never have arisen, alone and of himself, to the level of even the lowest of the members of any social group. So the result of the social relationship is to elevate each one of its members, although the social group is often collectively lower, in intelligence if not in morality, than the average of its elements. And it might be demonstrated that there is nothing irreconcilable in these two propositions.

The third case, the opposite of the second, has suggested some researches upon *timidity*. The attack of timidity, caused in some individuals by the mere presence of a group of people, no one of whom, taken alone, would be intimidating, is a nervous crisis characterized by a feeling of anguish, a sensation of stifling, palpitation, and waves of heat and cold. Some rather good studies have been made of stage-fright in artists. But the influence of race and heredity upon timidity has been observed only here and there, disconnectedly; this study should be made more exact and systematic.

The fourth and fifth cases, relating to the public, demand especial attention on account of the growing importance of this bringing together of the distant, and from greater and greater distances,—thanks to the periodical press.

The method of classification just indicated has to do only with the inter-mental action of sensibilities upon sensibilities (feelings being the only portion of our experience directly communicable from personality.) But it is applicable as well, and should be applied, to the action of wills upon wills, of intelligences upon intelligences. Here comes in, particularly, all that I have worked out elsewhere² upon the laws which govern

(1) See on this subject the book quoted above: *l'Opinion et la Foule*, which should have been called rather, *le Public et l'Opinion*.

(2) See *Les Lois de l'Imitation*. (Tr.)

the transmission of examples, *idea-examples* as well as *action-examples*; upon the reasons, logical or extra-logical,—or rather reasons of extrinsic or intrinsic logic—which determine the choice of the individual among different kinds of examples simultaneously offered for his imitation; and finally on those happy meetings of ideas, those fructifying unions of examples which sometimes take place in the mind of an individual, and produce there a new invention, the centre of a new out-lying of imitations.

Whether we are dealing with sensibilities, wills, or intelligences, it is always important that we should note to what external or inner conditions the suggestive action of one mind upon another or others, is subordinated. These conditions are of several kinds: physical, physiological, psychological, and social. If we examine attentively each one of these classes of influences, we soon are able to formulate from them certain general observations which sociology, in its early stages, would make a great mistake to neglect. From century to century, for example, and from country to country, there is great variation in the maximum of geometric distance beyond which inter-mental action cannot extend; the difference between the almost invariable minimum and this maximum constantly increases with civilization, which extends, multiplies, and diversifies the means of spiritual communication,—postal service, telegraph, telephone,—at the same time that it allows an ever increasing density of population in a given territory. In two ways at once, therefore,—and these two ways are multiplied by each other,—social progress makes the opportunities of inter-mental action more frequent, and their need more imperious. And that is only one of the least interesting of physical conditions. It has to do with the extension of inter-mental action in space; and is complemented by its parallel extension in time, thanks to writing and printing, which make possible, after thousands of years, the fecundation of the brain of the living by the mind of the dead.

Among the physiological conditions, the influence of race has been exaggerated. That of age perhaps better deserves to arrest the attention of the sociologist. For it is to be noted that the average normal individual, in the course of his evolution from childhood to maturity and then to old age, describes a double curve, doubly inverse, from the point of view of his suggestibility, that is, his power to serve as a model, and his facility in imitating examples. His suggestibility, which at birth is *nil*, constantly increases to about the same age; then after having continued the same, near to the threshold of old age, the former begins to increase until it becomes unlimited, while the latter infinite, constantly decreases up to the adult age, while his suggestivity decreases

again, and falls back little by little to zero. This is a law which, to be sure, is as simple as possible, but also as universal as possible; and one that is worth formulating, because, if it did not exist, no education would be possible, and, therefore, no social conservation, no social order or progress.

Can we also formulate the psychological conditions which give more power of suggestion to an individual than to his fellowmen, and predetermine him to fascinate and magnetize them? It may be said, vaguely, that great pride, an iron will, absolute faith in one's self, the imagination of a visionary, intense passion,—all subordinated to a fixed idea, or a fixed purpose,—make the magnetizer of crowds. But we must be more exact. In his excellent work on "The American Commonwealth," James Bryce devotes long and interesting chapters to the "Bosses," those all-powerful leaders of the electorate who impose themselves through some power called "magnetism." In France, too, this type has been often repeated. But its psychology is still to be drawn. This cannot be done easily; we must include on the one hand, a great number of the vulgar specimens of the type, and on the other hand, we must study particularly some of its exceptional examples, such as Cæsar, Napoleon, and Bismarck.

As for the social conditions which favor or retard the action,—either uni-lateral or reciprocal,—of minds in contact, in order to review them all we should have to write a complete treatise on sociology. I will simply call attention to the fact that, first among all the conditions which are favorable to this action and to its being reciprocal, we must place the fact of speaking the same language; next, the possession of a common religion and similar education. This means simply that the more inter-mental action has already been exercised among the ancestors of the two persons in question, filling them with like ideas, modes of action, and feelings, the easier will it be for them, when they come to meet, to communicate to each other that part of their inner life which is new. Thus everything favors the assimilation of individuals already belonging to the same group, and therefore tends, in spite of the manifold relations of group with group, in spite of international intercourse and courtesies, to differentiate the groups from each other. Luckily, the group-circle is constantly enlarging with the domain of the surviving languages, religions, philosophies, sciences, and methods of education. What is surprising is that within each group minds and characters have not been brought to an absolute dead level. How can we explain this phenomenon, except by the inexhaustible riches of individual originality, which wells up from the depths of organic life and which is in such absolute contradiction with the prejudice of the "fundamentally homogeneous," so dear to Spencer?

Identity of religion, education, and also party, therefore, usually makes two men more suggestive and suggestible toward each other than they would otherwise be. It is not the same with identity of class. So long as there shall exist a social hierarchy, recognized instinctively even by those who deny it most strongly, the fact of belonging to a class considered higher will give authority to the words of a speaker or an orator. The very hatred that follows such a class, by bearing witness to the envy it inspires, and therefore to the superiority that men recognize in it in spite of themselves, tends to prolong its prestige. Other things being equal, the individual who belongs to a victorious or more civilized class, one who is richer in herds, or lands, or investments, according to the epoch, one who is more powerful politically, in short the most illustrious, however that which makes him illustrious may vary with time and place, enjoys the advantage of a greater suggestive power. And so his examples are more easily followed, and are propagated more rapidly and to a greater distance, whether for good or ill. The fact of being illustrious gives to a man a character as important, socially, as the fact of being conscious is important psychologically, for cerebral action. Consciousness is not a mere epiphenomenon; it is the characteristic phenomenon, efficacious above all others; so with glory. In reality, when a man acts strongly upon our thought, it is in collaboration with many other minds through which we see him, and whose cumulative opinion impresses ours commandingly. We think vaguely,—and all the more strongly the less personally we know him,—of the respect in which he is held, of the fear, hatred, or admiration which he inspires. On his reputation, limited to a small group or spread throughout a more important one which makes a considerable part of the nation, depends his influence upon our ideas and our decisions. Only, when his notoriety is limited to a narrow circle of people whom we know individually, we easily escape this cause of subjection. But when the one in question is a public man, and very famous, it is in the mass and confusedly that the indefinite group of his admirers impresses us, and this action then takes on an impersonal appearance, an air of solid objective reality which takes possession of us with irresistible force. Let me add that there is a glory of things as well as of persons. The Parthenon is glorious, the oak of Dodona was so, the Iliad and the Divine Comedy are glorious, the victory of Austerlitz is glorious, and Newton's law of gravitation is no less so. So that we can not look at, read, or listen to these things aureoled with glory without being under the suggestive influence of the judgments that we know have been passed upon them by a mass of other men, dead or living. That is a direct and close inter-spiritual action, concentrated upon the material

objects in which it is preserved; very few minds succeed in freeing themselves from the superstition of judgments thus consecrated, and, when they do succeed, it is only by outbursts of paradox,—a kind of common-places turned inside out; and it is due most often to the power of new prejudices that contradict the old.

Among other illustrious things, we should set apart, for its social importance, the celebrity of places. It may be said that one of the most characteristic features of the nineteenth century was, on the one hand, the lowering of class prestige by the diminution of inequalities among individuals, and, on the other hand, the extraordinary reënforcement of the prestige of places by the prodigious impulse given to the growth of great cities, of ancient or modern fame, and their power of example-radiation among provincial and rural populations.

If space did not fail me, I ought before concluding to say a few words of the instruments for exact measurement that inter-psychology, like intra-psychology, should use. In the first place, it may borrow from the latter some of its own, as it does when, for example, it notes the physiological effects of an attack of timidity; as it might do, also, by measuring the physical stimulation produced by a person who is stimulating instead of being intimidating. But, beside these, inter-psychology has an instrument of its own, one which must be used with great care, it is true, namely, statistics—a kind of *social psycho-physics*. I can only indicate its place here.

This is but a brief sketch, though so long an article, of what inter-psychology should be, considered as a whole, and taken up with a clear understanding of the subject by a group of co-workers. I think I may safely say that, if it were cultivated according to this program, it would greatly aid in the development of all the social sciences, starting from linguistics and comparative religion, and arriving at æsthetics by way of political economy.

THE PROBLEM OF NATURAL RELIGION

THE PRESENT POSITION

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THE term natural religion admits of a somewhat varied usage. Any treatment of the problems of religion which confines itself to an appeal to the unaided "light of nature,"—any effort to show that, apart from revelation, we can attain to truth possessing a religious value, comes within the range of the meaning of the term. In scholastic philosophy there was a definite and technical distinction made between so much of religious doctrine as the unaided human reason can demonstrate, and that portion of religion which only revelation can make known to us. The distinction has ever since been insisted upon by all the more thoughtful believers in revelation. On the other hand, all those religious inquirers who, for any reason, feel doubtful concerning either the existence, or the scope, of a revealed religion, find in the study of natural religion an undertaking that has for them an especially strong interest. Yet this strong interest is in some degree shared also by the believers in revelation themselves; for while they often are disposed to set decided limits to the claims of the unaided human reason, it always remains a matter both of apologetic and of scientific interest for them to make clear how much the unaided human reason can know concerning God, and concerning man's duty and destiny. The believer uses his natural religion both to explain the truth to the doubters, and to confirm his own faith.

Hence the field of natural religion, interesting, as it does, all thoughtful people for whom religion has any value whatever, has remained, ever since the scholastic period of philosophy, a relatively neutral territory, where believer and unbeliever could take counsel together without unkindliness, and where the conflicts of the sects could be for the time forgotten, while the highest interests of our common humanity were all the more clearly remembered.

I.

I have been called upon to define, in the present discussion, my own view of the present state of inquiry concerning the principles of natural religion. In undertaking this task, I find myself especially embarrassed by the fact that within the past few years I have been repeatedly required to go over this very ground of the problems of natural religion, and to

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state publicly my own opinions about them in great detail, from various points of view, and in several different forms. To repeat once again such an undertaking is to run the risk of having only my own hackneyed formulas to present. And nothing can be more unfair to the depth and to the beauty of the central problems of life than is such a repetition, on the part of any one, of his own former expressions. For both in philosophy and in religion the letter killeth, while the life giving and immortal spirit, whether it be called the spirit of wisdom or of goodness, needs constantly fresh embodiments, and declines to be imprisoned in any single form of words. Yet since the present task is assigned to me, I can only try to outline, in as direct and unhackneyed a fashion as is possible to me, what I take to be the central problems of natural religion, and also what I regard as the present position and prospects of this sort of inquiry. I ask, however, in advance, indulgence for my doubtless too frequent repetitions of formulas that, as teacher or as writer, I have used before. I confess freely, and insist, that such tedious restatements are not signs of any dull monotony in the genuine nature of this topic,—a topic which is as ancient, but also always as full of novelty, as life itself. No, my dull repetitions are but the result of the poverty of my own routine of thinking. Yet even because of this poverty, I shall all the more try, as I state my case, to go afresh to life itself, that the wealth and vitality of the religious interests of the human mind may supply, if fortune permits, something of what my own reflection lacks,—namely, freshness and individuality.

II.

First, then, for a statement of the problem of natural religion. It is one of the problems furnished to us by the relations between our ideals and the facts of the real world. Upon a certain apparent opposition between these two sorts of objects, ideals and facts, all religious problems depend. Let us try first to define these two sorts of objects themselves.

The conception of a world of facts is one of the most essential of the possessions of sane minds. Without such a conception, no conscious truthfulness of speech, no fidelity to definite plans of action, no clear understanding with our fellows, no reasonableness of life, is possible. The problem as to what we mean by this fact-world is the central problem of the branch of philosophy known as metaphysics. The contents of this world of facts form the topic which the numerous special sciences divide amongst themselves, and treat from various points of view, while vast ranges of facts remain still, in the present imperfect state of human knowledge, outside of the range of any special science, and are known

to us only in the forms in which our common sense at present chances to be able to deal with them. If we ask, quite apart from any more detailed study of metaphysical problems, what character seems most universally assignable to all facts, one answer seems to be that a fact is something which of itself determines whether a given statement that you, as observer or inquirer, make about it, is or is not true. Moreover, this character of any fact, this power of the fact to determine the truth or the falsity of statements made about it, is something that applies not only to *some* of the statements that you may make about it, but to *all* possible statements that anybody may make about it, so far as these statements have a precise meaning, and refer to one single fact. Thus, to illustrate, Mount Washington is one of the objects belonging to the fact-world. As such it determines, of its own nature, whether some statement made about it, say an assertion as to its height, is true or is false. It either is or is not over six thousand feet in height, and any statement that it is over six thousand feet in height is thus predetermined to truth or falsity, in case the statement is made with sufficient definiteness regarding the period of time in question, and is otherwise a statement possessed of a precise meaning. Moreover, the fact which this mountain embodies is equally decisive as to the truth or falsity of any other statement that, with a definite meaning, may be made about it, by anybody.

Even the most fleeting facts of the universe are viewed by us as possessing, during the instant of their existence, just as much definiteness as belongs to the most lasting of realities. Transiency, in the world of facts, does not, therefore, imply indecisiveness. A fact, in order to possess definiteness, need not be a lasting fact. The new star recently observed in Perseus increased thousands of times in brightness within two days, and then slowly faded away; but its brightness at any one instant during its brief period of flaring, was always some definite degree of brightness; and whatever one may assert as to that star,—as to its distance, its size, its temperature, its spectrum, or as to the physical causes of its wonderful outburst, such an assertion, made for any one phase of its existence, is predetermined to be true or false by the very nature of the facts to which the assertion refers, however fleeting the phase in question, in the life history of this star, may have been, and however enormous the changes which in a brief period may have entirely displaced and made no longer real the events or physical states to which the given assertion relates.

That facts give warrant to true assertions made about them, and determine the falsity of erroneous assertions,—this we often express by calling facts objective, in contrast to “mere ideas,” or to mere opinions

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or judgments formed or asserted about the facts. The ideas, opinions, or judgments, are then called, by contrast, subjective. The principle that facts are decisive not only as to some, but as to *all* judgments which may be made about them, so that *every* possible and perfectly definite assertion which may be made about any single fact is either simply true or simply *not* true,—this principle we often express by attributing to facts, what we call, in technical language, their *individuality*. Individuality as possessed by each and every fact, is opposed to that generality or abstractness which our so-called “mere ideas” often possess. Such generality or abstractness we do not attribute to the single facts themselves. The general characters common to many facts do, indeed, permit and require you to define as true or as false certain of the judgments which you make about an object possessing any such general characters. But so long as you judge merely about the general characters of things, you are left without the means of determining the truth or falsity of at least *some* of the judgments that may be made about the objects in question. Thus, if I ask whether mountains, conceived in general, are or are not over six thousand feet high, no simple answer to the question is predetermined, just because the query is not about single facts, but only about general characters. For the general term “mountain” names primarily an idea of mine, and no one fact. Some individual mountains are, while some are not, over six thousand feet high. So that no one simple answer to this question, no direct yes or no, is determined by my general idea of a mountain. An individual fact, however, is one whose nature decides, in advance, every question, without exception, that can be asked about it with a precise meaning. The individual mountain, at any one stage of its geological history, is or is not over six thousand feet high.

So much, then, as to the most universal characters which we are accustomed to attribute to the world of facts. But now as to the other member of the pair of apparently opposed terms which we mentioned a moment ago, in beginning our definition of the problem of religion. We spoke of the contrast between facts and ideals. What is an ideal?

An ideal may take the form of a plan for our own conduct, of an aspiration or hope regarding our character or fortune, or of a hypothetical account of a state of things that we have not yet observed or confirmed. An ideal does not necessarily come to our minds in a very determinate form. It often appears as a very abstract and general idea. Yet it may, upon some occasions, seem to us to be embodied in facts, as when we call a beautiful day, or person, or deed, an ideal object of its own type. But in any case, an ideal, as it first comes to our consciousness, usually seems to differ from a fact in that it appears powerless to determine of

its own self whether certain judgments that we wish to make about its relation to the world of fact are true or false, while, on the other hand, our ideal is so much our own that we ourselves seem to determine what does and what does not belong to it or agree with it. Thus facts are determinate, and so bind our assertions to determinate truth or falsity. But our ideals may appear to us in an indeterminate form, and in any case we ourselves seem to give them whatever determinateness they come to possess. Facts we just called objective. An ideal comes to us as something of our own, as something subjective. Since we ourselves, in the very act of possessing our ideals, seem to determine by our own nature and attitude what does and what does not belong to them, or agree with them, they consequently seem to change as we change, to grow as we grow, and to express, primarily, our own will and our own personal meaning. On the other hand, they suggest to us assertions, such as the hopeful assertions, "My ideal will prevail," "I shall succeed," "The facts will be found to bear out and embody my ideal." And nevertheless, as the ideals come to our consciousness, they do not appear, of themselves, to predetermine in the least whether these assertions are or are not true. It is the fact-world, as we are accustomed to say, which decides about this aspect of the matter. You may form what ideals you will. The question always is whether or no the facts permit your ideal to be realized.

In general, the nature of an ideal is definable in terms of one of the most familiar and fundamental of our conceptions, namely, in terms of the conception of the Ought. An ideal is an idea that, from our point of view as believers in this ideal, *ought to be* a fact. If it is a distinctly practical ideal, this *ought* takes the ethical form. My moral ideal is an idea that I myself ought to embody in the form of fact, by means of my own deeds. For if our human ideals seem, as such, incapable of predetermining whether or no the facts shall embody them, the power of our will to determine certain outer facts is supposed to be, in individual cases, itself one of the facts of life. And an ideal that I accept, as mine, and am able to embody, or to turn into a fact, by a deed of my own, is, for me, a matter of duty, that is, of the moral ought. There remains, however, the vast range covered by those ideals of ours which our human will seems powerless to embody. They ought, in our opinion, to be real. As subjective ideals, they seem to us, in the form in which they come to our human consciousness, to be incapable of determining, by themselves, whether the facts do or do not embody them. We also, as weak human creatures, are powerless to realize them by our personal deeds. Yet they seem to us, in at least some cases, infinitely significant.

To confine ourselves here merely to these, the most significant ideals, we may say at once that they are, in the civilized man's mind, the topics of religious faith and doctrine. The ultimate triumph of the right, the attainment of the good as the final goal of ill, the immortal destiny of man, the accordance of the world's whole plan with the demands of reason,—these, in our civilized consciousness, are supreme and fundamental ideals. They ought, in our opinion, to be real. They are ideals about the world as a whole. As we men conceive them, we are unable, by our own individual power, to make them real. The facts which we seem so far to observe in the known world, do not yet manifestly and adequately embody them. And as subjective ideals, they do not appear to us to be capable, of themselves, of deciding between the truth and the falsity of the assertions which we make in hypothetically attributing to them a sovereignty over all facts. Hence, as they stand in our minds, they have not yet the place in the world of facts which they themselves seek or demand. Accordingly, our religious consciousness looks elsewhere than in ourselves, or in them, or in the regions of the fact-world which are so far apparently accessible to our observation, for the Being who, as we conceive, is able and willing to give them the determinate expression in the realm of facts which we think that they ought to possess. The problem of our religious consciousness is the problem whether we have any right to regard such a Being as himself a fact, or the whole world of facts, seen and unseen by us, as the expression of his will, or as destined in the end, or on the whole, to manifest this will.

Such, then, is in substance, the mere statement of our religious problem. Commonplace as this elementary analysis of the concept of fact and of ideal may seem, we shall soon find that upon precisely such elementary commonplaces, easily neglected by reflection because they are so familiar in experience, a sound method of thinking concerning ultimate problems depends.

III.

The problem of natural religion having been thus defined, we turn to the question, What does the light of nature indicate to us regarding the solution of the problem? And here at once we are met by a method of endeavoring to answer this question which in former ages was of great historical importance for the course of discussion concerning natural religion. This method consists in trying to follow the light of nature by examining the implications of what science and common knowledge reveal to us concerning the physical world, concerning its laws, its

development, its general constitution,—in a word, its reasonableness. The term *physical world* is a collective name for a vast mass of facts which we seem to have come in some measure to know. If we ask, then, as to the contents of the fact-world, our knowledge of external nature seems at first to give us our only accessible and definite reply. And this knowledge, resulting from the accumulated experience of many generations of men, has of late vastly increased, and constitutes today a comparatively well organized whole, with regard to which very large generalizations are already both possible and inevitable. It seems wise, then, to ask whether this, our knowledge of physical nature, when viewed in the most comprehensive way, gives us convincing evidence that the facts of the universe, despite their complexity and obscurity, are, on the whole, the embodiment of ideals which we can recognize and accept. In other words, does nature, as known to us, present to our view a sufficient agreement with ideal purposes to prove that some Being exists whose will is expressed in the facts and laws of nature? As we have already said, it is, indeed, true that the facts of the universe, as now known to us men, do not embody our highest ideals in a fashion that appears to us at once adequate and manifest. But, since we are also aware that at present we are acquainted only with a fragment of reality, the question is whether the fragment revealed to us through our acquaintance with outer nature is a recognizable embodiment of ideals to an extent sufficient to give us sound reason for believing that, if we could know the whole, we should see that it is in agreement with our highest ideals. Such an effort to trace, amidst all the obscurities of the fact-world, the signs of a divine plan,—to decipher the obscure inscription of which our experience shows us, as it were, fragments, to read in nature the manifestation of the purposes of God,—has, for many thinkers, of the foretime, constituted the mainstay of natural religion. The question regarding the value of this effort possesses a peculiar interest at the present time, in view of the importance which our knowledge of nature has justly acquired in modern life. But this interest has been made especially, and tragically central, in recent discussion, in view of the fact that, during the second half of the nineteenth century, the results of the study of nature have seemed, to many of the guides of popular opinion, to constitute not, as so often in former ages, a significant auxiliary to natural religion, but rather the principal barriers in the way of an ideal interpretation of the universe,—the principal obstacle to a religious assurance. The significance of this change of view, the reason for this turning of one of the principal weapons of the older forms of natural religion against every religious

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interest, can best be indicated here by means of a word regarding the general history of discussion during the nineteenth century.

In earlier centuries the doctrine of natural religion made frequent and positive use of the orderliness of nature, and of the adaptation of natural facts to man's needs, both as proof that the order of the physical world must be due to the designs of an all powerful creator, and as evidence that these designs must include a benevolent intent to fulfill the highest ideals which man is able to form regarding his own life and its meaning. But by the close of the eighteenth century, these older forms of natural theology were brought into considerable discredit amongst more critical thinkers. The scepticism of Hume had shown how little rational necessity belonged to certain of the principles which the natural theologians had all along been assuming. The profound alteration which the thought of Kant demanded regarding the foundations of all human knowledge appeared, for the time, to make utterly vain every effort to prove the existence of a creator by the signs of his purposes which one seemed to find manifest in nature. For, from Kant's point of view, what we call nature is simply the realm of man's outer experience of phenomena, of the appearances of the sense organized in accordance with the principles of our understanding. We can know nothing, theoretically speaking, about any ultimate facts whatever. We can reach, and should properly seek, no ultimate explanations of phenomena. We know, in case of nature, only the occurrences and the relations of such phenomena, such facts of experience, themselves. The order of this world of human experience, in so far as it is manifested in the laws of nature, is due to the conditions under which phenomena come to enter into the field of our knowledge. For our own understanding predetermines what forms must belong to the phenomena, in case we are to understand them. Meanwhile the ideally interesting character of nature, its beauty, where that is present, its teleology, where that appears, are objects which our judgment recognizes as present in experience, but which our limited powers forbid us to refer to any one theoretically intelligible and ultimate cause as their source. Natural theology can, therefore, never rest upon our knowledge of nature. Its source must be found elsewhere; and Kant actually looked for the true basis of natural religion not in any theoretical procedure of thought, but in the demands or postulates made by our moral consciousness. In general, Kant's result was that since phenomena alone are accessible to us, while things in themselves are unknowable, the older bases for natural religion must be abandoned.

During the transition from the eighteenth to the nineteenth century, there sprang up, upon the basis prepared by Kant, the idealistic move-

ment in philosophy. Accepting Kant's central thesis that our knowledge is necessarily confined to the realm of organized experience, and that facts outside of all experience can never be known, this idealistic movement, nevertheless, attempted to show that the principles manifested even in our very experience itself, have a certain divine and absolute significance, and so do enable us to know something of the nature of an Absolute Being, whose life is manifested even in our own personal selfhood, and whose characters are precisely such as the deepest religious consciousness has sought to define in speaking of God. With this idealistic movement we have not, at this stage of our discussion, especially to do. It suffices at the moment to say that, after a period of great activity, this movement, just because it had too much neglected to take account of the work of the special sciences of nature, fell into a certain discredit with the philosophical public. By the middle of the nineteenth century a renewed and most fruitful activity was manifested in the study of outer nature. New generalizations of vast scope and importance, derived from a study of physical phenomena, began to become more and more central in the field of human attention. The physical world came anew to appear as the one accessible revelation to man regarding the knowable nature of things. The nineteenth century became, more and more as it advanced, the century of science.

But this new study of the special sciences of nature was still very generally pursued in the spirit which Kant's rigid criticism of the limitations of our knowledge had first made conscious and definite. The further natural knowledge advanced, the less were most of the leaders of opinion disposed to use it for the sake of proving the existence or of defining the plans of any Being beyond or behind nature. The knowable, they now said, was the fact-world as manifested in human experience. The more critical students of the theory of knowledge, therefore, often insisted, quite in Kant's spirit, that all our insight into nature was concerned solely with the phenomena, with appearances, never with ultimate truths, and that we could learn from science only the ways in which human experience is capable of being organized, in such wise that the facts of our experience can be predicted in advance of their occurrence. Like Kant, such critical students of the principles of science thus rejected every effort to give ultimate explanations, and therefore declined to see any foundation for natural religion in the results of scientific inquiry. But meanwhile there were, amongst the students of nature, those who were less cautious, and who did indeed attempt, in some measure, to use the results of science for the purpose of getting a notion of the ultimate nature of things. Yet such investigators, also, were for the most part

quite indisposed to return to the principles of the older forms of natural religion. For the one great lesson which such students were disposed to read as the result of the natural sciences was that physical nature, being subject to unchangeable law, is very strongly contrasted with the whole realm of our ideals. For our ideals, in demanding, as they do, scope for individual initiative, and endless progress towards absolute goals, and the possibility of the occurrence of novel and significant deeds, define precisely what nature, that is, the fact-world, declines (as such thinkers maintain) to present to us. For, as such students were disposed to insist, in nature, as conceived under the form of rigid law, nothing essentially novel ever happens. The natural world consists of matter whose mass is invariable. All the changes of this matter are to be conceived as mere alterations of its ultimate parts. These changes themselves all occur so as to involve a perfect conservation of energy. All that happens is essentially predictable. Hence all appearance of significant novelty is an illusion. Progress is at best no universal fact, but is only a more or less temporary appearance. Individuals are but instances of the necessary laws themselves, and have no true initiative. Free will is impossible, and our deeds are only particular instances amongst the phenomena of nature, and are, like other phenomena, wholly subject to law. Thus over against our fluent and living ideals, stands a realm of fact whose characters are essentially changeless and lifeless.

Thus both the more critical and the more dogmatic students of the general results of our modern knowledge of nature have shown a disposition, in recent times, to decline to base any doctrine of natural religion upon these results. The more critical students have declared that we can never transcend the limitations of our experience of nature, or learn anything about what lies beyond or behind this experience. The more dogmatic thinkers have indeed regarded our natural knowledge as throwing some true light upon the actual constitution of the world of facts, but have all the more been led to make a very sharp contrast between this constitution and that which our ideals define, so that, in sum, our modern knowledge of nature has been viewed as a barrier in the way of natural religion, rather than as any auxiliary in our search for a positive knowledge that the world of fact possesses an ideal character. Such, then, has been the situation of a great deal of recent thinking regarding the relations of the sciences to natural theology.

IV.

And now, what shall we say regarding the merits of this controversy? Is our modern knowledge of nature an auxiliary, or is it rather in its

whole tendency, a logical obstacle to natural theology? In answer I can here only briefly mention a few leading considerations that bear upon this side of our topic. First, then, I regard the whole investigation of the bases of our knowledge of nature, which Kant initiated, as of the most lasting importance, not only for the problems of the logic of science, but also for the true interests of natural religion. For I hold that the outcome of Kant's investigation of the bases of our knowledge, while making us justly sceptical regarding all the efforts of the pre-Kantian theologians to read in physical nature the convincing marks of God's handiwork, does, nevertheless, prepare the way for an interpretation of the true relation between facts and ideals,—for an interpretation, I say, which goes far beyond anything that those older forms of natural theology were ever able to reach. Kant and his critical followers are right in saying that no knowledge of physical nature which is accessible to us men under our present conditions is, when taken by itself, capable of giving us trustworthy proof either as to the existence or as to the purpose of any Being whom we can justly regard as the author of the physical world. The older forms of natural theology were logically unsound. They were founded upon a failure to appreciate the true place which our knowledge of the physical world occupies in the whole scheme of our life and of our rational insight. Kant justly set them aside. But, on the other hand, this negative result of Kant's critical philosophy can be reached only by means of certain general considerations concerning the very definition of facts and of ideals, of knowledge and of being. And these considerations, once rightly understood, lead us to positive results which Kant himself only dimly foresaw. I shall speak further of these results. They are of critical importance for the proving and for the proper use and improvement of the genuine principles of natural religion.

But secondly, even without going into these deeper aspects of the problem regarding the limits of knowledge, it is not hard to show that if our present knowledge of the physical world does not give us any positive proof of the existence and of the plans of God, those have been over-hasty who have undertaken to show that our acquaintance with external nature is such as to furnish any definite presumption *against* the supremacy of ideals in the constitution of the universe. It is not merely true that our empirical acquaintance with the physical world is still too narrow and fragmentary to give us any power to prove a negative regarding the presence of ideals in or behind the world of facts. One can go further, and can say that the evidence which is often supposed most to tell against the claims of natural religion is in large part the result of a perfectly recognizable human illusion, of a false emphasis which certain of our

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interests strongly tend to make us give to one side only of our really very complex and diverse experience of that form of reality which we call the physical world.

For the negative evidence in question is supposed to rest upon the discovery that this physical world is a realm where unchanging law is actually universal, where the mass of matter and the quantity of energy are alike invariable, where, since all occurs according to rigid laws, everything, from the point of view of omniscience, would be predictable, where freedom and essential novelty, and all individual initiative, are consequently alike impossible. It is supposed that such a world, once shown to be the true world of facts, stands in such hopeless contrast with what our fluent and living ideals demand, that hereby a strong presumption is created against any view which tries to conceive the universe as a manifestation of ideals.

But whoever accepts this position with regard to the whole matter forgets by what sort of evidence this supposed result regarding the physical world has been reached. Man, ever since the stone age, and before, has been engaged in a ceaseless struggle with the mysteries and with the actually endless varieties of what we now call outer nature. He has been able to survive only because he has learned to organize his own conduct, and to coöperate with his fellows. But both this organization of his conduct, and this social coöperation with his fellows, have in their turn depended upon man's power to select, amidst the maze of his experience, (1) those phenomena in which he could successfully detect some definite and controllable routine, and (2) those which he could successfully describe to his fellows, and about which he could thus learn to agree with his fellows, so as consciously to observe, to define, and to use these experiences in common with the other men. Now it is precisely so much of human experience as chances to possess this sort of definite and controllable routine, which we have learned to regard as furnishing to us the signs that tell us about what we usually call the physical world. For by the physical world we very generally mean precisely so much of the whole world of our experience as we men can learn, with socially effective results, to control, to describe, to predict, and to conceive in common. But the very idea of outer nature, thus in question, is the outcome of a long struggle to select those facts of human experience which permit us to describe them and, in our social coöperation, to control them together. So much of our experience as we can so far neither describe nor control nor predict we therefore often regard as at best a faulty and relatively illusory indication of physical facts; and we do this simply because our whole long struggle to attain the mastery over our life has

trained us to search for the uniformities of experience, and to regard them as indicating the existence and the true essence of natural facts, while we have come to define either as personal and subjective, or as narrow and misleading, so much of our experience as does not bring us to a knowledge of exactly definable natural laws and facts. These are the grounds that have led us to emphasize the uniformity and mechanical characters of the physical world as its most essential ones.

Now that such a search for law, for describable uniformities of natural fact, and for an order in our experience should, after so many centuries of more or less conscious struggle, have proved at length so wonderfully successful, as it has proved in the course of the history of recent science,—this fact surely does not tend to *disprove* the tendency of great ideals to triumph at last over the confusing oppositions that long may stand in their way. For this our modern conception of nature is itself the partial but very significant realization of a great practical ideal, namely, of the ideal of man's control over the guidance of his individual and social life. So far, then, the success of our science in being able to select out of the seeming chaos of our raw experience systems of facts so coherent, uniform, describable, and common to all men, that they serve the purpose of enabling us to organize our lives, and our whole social order, this success of our science, I say, would seem to tend to illustrate how, after all, rational and ideal interests may be destined, in the long run, to win in this universe.

But, nevertheless, it is this very picture of the success of our scientific ideals which has for many of us that reverse and disheartening aspect upon which I have just dwelt. For the success of the ideal of describing and controlling certain regions of human experience has gone hand in hand with the inevitable tendency to regard just these regions of experience as furnishing the best evidence of what the real nature of the physical world and of the whole universe may be. We forget that we have all along been making in our sciences a deliberate selection of portions only of human experience. Hence we easily fall into an illusion,—the result of a false emphasis. In truth, a Shakespeare or a Plato regarded as a man amongst men, is at least just as much a part of the real world of natural fact as is a permanent mass of matter, or as is the total energy of a physical system of bodies. But since we can neither describe nor explain nor predict Plato and Shakespeare, we are obliged to be content with enjoying their ideal meaning, with estimating them as guides or as masters, and with saying very little about their describable place in the natural order. We merely presume that somehow they too must conform to natural law, we know not how. The typical natural

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facts we thus come to regard as the most rigid and describable ones; but we tend to do this merely because our principal interest, in our struggle with outer nature, has been an interest in getting a socially organized control over it. But if we look closer, we see that this very tendency to make so vast a contrast between the rigid and permanent natural facts and laws upon the one hand, and our own ideals upon the other, is due to the very conditions which have caused the conceptions of both these classes of objects to develop together in our minds. It is just for the sake of our own ideals that we have tended to conceive external nature in so unideal a fashion. In brief, human civilization depends upon two things. It depends, namely, (1) upon making what we call the physical world appear to us more and more as a sort of storehouse and system of controllable instruments, of tools, of mechanisms, and of phenomena that we regard as behaving with mechanical uniformity, so as to be either practically or conceptually controllable. But such phenomena, viewed as realities, come to seem to us the very opposite of ideals. On the other hand, civilization depends (2) upon the growth, the intensification, the constantly increasing love of our human ideals. Hence, however, the tendency to bring into sharper and sharper contrast our ideals on the one hand, and our conceptions of external nature on the other. And since we have tended, to a very great extent, to call natural phenomena real in proportion as we have learned to think of them as instances of rigid and verifiable law, the contrast of the mechanically conceived facts and the ideals, has tended to grow disheartening. And that is why, in so much of modern thought, a theoretical materialism regarding the nature of things flourishes side by side with a growing sensitiveness to the significance of ideals. At the moment when philanthropy becomes far reaching and ardent, a belief that, after all, the universe is a cruel and heartless mechanism, becomes prevalent. And yet I repeat, all this contrast is a result of false emphasis. The resulting modern tragedy of opinion is due to a mere abstraction, a false insistence upon one of two actually correlative terms. If you look more closely you see that what we know most certainly of all about nature is that men live in it, and spring from it, and possess their ideals, and war for these ideals, and often win in their warfare. These men themselves, together with all their ideals, are at least as genuine natural phenomena as any of the others. They have at least as much right as the permanent mass and the invariant physical energy of the physical universe to be taken into account when we estimate the genuine relations of facts and ideals. By no such special estimates shall we ever come to decide ultimate questions; but so far, if one views the whole matter in a judicial spirit, one can say, I think, that, fully

accepting all the inductively acquired results of the special sciences of nature, we have so far merely a drawn battle between the partisans and the opponents of an interpretation of the universe in terms of ideals. Neither side can win in such a contest; for every such method of dealing with our problem involves emphasizing now one and now another special group of facts of experience; and all hypotheses which undertake to unify, upon a purely empirical basis, these various groups of facts, are subject to essential alteration as soon as new groups of facts shall appear. But at all events our empirical knowledge of nature furnishes no presumption against the truth of natural religion.

I may venture to add, in leaving this branch of our topic, that despite the foregoing tendency to emphasize falsely the mechanical aspect of nature, some of the very largest of our modern inductions about the physical world are the ones that seem most to suggest, what of course by themselves they cannot prove, namely, that the physical world is rather the expression of a mental than of a mechanical process, and in so far has at least analogies with our own ideal interests. The doctrine of evolution, by indicating that we men ourselves, including also the Platos and the Shakespeares, are products of genuinely natural processes, tends to establish a relative continuity between material and mental phenomena. It seems somewhat easier to interpret the meaning of this analysis by supposing the material world to be a phenomenal manifestation of mental processes, than by the reverse hypothesis. But still more, the principle of the irreversible character of most of the processes whereby energy is transformed in the physical world, becomes, of late, more and more prominent in our conceptions of nature. This principle is certainly of very vast scope. It seems to have some very deep meaning. It is a principle which has been declared inconsistent with a purely mechanical theory of the nature of the physical world. This principle, in connection with certain other facts, has led of late to an effort to reduce all natural phenomena to transformations, or to states of more or less temporary equilibrium, of what we now call energy. This effort goes so far with some scientific thinkers, as to take the form of an attempt to do away with the concept of matter altogether, and to reduce the whole physical world to a collection of forms and transformations of energy. Where the equilibrium of a given distribution and grouping of energy remains for a long time nearly or quite invariant, we have the phenomena of masses of matter. But these need not be absolutely invariable. In long enough periods of time all natural things may undergo change. In essence the physical world thus tends to be conceived as through and through fluent. But minds, as known in our ordi-

nary experience, have just this fluent character. Only they, as they are known to us, change at a more rapid rate. Such a conception of an essentially fluent nature,—the world of Heraclitus restored upon the basis of the generalizations of modern knowledge,—seems thus at present to be at least a tolerable empirical conception; and as such it has been suggested by at least one famous, although no doubt somewhat speculative scientific thinker,—Ostwald. He, to be sure, is not disposed to emphasize quite as much as I here do the resulting analogy between natural and mental processes. I have neither the right nor the desire to estimate the scientific worth of this conception; but it enables one to summarize a great many facts in a simple way. It suggests that the false emphasis which materialism has laid upon the contrast between matter and mind may prove in future to be not so persistent a tendency of speculation regarding nature as I myself have been accustomed, for the reasons just stated, to expect it to prove.

The analogies between certain aspects of the physical world and the processes characteristic of a mind do not here cease. I repeat that these analogies seem to me to be manifested in a number of the most important and most pervasive of the aspects of the natural order. The whole tendency of nature to the formation of new individuals,—a very widespread tendency which Professor Shaler has recently discussed in his volume entitled "The Individual," displays many analogies with the processes characteristic of mind. There exists, also, an analogy between the tendency of minds to form habits, and certain tendencies even in what we call inorganic nature, which seem to be very pervasive. This analogy has been studied at length by various thinkers. As a result of such analogies we may say that while the older natural theology was indeed faulty in its effort to demonstrate, by the design argument, the existence and the plans of God, nevertheless, at the present time the hypothesis that what we call the physical world is throughout the manifestation of mind, appears, upon a purely empirical basis, and apart from an idealistic philosophy, at least as plausible a cosmological hypothesis as is the supposition that the physical world consists, let us say, of vortex rings that move about in a frictionless fluid.

As a fact, however, no such hypothesis is thus to be demonstrated. Ultimate questions demand thoroughgoing inquiries. I have dwelt upon these ambiguous aspects and tendencies of modern inquiry partly because we are often tempted to believe that the empirical evidence regarding the bases of natural religion tends all in one direction, and partly because the cultivation of a genuinely judicial spirit involves an effort to see both sides of this great modern controversy.

V.

Yet we have not gone forth into this wilderness of physical mysteries merely to see the reed of opinion shaken by the wind. I have had a positive purpose in mind even in dwelling upon the indecisive character of our present knowledge of the natural order. The present inability of the human mind to come into the desired direct contact with ultimate facts illustrates a principle of the utmost importance regarding the true relations of facts and ideals.

I ventured, at the outset of this discussion, to define facts as individual, as determinate, that is, as decisive of the truth or falsity of all assertions which refer to them. Whatever the real world is, it consists of such precisely determinate facts, and that, too, whether these facts be finite or infinite in number and complexity, whether they be permanent or transient, material or spiritual. To deny this principle of the determinateness of all the real facts of the universe would lead to a direct self-contradiction. For if you make any given assertion about the real world, or about anything in the real world, and if that assertion has any definite meaning, then the assertion in question is either true or false. To say that it was neither true nor false would be self-contradictory. But now the truth or falsity of this assertion constitutes its relation to the facts. It has, then, a perfectly definite relation to the facts, and the facts have a determinate relationship to that assertion, just because it is true or false regarding them. Since this principle holds of every possible assertion about facts, we can only conceive the facts as themselves possessed of absolutely determinate characters. There is nothing indecisive about them. Or to sum up the matter in a well known formula of the textbooks, everything in the world is precisely what it is, and either does or does not possess any predicate that, with a precise meaning, may be assigned to it. To say all this is, indeed, to reiterate the commonplace of logic.

Yet observe in what a strange situation this, the first principle of all sane thinking, places us when we compare it with that very state of indecision, of inquiry, in which our study of the physical world has just left us. What we have just exemplified is our inability to observe for ourselves at present, any ultimate facts concerning the true constitution of the physical world. And yet, as we inevitably say: The true physical world, that is, the genuine and ultimate reality of which the natural phenomena are a hint, really has a precise, an individual, a perfectly definite constitution. Only our experience is at present too narrow, too special, too indeterminate, to reveal to us what that constitution is. Now

precisely this imperfection of our experience which our ignorance of the natural world exemplifies, this same imperfection is illustrated by the state of our finite human experience wherever we turn. It is as Kant said: In our human experience, as at present constituted, no ultimate facts, no perfectly determinate realities, such as our thinking demands, are anywhere presented to our observation,—and yet, with perfect assurance, we, nevertheless, insist that there *are* ultimate facts, and that they *are* decisive as against all our mere opinions. Now what does this whole baffling situation of our finite life mean?

It means, I answer, above all, this: Our very conception of a world of determinate facts is one of our ideals, and is in truth the central one amongst all our ideals. When we at the outset opposed the fact-world to the whole world of ideals, we were merely emphasizing a contrast amongst our ideals themselves. This contrast has constant and practical value in life, just because the idealism of discovering determinate truth is, indeed, sovereign amongst our purposes, and hence stands in strong relief over against lesser purposes. But in truth, a genuinely determinate and individual fact remains for our finite experience an ideal object, just as much as perfect saintliness or perfect beauty or perfect blessedness remain ideal objects. A fact is an object that we ought to observe, were we only wise enough, but that, in its truly determinate individual character, we do not observe; an object that we ought to seek, and do seek through all the process of our experience, but that we could find only in case our experience won a type of constitution which at present it essentially lacks. No man hath seen God at any time. But just so, no man hath seen a single individual fact, a single perfectly determinate content of experience. A fact is merely that which we should experience if our insight had become perfectly determinate with reference to all our possible inquiries, so that we found present that which answered all conceivable questions regarding its own constitution.

Therefore, to attribute to the universe the determinate constitution which we have already found it necessary to attribute to the world of facts, is to regard the real world as the expression of at least one of our most central ideals. But while this ideal does, indeed, stand in a marked contrast with many other ideals, in the form which these ideals assume in our present stage of development, the contrast is not and cannot be such as to involve a permanent and absolute opposition.

For, in the next place, as to the point which Kant treated so negatively: The ultimate facts do, indeed, lie beyond any insight that our present human experience ever reaches; but this does not mean or imply that the ultimate facts of the universe lie beyond all experience, both human and

such as is not now human. For when we seek for facts, we simply follow any direction of research which seems to lead us towards a more determinate and definite experience. Experience grows more definite as it answers more definite questions. But it does not cease to be experience by becoming thus nearer to determination. Nor is that determinate state of things which furnishes the precise decision as to every question that can be asked, a state of things such as is able to exist apart from any and all experience. On the contrary, in order to be a world of facts, the world must be present to some experience, and in truth to an experience of absolute and divine completeness. For to possess any ideas, to make any assertions, to ask any questions, is, in us, a conscious process. And what this process seeks, in so far as it seeks to know the facts, is precisely the attainment of a conscious state wherein questions are seen to be determinately answered. No search for an ideal is a search for anything beyond all consciousness. It is a search for a complete expression of some conscious process. This state of consciousness wherein questions are determinately answered remains, from the point of view of a finite, of a searching and inquiring consciousness, an ideal object of search. And that state of consciousness is the only object that the ideal of the truth seeker can define as his goal. To say, as we must, that this ideal is actually realized, and that such realization constitutes the very nature of the true universe, is to assert simply that there is, then, a consciousness for which all questions are answered. Now such a consciousness is a mind to which all reality, natural and spiritual, is present in a perfectly determinate and individual form. No other account can consistently be given of the nature of facts. There are facts. They are perfectly determinate. They are such as to answer all questions and such as to decide regarding the truth and falsity of all assertions. For any inquiring consciousness these facts remain ideal objects, sought but not yet fully found, limited in experience, but not wholly possessed, approached as one's experience grows more determinate, but definable only as the objects that would be present were the ideal of the truth seeker now and here fulfilled, and were his experience perfectly determinate, as now it is not. To assert that this ideal is not a mere ideal, but is fulfilled, is expressed by the real world, is to assert that the real world is present to a determinate and complete experience for which all questions about fact are answered. Now such an experience has at least the character of a divine omniscience, and it has all reality as its own present object.

Yet there still remains the contrast between the ideal of the truth seeker, viewed merely as the search for determinate experience, and for the decision, through this experience, of every question,—between this

ideal, I say, and these ideals of the moralist, of the lover of beauty, of the seeker for the triumph of righteousness with which we began. Even if we regard the fact-world as thus necessarily and simply a certain total of observed contents, present to a complete and determinate conscious experience, for which and in which are all things, does that throw any light upon the question whether the fact-world fulfills any other ideals than those of mere truth seeking? Are the facts otherwise the fulfillment of ideals except as they merely possess decisive and determinate character?

To this question a very simple consideration furnishes, in my opinion, the sufficient answer. Mere contents of experience, presented as our sensations are presented to us, can never be, of themselves, precisely determinate, not even if there were present an infinite variety and complexity of them. All such facts are still general in character. A being who merely saw such facts would see nothing final or decisive. In order to possess value as a determinate fact, an experience must embody an intention, must fulfill the purposes of a will.

Even the ideal of truth seeking already illustrates this principle. For one who seeks truth does not seek mere wealth of experience, but determinateness of experience. He wants to know what is and what is not true. He wants to find out what is excluded by reality as well as what is presented. Now that some possible content of experience does not exist, this no being can recognize who merely observes various presented contents of experience, however numerous. To know that some possible object does not exist involves seeing that such a possible content is inconsistent with what does exist. Now no two mere contents of experience are inconsistent, as mere contents, with one another. But purpose can conflict with purpose, plan with plan, affirmation with negation, deed with deed. Hence I insist that in the world of our absolute experience nothing can be viewed as finally decided merely in terms of presented or absent contents of experience. The decision must be as between alternatives possessing value for a will. It is will that expresses itself determinately, and that gives individuality to facts. The absolute experience must also be an absolute will, and the universe must be the expression of such a will. Thus, then, in the world of the absolute experience, the ideal of the truth seeker cannot be fulfilled alone. In order for the ideal of the truth seeker to be fulfilled, all other ideals must be taken into account.

For the rest, as you at once see, all finite ideals have some sort of determinate relation to the world of facts. But suppose that in the world of determinate facts some particular ideal of ours, I care not what,

is found to be, from the final or absolute point of view, an ideal that the facts do not fulfill, but defeat, do not accomplish, but set aside. Now this defeat of our moral or æsthetic or personal ideals is, by hypothesis, a fact, and a fact belonging to the absolute or final world of experience. Now what merely presented fact of sense taken by itself, apart from some highly ideal interpretation, ever could show you or anybody that any ideal which you have once seriously possessed is actually defeated and excluded from any place of being? I call upon you who have waited and toiled for ideals, amidst all sorts of empirical discouragements, who have struggled with opposing fortunes, to bear me witness that the merely presented contents of experience, as our senses show them to us, can never prove that an ideal has failed, but can only illustrate how it has not yet succeeded. Ordinary common sense says, in the presence of apparent failure, "Wait and see," "Try again." In other words, it is not yet known, in any particular instance, and by mere presented experience that reality determinately excludes your ideal. Only a knowledge of the whole realm of fact could show that. Even death, taken as an empirical fact, never proves that love has really failed, losing altogether her own from the realm of reality. For faith and hope define, as at least a possibility, a higher life where love may find again her own. The mere possibility thus defined must no doubt be determinately settled, yes or no, from the point of view of that absolute experience to which we have now appealed as the knower of all reality. But from the point of view even of this absolute experience, what can be found present that would determinately say no to any once suggested possibility? What can wholly exclude a once defined possibility from being recognized and included by that absolute experience?

I answer here by brief illustrations. Once geometers sought long for the solution of the problem called squaring the circle. This problem was one of their ideals. All sorts of experiences of temporary failure came to them as they tried various constructions in the effort to solve the problem. No such particular experiences could have ever shown that the desired solution of their problem had no existence in the realm of truth. For centuries they pursued the research. At last, however, they reached, as late as the year 1882, the definitive settlement of the quest about the circumference and area of the circle. And now what settled the question? I answer, the discovery which brought the problem to a conclusion was at once a defeat and a victory, an abandonment and a fulfillment of the original ideal. One abandoned this ideal in its cruder form, but fulfilled even thereby its true meaning in a higher form. What the mathematicians had all along meant and defined as the length of the

circumference of a circle was definitely proved to be an existent object, but was shown to be one that could not be constructed or measured by any of the methods which the ancient geometers originally applied for the purpose, so that thus far the ancient effort was shown to be foredoomed to failure. On the other hand, the discovery of this very failure involved really fulfilling the immortal soul of the ancient ideal, by showing what the real and positive properties of the length of the circumference were, and what the ideal in question had all along really meant. In brief, the old ideal was included in a new one; and what it had directly undertaken was shown to be impossible, merely by showing what the deeper meaning of this undertaking was, and what the hidden implications of the ancient ideal were.

In a similar way, the seekers after perpetual motion used to aim after a certain sort of control over nature. The assurance, never absolute, was made in course of time indefinitely probable, that the ideal of the seekers of perpetual motion, as they had defined it, was false, or was excluded by the nature of things. But this very assertion has involved, in fact, a realization, upon a higher level, of the immortal soul of the very ideal itself of the seekers of perpetual motion. For upon the postulate of the impossibility of perpetual motion is founded the whole modern theory of energy, the greatest generalization of physical science, and the one which defines our highest yet attained control over natural phenomena.

These illustrations bring to light the principle which I here have in mind. No ideal, from my point of view, fails unless the absolute experience excludes its expression. But the ideal itself exists. Account must, therefore, be taken of it even in excluding it. Now one who takes account of an ideal, and who finds that, nevertheless, as it is stated, it cannot consistently with the whole of truth be fulfilled, does not merely observe particular contents of experience which here and there delay or prevent its fruition. He observes how, when carried out of its own legitimate consequences, the true meaning of this partial ideal can only be consistently fulfilled in some form which transforms, and yet in some measure retains the genuine, the deeper meaning of the original ideal itself. The absolute will, then, in confirming or defeating finite ideals, takes account of them, and fulfills their true intent even when it sets aside their cruder expression. The immortal soul of every ideal is determinately fulfilled in the absolute.

VI.

Now such is the view of the inmost nature of the fact-world to which we are led, as I hold, by an effort to think out to the end the very criti-

cism of our finite knowledge which Kant initiated. It is true that as we now are, we never experience the true nature of any ultimate facts. But that is because ultimate facts exist only as the determinate contents of an absolute experience, for which they are what they are merely because this experience, expressing as it does, ideals, excludes what is inconsistent with these ideals. This absolute Experience is also an absolute Will. Its life is the world. Its facts exist only as known and as willed. But it is not merely an Absolute Will. It takes account of every finite will, and is in fact the true fulfillment of the higher meaning of every finite will. For it excludes and defeats any special form of finite ideal only by including the true meaning of this very ideal in some higher form. Hence your religious instinct is right in affirming, as it does, what you often express thus, "God, that is, the absolute Will, takes account of me, of my ideals and intents, and opposes my will only in so far as he also includes and fulfills it. I, the individual, dwell in God, as he dwells in me. His providence takes account of my every ideal. I never fail except by winning in some higher form, the very ideal that I meant." Such are the fundamental considerations upon which, as I hold, we must today, amidst all the complexities of the modern world, and in view of the great results of modern deflection, found our efforts to use and to improve the everlasting principles of natural religion.

THE LEGEND OF DEATH AMONG THE BRETONS

ANATOLE LE BRAZ

RENNES, FRANCE.

“**A** CHARACTERISTIC of the Celtic races which most impressed the Romans,” wrote Renan,¹ “was the precision of their ideas about a future life, their inclination to suicide, and the loans and contracts that they signed in view of another world. The lighter hearted people of the South saw with terror in this assurance, the proof of a mysterious race, who possessed an understanding of the future and knowledge of the secret of death.” Indeed, as far as we can trace back in the history of the Celts, preoccupation with the Beyond, as we say today, seems to have exercised a very peculiar power upon their imagination. Cæsar shows us the Gauls, upon the faith of the Druids, claiming father-ship for the god of death, and professing descent from him. “It was for this reason,” he adds, “that they measured the march of time, not by the days, but by the nights.” We also know, thanks to the commentaries, what importance they attached to their funeral rites and what altogether exceptional pomp they displayed in them. We know, too, always from the same source, that the principal concern of the Druidic teaching was to imbue the souls of men with the certainty that they would not perish. It is true, that, apropos of this, Cæsar speaks rather of metempsychosis than of survival. But M. Gaidoz remarks with good reason upon the strangeness of this assertion, contradicted as it is by other writings of Cæsar himself. If, for example, they burned with the deceased all that he was supposed to have loved while alive, including his dogs and his slaves, it was clearly that they might continue to serve

This essay is contributed by M. Anatole Le Braz from a more extended work which he has published in book form under the title, *The Legend of Death Among the Armorican Bretons*. In the latter part of this essay he makes mention of the sad and tragic death of his brother-in-law M. Léon Marillier, who was a man of universal mind and a brilliant writer. As Master of Conferences at the Ecole des Hautes-Etudes, Professor of National History at the Hotel de Ville, Professor of Psychology at Sèvres, Director of the *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions*, and as an ardent worker in many endeavors that help to social progress and fraternity between nations, he gave the assistance of his keen intelligence and his devotion. He was a member of the Advisory Board of *The International Monthly*, associating with Professor Toy in the department of The Science of Religion. France mourns in the death of M. Léon Marillier the loss of a pure and upright scholar.—THE EDITOR.

(1) *Essais de Morale et de Critique*, p. 451, Paris, 1860.

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him after death. The same with the loans, to which allusion is made above; naturally, they would not have consented to them without a firm belief in personal immortality. That the Druids might not, in this respect, have shared the common opinion, that they might have had their own doctrine, somewhat different, or, as some prefer and as a few authors set forth, that they were directly inspired by the Pythagorean conception,—is not impossible. Pomponius Mela leads us to infer that they did not reveal their whole science to the mass of the people, that they kept it, on the contrary, almost exclusively for themselves and their adepts. As for the question which concerns us, there is nothing to contradict the supposition that, while having their own private and secret theory about the future destinies of the soul, they limited themselves, in their preaching to the people, to the one belief that existence survives death.

This was, in any case, the only part of their teaching which the Gauls had retained, if we may judge from the lines of the “Pharsalia” in which Lucan, addressing the Druids, expresses himself thus, “According to your lessons, the shades do not go to the silent dwellings of Erebus nor to the pale, subterranean kingdoms of Pluto; the same spirit quickens the members in another world: if your science is not charlatanry, death is the threshold to a long life.” It remains to be determined what this other world was for the Celts, this *orbis alius*, in which life was supposed to be resumed and pursued from the day after death. Roget de Belloquet tried to prove that it was a question of the moon: Henri Martin preferred to declare himself in favor of the sun. Both, however, were on a false trail, because they did not verify the meaning of the word *orbis*, which, as M. Salomon Reinach has lately proved, means, in the language of Lucan and of the poets of his time, not the entire world, but merely a portion of the earth. It is not to a planet other than our own that we must go to seek the Celtic Elysium. The “other world” of which Lucan speaks, is not situated outside of this. The dead did not escape from the earth any more than they vanished within its depths. To die was simply to emigrate. When the Gallic warrior, who, in the fourth century before our era, occupied with his clan the present Batavian provinces, saw the waves let loose from the North Sea come flinging themselves upon his cabin to swallow up his family and himself, powerless to escape the peril, he put on his battle array and then, his bare sword in his hand, his shield upon his arm, his family close at his side, he awaited the supreme moment without flinching, convinced that moment once passed, that he would find himself safe and sound upon another bank, and that in a new country he would continue an identical existence.

But we cannot show with precision where the Celts located this

country of the dead. They themselves had, doubtless, only vague and confused ideas upon the subject and probably tradition varied with the environment, inland or marine, as still appears today in Lower Brittany, where the people of the interior do not assign the same dwelling place to the souls of their dead as do the people of the coast. The Celtic populations of the coast were naturally led to locate this dwelling place in one or more of the many islands whose vague outlines they perceived in the midst of the waters, alternately lighted by the sun or veiled by the mist; these must have seemed to them a kind of enchanted land. In the sixth century after Christ, the time of the historian Procopius, the island of Britain was reputed, in popular belief, to be the country of the dead. On the coast facing the island, are scattered, the historian relates, a quantity of villages whose inhabitants practice both fishing and husbandry. Subjects of the Franks in every other respect, they are yet exempt from paying tribute to them, because of a certain service (their own word) that has been incumbent upon them, as they believe, since ancient times; they maintain that they are vowed to the service of souls. At night, when asleep, they are suddenly awakened by blows upon the door; outside, a voice calls them to work. They rise in haste. Vainly would they refuse to obey; a mysterious power drags them from their houses and forces them toward the sandy shore. Here there are boats, not their own, but others. Apparently they are empty, in reality they are filled with people, almost to overflowing; the water comes level with the boat's edge. They get in and seize the oars. An hour after, in spite of the weight of the invisible passengers, they reach the island, although in ordinary times the journey requires not less than a night and a day. They have no sooner touched the shore of Britain than, suddenly, the boats are lightened though they have seen no companions of their crossing descend, and, on land, a voice is heard, the same that waked them from their sleep; it is the conductor of souls presenting one by one the dead which he has brought, to those qualified to receive them, calling the men by the name of their father and the women, if there are any, by that of their husbands, and stating for each shade, the functions it exercised while alive.

Such, in its outlines, is the account of Procopius,—the most complete episode of the legend of death among the Celts that antiquity has transmitted to us. Everything in it is as suggestive as could be desired, from the gliding of these unknown boats over the nocturnal sea, to the mysterious funeral procession coming at the call of the invisible nomenclator. How can we fail to connect some of the details contained in this recital with analogous traits which the old epic poetry of Ireland has preserved

for us? There, too, we find another world, reached also by the sea, either in a ship of glass or in a ship of bronze. The names that have been given it are most diverse; it is sometimes *mag mell*, the "agreeable plains," sometimes *tir innam Ceo*, "the land of the living," sometimes *tir nan og*, the "land of youth." In the accounts that they give of it, it is described as a marvelous country. The beautiful Fand celebrates it in seducing terms to Condlé, son of Cond, "It is a country where it is not unfortunate to go. I see the sun is setting, although this country is far away, yet we shall reach it before night. It is the country of joy, so thinks every one who goes through it." Neither death, nor sin, nor reproach are known there; the time is passed in endless pleasures. Briefly, it unites, so it would seem, all the conditions of an Elysian land. Must we conclude from this that it corresponds, in the minds of the *fle*, to the *orbis alius* of Lucan, and the insular Britain of Procopius? It is an open question. The inhabitants of this region of delight are, in fact, more often presented to us, not as dead, but as beings of a nature apart, superior to humanity. They are designated by the name of *sidhe*, meaning "fairies." They live in sumptuous palaces, where there are seen as many as one hundred and fifty beds ornamented with wonderfully carved columns, and with never-emptying cups of hydromel. Their habitual occupations are feasting and war. It is not rare for simple mortals to be brought there. For, visible or invisible at their wish, the *sidhe* willingly frequent this world; their enchanted chariots fly over the surface of the waters. But it is especially the daughters of Mag Mell who come to seek their fortune in love on the shores of Ireland. They do not resemble the women of the country; when they sally forth, they let their yellow hair float behind them; their breasts, of wonderfully beautiful form, are covered with gold; they possess attractions without number; there is a charm in their words that infallibly penetrates the heart. They know their power and take pleasure in proving it on the sons of men. Because the *sidhe* who gave herself to him left him, Cuchulainn the Fearless, languished away of an incurable disease, until the Druids made him drink the waters of forgetfulness. When the *sidhe* have fixed their choice upon a young man, they give him a wonderful apple; if he eats it, he belongs to them forever; no influence, no incantation can free him; he will break the dearest ties to follow them over the waves, "to the regions beyond the vast seas," and sometimes he will disappear thus and never return. Not that those who have been charmed to "fairy land" are condemned to stay there. This is not a country from which there is no returning. We see heroes reach there, live there a month or two and then regain unharmed their own firesides. It is the same way with ordinary mortals,

except that, once back in their native land, they remain bound to certain magical obligations that they may not violate with impunity.

II.

It is difficult to discover in just what way this pure fairy land recalls, properly speaking, that "other world." M. D'Arbois de Jubainville, the most learned Frenchman upon this subject, does not hesitate, however, to confound them. He has, I suppose, been led to this hypothesis by the numerous relations which he was the first to point out between the Irish legend and the Greek. Comparing the "agreeable plains" of the Gaëls with the Grecian "plains of Elysium," he identifies the blessed who inhabit the one with the *sidhe* who inhabit the other. The latter, like the former, are the dead. And in this way the designations "young" and "living," which are attributed to them in the texts, are explained, since, dead, they enjoy an endless life and are assured of eternal youth. Nothing in the ancient epic songs expressly authorizes such an interpretation. There are, however, other traditions which seem to contend in its favor. Such are the stories current upon the Tûatha Dé Danann. The Tûatha Dé Danann, "descendants of the god whose mother was named Dana," made up the population of Ireland when the sons of Milé (looked upon as the fathers of the present race) invaded the country. Overcome, the Tûatha Dé Danann gave way to the new occupants and disappeared without, however, abandoning the island, where sometimes visible and then invisible, like the *sidhe*, they soon began to play, in popular belief, the rôle hitherto reserved for those supernatural beings. If, then, the story of the Tûatha Dé Danann has some real foundation, if it is not a mythical conception, the legend of the dead ancestors would soon become confused with, or even substituted for, the legend of the fairies. Now it is certain that the shores attributed to the Tûatha Dé Danann as their dwelling place beyond the tomb, are particularly rich in sepulchres of the primitive epoch,—witness the vast necropolis on the borders of the Boyne, so often visited by archæologists, where the pre-Christian annals located the wonderful palace of King Dagdé.

The fragment entitled the "Expedition of Néra," which serves as introduction to the "Tâin bó Cuailgne" (The Carrying off of Cuailgne's Cows), an epic of the tenth century, is the first Irish text to make any precise mention of a phantom. And note on what occasion. "One eve of Samhain,—the night preceding All Saints Day,—the King Ailill and the Queen Medl offered a prize to the warrior who should be brave enough to go to tie together with a branch of willow the feet of a captive,

hung the night before. Néra, alone, was willing to brave the darkness and the horror of a night when the demons were wont to show themselves. When he reached the place, the dead man himself showed him how to arrange the branch of willow, and when this was done, demanded that Néra should take him on his back and carry him where he might drink. Néra accordingly carried him from door to door. But the dead man would enter only a house where the pails of dirty water had not been emptied or the fire covered. When he found what he sought and had quenched his thirst he threw the last swallow of water upon the people of the house and they immediately died." This episode is significant in that the deed attributed here to the hanged man, is generally placed to the account of the fairies. Many of the tales in which they figure, picture them, indeed, the enemies of slovenliness and disorder. They, too, enter houses, inspect the housekeeping, and show themselves pitiless to people who are neglectful and filthy. The confusion of the dead and the fairies is, therefore, evident in the "Echtra Nerai." A passage in the "Togail Bruidne dà Derga" (The Destruction of the Castle of dà Derga) furnishes perhaps a still more characteristic argument in favor of the theory of M. D'Arbois. While King Conaire is traveling, he sees upon the road ahead of him, three red men on horseback. He sends one of his warriors to them with an offer for them to enter his service and he receives this reply, "We are astride the horses of Donn Tetscorach of the land of the *sidhe*; *although we seem to be living yet we are dead.*" The three red men had been banished from the country of the *sidhe* for having lied.

But these texts are the only ones that have to do with real ghosts. Elsewhere in the Irish epics, when beings from another world appear, they are fairies and not the dead. In modern belief, on the contrary, the one is generally identified with the other. Examples abound that give evidence of this identification. On the Isle of Man, a man crossed the threshold of a hall where the fairies were feasting, and among the revellers he recognized persons of his acquaintance. One of them charitably warned him to taste of nothing that was offered him, if ever again he wished to see his home. He hastily emptied his cup upon the ground and at that very moment, the hall, the feast, and the assembled company vanished like a dream. The person who had given him this salutary counsel was one who had died. In Ireland, the *bean-sidhe*, that mysterious woman, a harbinger of death, is, as the situation may demand, either a fairy or a phantom, and the wandering souls of dead parents are often supposed to be dwarfs who travel the roads at night, making music. Like the fairies, the dead are supposed to inhabit subterranean dwellings; like them they

are encountered on the highways, mounted on fantastic steeds that go galloping by at full speed. Iron, which is a protection from the fairies, is also a protection from ghosts. The days in Irish mythology sacred to the feasts of the *sidhe* are Belténé (May 1st.) and Samhain (November 1st.), but they are, also, the days when the dead become once more their own masters and regain unfettered liberty. On the night of Samhain, the dead take part in the rejoicings of the fairies, drink their wine in fairy cups, and dance in the moonlight to the music of fairy instruments. A man whom the fairies carried off to attend their ball, found his sister, whom he had lost three years before, among the dancers and he succeeded in having her given back to him alive. The belief that death is real only for old people, is common among the Irish. When any one leaves this life in full strength and youth, it is because he has been charmed away by the fairies. This same belief exists in Scotland. In a story related by Campbell, an old woman, talking with the ghosts of her former masters, learns from them that the *sidhe* have just taken away a young man, mourned as dead. Finally, where the two categories of beings are not entirely confused,—and where the Christian idea that fairies are demons has not been implanted, the fairies pass for the descendants of the Tûatha Dé Danann, who, in the more recent traditions, are obviously conceived of as dead ancestors and no longer as a supernatural people.

Thus the legend transmitted from mouth to mouth supplements, in great measure, the silences of the scholarly epic. What the *file* of the early centuries do not tell us or what they let us barely suspect, the story tellers of more recent ages teach us. Whatever may be, however, the opinion adopted upon this especial point, the fact none the less remains, that the Irish conscience has always been haunted, as was the whole Celtic soul, by the imperious image of another world. And what proves this fact still more eloquently, is the advantage that Christianity has taken of this prepossession, adapting and exploiting it to her profit. We have seen that the tradition relative to the dwelling place of the *sidhe* or of the dead is, to a certain extent, double. Sometimes it appears as a sea-faring country, bathed on every side by immense waters, and touched by the long, glittering rays of the setting sun. And again it is represented in the form of a city within the earth, as is the case of the palaces which shelter in their depths the vanquished race of the Tûatha Dé Danann. There is reason to think that the pagan veneration for these ancient cities of the dead was not stranger to the birth, and then to the development of the Christian myth, the "Purgatory of Saint Patrick."

This pious fable is well known. When Saint Patrick desired to preach the dogmas of Paradise and of Hell to the men of Hibernia, he

encountered a most violent incredulity. A future life considered in the light of a reward for one's present life was not, in fact, a Celtic conception. "If you wish that we should believe in the reality of the torments of which you tell us," said the auditors of Saint Patrick, "grant that one of us may see these things with his own eyes and bring us news of them." And, to convince them, the saint granted their desire. A pit was dug, if it did not already exist, in the form of a grotto or funeral chamber,—for, as has been justly observed, the physical aspect of a country counts for a great deal in the creation of these kinds of myths,—and an Irishman ventured in. When he reappeared, all the horror of the places he had visited and of the sights he had seen, was stamped upon his face. This happened, so they say, upon a little island of Lough-Derg, in the present County Donegal. This wild and remote corner of Ireland was destined, as a result, to become the centre of pilgrimage for all Christendom. The journey to the "pit" or purgatory of Saint Patrick, was one of the most fervent devotions of the Middle Ages. Those who had accomplished it lost their taste for earthly joys and lived as though dead in the midst of their fellow men. The ordeals to be undergone were long and fearful. It was an initiation analogous to that of the old mysteries or of modern Free Masonry. The postulant had first to assure himself, by scrupulous examination of his conscience, that he felt within him the necessary strength of soul and courage. His resolution made, he sought the bishop of that district, who, after describing the risks of such an enterprise, gave him a letter for the prior of the monastery on the sacred isle. The lake was crossed, not without peril, in the hollowed trunk of a tree, just large enough to contain the body of one person; many times the crossing occupied whole days during which time the pilgrim was reduced to bread and water. On landing, he was immediately, at the sight of the episcopal letter, conducted to a penitential cell, hardly bigger than a coffin, assigned to him by the prior. There he remained seven days, dead to the world, praying and doing penance. The eighth day, he was enclosed within a still darker room and received no nourishment of any kind. The next morning, the morning of the solemn day, they came to seek him there, to conduct him, with great pomp, to the church. He was confessed, partook of the holy communion, heard the requiem mass, the mass for his own death, and then, preceded by the clerks and laics chanting litanies, he approached the entrance of the sombre cavern. Upon the threshold, the prior once more admonished him to renounce his purpose while there was still time, and if he persisted, gave him his benediction, with his accolade, saying to him, "Go!" The next instant, he was cut off from the world; the door was closed behind him, as the

stone upon a grave. The following day it was opened at the same hour, with the same ceremonial. If the man did not appear at that exact moment, they believed that he had been overcome by lack of faith and were silent forevermore concerning him.

Those who issued victorious from the ordeal, were never weary in telling of the beautiful or terrible wonders they had witnessed. In the Europe of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the success of these strange stories was almost as great as that of the Gallic romances. We know that Dante was obviously inspired by them. The narrative of the Chevalier Orven, especially, had a prodigious success. Marie de France put it into verse. And, four hundred years later, although disfigured by the lapse of ages, it still preserved enough fruitful virtue to furnish two rival Spanish writers, Calderon and Lope de Vega, with one of their most beautiful dramatic themes. But I imagine that nowhere,—Ireland excepted,—did it have a more direct action upon the human heart than in Armorican Brittany, where the theatre also helped to render it popular. “*La vie de Louis Eunius*,” naïvely divided into scenes and the dialogues written in broken lines, remains the favorite reading of the Bretons of today, as it was, for their ancestors, the most thrilling play. “There are not two books like that,” an aged spinner of Trégor once confided to me,—“think of it! it tells how things happen in the other world.”

III.

The fact is that the Bretons, of all the Celtic peoples, are, perhaps, the ones who have best kept intact the old racial curiosity about the problems of death. There is no subject that fascinates them more, nor one with which they are as it were more at home or more familiar. The very physiognomy of the country they inhabit seems to have helped in keeping them in this state of mind. “When, traveling in the Armorican peninsula,” says Renan, “you enter the real Brittany, the land worthy of the name by virtue of its people and its language, a sharp change is suddenly felt. A cold wind springs up, laden with loneliness and sorrow and turns the soul to other thoughts; the leaves are stripped from the tree tops, and the branches writhe and twist; the heath stretches far away its uniform hue; the granite rock pierces at each step a soil too scanty to clothe it; a sea that is always gloomy, forms on the horizon a circle of eternal moaning. * * * It seems as though you were entering the subterranean strata of another age, and you experience something of the impression that Dante causes us when he leads us from one circle of his hell to another.” The shadows are doubtless over-stressed in this picture; but

it cannot be denied that there is a gravity and a melancholy peculiar to this country. The uncertain light, the frequent fogs, the strange distortions that they often give to objects, the ghostly silhouettes mysteriously animated, that they lend, for instance, to the rocks of the coasts or to the trunks of the branchless oaks upon the slopes, already fantastic in themselves, the wailing of the wind, a ruling master there, and the moaning of the sea, whose note is never the same, along a coast infinitely wave-worn, sometimes cut with deep incisions, sometimes sown with reefs or piled with pebbles,—all help to favor the innate leaning of the Breton's imagination towards the fantastic and the supernatural.

The landscape is, indeed, in league with the climate. And after following the old abandoned roads, overgrown with soft grass, it is easy to understand why the sudden meeting with a belated traveler may assume there the character of an apparition. Such regions, of a wild and almost sinister solitude, must necessarily evoke myths. And, for those who have visited the immense bog of blackish peat, called Yeun Elez, in the wildest district of inner Brittany, in the midst of harsh granite rock where all, even vegetable life, is absent, it is not strange that the people should have made of it something analogous to the Lough Derg of Ireland, a kind of entrance to the subterranean palaces of the dead. It is, also, to the natural conditions of the country, to the surging of the sea in the fissures of the coast, that all those ocean "hells," whence wailing voices rise, owe their tragic legends,—Enfer de Plougrescant, Enfer de Plogoff, Enfer de Groise, to name only those best known. We can understand, in the same way, with a glance at the Breton hills, how, with their profiles like tombstones and their pyramidal crowns of quartz or schist, they might have become, in local tradition, vast, sheltering sepulchres for immemorial ages; sheltering either wise men, endowed with prophetic wisdom, as Govenn Klan, who sleeps beneath the Menez-Pré; or fabulous war chiefs, like King March to whom one of the heights of Menez-Horn is sacred; or, lastly, beings of more than human stature and power, like that Gevar, buried within the mountain of Loqueffert, whom it was necessary to double nine times in order to get his whole body within it.

For these and for other reasons, we may say of Brittany that it is before everything else, the country of death. And man has helped to perfect, in this respect, the work of nature. He has multiplied funeral monuments in this land, so propitious to evocations from the Beyond. To travel in Brittany is to tread the classical soil of ossuaries and cemeteries. There is no little town so humble that it has not its own ossuary or cannot at least show the remains of one. In olden times, a Breton church was never built without its ossuary, either within its very walls

or a few steps distant from it. In front of the "house of God," they wanted the "house of the dead," those other gods of primitive mythology, —and the devotion of the living is directed no less to the one than to the other. Often times the ossuary was more beautiful, more ornamented, more monumental, than the church, as is the case with the funeral chapels of Roche-Maurice and Saint-Servais. Many of them are architectural wonders. To name them all would be to draw up an endless list of parishes. There are some, like the *camposantos* of Saint Pol de Lévy, with its large enclosure dotted with little Gothic structures, that give one the impression, not of a temple, but of a veritable city of the dead. Those that are most miserable in appearance even, are sometimes the most striking; and in order to appreciate the degree to which the Bretons delight in funeral associations of the most suggestive kind, it is only necessary to wander among the poor mountain villages, at Laurivan, for instance, or at Spézet. Old, shattered, the top slabs cracked by the wind and the rain, the cemetery seems to be sinking into the same ruins as the human ruins it contains; behind the bars of the gratings, pell-mell with the planks of the coffins, the bones are piled in heaps; it often happens that they overflow and you can brush against rows of mossy heads, on the outer sill of the opening, following with their empty eyes the coming and going of the people.

As if the mute eloquence of such a sight were not sufficient, the greater part of these "houses of the dead" are furnished with Latin, French, and Breton inscriptions, all repeating the same hallucinating refrain. *Memento mori*, says the ossuary of Guimilian; *cogita mori*—*Respice finem*, repeats that of Lannédern. At Saint-Thégomme the dead themselves are supposed to speak: "It is a good and holy thought to pray for the faithful who have departed this life,—*Requiescant in pace: amen. Hodie mihi cras tibi*:—O sinners, repent you while ye are yet alive, for for us, the dead, there is no longer time. Pray for us who are dead, for one day, thou too, wilt be as we are. Abide in peace." The inscription of La Martyre in Breton verse, more sober and less mournful, has yet a touch of something more bitter and vehement:—

"An Maro, an Barn, an Ifern ien
Pa ho soing den etle crema,
Fol eo na preder e speret
Guelet ez-eo ret deada."¹

The sculptural designs that decorate these edifices are naturally in

(1) Death, judgment, and cold hell,—When man thinks on them he must tremble. Truly, his mind is that of a fool,—if he does not see that he, too, will die.

keeping with their surroundings. They are mostly bones in the form of a cross, and death heads, sometimes an angel lifting in its arms a little naked figure, symbolic of the soul, sometimes a corpse struggling to lift the folds of its winding sheet and free itself from the tomb, but death is more especially represented in the form of a skeleton armed with the lance, attributed to him both in the Cornish dramas and in the Breton mysteries. His name, in popular language, is *Ankou* (death). Some of these stone and wooden *Ankou* are celebrated in the country round about, the *Ankou* of Bulat, that of Ploumilliau, of Cléden-Poher, Roche-Maurice, Laudivisiau, and others that I may not stay to name. The *Ankou* of Ploumilliau has, for a long time, been enthroned above the altar of the dead, within the church itself, and from all the neighboring parishes the people come to pray before it, some even bringing offerings. On the stone tablet that surmounts the fleshless head of the *Ankou* of Landivisiau, is written this ironical epitaph, "Behold, I am the god-father—Of him who kills them all." The *Ankou* of Roche-Maurice, brandishing his lance like a javelin, shrieks this cry of menace or of triumph, "I kill you all!"

It is the custom of the Bretons every year, on the evening of All Saints, to visit, in procession, the cemetery wherein the relics of their ancestors are interred, but there is scarcely a day in the whole year when they do not kneel in the cemetery beside the graves of those more recently dead. Elsewhere, for hygienic reasons, there is more and more of a tendency to separate from the villages the places of burial. In Brittany, such action is considered absolutely irreverent. To exile the dead from close proximity to the church, would not that in a way be the same as killing them twice over, by cutting them off from communion with their neighbors, in whose words and acts they doubtless continue to be interested? Accordingly, the cemetery, with very rare exceptions, is located exactly in the centre of the little village. It is, in fact, the most essential element, the centre of all vitality. The houses that surround it seem grouped there only to keep it company. Others form a part of its very enclosure and I remember one tavern room at Saint-Jean du doigt, in which the table had for its counterpart outside a tombstone from which it was separated only by the panes of a window that opened on a level with the consecrated ground. This almost perpetual mingling of life and death is one of the most impressive things in this country.

It would be a misfortune for the new-born child if he should not be carried through the cemetery in order to be baptized. As a young man, he makes his tryst with the girl whom he "desires" beneath the elms or the yew trees in the cemetery, and it is on the cemetery wall that his

douce (sweetheart) will wait, on days of "pardon," until he invites her for a promenade or the dance. Again, it is from the steps of the cemetery that all proclamations, announcements, and banns are read. The cemetery takes the place of a public tribune and a promenade. It is visited from duty and for pleasure. During the week, their work finished, the villagers willingly linger about the cemetery, in pious loitering, until the last tinklings of the angelus have died away into silence. On Sunday, the whole population of the village may be found there. For the Bretons, indeed, Sunday is as much a day of the dead as a day of God. And the parochial vestry know this well. They owe their most available resources to the Sunday offerings bestowed in memory of the dead. Attend a village mass. Three, four collectors file by, invoking the generosity of the faithful for Our Lady so and so, or Saint such an one, and it is only here and there that they gather some petty offering. But behind these four solicitors advances a fifth, saying, *Ervit an Anaon!* (for the Souls), immediately the coppers come pouring in and often small silver pieces. There is no farm-hand so poor nor a cow-herd so miserable that he does not have in reserve his "sou des morts."

The service over, each tries to be first among the graves. Upon each mound, on every mortuary slab, there settles down a living swarm. And then another service begins, celebrated this time by the believers themselves, to which from their faces and attitudes, it is easy to see that they bring whatever is most personal, intimate, and deepest. His most real religious act is done by the Breton in the cemetery. I have known, in Paris, families and gangs of working men, transplanted from Brittany to the Quartier Grenelle or the Quartier Vaugirard, who, when they could obtain a little leisure, pretending to go out for the fresh air, wandered up and down the walks of Montparnasse cemetery. "It reminds us a little of home," they said. As they passed through these funeral aisles, it seemed to them that they had found again their native land.

IV.

The whole consciousness of these people is turned fundamentally toward the mysteries of death. And the ideas they entertain of it, in spite of the strong Christian impression they have received, seem scarcely different from those we have pointed out among their pagan ancestors. For them as for the primitive Celts, death is less a change of condition than a journey, a departure for another world. Doubtless, apropos of this other world, the modern Celt does indeed use the names Paradise, Hell, and Purgatory, but it is clear that he employs them only as an

acquired language, and that what he conceives behind these words has but the most distant relation to the particular ideas they express.

Not that the Bretons relegate the souls of their dead to a country distinct from that of the living, any more than did the Gauls of the time of Lucan or the Gauls of ancient Ireland. We find, indeed, among them, still recognizable beneath slight changes of detail, vestiges of the double Irish tradition that sees in the other world sometimes a subterranean country and sometimes a land by the sea. In Brittany, the former appears as the Yeun Elez to which the dead sink in the bowels of the earth through the Youdic, a slimy hole; the latter as a rocky island, the Vévennec, off the Pointe du Raz. As in the account given by Procopius, the dead are piloted thither at night, in boats. Elsewhere, the myth of the buried city has been substituted for that of the island. This has occurred especially along the whole of coast Trégor. There, beneath the waters, lies an immense country and the line of islands scattered along the coast is the proof of its former existence. A marvelous city covered it, with beautiful gardens, and streets, porticos, churches, and palaces. It was called Ker-Is. On beautiful summer evenings when the breezes are hushed and the sea is calm, the chiming of its bells can be clearly heard. For, overtaken when in the full swing of life and activity by a sudden cataclysm, the city continues to live a mysterious and enchanted life. Its inhabitants, reversing the speech of the red men, might say, "Although we seem dead, yet we are alive." And this is but one of the many features in which it recalls the fabulous country of the *sidhe*.

Before punishment overtook this country,—a purely Christian idea,—it also was considered the *country of joy*. The days and nights were an endless succession of feastings, mirth, and pleasure. Grallon, the king of Ker-Is, like Vethra, king of Mag Mell, set the example to his subjects. And who does not recognize in his daughter, Ahès or Dahut, the Breton sister of the beautiful Fand, with her floating golden hair, her matchless beauty, the attractions of her lovely youth, and the irresistible charm of her voice? Like Fand, Dahut seeks out the sons of men and like her she is expert in the wiles of love, and human hearts are as obedient to her call as were the hearts of Cuchulainn or Condlé to the voice of Fand. Add to this that the same uncertainty hovers over the submarine city as over the "land of the living." Is it, then, an Elysian dwelling place or merely a fairy city? We cannot know exactly. Not that the people of this world have never visited it, and herein lies another point in common with Mag Mell. It is not necessary to have departed this life in order to gain access there. Mortal men have crossed the thresholds of its gates and talked with its inhabitants. But their accounts

of what they saw give us no exact information of the people they met, and we are left to wonder whether these were really dead folk or victims analogous to those of the *sidhe*, rather than enchanted people held captive at the bottom of the ocean. The two conceptions are so confused and so closely entwined that it is difficult to unravel them.

In Brittany as in Ireland there was an early confusion of purely fantastic characters with ghosts. It is thus that frightful forms, primitively engendered by the fear of darkness, have at last become the dead. The *Kanner ezed-noz* (washer-women of the night), who must at first have been water fairies, are today supposed to wash the linen of the dead on the sloping shores of the ponds or on the margins of fountains in the hollows of desert valleys. The *hopper-noz* (night crier), the *buguel-noz* (child or herdsman of the night), and, in a general way, all the spirits of night time, just so far as the idea of their former character was obscured in the popular imagination, were classed among the ghosts; anonymous ghosts, however, with no other definite attributes than the difference of a mysterious horror. For this reason, perhaps, they remain vaguely distinguished from the dead, properly so-called.

These last, for the most part, indeed, continue to live in another world as they were wont to live here. And this point of comparison between the Breton legend and the older Celtic conception, is doubtless not the least significant. The grave changes nothing of the man's condition. The dead has simply "departed" and the life that he leads in his new residence is identical with his former existence. Just as the Celt of epic ages was certain of finding upon the other shore his battle harness and his weapons, so the Breton of our times is supposed "down there" to take up his tools and his former ways. The shop keepers of Ker-Is have not ceased to offer goods to their customers, nor the market gardeners their vegetables. It is the ghost of a laborer driving his plough that we see, or we hear the wheel of an old tow spinner whirring as rapidly after as before his death. All these people from beyond the grave are spoken of with one collective name, *an Anaon*, the Souls. But these souls never appear separate from their bodies. The deceased keeps his material form, his physical exterior, all his features. He also retains his usual clothing, he wears the same working jacket, the same felt hat with its wide brim. Nor does he change his affections, his tastes, his preoccupations, and his interests. On this point, the Christian ideas have not been able to overcome the old primitive belief. The dead have exactly the same likes and dislikes, loves and hatreds. Lack of courtesy angers him; if any one does him an injury, he takes his revenge. He retains his peasant shrewdness as well as the memory of the debts he has

left unpaid, which, too, he fulfills quite as religiously as did the Celt of Druidic times. Exactly as in his lifetime, he is an impassioned tiller of his fields or a zealous fisherman among his boats and nets. He haunts his house almost as much as when alive. He comes back to sit by the hearth and warm his feet on the hot coals, to converse with his servants, and superintend the conduct of men and things.

He comes back, did I say? The expression is wrong. These are not returning spirits, since, properly speaking, they have not gone away,—or only a very little way! The corpse is no sooner enclosed within its bier, than, a moment after, the spirit may be seen leaning over his garden gate. If death is a journey, the return, at all events, follows close on the departure. Possibly it is to the Christian mode of sepulture that we must attribute this change in the old myth. The creation of cemeteries may have suggested the idea that the other world began on the threshold of the grave; it was then no longer localized in any special, fixed region, isolated by the mountains or by the sea. The Yeun Elez is thus despoiled of a part of its prestige; a few souls are still directed there, but only those that are restless and dangerous and can be held quiet in no other place. It is the same way with the rocks of Vévennec and the other maritime Elysiums; only those unappeased shades of the drowned whose bones lie in no holy ground, inhabit there.

The others,—that is to say the great majority of the dead,—are no longer represented as taking distant, funeral journeys. It seems that upon their entrance to the tomb, they enter, at the same time, into the other life. They live again, consequently, in the same abodes where they have always lived. The dwelling place of the dead is commingled with that of the living. It is no longer here or there, in this district of the land or in that island of the sea,—it is everywhere, it extends as far as Brittany extends, and the whole country of Brittany becomes literally the “country of the dead.” The legends show this expressly. Invisible by day but not absent, the souls, as soon as the sun sets, invade the fields, the pastures, and the roads, to attend to their silent duties. They are as numerous as the “blades of prairie-grass or the grains of sand upon the shore.” They talk among themselves in the rustling of the leaves and the murmuring of the wind. They prowl around the houses, enter and make themselves at home there until the first cock crow. For a long time in Brittany, it was the custom to leave the door unlocked at night so that the dead might enter. Even today they are careful to cover the coals on the hearth with cinders so that the ghosts may find a fire at any hour. And the food they leave upon the table on the eve of certain feast days belongs to the same preconceived idea. By a kind of tacit

agreement it is understood that during the day, the earth belongs to the living and at night to the dead. And the compact must be respected on one side as much as on the other. The mortal who breaks the compact, exposes himself to annoying encounters, that may entail the most unfortunate results. The dead, on the other hand, may not infringe upon their limits without suffering injury; of what nature we are not explicitly told. But we constantly see wandering souls tremble lest they be surprised by day. A superior power,—that of God, Christianity would declare,—constrains them, often to their regret, to return to the diurnal residence assigned them.

Can there have existed, in the popular, primitive conception, a sort of hierarchical organization and regular police among the people of the *Anaon*? Many indications would seem to point to this. One of the most noteworthy is the character of the *Ankou*. His manifold rôle lends itself to many and various hypotheses. It is possible that he may originally have been the counterpart of that *Dispater*, from whom the Gauls of Cæsar's time claimed descent, or he may have been one of the gods or "kings" of the dead, whom Irish tradition placed upon the throne in the country of the *sidhe*. "All hail, Labraid, swift handler of the sword!" chants a poem in the cycle of Ulster, "He hews the bucklers in sunder, he scatters the javelins, he wounds the body, he kills the free man, he seeks slaughter and bloodshed, in them he is beautiful; he puts whole armies to confusion, he scatters the treasures of men, O thou who assailest warriors, all hail, Labraid!" We find an echo of these savage lines in the Breton ballad that exalts the omnipotence of the *Ankou*. Like the kings of Mag Mell, the *Ankou* journeys in an enchanted chariot,—a chariot that does not, it is true, recall the brilliant descriptions of the Gaëlic epics, but which, however creaking its axles, none the less leaves terror and devastation in its wake. From all these traits, the *Ankou* was evidently thought to be some ancient divinity of death. There are other traditions, however, which seem to arise from a very different conception. Often, indeed, the *Ankou* is represented as a kind of administrator, destined to guard and watch over the things of the other world. "He is the mayor of the dead," a peasant said to me one day. In this conception, each parish has its own *Ankou*. This local *Ankou* is taken from the community of the dead and his charge is merely temporary; it reverts by right to the last deceased of the year, who is invested with power until the end of the following year. Perhaps, as M. Marillier has intimated, we may see in this the vague survival of an old ancestral cult, the *Ankou* of each village would have been, in remote times, the chief last deceased; later, the organization by clans and the ancestral worship having both

disappeared, the popular belief would have attributed the prerogatives of the once adored chief to any dead man whatever, provided he was the last to have died.

Whatever may be the value or futility of these conjectures we cannot deny that the religion of death, so dear to the Celtic conscience, has retained a hold singularly vital and deep on the soul of the Breton people. If it is not their whole religion, as one would be almost tempted to believe, it is, at least, its most enduring work and permanent basis. Christianity has only been able to consecrate what it could not destroy. And thus there has existed, even until modern days, the anachronism of a race living only for its dead, enjoying their intercourse and yet dreading it, and making, I do not say merely its constant thought, but its perpetual conversation of them and their motions, their proceedings, their joys or their sorrows, their regrets and their desires.

V.

Let us enter the first thatched house that we come to, on one of the winter evenings that, creating a forced leisure for the Breton, draw him from his usual taciturnity and furnish him an occasion for telling the overflowing measure of his dreams. The family, with a few of the neighbors, is assembled in the principal living room,—often the only room in the house,—serving at once for kitchen, dining room, and even bedroom, as the big cupboard beds of carved oak facing one another on either side of the fireplace, bear witness. Beside these are placed two long wooden boxes as a sort of step, serviceable also for seats, the *bank-tossel*. The men sit upon these benches or in the primitive arm chairs, fashioned with an axe from tree trunks, which occupy the two deep corners of the huge fireplace. Some spin hemp, others braid straw for baskets or for bee hives, but the most of them refresh themselves by peacefully smoking the smallest of black earthen pipes, stuck in the corner of their mouths, the bowl upside down. The women of the audience sit a little apart from the men. According to Breton etiquette, the upper end of the house belongs by ancient social prejudice to the stronger sex; the lower end is allotted to the women who knit and spin and card wool. With the monotonous whirring of the wheels is mingled the light clicking of the needles and the rude creak of the combs. Upon the hearth, the fire flames up brightly or burns with a gentler light, according as it is fed with dry oak or peat. A slender resin candle pinched between iron nippers completes the scene, and the unequal light that it casts has scarcely any other effect than to balance the masses of shadows with its smoky, flickering gleam.

Listen now to the conversation. Of course at first the events of the day are discussed. The men speak of their work; they have sowed this field, dug up that other piece of untilled land, or ballasted some road. The women exchange the most varying comments on the amount of milk yielded by the cows, on last Sunday's sermon at high mass, the rate of butter at the store, the bits of village gossip dear to their hearts, and the last local news. But these subjects are quickly exhausted and some one says, "Hola there, girls! suppose you sing a *sône*? * * * " or else it is a "story" that they want to hear, one of those numberless stories of marvels and adventures, the most important types of which M. Luzel has so admirably collected. Outside, however, the night has grown heavier and denser and little by little melancholy oppression seems to cast its influence over the people inside the humble lodging. The talk dies away; there are long intervals of vaguely anxious silence. At this moment it is enough if a gust of wind shakes the window pane, if the dying flame leaps up suddenly, or the cord of a wheel breaks, or the napkin wrapped around the bread on the table flutters in some current of air,—any of these things is enough to communicate to all the men and women a feeling at once poignant and delicious, of the vague presence of the *Anaon*. And, as if at a given signal, each one starts on the inevitable thrilling subject of death and the dead. Nothing further is needed to stimulate their memories or their tongues. Conversation grows animated, stories succeed stories and with what penetrating ardor! with what religious gravity!

Among the people assembled, there is not one, from the old grandfather who has nearly reached his hundredth year to the smallest boy, who has not received some mysterious revelation of the beings or things beyond the grave. And there is nothing astonishing in this, if you remember that these people are still in a state of mind in which they explain the simplest events of daily life by reasons of a supernatural kind. The greater part of these "legends of death" are, indeed, only real incidents, or even trifles, which a predisposed imagination has interpreted according to its wishes or its fears. Suppose a Breton peasant is overtaken by twilight in the meadows. He hastens to reach the shelter of his home, already fearful of some possible ghostly meeting. On the road ahead of him, one of his fellow laborers is likewise hurrying home. *A priori* he decides that on account of the lateness of the hour this cannot be a living person and he delays his steps so as not to pass by him. But, while keeping at a respectful distance, he does not cease to watch him closely. In the stature, appearance, and clothing of this man he thinks he recognizes one of his neighbors who was buried a day or two before. He

thinks, did I say? No. It is rather an immediate conviction with him, an absolute certainty. Thus, as soon as the phantom has disappeared (that is, as soon as the passer-by has turned down a cross road), the peasant starts to run, arrives at his home quite out of breath, and to the questions of his frightened wife and children, replies that he has just been walking behind their dead neighbor. The legend is created. The next morning it spreads from door to door throughout the whole village, not without the addition of some new details. The next winter it is one of the evening's stories, and receives a sort of final consecration by dramatic narration.

The Bretons, indeed, excel in these kind of stories. As there is no subject that fascinates them more, so there is none in which they display richer or more varied resources. It seems as though they gave their whole self to the theme. And this whole is no small thing, if it is true that few races have a more original manner of feeling and thinking. "Compared with the classic imagination," says Renan, "the Celtic imagination is truly the infinite compared with the finite." The truth is that one cannot live long among the Breton people without being impressed with the keen, rare, and often exquisite qualities of their mind. Their songs bear witness to this. There is revealed in them an uncommon essence of poetry, delicately shaded in the *Soniou* and full of fire and sober energy in the *Grverziou*. What is not less remarkable is the unconscious and wholly spontaneous art with which these uncultured people succeed in portraying their emotions and their dreams. They are born story tellers as they are born poets. They have an instinctive sense of composition and they are especially endowed with an innate gift for the dramatic, for the picturesque, and for color. Thus the somewhat literary form and tone of these legends may be explained. Many of these little dramas have often been acted by the story teller himself, or, in any case, have touched him to the very heart, so that to them he imparts the timbre, and if I may put it so, the quivering life of his personality. This is the distinction between these funeral recitals and the mythological stories. The story is impersonal, it comes from afar, it has traversed time and space, and it tells of strange lands, of fictitious heroes, and extraordinary adventures by which one is amused without needing to have much faith in them; they are repeated from age to age without change of substance, or even of words, somewhat like a lesson learned by heart; there is something positive and absolute about the story. The legend on the contrary is a local production; the people have watched it sprout, grow, and expand. It is constantly in formation and transformation; it is alive. The actors whom it brings upon the stage are all known or have been

known. They are the people of the village, of the parish, they are your next door neighbors, they are as it were you yourself. What has happened to them may happen to any one and with the same circumstances and in the same places. For the setting of the story is also real; it is constantly beneath your eyes, at your very door. It is the hollow road over which you have passed fifty times at least, it is the downs whose billowy heather you see from here, it is the cemetery buried there beneath the sombre shade of the big willows, it is the sea, that other cemetery without epitaphs and headstones, which you can hear moaning so dolorously. In order, then, to attain a really tragic grandeur, the teller of the legend has only to yield himself in all simplicity of soul to the strong impressions which he has been the first to receive from the things of which he tells. Without intending it and quite unconsciously he creates beauty.

During nearly fifteen consecutive years I have hardly ceased, I may say, to question the popular memory; and with this aim, I have traversed all Brittany, Morbihan, whose dialects were less familiar to one, alone excepted. Of the other Armorican regions, Goélo, Trégor, Léon, Upper and Lower Cornouailles, there is not one to which I have not carried my researches. And if I insist upon it, one reason is doubtless that the manifold sources of these legends may be known, but another reason is that I have brought from these travels a memory, whose sweetness time has not weakened. I recall the scenes and the faces: now it is the interior of the shoemaker's cabin in Argoat, with its primitive fireplace in the middle, and through the hole in the roof, the glimpses of the nocturnal sky where the stars are shining brightly; again, a room in the lighthouse of the Ile de Sein where the watchman, keeping his vigil, sits upon his bench and the reflectors of the lantern flash their peaceful light over the baffled sea; again, it is the miserable inn of Corn-Cam, lost amidst the mournful solitudes of Ménez-Mikêl, a precarious lodging for wagoners in distress, who, for lack of beds, stretch themselves out to sleep upon the beaten ground; and again,—but I should never end the naming of the hospitality, far from commonplace, that it was given me to enjoy. From none of them did I depart with empty hands. May the humble people who received me so kindly find here the expression of my gratitude. Many of them now know how much truth there lay beneath the fictions of the dead about which we chatted together.

Though I arranged to extend my investigations through all the Breton countries whose speech was known to me, there are, nevertheless, a few villages where I have dwelt most especially, which have furnished me with the most important contributions. For the memory of our peasants

is like the presses that ornament their houses; it is full of things but very slow to open. It is only by a series of assaults, so to speak, that you succeed in forcing its secrets and drawing out bit by bit its treasures. This work of patience requires days and even months. One of the places of Brittany where I have been able to practice it with most fruit, is Port Blanc. To give some idea of the method I followed, I cannot do better than show how I went to work in this restricted environment.

Port Blanc is a little seafaring hamlet on the English Channel, forming part of the parish of Peuvénan, and about ten kilometres from Tréguier. Like the Gallic village of which Procopius speaks, it is inhabited by a population of fishermen who live quite as much by the cultivation of their fields as by the product of their nets. They live, however, very miserably. The soil is poor and the coast but scantily supplied with fish. For this reason, a great many embark at the end of the winter for the cruel, northern fishing in the Iceland seas. Alas! it is seldom that they return richer if, indeed, they return at all! Others go to hire themselves out in Jersey to gather the potatoes. Those who dislike to expatriate themselves invent some supplementary industry to eke out their scanty gain. They hew stone, for example, from the vast beds of rock with which the fields are sown, or else they gather a certain choice kind of seaweed which they sell to the druggists, or collect a coarser variety, dry it, and burn it to make soda. But especially they search the wrecks along the coasts, at night when the tide is right and when it is impossible for the watchful coast guards to surprise them. In spite of these "thousand trades," as they call them, theirs is a precarious fate. They do not complain however. The beautiful optimism of their race flows in their veins. Among those who have not been stupified by alcohol, the terrible plague of Brittany, the faces are open, gay, and prepossessing. There is no reality so sad or overwhelming for which they may not find consolation in dreams. They love illusions. In their low, thatched cottages, before their scanty heather fires, they will relate or read scenes of old deeds of chivalry, arranged in naïvely dramatic form. They like to sing and when they feel entirely at their ease, delight in long conversations.

The best part of my youth was spent among them. In later life I formed the habit, very dear to me, of spending my vacations in Port Blanc. My summer cottage stood a next door neighbor to their thatched huts, and, having known me for so long they treated me as their own. When I undertook to explore the field of the mortuary legends of Brittany,—the only subject that my regretted master, M. Luzel, had left untouched,—it was in the region of Port Blanc that I made my first discoveries. In

the beginning, I must confess, the results were poor. The people, questioned separately, did not or would not admit that they knew anything to tell me. "We will see," they would say, "we will consider. We need time to remember." In the summer of 1891, I tried a new tactic and assembled them all at my house. I invited them by groups, to come and "talk" on Saturday evening, when the week's work was over. At first they seemed to hesitate. Then, the cordiality and the simplicity of their reception having put them quite at their ease, the first who had ventured to come brought others, and soon it was merely a question of who could get there first. In order that they should feel at home, our meetings were held in the kitchen and each one sat wherever he found room. My wife served the men with cider and the women with coffee. There was a plentiful provision of powdered tobacco for those who took snuff, nor were those who smoked or chewed forgotten. Punctually upon the stroke of eight, or of half past, we would hear the noise of the sabots on the stony streets of the little village, announcing our guests. They would enter, bowing upon the threshold of the "*maisonnée*," with a self-respecting politeness that is a tradition of their race,—and the festival evening would begin, all the windows wide open to the sea and the night.

I had, however, more than one obstacle to overcome before I could lead the conversation in the desired direction. They wondered among themselves what manner of interest I could feel in their beliefs and whether my questions were not prompted by an unholy curiosity. "It is not to mock our stories, is it, sir? The dead do not like such jesting and we would not wish to incur their wrath." I had to summon all the persuasion of which I was capable before I could quiet their scruples. My proposal to take down in writing the stories that were told me, created new fears in the timorous minds of the women. As soon as I started to pick up my pen, I would see their brows darken and their lips shut tightly together. They were afraid lest my writing would be sacrilege. Many would shake their heads, whispering, "If the priests knew of it, they would refuse us the sacraments at Easter." Happily, the men of this region of Trégor are rather inclined to opposition and their jeers triumphed over the apprehensions of their more timid companions, which were really quite unjustified, and at last I achieved my purpose.

Those were memorable evenings, and I never look back to them without a keen sense of pleasure. While I was with these primitive souls, it seemed as though I were communing with the intimate genius of their race. It was usually I who gave the first shove that started my people going. I would begin with the story of some episode learned elsewhere, and in the circle of lamp light, I would suddenly see all the

heads bend forward, while their faces grew bright and eager. Even while I talked I was assisting the work of resuscitation that each of my words provoked in these obscure brains, filled with so many memories. It rarely happened that I finished my story without being interrupted. *Nann n'ê Ket ével-sé!* (No, it is not like that),—some one would exclaim,—*aman vé laret a fesson all* (we tell that differently here). You may imagine with what alacrity I would pass over the word to them, and turn from story teller to scribe. All that remained for me, after that, was to hold my pen tight. A contagious spirit of emulation would little by little seize upon the whole assembly. From all corners of the room voices would rise claiming their turn. I was frequently obliged to restrain their impatience and moderate their zeal. But as soon as I said “now you,” to one of them, the silence would be instantly reestablished, their bodies would settle into an hierarchical immobility, their heads and shoulders bent forward, their hands upon their knees, and you could literally hear the night moths fascinated by the light, fluttering about the lamp. What a sudden pallor would creep over their faces when, in the pathetic places, the narrator would unconsciously lower his voice and utter his words very slowly, as if he too were frightened by the mysteries he was about to reveal.

Two or three of the habitués of these reunions were truly gifted story tellers. The grandiloquence of Laur Mainguy, for example, was only to be equaled by the rude and sober fire of Jean-Marie Voulouzan. The former was an old, half blind stone cutter; the latter an ex-fisher of the Iceland seas. Both were admirable masters of their language. But the women were perhaps even superior to the most distinguished story tellers among the men. There were some, like Jeanne-Marie Bénard and Catherine Carvennec, who managed their stories with all the experience of professional serial writers. But the “queens” of these meetings were, by common consent, Lise Bellec and Marie-Cinthe Voulouzan, two old maids, sisters in talent, but as unlike as possible in appearance and manner. Lise Bellec is a dressmaker, sewing by the day. She is a round, plump, little woman, with the fine hands and feet of an aristocrat, of modest, almost formal gestures, and with the gentle face of a nun. Her conversation is charming, mingling gravity and grace. She chooses her words with quiet ease, evincing no uncertainty and with no after-touches, speaking in a crystalline voice that is, nevertheless, supple and harmoniously shaded. It suggests the modulations of a flute. She generally sat beside me, in a low chair, and while I wrote at her dictation, her eyes would follow the movements of my hand, stopping to let me catch up with her whenever she saw I was falling behind. In short, she was an ideal story teller. Marie-Cinthe was coarse looking, with sharp

features, a skin as wrinkled as the bark of a tree, and green eyes that had a phosphorescent light of their own. Thin, nervous, always in motion, she lent an extraordinary dash and fire to her stories; she acted them out and made them live with an almost savage intensity; she fell under the spell of her own words. From this strange old woman there would emanate a sort of electricity, that at certain moments would make us all shiver. She used pauses that were eloquent, tragic. She would bring into her story the very objects that surrounded us, the immense landscape, the darkness outside. "Hold! * * * Listen to the wind! * * * Do you hear the sea! * * * " There was a solemnity at once impressive and sinister in her words and gestures.

If the task of the collector of legends often has its disappointments, it also has its pure satisfaction and its charm. I have never felt this more deeply than during the evenings at Port Blanc, in the midst of that fantastic concert of dreams, accompanied outside by the endless moaning of the waves in the fathomless night.

VI.

The memory of the Bretons is inexhaustible. The more you draw from it, the more you despair of ever reaching the bottom. I have had too much experience of it not to know that their memory is the land of the unforeseen, fruitful in surprises without end. But we must not forget that, among these people, legend is always in flux. At the very moment you think you have fastened it in one form, it is already branching out in new ones. Each age, each generation, each temperament forms it anew and claims it for its own, stamping it with a different character by breathing into it another soul. Living, it is ceaselessly evolving according to the law of all organic life.

For they are alive, these legends, they live in the hearts of the Bretons of today just as intensely as they lived in the hearts of their most far-away ancestors. Was it not Marillier who once wrote in this connection, "The beliefs that have given birth to these stories, in which the souls of the dead are the principal actors, are still active and fruitful * * * "? Alas! unfortunate man, he did not know how truly he wrote. Had it not been for these beliefs, their tyrannous empire over terrified minds, it is probable that he would not have perished, nor more than one perhaps of those who preceded him in death. After the boat was engulfed which contained him and the others, the current must have carried him to the reef, to which he owed it that though drowned he was not lost. Vainly did he fill the narrow estuary of the sea with the wild cry of his

distress. The coast was so near that he would have been able to distinguish not only the outlines of the houses but even the shadows of the people as they moved across the lighted window panes. At every moment he must have said to himself, "They are coming now." But no. The lights on the shore went out one by one and no one stirred. All night long he cried; and all night long, unheeding, they left him there. It was not until daybreak,—daybreak, observe,—that they made up their minds at last to rescue this human waif whom the sea had spared and whom a less tardy help would doubtless have preserved to life and science and to all the noble things he loved. And why did the rescue come too late and serve only to prolong the most cruel physical and mental agony? A fisherwoman whom I sadly reproached, replied with her head bent low, "Oh! we heard the calls clearly; they fairly rent the night! But for that very reason, *we thought it was the shrieking of the souls in the 'hell' at Plougrescant!*"

Note that there are no braver fishermen than the seamen of that coast. It is their daily sport to scorn death, but of the dead they have an unreasonable, savage fear, capable of destroying in them every humane sentiment. God forbid that I should lay a crime at their door. It is not their fault if they have not yet renounced the ancient heritage of a race upon whom the yoke of primitive superstitions weighs so heavily, *oppressa gravi sub religione*. May the blessings of modern instruction free at least the minds of their children from these phantoms of an ancient past. May the "legend of death" soon be for the Bretons only a memory, embalmed by one of themselves within these pages as in a shroud.

LESSONS FROM DUTCH COLONIZATION

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THE Dutch have been for centuries a most interesting people. The story of their heroic resistance to the aggressions of Spain in the sixteenth century and the wise deeds of William the Silent, the quaint, broad breeched figures in blue on the Delft pottery with the canals and windmills, Irving's humorous tales of the doings of the Dutch in New Amsterdam, the stubborn resistance of the Boers offsetting by its sheer heroism the doubtful character of their treatment of the natives and the tyranny of their government,—all these things and many more have led the world to be amused by the Dutch people, but to expect of them heroism, a sturdy common sense devoid perhaps at times of ennobling sentiment or thought of others, and habits of living peculiarly adapted to the accomplishment of the ends sought for, as well as to their own needs and tastes. For decades, too, it has been known generally that the administration of their East Indian colonies, acquired when Holland was mistress of the seas, was, for a time at least, singularly successful from the financial point of view, though there were rumors of heartless treatment of the natives. Even now, perhaps no other country has colonies so beautiful or so universally attractive to travelers as is Java, "the Garden of the East." How have these results been brought about and what are the Dutch colonies of today?

The Dutch East Indies consist of the great islands of Sumatra and Java, with a large part of Borneo and New Guinea, as the main possessions, together with the Celebes, the Moluccas (the Spice Islands of old time fame), of which the best known is Amboyna (from which the Dutch draw their best native soldiers), and scores of other lesser islands lying between and around the more important ones. The total area is seven hundred and thirty-six thousand, four hundred square miles, a territory substantially equal to four fifths the territory of the United States, east of the Mississippi, and between five and six times that of the Philippines (one hundred and twenty-seven thousand, eight hundred and fifty-three).

The climate and products are quite similar to those found in the Philippines. Both groups of islands are in the tropics although most of the Dutch East Indies lie nearer the equator with the more important islands a little south of it, as the Philippines are a little north of the equator. In Sumatra, as in the Philippines, tobacco of a high grade is grown; in

both groups rice forms the chief food of the population and is probably all in all the leading product; the range of fruits seems substantially the same; sugar flourishes in both groups of islands; and, while as yet in the Dutch East Indies the valuable hemp of the Philippines is not grown, so far as one can judge there is nothing in the nature of the case to prevent, in some of the islands at least, the growth of this most useful product.

There is a great similarity, also, in many particulars, between the native inhabitants of both groups. In the Battaks of Sumatra and in the Dyaks of Borneo we have probably pre-Malay Indonesian races similar to those found in Mindanao, both groups being to a considerable extent similar in physical characteristics and both having some of the customs of those races. The great mass of the native population in both cases is Malay. In native characteristics they seem much the same, although one finds in them as they exist today many striking differences, owing probably in part to the influence of the different European nationalities with which they have come in contact. So far as the residents of the Dutch East Indies have any religion outside of paganism, they are almost all of them Mohammedans, although to be sure their religion sits somewhat lightly upon them, and one sees little or nothing of the fanaticism of the Turk or Sudanese, while they doubtless retain many of the superstitions of their earlier heathenism. Buddhism, which once flourished in Java, of which the remains of the temples at Boro Boedoer and Brambanan give such impressive proof, seems completely to have disappeared. In the Philippines, in Mindanao, the Moros are Mohammedans of apparently a somewhat similar type; but as is well known the great mass of the Filipinos who are not pagans have, from their three and one half centuries of Spanish rule, become Christians. Here also, however, there will be found among the uneducated very many relics of their ancient heathenism, as is shown perhaps particularly in the anting-anting charms which protect from bullets and ward off cholera or the plague, and in the manner of the superstitious worship of the saints.

The entire population of the Dutch East Indies numbers, it is estimated, some thirty-five millions. In most of the islands the population is scattering and wide reaches of territory are practically uninhabited and open to settlement and cultivation. Java and Madura, however, with an area of fifty thousand, five hundred and fifty-four square miles (only a little larger than Cuba or than Luzon with its forty-four thousand, two hundred and fifty-three square miles), have alone a population of more than twenty-eight millions, or some five hundred and fifty-four to the square mile,—a population more dense than that which is found in any country of Europe outside of Belgium, which has a population of five

hundred and seventy-nine to the square mile. The population of Connecticut and Ohio are respectively only one hundred and fifty and ninety and one tenth to the square mile, while that of Luzon is eighty-five, and of Cuba thirty-five persons.

For our present purposes we may ignore the outlying possessions of the Dutch East Indies and confine our attention to the most important and most populous, Java, although the three parts of the island, western, central, and eastern, have populations differing somewhat in language and in name, the Sundanese, the Javanese proper, and in the extreme east and in Madura the Madurese. The characteristics of them all are very similar although a Dutch resident will point out differences. They are in most particulars both physical and mental very similar to the Malays of the peninsula and to the Filipinos. In physique they are rather small, and though trimly built, do not impress one as strong. In disposition they are inclined toward indolence and carelessness, and though they have excellent manners and in certain particulars, especially regarding their relations to their chiefs, a high sense of honor, they are untrustworthy, prone to say the thing that will please instead of telling the truth, and with no too keen a sense of the rights of private property. You like them for their good manners and courtesy, but you do not trust them. If they have given themselves to your service, as their chief or their leader, they are capable of dying for you if need be; but if you have wounded their sense of honor or have aroused their jealousy, they are equally capable of stabbing you in the back. They are proud. They have as delicate a sense of their "honor" as the Frenchman of a century ago, but their conception of honor and honesty is that universally found in a modern Oriental. One of their best friends who has known them most thoroughly for years has said, "Call a Javanese a liar and he will politely argue the matter with you; if you tell him that he is no gentleman look out for his knife." How have the Dutch dealt with this interesting people?

Generally speaking, it has been the plan to make use as far as is possible of the native institutions and of the hereditary rulers while keeping the directing and controlling power entirely in the hands of the Dutch. In the larger part of the outlying possessions where the Dutch have had little commercial interest, they have in the most remote districts left the natives almost entirely to themselves. In the districts where the Dutch have settled, and particularly in such prosperous places as Deli and Padang in Sumatra, they have appointed a resident adviser, who is to a considerable extent, ruler of the native sultan or regent. The resident is often called the "Elder Brother" of the native sultan or regent, and while he has

the elder brother's privilege of giving advice, it is also expected that the native as a younger brother will heed that advice. There is one set of laws for the Europeans, another set of laws for the natives. For the Europeans the Dutch administer the laws entirely; for the natives in the most important matters, as courts of appeal, etc., the laws are administered by the Dutch, but in all minor matters native judges administer justice and carry out the laws. In these outlying possessions, however, the organization varies to suit the needs.

In Java the same general principles obtain, but here the longer experience and the more vital interests of the Dutch have given a more completely developed system. At the head, with jurisdiction over all Netherlands-India, is the governor general appointed by the home government and assisted by a council of five members, all Dutch, likewise appointed by the home government. These men are all supposed to be conversant with colonial affairs, but it sometimes happens, as at present for example, that for special reasons a man is sent out from Holland who has no special knowledge of the East. Sometimes he may be an expert in some line of work that is particularly prominent at the time in the colonies; sometimes it is hinted that an element of favoritism or political expediency for the people in power at home determines the appointment. It may be said, however, once for all, that the Dutch civil service in the East is filled with men who are thoroughly well trained and who, as a rule, are able, experienced, honest, and well qualified for their positions. In Dutch as in British India, the natives apparently trust the European and expect justice from him rather than from their native chiefs; although the Europeans who have to deal with the government hint at times that the Dutch official is not always easy to deal with, or enterprising, or beyond the possibility of irregular influence. The foreigners, in trade in Batavia and elsewhere, however, generally speak of the government as wise and just, although not inclined to be liberal.

Outside the capital the island is divided into residencies or provinces, wherein the Dutch resident is chief; in the various districts of the residencies there are assistant residents, and below them in special charge of financial affairs are the controleurs. Ranking with the assistant residents are the native regents; under them, in charge of local matters of the police and administration are the wedonos; and as heads of the villages, etc., are the village headmen or "bekels." Everywhere the Dutch officials direct and control, while the work to a considerable extent is carried out by the natives. In local administration the native language alone is employed, minor criminal and civil cases in court being conducted in that language. The great number of clerks, police, etc., are natives or, in many cases in

the more important clerkships, half castes. As will be seen later the Dutch have familiarized themselves with the language, the circumstances, and the customs of the people, and the intercourse between Dutch and native is very intimate, although everywhere the Dutch remains clearly master.

In two provinces in Java, Djokjakarta and Soerakarta, there are native rulers, sultans similar to those in the outlying districts, in whose name the government is carried on by native officials almost entirely under the general direction of the resident. Elsewhere in Java the administration is under the immediate direction of the Dutch, and the higher places are filled by the Dutch.

We may pass over the earlier history of Java until well into the present century when Admiral van den Bosch went as governor general to Java. Before that time Holland had been engaged in subduing the islands and her methods of administration in the conquered parts may not arouse great interest. Doubtless in certain cases, especially in the Spice Islands, they had been as high handed as were those of Spain, Portugal, and others in their colonies. But after the English occupation, when under the pressure of need of greater revenue, the Dutch governor general in 1832 established the culture system, the history took a new turn and Java became apparently so prosperous that ever since she has in many ways been looked to as an example of what, by rigid methods, might be obtained financially from a subject people in a distant colony.

The governor general found a well populated island with a fertile soil ready for cultivation. His plan was simply to see to it that the people worked, had their physical needs provided, and that the surplus product went to the government. Great plantations of coffee, indigo, etc., were laid out; the inhabitants were required to work upon them for a fixed length of time, or else to cultivate the produce assigned and to sell it all to the government at fixed prices. The price was enough to make a living for the cultivator, but low enough to make very large profit for the government. For many years Java thus furnished Holland a large surplus revenue with which she was able to build her railways and meet her other needs. The culture system was a kind of modified slavery, inasmuch as the natives were neither allowed to leave the land nor to direct their own affairs; but there is no reason to believe that the Dutch, speaking generally, treated them with special cruelty or cut their earnings down below their needs for livelihood. Indeed, it is not at all improbable that the native may have lived fully as well as he would have done had he not also earned a surplus profit for his Dutch masters, for the Javanese is an improvident fellow unless he is under outside pressure, and when his needs for the day are satisfied, he is likely to take his ease and enjoy

himself. People often say that under the culture system the Dutch taught the Javanese to be diligent. It is probably nearer the truth to say that they compelled them for a time to be busy; the habit of diligence and thrift does not belong to the Javanese today. They work and apparently work well in the rice fields when it is necessary to put in the crop; and one can hardly imagine a prettier sight of busy industry than the going forth on a bright morning of a gaily dressed group of fifty or a hundred cheerful, laughing girls and women to cut the heads of rice when the crop is ripe. But they go gaily to work when they are summoned for a special task, and when the work is done they can loaf and play with equal gayety. Foreigners resident among them who have encouraged their servants to work steadily and to save carefully are sometimes surprised, after the head of a family has worked diligently for a year and saved a good round sum, to have him quit employment for no particular reason, and to see him idle away his time for another year while he is spending all his savings.

But however beneficial or however light, the burden of the culture system upon the native, it smacked too much of slavery to go unchallenged. Late in the nineteenth century the political party at home which chose to set itself up as champion of the rights of the oppressed began to challenge the action of the government in holding its subjects to forced labor. Under this pressure the government gradually gave up the system until at present it is employed only on the coffee plantations. These, although still quite extensive (fifty-six million, nine hundred and eighty-five thousand, seven hundred bearing trees in 1900), are, nevertheless, gradually growing smaller in extent, the government planting out from year to year a somewhat less number of trees than it abandons. The reason for this is doubtless in part political pressure, but in part also the apparent fact that the business is not as profitable as it has been. The plantations given up are naturally the most unprofitable, and the new ones set out are in sections of the country where they are likely to be more profitable. Indeed, the Dutch administrators on the ground do not apparently think that there is any immediate likelihood of the system being abandoned entirely, provided the plantations remain profitable. On the other hand, they acknowledge that the work done on the coffee plantations, even though they have the power of the magistrate back of them to compel the laborers to attend carefully to their work, is far less efficient than that done on private plantations. Even a careless inspection of neighboring plantations, one government, one private, shows the wastefulness of the non-free labor. The government plantations are likely to be over shaded, the trees to be too thickly set out and not well

pruned, and the yield in many cases is not more than half of that taken in the same locality from private plantations. The price fixed at the present time, by the government at home, fifteen gulden per picul for the best quality of coffee, has been during the last year not more than half of the regular market price, and still it is questionable if, counting the profit that might otherwise be derived from the land, the income is to be considered large. On the other hand, the price has been so fixed that taken in connection with his other earnings the worker on the state coffee plantations, compelled to sell all his product to the government, probably on the whole has about as large an income and lives about as well as his neighbor whose time is devoted entirely to the so-called free labor.

It has been the intention of the government of late years, while not perhaps making a special effort to elevate the Javanese, at least to arrange for him to secure a comfortable living and to prevent him from being exploited or oppressed by others. On the state plantations prices have been fixed so as to enable him to earn a living. When he has himself taken up land and wishes to lease to a European for sugar plantations, indigo growing, or other crop, the government again steps in to see that he is not unduly oppressed. The average Javanese is too simple minded a creature to deal on equal terms with Europeans. The government, therefore, forbids him to lease his land to Europeans except under conditions laid down in the laws, and in each individual case with the special consent of the resident, who looks into the conditions of the contract and sees that they are fair. The land must not be used for tobacco planting or sugar planting often enough to exhaust its fertility, and the native who, if a cash lease were paid into his hands once for all, might soon squander it, has reserved for him the right, in the odd years, to cultivate the land for rice or other native produce. Even when, as in the native states of Djokjakarta and Soerakarta, the lease of the land from the over-lord carries with it the right to demand the free cultivation of the land from the resident peasants, the law again provides that half the land must be worked each year for the crops of the peasants, though the other half goes to the lease holder.

Although forced labor has, speaking generally, been done away with so far as the cultivation of the soil is concerned, except as above mentioned, there still remains in Java in other ways a much larger share of what might be called labor taxes than is found in most civilized states. In many parts of the United States and in France today we still find every able bodied man subject to a certain number of days' service for building roads. In most cases in England and the United States in times of an emergency the government may call upon citizens to aid in keeping the

peace; but in Java, as in Burma and other Oriental countries, the service is much more common. Compulsory service for the state in working on roads or performing other general public duties in certain localities goes as high as forty-two days in the year, while the average number for every able bodied man throughout the island numbers probably twenty-four. Not merely in the country districts but also in the larger cities the custom obtains, as in the country villages in Burma and elsewhere, of having the police duties at night performed without pay by all able bodied citizens in turn. The wedono has a list of the citizens. He arranges the plan of watchmen and patrol in his district in the country or city, and the men are warned in turn to come to perform their duties without pay. This is not looked upon by the natives as oppressive. It is something to which they have been accustomed from time immemorial and is a duty which they owe to the state. In not a few instances the Dutch government has been able to win the gratitude of the people by lessening to a considerable extent the number of days on which they are required to serve in this public work.

In the Dutch East Indies the Chinese problem has appeared in two quite different forms. In Java, with its dense population of Javanese, the Chinese are not needed as coolies throughout the country, although in the larger cities they are a good deal in evidence, doing the heavier kinds of work for which the indolent Javanese has little taste. The Chinese coolie, however, as soon as he gets a little money ahead is likely to become an itinerant peddler, although his wanderings by the Javanese law are strictly confined to the town in which he lives. A little later he sets up a shop and becomes a merchant and speculator, unless, indeed, he has come in the first place as a skilled laborer to become in time a house builder, shoemaker, wheelwright, or to engage in some other kind of manufacturing business. The Javanese can build tobacco sheds and their own thatched dwellings, but good houses need Chinese carpenters.

The Chinaman with his industry and thrift, when he comes into immediate competition with the Javanese soon runs him out, and whenever the pleasant spoken but hard hearted celestial has an opportunity of dealing on even terms with the credulous, thriftless Javanese, the result is almost certain to be that all earnings of the latter beyond enough to keep body and soul together and all property which he may have succeeded in securing in any way slips gently into the hands of the Chinaman and there it remains. This lack of ability of the Javanese to deal with the Chinaman without loss has led the government to watch carefully Chinese immigration into Java; to restrict the Chinese closely to the quarters of the towns assigned to them; and to forbid them to enter the country

villages or to go from place to place within the island except by special permission and on special business. Those who advocate freedom of movement and the opening of all lands to all peoples may object to this rigid policy on the part of the Dutch; but if it is part of the duty of the government to watch over the people under its care and to administer Java for the Javanese, the Dutch government is wise in restricting so rigidly the intercourse of the Chinamen with the natives. No one doubts that the Chinaman is a much abler and in many ways a much higher type of man than the Javanese, but no one who knows them both as they exist in the East would question that if allowed to intermingle freely it would take but a few years to make the Javanese, whatever the law might say, practically the slaves of the Chinese.

In Sumatra, in the tobacco planting and mining regions, the case is entirely different. The Malays are not sufficient in number in those parts of Sumatra to do the work required. Neither do those who are there desire to perform the steady manual labor needed for such purposes. In consequence the Dutch government has encouraged the planters to bring Chinamen into Sumatra in as large numbers as required, to hold them under contract on the plantations, and to develop with their aid as rapidly as possible the resources of the country. The result has been apparently very good for both planters and Chinese, and it is impossible to say, as yet, how the native Malay has, under the circumstances, been in any way injured. The Chinese are held strictly to the plantations during the time of their contract. When that is over they ordinarily either continue as free coolies, or settle as gardeners, which the government likes, or as shop keepers or skilled workmen in the towns, or return to China. With their aid tobacco plantations have flourished exceedingly. The country has been opened up; new roads have been built; Europeans and others have come in large numbers, so that the native Malay, so far as he cares to work, finds better demand at higher prices for his products if he cares to cultivate the ground, or even greater demand for such work as he likes to do, such as driving ponies or managing boats.

On the other hand, there is no reason to think that from the point of view of his physical welfare the Chinaman is not well treated. The planters, to be sure, complain sometimes that under the laws for the protection of the Chinese and their rigid enforcement, the Chinaman is likely at times to become a little too independent, and that the magistrates take his side against the planter. But the managers of the larger plantations themselves, partly through desire to keep their working force in the best physical condition, but also partly, apparently, through sheer kindness of heart and pride in doing their duty well, have provided hospitals which

are not merely sufficient to satisfy the demands of the government inspectors, but which are in themselves models of cleanliness, of convenience, and of completeness of equipment. Even further than this the great Planters' Association with its headquarters at Medan has provided for Chinese disabled on their plantations or for those who have become old and decrepit and who have no friends to take them back to China, a "Home" where they can spend the rest of their days in ease and comfort, such perhaps as they have never known before. Indeed, this asylum for the workmen, mostly Chinese, but some Javanese and Malays, who are no longer able to work, may well compare in its equipment and management with many of the homes for superannuated sailors and soldiers and other unfortunates provided for in similar ways by private or public charity in either the United States, or England, or other parts of Europe.

So much may well be said with reference to the care which both the government and private employers take of their people both Javanese and Chinese. On the other hand, one should perhaps touch somewhat, though briefly, upon another side of the question which, although it shows a policy which would be bitterly opposed from a moral point of view in England or the United States, still represents the thrift or, as they themselves would probably say, the sound common sense of the Dutchman. The Dutch government, for example, derives a large revenue from the Chinese habits of smoking opium and gambling. Not merely does the government sell opium and gambling farms or directly collect the taxes on opium, as is usual in all countries where there is a large Chinese population, but on the larger plantations provision is made to supply opium to the Chinese at a cost which shall not be too high, in order that the Chinese may not become dissatisfied and make a demand for higher wages. Aside from that fact, the larger plantations provide special gambling halls with theatre attached, so that during the curing season when the laborers on the widely extended plantations are gathered at one centre, and at the time when the larger part of the year's wages are paid, the gambling which the Chinese is certain to indulge in may be done on the plantations under more or less careful supervision. The owner of the gambling farm will probably sell for a fixed sum to the Chinese manager of the plantation the right to collect ten per cent of the gambling profits for his own use. This manager then sees that the gambling hall is opened and properly lighted, that a term of the Chinese theatre, one or two weeks, is provided, and he takes the supervision of the gambling. Even the European managers of the estates, though they have no direct share in the gambling profits, often countenance the game by going once or twice each year. To show their approval they stake small sums,

while if they make any winnings, they scatter them among the workers.

This pandering to the gambling habit has, too, its practical side. Not merely do they keep their men from wasting their time by going to the towns, whence many of them if it were permitted, might easily run away; but since a large majority are certain to lose a great part of their year's earnings in their week's gambling, they are ready at hand in a humble state of mind to make favorable contracts for the coming year, although, to be sure, the contracts would naturally be of the customary form and for the usual amounts. When one listening to this cold blooded explanation of their reasons for supplying gambling houses to the Chinese, inquires whether the planters do or are supposed to take any interest in the welfare of the Chinaman beyond his physical needs, he is likely to be met with a good natured rejoinder to the effect that caring for the moral or spiritual nature of the Chinese, if he has any, is not known to have any direct connection with tobacco raising, and the planter is there for business.

The calculating habit of the Dutch in their colonial policy is shown in an even more striking, not to say, for the American, shocking way in connection with their army. It is a well known fact,—no attempt is made to conceal it,—that the Dutch army administration, in order to meet the always grave and most puzzling problem of venereal disease among the common soldiers, encourages their keeping concubines. In all their larger barracks in their permanent stations, so far as room will allow, the concubines are taken into the barracks, provision is made to supply part of their food at cost or less, suitable rooms are arranged for them and their children to remain in during the day, to cook their food, etc., and even in many places regular schools are held within the barracks for the proper training of their children.

When the soldier returns to Holland, if he wishes to leave his concubine and children this may be done. If he wishes to recognize his child by giving it his own name, the name may be registered in legal form, and the child then, instead of ranking with the native Javanese, is classed thereafter with Europeans, entitled to the privileges of the laws for Europeans.

The Dutch officers when questioned in regard to the system, singular as the fact appears, show no other sentiment than a regretful protest against the squeamishness of some of the "old women of both sexes" at home who object to the practice. They say that the percentage of soldiers unfit for duty through venereal disease is greatly lessened by the system, and that in fact nearly all cases still remaining are among those who have not adopted the plan, and that this result alone is sufficient to justify it.

One of the highest officers, upon whom the success of the army both now and in the future depends, remarks still further that these children brought up thus in the barracks naturally acquire a taste for arms, and that they form a very useful source for the supply of new recruits.

To a test question of the chief surgeon at one of the leading posts as to whether he would recommend the United States to adopt that system for its army in the Philippines, the reply was made that, provided the sentiment in the United States would permit its adoption, he would recommend it by all means, with the further addition, since the United States is rich and could afford it, that a small money allowance be made to supply suitable clothing for the concubines, and that something more be allowed for feeding and caring for them and the children than is possible for a country so weak financially as Java. The custom, of course, cannot possibly be considered by the United States; but I know of nothing which illustrates so well the clear sighted, though possibly short sighted, Machiavelian sagacity of the Dutch, which sees the end desired and refuses to let its eyes be dimmed by what it would consider the foolish moral sentiments of others, than the way in which the Dutch deal with these most difficult questions relative to the soldiers and laborers.

This, perhaps, leads directly to a brief consideration of the governmental attitude toward religion. As has been said the Javanese are Mohammedans. It is part of the policy of the government, as it is of the English government and its colonies, to grant freedom of worship. No question is raised regarding the religion of the people; no objection is made to their following the laws of their religion regarding marriage, etc., so far as these do not conflict with the public peace or with good order in the community. On the other hand, the Dutch government has not encouraged the agitation of religious questions among the people, and Christian missionaries, on the whole, can hardly be considered welcome. They are not forbidden to enter Java, but none can enter and engage in their work without special permission, and the field of their territory and the general nature of their work are distinctly prescribed. If there is any demand for them anywhere, beyond question they would be freely welcome. If, on the other hand, there were any likelihood of their starting up dissatisfaction among the people which would increase the difficulties of the government, they would not be received. The Dutch themselves have their own Protestant ministers, and in a fairly large number of cases there are native Protestant preachers of their own church to assist in the religious instruction of the people. But on the whole it may fairly be said, probably without injustice to any, that the Dutch as a government and as a people in Java, while not irreligious are

non-religious, and while they are in no sense hostile to religion, Christian, or Mohammedan, or other, they do not intend to let religion interfere seriously with either government or business.

The Dutch have made comparatively little effort to encourage education among the natives except so far as it would be directly useful in government service. Indeed, until just recently it was a part of their policy to discourage the learning of the Dutch language by the natives and to do practically nothing to give the natives training beyond that required for the cultivation of their fields. At present, since 1893, the sentiment is somewhat different. There are four schools which have been established for the training of the sons of chiefs in which instruction is given to those who are hereafter to hold positions of more or less responsibility in the government, and the kind of training given is adapted particularly to fit them for their duties. The common school subjects are taught, and, in addition, besides the Dutch language, the elements of jurisprudence, public and administrative law of Netherlands-India, elements of political economy, of agriculture, surveying, and drawing. While as has been said, government business with the natives is carried on entirely in the vernacular and while one almost never meets a native who has any knowledge of Dutch, there is at present apparently no positive objection to having a native learn the Dutch language if he wishes and has the energy, although no direct encouragement in that direction is given. There are two grades of vernacular schools scattered here and there throughout the country in the first grade of which, on the payment of a small fee, children of the natives may receive an elementary education: reading, writing, and the four rules of arithmetic applied to whole numbers. For the payment of a somewhat larger fee in the second grade an education equivalent possibly to what we would call a grammar school education may be acquired. In Java in 1897, for a population of some twenty-eight millions, there were two hundred and seven such schools of the first grade, twenty-six of the higher. In all there were twenty-five thousand, one hundred and twenty pupils. At present, however, there are also a few normal schools for training teachers to do the work in the vernacular schools; there are some schools of an elementary nature for native physicians and the spirit of the government seems much more liberal than earlier. In fact there is reason to believe that within the near future there will be a considerable educational development in Java, although nothing in any way approaching the plans of the United States in the Philippines is suggested. The natives have also certain Mohammedan religious schools in which the Koran is read and pupils learn to pronounce the Arab script. While the result is not highly educational,

still the fact should be noted. There were in 1894, twenty-three thousand, six hundred and forty of these schools with about three hundred and forty thousand pupils.

In a somewhat more practical way, perhaps, something is being done toward improving industrial conditions. There is a beginning of industrial training and the educational authorities would favor a rapid extension of this kind of work. Java is essentially an agricultural country. In the famous garden of Buitenzorg, not merely is there a marvelous exhibition of plants and trees and flowers of all kinds, but there is also an experimental garden in which much is done to develop knowledge, scientifically and practically, both in Java and elsewhere. From this institution are sent from time to time into different parts of Java, men whose business it is to make model gardens in which are grown in the best way useful plants, vegetables, etc., so that the native people seeing them learn their qualities and how they may cultivate them best, and how they may themselves make their own work much more profitable. This kind of education is one that will bear a large development and could be usefully followed out in all countries like Java.

One cannot leave this subject without commenting upon the oft told stories of the dominating manners of the Dutch toward the natives. One reads and hears of the way in which the natives kneel to any Dutch passerby on the highway and of the abject way in which they grovel on the floor before their official superiors. There is, of course, some truth in these stories, but they have usually been told by people, who, through ignorance or malice, misinterpret their significance. It is true that a native in the presence of a judge or a higher official squats or kneels on the floor, and that when one meets a Dutchman on the highway he often stands at the side of the road, hat in hand. It should be kept in mind, however, that these are merely old time manners and courteous observances which these people have observed for centuries toward their chiefs and rulers, and which even today they observe with equal if not greater care toward their native chiefs than toward their Dutch officials. It produces an unpleasant impression upon an American when he steps into a school to see the teacher, who has been sitting on a chair, slip to the floor, and who, if he goes before one into another room, walks there bent almost double and immediately takes his former position on the floor. But, on the other hand, a sight no less unpleasant is that of the followers of a native regent crouching about the platform of a railway station while he enters the train and not venturing to stand upon their feet until the train has departed.

All this shows that the Dutch have merely put themselves in the

place of the native rulers, and although one hears at times that if a native fails to remove his hat in the presence of a Dutch official riding by, he has it knocked off with the riding whip, it is probable that even this punishment is much less than he would receive from a native chief for a similar lack of courtesy. Moreover, I can personally testify that these courtesies are not always observed in the presence of Dutch officials, and that there is sometimes no rebuke from the officials. Of course in the streets of Batavia, Soerabaya, Bandoeng, and other places where the people have become accustomed to foreigners and foreign ways, one sees nothing of obsequiousness. Servants are likely to have a due share of impudence.

Moreover, this custom which has awakened so much criticism from so many travelers is by no means confined to Java. In Burma, also, one finds lower officials squatting in the presence of higher, and even in that most pleasing country, Japan, among that most independent and self-respecting people, when you step into one of the smaller shops where the merchants are not much accustomed to the presence of foreigners, it is sometimes even embarrassing to see a somewhat dignified, middle aged man or an attractive, smiling young woman drop on hands and knees before you and bump the head to the floor before asking in what way to serve you.

In spite of these obsequious manners of the Javanese in the presence of their superiors, the intercourse between the natives and the Europeans is on the whole more nearly on terms of friendliness than that in India between the English and the natives, even though the natives of India of the higher caste are in many cases much better educated and much abler men intellectually than even the best of the Javanese rulers. At many social functions in Java, as in India, one may see the regents and their other officials. They often serve on committees with Europeans. Particularly does one notice the difference in connection with the half castes, of whom there are great numbers, and who, in Java possibly more than in India, are rapidly becoming a factor that may prove troublesome to the government. As has been said, when half caste children are acknowledged by their European fathers, even though they may have sprung from unmarried mothers, their legal status is European, and there is open to them, technically, any position that is open to Europeans. Practically, also, one sees many of them in clubs. They are met often in private and public gatherings, and they hold not a few positions of considerable responsibility in the government. It is probable, in fact, that they hold as many and as high positions as they are really fitted to hold, for the half caste, although often skilful in details and faithful in his work, has rarely

administrative ability or power of command. Moreover, it is to be feared that in very many cases he inherits the bad rather than the good qualities of both of his parents, for, speaking generally, it is commonly said in Java that the half castes are not robust physically and that they are very corrupt morally. But they are present in Java in very large numbers, far out-numbering the Europeans. Their home is in Java; their only hope of a career is there; they are ambitious in many cases, and they have no voice,—as, for that matter, no European has,—in determining what the government shall be, or in electing the officials. They are in consequence often dissatisfied, and it is to be feared that in time to come they may prove to be a somewhat dangerous element.

The government officials in Netherlands-India, in speaking of the difficulties of their problems, often call attention to the fact that they, with their thirty-five millions of population, belong to a small, weak country of Europe with a population of but some five millions, and not to one of the great international powers. When they realize the progressive tendency in the way of foreign dominion, it evidently makes them uneasy, for they are patriotic and independent. I met more than once those who expressed pleasure at the fact that the United States was in control of the Philippines, because, as they said, they did not think that the United States was likely to be aggressive, while, if the Spaniards had retained the Philippines much longer, they feared that the Japanese, who are ambitious, would seek some excuse to seize the Philippines, and then afterwards would be reaching out for the Dutch East Indies also. On the other hand, at the time that the United States took the Philippines some Dutch papers in Java expressed a fear lest the lust of conquest and dominion being once aroused the United States would not rest until she had seized the Dutch East Indies. And so, looking from one nation to the other, knowing the richness of their territory and realizing the weakness of the mother country, they fear that either a nation mentioned, or England, more likely Germany, or some other nation will attempt to seize control.

Of course no one knows what the future may bring forth, but this at least can be predicted with certainty that if any other nation attempts to seize Netherlands-India against the will of its rulers it is likely to meet with a stubborn opposition. Although the Dutch themselves in Java, in speaking of the heroism of their brethren, the Boers, in South Africa, say that the latter have retained the Middle Age heroism which led the Dutch to secure their liberty in Europe, while they fear that the Dutch in Europe and in Java, through the softening influence of nineteenth century civilization, have lost much of that spirit, there is, in my judgment, no reason to doubt that the habit of control and the native

stubbornness of the Dutch still remains in both Holland and Java, and that should there be need to fight for their independence, they would be found equal to the endurance of heroic sacrifice and would make dogged resistance.

The experiences of the Dutch have been varied; their success in many ways has been marked. Some of their methods we could not employ; others might be followed to advantage. But whether they can be followed or not, they at least are all suggestive and may well stimulate us to a more careful and thoughtful consideration of our own plans.

ALFRED DE VIGNY

EDMUND GOSSE

LONDON

THE reputation of Alfred de Vigny has endured extraordinary vicissitudes in France. After having taken his place as the precursor of French romantic poetry and as one of the most admired of its proficient, he withdrew from among his noisier and more copious contemporaries into that "ivory tower" of reverie which is the one commonplace of criticism regarding him. He died in as deep a retirement as if his body had lain in the shepherd's hut on wheels upon the open moorland, which he took as the symbol of his isolation. He had long been neglected, he was almost forgotten, when the publication of his posthumous poems—a handful of unflawed amethysts and sapphires—revived his fame among the enlightened. But the Second Empire was a period deeply unfavorable to such contemplation as the writings of Vigny demand. He sank a second time into semi-oblivion; he became a curiosity of criticism, a hunting ground for anthology makers. Within the last ten years, however, a marked revolution of taste has occurred in France. The supremacy of Victor Hugo has been, if not questioned, since it is above serious attack, at least mitigated. Other poets have recovered from their obscurity; Lamartine, who had been quenched, shines like a lamp relighted; and, above all, the pure and brilliant and profoundly original genius of Alfred de Vigny now takes, for the first time, its proper place as one of the main illuminating forces of the nineteenth century. It was not until one hundred years after this poet's birth that it became clearly recognized that he is one of the most important of all the great poets of France.

The revival of admiration for Vigny has not yet spread to England, where he is perhaps less known than any other French writer of the first class. This is the more to be regretted because he did not, in the brief day of his early glory, contrive to attract many hearers outside his own country. It is not merely regrettable, moreover, it is curiously unjust, because Vigny is of all the great French poets the one who has assimilated most of the English spirit, and has been influenced most by English poetry. André Chénier read Pope and Thomson and the "Faery Queen," but he detested the Anglo-Saxon spirit. Alfred de Vigny, on the other hand, delighted in it; he was a convinced Anglophil, and the writers whom he resembles, in his sublime isolation from the tradition of his own country, are Wordsworth and Shelley, Matthew Arnold and Leo-

pardi. He has much of the spirit of Dante and of the attitude of Milton. Wholly independent as he is, one of the most unattached of writers, it is impossible not to feel in him a certain Anglo-Italian gravity and intensity, a certain reserve and resignation in the face of human suffering, which distinguish him from all other French writers of eminence. It is not from any of Alfred de Vigny's great contemporaries that life would have extracted that last cry in the desert:—

“Seul le silence est grand ; tout le reste est faiblesse,”

nor should we look to them for the ambiguous device “Parfaite illusion—*Realité parfaite.*” The other poets of France have been picturesque, abundant, gregarious, vehement ; Alfred de Vigny was not of their class, but we can easily conceive him among those who, in the Cumberland of a hundred years ago, were murmuring by the running brooks a music sweeter than their own.

One word of warning may not be out of place. If Alfred de Vigny was known to English readers of a past generation it was mainly through a brilliant study by Sainte-Beuve in his “*Nouveaux Lundis.*” This was composed very shortly after the death of Vigny, and, in spite of its excessive critical cleverness, it deserves very little commendation. Sainte-Beuve, who had been more or less intimate with Vigny forty years before, had formed a strange jealousy of him, and in this essay his perfidy runs riot. It is Sainte-Beuve who calls the poet of “*Les Destinées*” a “beautiful angel who had been drinking vinegar,” and the modern reader needs a strong caution against the malice and raillery of the quondam friend who was so patient and who forgot nothing.

I.

An image of the youthful Alfred de Vigny is preserved for us in the charming portrait of the Carnavalet Museum. Here he smiles at us out of gentle blue eyes, and under copious yellow curls, candid, dreamy, almost childlike in his magnificent scarlet and gold uniform of the King's Musketeers. This portrait was painted in 1815, when the subject of it was just eighteen, yet had already served in the army for a year. Alfred de Vigny was born at Loches, on March 27, 1797. Aristocrats and of families wholly military, his father and mother had been thrown into prison during the Terror, had escaped with their lives, and had concealed themselves after Thermidor, in the romantic little town of the Touraine. The childhood of the poet was not particularly interesting ; what is known

about it is recorded in M. Séché's recent volume¹ and elsewhere. But there effervesced in his young soul a burning ambition for arms, and before he was seventeen, he contrived to leave school and enter a squadron of the Gendarmes Rouges. He was full of military pride in his early life, and until his illusions overcame him, he hardly knew whether to be more vain of the laurel or of the sword. He says:—

“J’ai mis sur le cimier doré du gentilhomme
Une plume de fer qui n’est pas sans beauté ;
J’ai fait illustre un nom qu’on m’a transmis sans gloire,”

for he knew that the deeds of that “petite noblesse” from whom he sprang were excellent, but not magnificent.

No one seems to have discovered under what auspices he began to write verses. There appear in his works two idyls, “La Dryade” and “Syméthæ,” which are marked as “written in 1815.” Sainte-Beuve, with curious coarseness, after Vigny’s death, accused him in so many terms of having antedated these pieces by five years in order to escape the reproach of having imitated André Chénier, whose poems were first collected posthumously in 1819. Such a charge is contrary to everything we know of the upright and chivalrous character of Vigny. That the influence of Chénier is strong on these verses is unquestionable. But Sainte-Beuve should not have forgotten that the eclogues of Chénier were quoted by Châteaubriand in a note to the “Génie du Christianisme” in 1803, and that this was quite enough to start the youthful talent of Vigny. From this time forth, no attack can be made on the originality of the poet, so far as all French influences are concerned. The next piece of his which we possess, “La Dame Romaine,” is dated 1817; this and “Le Bal,” of 1818, show the attraction which Byron had for him. In these verses the romantic school of French poetry made its earliest appeal to the public, and in 1819 Alfred de Vigny’s friendship with the youthful Victor Hugo began.

It was in 1822 that a little volume of the highest historical importance was issued, without the name of its author, and under the modest title of “Poèmes.” It was divided into three parts, “Antiques,” “Judaiques,” and “Modernes,” and the second of these sections contained one poem which can still be read with undiluted pleasure. This is the exquisite lyrical narrative entitled “La Fille de Jephthé,” which had been composed in 1820. To realize what were the merits of Alfred de Vigny as a precursor, we have but to compare this faultless Biblical elegy

(1) Léon Séché, *Alfred de Vigny et son Temps*, Paris, Félix Juven, 1902.

with anything of the kind written up to that date by a French poet, even though his name was Hugo.

Meanwhile the life of Vigny was a picturesque and melancholy one. A certain impression of its features may be gathered, incidentally, from the pages of the "*Grandeur et Servitude Militaires*," although that was written long afterwards. He was a soldier from his seventeenth to his thirtieth year, and many of his best poems were written by lamplight, in the corner of a tent, as the young lieutenant lay on his elbow, waiting for the tuck of drum. He was long in garrison with the Royal Foot Guards at Vincennes, and thence he could slip in to Paris, meet the rest of the Cénacle at the rooms of Nodier, and recite poetry with Émile Deschamps and Victor Hugo. But in 1823 he was definitely torn from Paris. The Spanish War took his regiment to the Pyrenean frontier and it was while in camp, close to the Roncevaux and Fontarrabia, that he heard, one knows not how, of the newly discovered wonders of the "*Chanson de Roland*," which was still unknown save to a few English scholars; the result was that he wrote that enchanting poem, "*Le Cor*." If the student is challenged, as he sometimes is, to name a lyric in the French language which has the irresistible magic and melody of the best pieces of Coleridge or Keats, that fairy music which is the peculiar birth-right of England, he cannot do better than to quote, almost at random, from "*Le Cor*":—

“ Sur le plus haut des monts s’arrêtent les chevaux ;
L’écume les blanchit ; sous leurs pieds, Roncevaux
Des feux mourants du jour à peine se colore.
A l’horizon lointain fuit l’étendard du More.

‘ Turpin, n’as-tu rien vu dans le fond du torrent ? ’
‘ J’y vois deux chevaliers ; l’un mort, l’autre expirant.
Tous deux sont écrasés sous une roche noire ;
Le plus fort, dans sa main, élève un Cor d’ivoire,
Son âme en s’exhalant nous appela deux fois.’

Dieu ! que le son du Cor est triste au fond des bois.”

Begun at Roncevaux in 1823, "*Le Cor*" was finished at Pau in 1825. At the former date, Alfred de Vigny was slightly in love with the fascinating Delphine Gay, and some verses, recently given to the world, lead to the belief that he failed to propose to her because she *laughed too loudly*. Already the melancholy and distinguished sobriety of manner which was to be the mark of Alfred de Vigny had begun to settle upon him. Already he shrank from noise, from levity, from hollow

and reverberating enthusiasm. His regiment was sent to Strasburg and he became a captain. Returning to the Pyrenees, he wrote "Le Déluge" and "Dolorida"; in the Vosges he composed the first draft of "Éloa," which he called "Satan." In the second edition of his "Poèmes," there were included a number of pieces vastly superior to those previously published, and Alfred de Vigny boldly claimed for himself that distinction as a precursor, which was long denied to him, and which is now again universally conceded. He wrote that "the only merit of these poems,"—it was not their only or their greatest merit, but it was a distinction,—*"c'est d'avoir devancé au France toutes celles de ce genre."* That was absolutely true.

When we reflect that the earliest poems of Victor Hugo which display his characteristic talent, such as "Le Sylphe" and "La Grand'mère," belong to 1823, the originality of "Moïse," which was written in 1822, is extraordinary. In spite of all that has been published since, this poem may still be read with complete pleasure; there are few narratives in the French language more distinguished, more uplifted. Moses stands at sunset on the brow of Nebo; the land of Canaan lies spread at his feet. He gazes at it with longing and despair, and then he turns to climb the mountain. Amid the hymns of Israel he ascends into the clouds, and in the luminous obscurity he speaks with God. In a majestic soliloquy he expatiates on the illusions of his solitary greatness, and on the disappointment of his finding his own life more isolated and more arid the vaster his destinies become. The angels, themselves, envy his position:—

*"Vos anges sont jaloux et m'admirent entre eux,
Et cependant, Seigneur, je ne suis pas heureux ;
Vous m'avez fait vieillir puissant et solitaire,
Laissez-moi m'endormir du sommeil de la terre."*

Here we have at length the master accent of Alfred de Vigny, that which was to be the central note of his poetry, a conception of the sublimity of man, who, having tasted of the water of life, sinks back "dizzy, lost, yet unbewailing." Nothing could be more poignant than the melodious reverie of Moses:—

*"J'ai vu l'amour s'éteindre et l'amitié tarir ;
Les vierges se voilaient et craignaient de mourir.
M'enveloppant alors de la colonne noire,
J'ai marché devant tous, triste et seul dans ma gloire,
Et j'ai dit dans mon cœur : 'Que vouloir à présent ?'
Pour dormir sur un sein mon front est trop pesant,*

Ma main laisse l'effroi sur la main qu'elle touche,
 L'orage est dans ma voix, l'éclair est sur ma bouche ;
 Aussi, loin de m'aimer, voilà qu'ils tremblent tous,
 Et, quand j'ouvre les bras, on tombe à mes genoux.
 O Seigneur ! j'ai vécu puissant et solitaire,
 Laissez-moi s'endormir du sommeil de la terre !"

On the morning when these enchanting verses were composed, poetry was full grown again in France, reborn after the long burial of the eighteenth century.

The processes of the poet's mind are still better observed in "Le Déluge," a less perfect poem. All was serene and splendid in the primeval world,

"Et la beauté du Monde attestait son enfance,"

but there was one blot on the terrestrial paradise, for "l'Homme était méchant." In consequence of a secret warning, Noah builds the ark, and enters it with his family. One of his descendants, however, the young Sara, refuses to take shelter in it, because she has an appointment to meet Emmanuel, her angel lover, on Mount Arar. The deluge arrives; Sara calls in vain on her supernatural protector, and, climbing far up the peak, is the last of mortals to be submerged. The violence of the flood is rather grotesquely described; the succeeding calm is, on the other hand, of the purest Vigny:—

"La vague était paisible, et molle et cadencée,
 En berceaux de cristal mollement balancée ;
 Les vents, sans résistance, étaient silencieux ;
 La foudre, sans échos, expirait dans les cieux ;
 Les cieux devenaient purs, et, réfléchis dans l'onde,
 Teignaient d'un azur clair l'immensité profonde."

Written in the Pyrenees in 1823, "Le Déluge" exemplifies the close attention which Alfred de Vigny paid to English literature, and particularly to Byron. In "Moïse" the sole influences discoverable are those of the Bible and Milton; "Le Déluge" shows that the French poet had just been reading "Heaven and Earth." This drama was not published until January, 1823, a week after Moore's "Loves of the Angels," which also was already exercising a fascination over the mind of Vigny. The promptitude with which he transferred these elements into his own language is very remarkable, and has never, I think, been noted.

Still more observable are these English influences in "Éloa," which was written in the spring of 1824. This is the romance of pity, tender-

ness, and sacrifice, of vain self-sacrifice and of pity without hands to help. It was received by the young writers of its own country with a frenzy of admiration. In "La Muse Française" Victor Hugo reviewed it in terms of redundant eulogy. A little later, and when so much more of a brilliant character had been published, Gautier styled "Éloa" "the most beautiful and perhaps the most perfect poem in the French language." As a specimen of idealistic religious romanticism it will always be a classic and will always be read with pleasure; but time has somewhat tarnished its sentimental beauty. It is another variant of the "Loves of the Angels," but treated in a far purer and more ethereal spirit than that of Moore or Byron.

It would be difficult to point to a more delicate example of the school of sensibility than "Éloa." To submit one's self without reserve to its pellucid charm is like gazing into the depths of an amethyst. The subject is sentimental in the highest degree; Éloa is an angel, who, in her blissful state, hears of the agony of Satan, and is drawn by curiosity and pity to descend into his sphere. Her compassion and her imprudence are rewarded by her falling passionately in love with the stricken archangel, and resigning herself to his baneful force. Brought face to face with his crimes, she resists him, but the wily fiend melts into hypocritical tears, and Éloa sinks into his arms. Wrapped in a flowing cloud they pass together down to Hell, and a chorus of faithful seraphim, winging their way back to Paradise, overhear this latest and fatal dialogue:—

“ ‘Où me conduisez-vous, bel ange?’ ‘Viens toujours.’
 — ‘Que votre voix est triste, et quel sombre discours!
 N'est-ce pas Éloa qui soulève ta chaîne?
 J'ai cru t'avoir sauvé.’ ‘Non! c'est moi qui t'entraîne.
 — ‘Si nous sommes unis, peu m'importe en quel lieu!
 Nomme-moi donc encore ou ta sœur ou ton dieu!
 — ‘J'enlève mon esclave et je tiens ma victime.’
 — ‘Tu paraissais si bon!’ ‘Oh! qu'ai-je fait? Un crime’
 — ‘Seras-tu plus heureux? du moins, es-tu content?’
 — ‘Plus triste que jamais.’ — ‘Qui donc est-tu?’ ‘Satan.’ ”

Taste changes, and "Éloa" has too much the appearance, to our eyes, of a wax-work. But nothing can prevent our appreciation of the magnificent verses in which it is written. The design and scheme of color may be those of Ary Scheffer, the execution is worthy of Raphael.

Before we cease to examine these early writings, however, we must spare a moment—though only a moment—to the consideration of a work which gave Vigny the popular celebrity which served to introduce his

verses to a wider public. Early in 1826 he was presented to Sir Walter Scott in Paris, and, fired with Anglomaniac ambition, he immediately sat down to write a French Waverly novel. The result was "Cinq-Mars," long the most successful of all his writings, although not the best. It is a story of the time of Louis XIII. and of Cardinal Richelieu; it deals with all the court intrigues which led up to the horrible assassination of De Thou and of Henri d'Effiat, Marquis de Cinq-Mars. Anne of Austria is a foremost figure on the scene of it. "Cinq-Mars," a very careful study in the manner of Walter Scott, was afterwards enriched by notes and historical apparatus, and by an essay "On Truth in Art," written in 1827. It has passed through countless editions, but it is overfull of details, the plot drags, and the reader must be simple to find it an exciting romance. It is interesting to notice in it the Anglophil tendencies of its author betrayed in quotations from Shakespeare, Milton, and Byron, and the restricted circle of his friends by frequent introduction of the names of Delphine Gay, Soumet, Nodier, Lammenais. "Cinq-Mars" will always be remembered as the earliest romantic novel of France.

The marriage of Alfred de Vigny, the facts and even the date of which have been persistently misreported by his biographers,—even by M. Paléologue,—took place, as M. Séché has proved, at Pau, on February 3, 1825. He married Miss Lydia Bunbury, the daughter of Sir Edward Bunbury, a soldier and politician not without eminence in his day. She was twenty-six years of age, of "a majestic beauty" which soon disappeared under the attacks of ill-health, and everything about her gratified the excessive Anglomania of the poet. She could not talk French with ease, and curiously enough when she had for many years been the Comtesse Alfred de Vigny, it was observed that she still spoke broken French with a strong English accent. It appears that this was positively agreeable to the poet, who had a little while before written that his only *penates* were his Bible and "a few English engravings," and whose conversation ran incessantly on Byron, Southey, Moore, and Scott. It is certain that French criticism has found it hard to forgive the intensity of Vigny's early love of all things English.

French writers have labored to prove that the marriage of Alfred de Vigny was an unhappy one. It was certainly both anomalous and unfortunate, but there is no need to exaggerate its misfortunes. Lydia Bunbury appears to have been limited in intelligence and sympathy, and bad health gradually made her fretful. Yet there exists no evidence that she ever lost her liking for her husband or ceased to be soothed by his presence. He, for his part, had never loved when he proposed to Lydia Bunbury and their relations continued to be as phlegmatic on the one side

as on the other. For four or five years they lived together in sober friendship, Lydia sinking deeper and deeper into the condition of a chronic invalid. She was then nursed and tended by her husband with the tenderest assiduity and patience, and in later years he was a constant visitor at her sofa. She had exchanged a husband for a nurse, and doubtless renunciation would have been the greater part for Vigny also to play. But over his calm existence love now, for the first and only time, swept like a whirlwind of fire. In the tumult of this passion it is to his credit that he never forgot to be patient with and solicitous about the helpless invalid at home. If morality is offended, let this at least be recollected, that Lydia de Vigny knew all, and expressed no murmur that has been recorded.

The first period of Alfred de Vigny's life closed in 1827, when he left the army, on the pretext of health. He traveled in England with his wife, and it was at Dieppe, on a return journey in 1828, that he wrote the most splendid of his few lyrical poems, "*La Frégate La Sérieuse*." This ode is too long for its interest, but contains stanzas that have never been surpassed for brilliance, as for example:—

“ Comme un dauphin elle saute,
 Elle plonge comme lui
 Dans la mer profonde et haute
 Où le feu Saint-Elme à lui.
 Le feu serpente avec grâce ;
 Du gouvernail qu'il embrasse
 Il marque longtemps la trace,
 Et l'on dirait un éclair
 Qui, n'ayant pu nous atteindre,
 Dans les vagues va s'éteindre,
 Mais ne cesse de les teindre
 Du prisme enflammé de l'air.”

II.

It is remarkable to notice how many English influences the nature of Alfred de Vigny obeyed. In May, 1828, the performances of Edmund Kean in Paris stirred his imagination to its depths. He immediately plunged himself into a fresh study of Shakespeare, and still further exercised his fancy by repeated experiences of the magic of Mrs. Siddons during a long visit he paid to London. The result was soon apparent in his attempts to render Shakespeare vocal to the French, who had welcomed Kean's "*Othello*" with "*un vulgaire le plus profane que j'ai jamais l'ignorance parisienne ait déchainé dans une salle de spectacle*" (May 17,

1828). Vigny translated "The Merchant of Venice," "Romeo and Juliet," and, above all, "Othello," which was acted in October, 1829, amid the plaudits of the whole romantic camp of Paris. That night Vigny, already extremely admired within a limited circle, became universally famous, and a dangerous rival to Victor Hugo, with whose "Hernani" and "Marion de Lorme" comparison was inevitable.

But Alfred de Vigny cared little for the jealousies of the Cénacle. He was now absorbed by a very different passion. It appears to have been on May 30, 1829¹ that, after a performance of Casimir Delavigne's romantic tragedy of "Marino Faliero," Vigny was presented to the actress, Marie Dorval. This remarkable woman of genius had been born in 1798, had shown from the age of four years a prodigious talent for the stage, had made her début in Paris in 1818, and had been a universal favorite since 1822. She was, therefore, neither very young nor very new when she passed across the path of Alfred de Vigny with such fiery results. She was highly practised in the arts of love, and he a timid and fastidious novice. It may even be said, without too great a paradox, that the romance of "Éloa" was now enacted in real life, with the parts reversed, for the poet was the candid angel, drawn to his fall by pity, curiosity, and tenderness, while Mme. Dorval was the formidable and fatal demon who dragged him down. "Demon," however, is far too harsh a word to employ, even in jest, for this tremulous and expansive woman, all emotion and undisciplined ardor. M. Séché has put the position very well before us: "When, at the age of thirty-two, she saw kneeling at her feet this gentleman of ancient lineage, his charming face framed in his blond and curly hair and delicately lighted up by the tender azure of his eyes, she experienced a sentiment she had never felt before, as though a cup of cold well-water had been lifted to her burning lips."

Reserved, irreproachable, by temperament obscure and chilly, it was long before Alfred de Vigny succumbed to the tumult of the senses. For a long time the animated and extravagant actress was dazzled by the mystical adoration, the respectful and solemn worship of her new admirer. She was accustomed to the rough way of the world, but she had never been loved like this before. She became hypnotized at last by the gaze of Alfred de Vigny fixed upon her in what Sainte-Beuve has called "a perpetual seraphic hallucination." A transformation appeared to come over herself. She fell in love with Vigny as completely as the poet had with her, and she became, in virtue of the transcendent ductility of her temperament as an actress, a temporary copy of himself. She was all

(1) See M. Léon Séché's monograph, pp. 53-56.

reverie, all abstract devotion, and the strange pair floated through the stormy life of Paris, a marvel to all beholders, in a discreet and delicate rapture, as a poet with his muse, as a nun with her brother. This ecstatic relation continued until 1831, and during these years Alfred de Vigny scarcely wrote anything in prose or verse, entirely supported by the exquisite sentiment of his attachment. He fulfilled the dream of Pascal, "Tant plus le chemin est long dans l'amour, tant plus un esprit délicat sent de plaisir."

The circumstances under which this seraphic and mystical relation came to an end are related in detail by M. Léon Séché. The wonder is that Mme. Dorval, so romantic, violent, and susceptible, should have been willing so long to preserve such an idyllic or even angelic reserve. George Sand who saw her at this time selects other adjectives for her, "Oh! naïve et passionnée, et jeune et sauve, et tremblante et terrible." But she determined at last to play the comedy of renunciation no longer, and Vigny's subtlety and platonism were burned up like grass in the flame of her seduction. He was Éloa, as I have said, she was the tenebrous and sinister archangel, and he sank in the ecstatic crisis of her will. For the next few years, Mme. Dorval possessed the life of the poet, swayed his instincts, inspired his intellect. His genius enjoyed a new birth in her; she brought about a palingenesis of his talent, and during this period he produced some of the most powerful and the most solid of his works.

Under the influence of these novel and violent emotions, Vigny began at the close of 1831 to write "Stello"; he composed it in great heat, and it was finished in January, 1832, and immediately sent to press. "Stello" is a book which has been curiously neglected by modern students of the poet; it is highly characteristic of the author at this stage of his career, and deserves a closer examination than it usually receives. It is a triad of episodes set in a sort of Shandean framework of fantastic prose; the influence of Sterne is clearly visible in the form of it. It occupies a single night, and presents but two characters. Stello, a very happy and successful poet, wealthy and applauded, nevertheless suffers from the "spleen." In a fit of the blue devils, he is stretched on his sofa, the victim of a headache, which is described in miraculous and Brobdignagian terms. A mystic personage, the Black Doctor, a physician of souls, attends the sufferer, and engages him in conversation. This conversation is the book called "Stello."

The Black Doctor will distract the patient by three typical anecdotes of poets, who, in Wordsworth's famous phrase,

"began in gladness,
But thereof came, in the end, despondency and madness."

He tells a story of a mad flea, which develops into the relation of the sad end of the poet Gilbert. To this follow the history of Chatterton, and an exceedingly full and close chronicle of the last days of André Chénier. The friends converse on the melancholy topic of the rooted antipathy which exists between the Man of Action and the Man of Art. Poets are the eternal helots of society; modern life results in the perpetual ostracism of genius. Stello, in whom Alfred de Vigny obviously speaks, is roused to indignation at the charge of inutility constantly brought against the fine arts, and charges Plato with having given the original impetus to this heresy by his exclusion of the poets from his republic. But the Black Doctor is inclined to take Plato's view, and to hold that the great mistake is made by the men of reverie themselves in attempting to act as social forces. The friends agree that the propaganda of the future must be to separate the Life Poetic from the Life Politic as with a chasm.

Then in eloquent and romantic pages the law of conduct is laid down. The poet must not mix with the world, but in solitude and liberty must withdraw that he may accomplish his mission. He must firmly repudiate the too facile ambitions and enterprises of active life. He must keep firmly before him the image of those martyrs of the mind, Gilbert, Chatterton, and Chénier. He must say to his fellow men, what the swallows say as they gather under our eaves, "Protect us, but touch us not." Such is the teaching of "Stello," a book extraordinary in its own day, and vibrating still; a book in which for the first time was preached, without the least reserve, the doctrines of the aristocracy of imagination and of the illusiveness of any theory of equality between the artist and the common proletariat of mankind. Alfred de Vigny wrote "Stello" in a passion of sincerity, and it is in its pages that we first see him retiring into his famous "ivory tower." It is the credo of a poet for whom the charges of arrogance and narrowness do not exist; who doubted as little about the supremacy of genius as an anointed emperor does about Right Divine.

The stage now attracted Vigny. In the summer of 1831 he wrote, and in 1834 brought out on the stage of the Second Théâtre Français, "La Maréchale d'Ancre," a melodrama in prose, of the beginning of the seventeenth century, a poison and dagger piece, thick with the intrigues of Concini and Borgia. In May, 1833, he produced "Quitte pour la Peur," a trifle in one act. These unimportant works lead us up to what is perhaps the most famous of all Vigny's writings, the epoch-making tragedy of "Chatterton." This drama, which is in very simple prose, was the work of seventeen nights in June, 1834, when the poet was at

the summit of his infatuation for Mme. Dorval. The subject of "Chatterton" had been already sketched in "Stello," and the play is really nothing more than one of the episodes in that romance, expanded and dramatized. Vigny published "Chatterton" with a preface which should be carefully read if we are to appreciate the point of view from which the poet desired his play to be observed.

The subject of "Chatterton" is the perpetual and inevitable martyrdom of the poet, against whom all the rest of the successful world nourishes an involuntary resentment, because he will take no part in the game of action. Vigny tells the story of the young English poet, with certain necessary modifications. He represents him as a lodger at the inn of John and Kitty Bell, where at the end he tears up his manuscripts and commits suicide. The English reader must try to forgive and forget the lapses against local color. Chatterton has been a spendthrift at Oxford, and has friends who hunt the wild boar on Primrose Hill; Vigny keeps to history only when it suits him to do so. These eccentricities did not interfere with the frenetic joy with which the play was received by the young writers and artists of Paris, and they ought not to disturb us now. Chatterton drinks opium in the last scene, because a newspaper has said that he is not the author of the "Rowley Poems," and because he has been offered the situation of first flunkey to the Lord Mayor of London. But these things are a symbol.

Much of the plot of "Chatterton" may strike the modern reader as mere extravagance. The logic of the piece is, nevertheless, complete and highly effective. It was the more strikingly effective when it was produced because no drama of pure thought was known to the audience which witnessed it. Classics and romantics alike filled their stage with violent action; this was a play of poignant interest, but that interest was entirely intellectual. The mystical passion of Chatterton and Kitty Bell is subtle, silent, expressed in thoughts; here were brought before the footlights "infinite passion and the pain of finite hearts that yearn" without a sigh. It is a marvelous tribute to genius that such a play could succeed, yet it was precisely in the huge psychological soliloquy in the third act,—where danger seemed greatest,—that success was most eminent. When the audience listened to Chatterton murmuring in his garret, with the thick fog at the window, all the cold and hunger supported by pride alone, and when they listened to the tremendous words in which the pagan soul of Alfred de Vigny speaks through the stoic boy, their emotion was so poignant as to be intolerable.

The poet as the imaginative pariah,—that is the theme of "Chatterton"; the man of idealism crushed by a materialistic society. It is a

case of romantic neurosis, met without shrinking. Chatterton, the dramatist admits, is suffering from a malady of the mind. But why, on that account, should he be crushed out of existence? Why should there be no pity for the infirmities of inspiration? Has the poet really no place in the state? Is not the fact that he "reads in the stars the pathway that the finger of the Lord is pointing out" reason enough for granting him the trifle that he craves, just leisure and a little bread? Why does the man of action grudge the inspired dreamer his reverie and the necessary food? Everybody in the world is right, it appears, except the poets. I do not know that it has ever been suggested that, in his picture of Chatterton, Vigny was thinking of the poet, Hégésippe Moreau, who, in 1833, was in hospital, and who eminently "n'était pas de ceux qui se laissent protéger aisément."

"Chatterton" is Alfred de Vigny's one dramatic success. It is extremely original; it expresses with great fulness one side of the temperament of the author, and it suits the taste of the young artist not only in that but in every age. It is written with simplicity, although adorned here and there, as by a jewel, with an occasional startling image, as where the Quaker (a chorus needed because the passion of Chatterton and Kitty is voiceless) says that "the peace that reigns around you has been as dangerous for the spirit of this dreamer as sleep would be beneath the white tuberose." Whatever is forgotten, "Chatterton" must be remembered, and in each generation fresh young pulses will beat to its generous and hopeless fervor. Vigny was writing little verse at this time, but the curious piece called "Paris: Elevation" belongs to the year 1834, and is interesting as a link between the otherwise unrelated poetry of his youth and the chain of philosophical apologues in which his career as a poet was finally to culminate. But his main interest at this time was in prose.

Tenacity of vision was one of the most remarkable of Vigny's characteristics. When an experience had once made its impression upon him, this became deeper and more vivid as the years went on. He concealed it, he brooded on it, and suddenly the seed shot up and broke in the perfect blossom of imaginative writing. Hence we need not be surprised that the military adventures of his earliest years, when the yellow curls fell round the candid blue eyes of the boy as he rode in his magnificent scarlet uniform, although long put aside, were not forgotten. In the summer of 1835, with that curious activity in creation which always followed his motionless months of reverie, Alfred de Vigny suddenly set about and rapidly carried through the composition of the finest of his prose works, the admirable classic known as "Grandeur et Servi-

tude Militaires." The subject of this book is the illusion of military glory as exemplified in three episodes of the great war. The form of the volume is very notable; its stories rest in an autobiographical setting, and it was long supposed that this, also, was fiction. But a letter has recently been discovered, written to a friend while the "*Grandeur et Servitude*" was being composed, in which the author says, categorically, "wherever I have written 'I,' what I relate is the truth. I was at Vincennes when the poor adjutant died. I saw on the road to Belgium a cart driven by an old commander of a batallion. It was I who galloped along singing 'Joconde.'" This testimony adds great value to the delightful setting of the three stories, "*Laurette*," "*La Veillée de Vincennes*," and "*La Canne de Jonc*." It is the confession of a sensitive spirit, striking the note of the disappointment of the age.

"*Laurette*" is an experience of 1815, in which a tale of 1797 is told; the poet makes a poignant appeal to the feelings by relating a savage crime of the Directory. A blunt sea captain is ordered to take a very young man and his child-wife to the tropics, and on a certain day to open a sealed letter. He becomes exceedingly attached to the charming pair of lovers, but when at last the letter is opened, he finds that he is instructed to shoot the husband for a supposed political offence. This he does, being under the "servitude" of duty, and the little wife goes mad. Nothing can exceed the exquisite simplicity of the scenes on shipboard, and the whole narrative is conducted with a masterly and almost sculptural reserve. The moral of "*Laurette*" is the illusion of pushing the sentiment of duty to its last and most inhuman consequences.

Somewhat later experiences in Vigny's life inspire "*La Veillée de Vincennes*," a story of 1819. This episode opens with a delicious picture of a summer evening in the fortress before the review, the soldiers lounging about in groups, the white hen of the regiment strutting across the courtyard in her scarlet aigrette and her silver collar. It is full of these marvelous sudden images, in which Vigny delights, phrases that take possession of the fancy; such as, "*Je sentais quelque chose dans ma pensée, comme une tache dans une émeraude.*"

As a story "*La Veillée de Vincennes*" is not so interesting as its companions, but as an illustration of the poet's reflections upon life, it has an extreme value. The theme is the illusion of military excitement; the soldier only escapes ennui by the magnificent disquietude of danger, and in periods of peace he lacks this tonic. The curious and quite disconnected narrative of the accidental blowing up of the powder magazine, towards the close of this tale, is doubtless drawn directly from the experience of Vigny, who narrates it in a manner which is almost a prediction of that of Tolstoy.

In "La Canne de Jonc" we have the illusion of active glory. In the military life, when it is not stagnant, there is too much violence of action, not space enough for reflection. The moral of this story of disappointment in the person of Napoleon is that we should devote ourselves to principles and not to men. There are two magnificent scenes in "La Canne de Jonc," the one in which the Pope confronts Napoleon with the cry of "Commediante!," the other in which the author pays a noble tribute to Collingwood, and paints that great enemy of France as a hero of devotion to public duty. The whole of this book is worthy of close attention. It is one of the most distinguished in modern literature. Nothing could have been more novel than this exposure to the French of the pitiful fallacies of their military glory, of the hollowness of vows of poverty and obedience blindly made to power, whose only design was to surround itself by a bodyguard of gladiators. Of the reserve and sobriety of emotion in "Grandeur et Servitude Militaires," and of the limpid, delicate elegance of its style, there cannot be any question. It will be a joy to readers of refinement as long as the French language endures.

At the close of 1835 Alfred de Vigny made the distressing discovery,—of which he was the only member of the circle who remained oblivious,—that Mme. Dorval was flagrantly unfaithful to him. He became aware that she was in intrigue with no less a personage than the boisterous Alexandre Dumas. Recent investigations have thrown an ugly light on this humiliating and painful incident. Wounded mortally in his pride and in his passion, he felt, as he says, "the earth give way under his feet." He was from this time forth dead to the world, and, in the fine phrase of M. Paléologue, he withdrew into his own intellect as into "an impenetrable Thebaid where he could be alone in the presence of his own thoughts." Alfred de Vigny survived this blow for more than a quarter of a century, but as a hermit and a stranger among the people.

III.

When Alfred de Vigny perceived the treason of Mme. Dorval in December, 1835, his active life ceased. Something snapped in him,—the chords of illusion, of ambition, of the hope of happiness. He never attempted to forgive the deceiver, and he never forgave woman in her person. His pessimism grew upon him; he lost all interest in the public and in his friends; he sank into a soundless isolation. He possessed a country house, called Le Maine-Giraud, in the west of France, and thither he withdrew, absorbed in the care of his invalid wife, and in the

cultivation of his thoughts. His voice was scarcely heard any more in French literature, and gradually he grew to be forgotten. The louder and more active talents of his contemporaries filled up the void; Alfred de Vigny glided into silence, and was not missed. During the last twenty-eight years of his existence, on certain rare occasions, Vigny's intensity of dream, of impassioned reverie, found poetical relief. When he died, ten poems of various length were discovered among his papers, and these were published in 1864, as a very slender volume called "Les Destinées," by his executor, Louis Ratisbonne.

Several of these posthumous pieces are dated, and the earliest of them seems to be "La Colère de Samson" written in April, 1839, when the Vignys were staying with the Earl of Kilmorey at Shavington Park in Shropshire. It is a curious proof of the intensity with which Alfred de Vigny concentrated himself on his vision that this terrible poem, one of the most powerful in the French language, should have been written in England, during a country visit. It would seem that for more than three years the wounded poet had been brooding on his wrongs. Suddenly, without warning, the storm breaks in this tremendous picture of the deceit of woman and the helpless strength of man, in verses the melody and majesty of which are only equaled by their poignant agony:—

"Toujours voir serpenter la vipère dorée
 Qui se traîne en sa fange et s'y croit ignorée ;
 Toujours ce compagnon dont le cœur n'est pas sûr,
 La Femme, enfant malade et douze fois impur !
 Toujours mettre sa force à garder sa colère
 Dans son cœur offensé, comme en un sanctuaire,
 D'où le feu s'échappant irait tout dévorer ;
 Interdire à ses yeux de voir ou de pleurer,
 C'est trop ! Dieu, s'il le veut, peut balayer ma cendre,
 J'ai donné mon secret, Dalila va le vendre."

He buried the memory of Mme. Dorval under "La Colère de Samson," as a volcano buries a guilty city beneath a shower of burning ashes, and he turned to the contemplation of the world as he saw it under the soft light of the gentle despair which now more and more completely invaded his spirit.

The genius of Alfred de Vigny as the philosophical exponent of this melancholy composure is displayed in the noble and sculptural elegy, named "Les Destinées," which he composed in *terza rima* in 1849, but in a still more natural and personal way in a poem which is among the most fascinating which he has left behind him, "La Maison du Berger." Here he adopted a stanzaic form closely analogous to *rime*

royal, and this adds to the curiously English impression, as of some son of Wordsworth or brother of Matthew Arnold, which this poem produces; it may make a third in our memories with "*Laodamia*" and "*The Scholar Gipsy*." Vigny describes in it the mode in which the soul goes burdened by the weight of life, like a wounded eagle in captivity, dragging at its chain. The poet must escape from this obsession of the world; he finds a refuge in the shepherd's cabin on wheels, far from all mankind, on a vast, undulating surface of moorland. Here he meditates on man's futility and fever, on the decline of the dignity of conduct, on the public disdain of immortal things. It is remarkable that at this lofty station, no modern institution is too prosaic for his touch; his treatment of the objects and methods of the day is magnificently simple, and he speaks of railways as an ancient Athenian might if restored to breath and vision. A certain mystical Éva is evoked, and a delicate analysis of woman follows. From the solitude of the shepherd's wheeled house, the exile looks out on life, and sees the face of nature. But here he parts with Wordsworth and the pantheists; for in nature, also, he finds illusion and the reed that runs into the hand:—

"Vivez, froide Nature, et revivez sans cesse
 Sur nos pieds, sur nos fronts, puisque c'est votre loi;
 Vivez, et dédaignez, si vous êtes déesse,
 L'homme, humble passager, qui dût vous être un roi;
 Plus que tout votre règne et que ses splendeurs vaines,
 J'aime la majesté des souffrances humaines;
 Vous ne recevrez pas un cri d'amour de moi."

Finally it is in pity, in the tender patience of human sympathy, in the love which is "*taciturne et toujours menacé*," that the melancholy poet finds the sole solace of a broken and uncertain existence.

It is in the same connection that we must read "*La Sauvage*" and "*La Mort du Loup*," poems which belong to the year 1843. The close of the second of these presents us with the pessimistic philosophy of Vigny in its most concise and penetrating form. The poet has described in his admirable way the scene of a wolf hunt in the woods of a château where he has been staying, and the death of the wolf, while defending his mate and her cubs. He closes his picture with these reflections:—

"Comment on doit quitter la vie et tous ses maux,—
 C'est vous que le savez, sublimes animaux!
 A voir ce que l'on fut sur terre et ce qu'on laisse,
 Seul le silence est grand : tout le reste est faiblesse;
 Ah ! je t'ai bien compris, sauvage voyageur,

Et ton dernier regard m'est allé jusqu'au cœur !
 Il disait : 'Si tu peux, fais que ton âme arrive
 A force de rester studieuse et pensive,
 Jusqu' à ce haut degré de stoïque fierté
 Où, naissant dans les bois, j'ai tout d'abord monté.
 Gémir, pleurer, prier, est également lâche.
 Fais énergiquement ta longue et lourde tâche
 Dans la voie où le sort a voulu t'appeler—
 Puis, après, comme moi, souffre et meurs sans parler.' "

It was in nourishing such lofty thoughts as these that Alfred de Vigny lived the life of a country gentleman at Maine-Giraud, reading, dreaming, cultivating his vines, sitting for hours by the bedside of his helpless Lydia.

"Silence is Poetry itself for me," Alfred de Vigny says in one of his private letters, and as time went on he had scarcely energy enough to write down his thoughts. When he braced himself to the effort of doing so, as when in 1858 he contrived to compose "*La Bouteille à la Mer*," his accent was found to be as clear and his music as vivid and resonant as ever. The reason was that although he was so solitary and silent, the labor of the brain was unceasing; under the ashes the fire burned hot and red. He has a very curious phrase about the action of his mind; he says, "*Mon cerveau, toujours mobile, travaille et tourbillonne sous mon front immobile avec une vitesse effrayante; des mondes passent devant mes yeux entre un mot qu'on me dit et le mot que je répons.*" Dumas, who was peculiarly predisposed to miscomprehend Vigny, could not reconcile himself, in younger days, to his "immateriality," to what another observer called his "perpetual seraphic hallucination"; after 1835, this disconcerting remoteness and abstraction grew upon the poet so markedly as to cut him off from easy contact with other men. But his isolation, even his pessimism, failed to harden him; on the contrary, by a divine indulgence, they increased his sensibility, the enthusiasm of his pity, his passion for the welfare of others.

Death found him at last, and in one of its most cruel forms. Soon after he had passed his sixtieth year, he began to be subjected to vague pains, which became intenser, and which presently proved to be the result of cancer. He bore this final trial with heroic fortitude, and as the physical suffering grew more extreme, the intellectual serenity prevailed above the anguish. In the very last year of his life, the poetical faculty awakened in him again, and he wrote "*Les Oracles*," the incomparably solemn and bold apologue of "*Le Mont des Oliviers*," and the mystical ode entitled "*L'Esprit Pur*." This last poem closed with the

ominous words, "et pour moi c'est assez." On September 17, 1863, his soul was released at length from the tortured and exhausted body, and the weary Stello was at peace.

It is not to be pretended that the poetry of Alfred de Vigny is to every one's taste. He was too indifferent to the public, too austere and arrogant in his address, to attract the masses, and to them he will remain perpetually unknown. But he is a writer, in his best prose as well as in the greater part of his scanty verse, who has only to become familiar to a reader susceptible to beauty, to grow more and more beloved. The other poets of his age were fluent and tumultuous; Alfred de Vigny was taciturn, stoical, one who had lost faith in glory, in life, perhaps even in himself. While the flute and the trumpet sounded, his hunter's horn, blown far away in the melancholy woodland, could raise an echo in the heart of no warrior or banqueter. But those who visit Vigny in the forest will be in no hurry to return. He shall entertain them there with such high thoughts and such proud music that they will follow him wherever his dream may take him. They may admit that he is sometimes hard, often obscure, always in a certain facile sense unsympathetic, but they will find their taste for more redundant melodies than his a good deal marred for the future. And some among them, if they are sincere, will admit that, so far as they are concerned, he is the most majestic poet whom France produced in the rich course of the nineteenth century.

BJÖRNSTJERNE BJÖRNSEN

1832-1902

WILLIAM MORTON PAYNE

CHICAGO.

IF WE were to ask for the name of the greatest man of letters now living in the world, the possible claimants to the distinction would hardly be more than five in number. If it were a question of poetry alone, Mr. Swinburne would have to be named first, with Signor Carducci for a fairly close second. But if we take literature in its larger sense, as including all the manifestations of creative activity in language, and if we insist, furthermore, that the man singled out for this preëminence shall stand in some vital relation to the intellectual life of his time, and exert a forceful influence upon the thought of the present day, our choice must rather be made among the three giants of the north of Europe, falling, as it may be, upon the great-hearted Russian emotionalist who has given us such deeply moving portrayals of the life of the modern world; or upon the passionate Norwegian idealist whose finger has so unerringly pointed out the diseased spots in the social organism, earning by his moral surgery the name of pessimist, despite his declared faith in the redemption of mankind through truth and freedom and love; or, perchance, upon that other great Norwegian, equally fervent in his devotion to the same ideals, and far more sympathetic in his manner of inculcating them upon his readers, who, on the eighth of last December, rounded out his scriptural tale of three score years and ten, and, in commemoration of the anniversary, was made the recipient of such a tribute of grateful and whole-souled admiration as few men have ever won, and none have better deserved. It would be certainly invidious, and probably futile, to attempt a nice comparative estimate of the services of these three men to the common cause of humanity; let us be content with the admission that Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson is *primus inter pares*, and make no attempt to exalt him at the expense of his great contemporaries.

It will be well, however, to make certain distinctions between the life work of Bjørnson and that of the two men whom a common age and common aims bring into inevitable association with him. These distinctions are chiefly two,—one of them is that while Tolstoy and Ibsen have become largely cosmopolitan in their outlook, Bjørnson has much more closely maintained throughout his career the national, or, at any rate, the racial standpoint. The other is that while Tolstoy and Ibsen have become, the one indifferent to artistic expression, and the other baldly

prosaic where he was once deeply poetical, Björnson has preserved the poetic impulse of his youth, and still gives it play even in his envisagement of the most practical modern problems. Let us enlarge a little upon these two themes. Ernest Renan, speaking at the funeral of Turguénieff, described the deceased novelist as "the incarnation of a whole people." Even more fittingly might the phrase be applied to Björnson, for it would be difficult to find anywhere else in modern literature a figure so completely and profoundly representative of his race. In the frequently quoted words of Dr. Brandes, to speak the name of Björnson in any assembly of his countrymen is like "hoisting the Norwegian flag." It has been maliciously added that mention of his name is also like flaunting a red flag in the sight of a considerable proportion of the assembly, for Björnson has always been a fighter as well as an artist, and it has been his self-imposed mission to arouse his fellow countrymen from their mental sluggishness no less than to give creative embodiment to their types of character and their ideal aspirations. But whatever the opposition aroused by his political and social radicalism, even his opponents have been constrained to feel that he was the mouthpiece of their race as no other Norwegian before him had been, and that he has voiced whatever is deepest and most enduring in the Norwegian temper. Powerful as has been his appeal to the intellect and conscience of the modern world at large, it has always had a special note of admonition or of cheer for his own people. With reference to the second of our two themes, it is sufficient to say that, although the form of verse has been almost wholly abandoned by him during the past thirty years, the breath of poetry has never ceased to exhale from his work, and the lyric exuberance of his later prose still recalls to us the singer of the sixties.

Few productions of modern literature have proved as epoch making as the modest little volume called "*Synnöve Solbakken*," which appeared in the book shops of Christiania and Copenhagen in 1857. It was a simple tale of peasant life, an idyl of the love of a boy and a girl, but it was absolutely new in its style, and in its intimate revelation of the Norwegian character. It must be remembered that until the year 1814, Norway had for centuries been politically united with Denmark, and that Copenhagen had been the common literary centre of the two countries. To that city Norwegian writers had gravitated as naturally as French writers gravitate to Paris. There had resulted from this condition of things a literature which, although it owed much to men of Norwegian birth, was essentially a Danish literature, and must properly be so styled. That literature could boast, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, an interesting history comparable in its antiquity with the greater litera-

tures of Europe, and a brilliant history for at least a hundred years past. But old literatures are sure to become more or less sophisticated and trammelled by tradition, and to this rule Danish literature was no exception. When the constitution of Eidsvold, in 1814, separated Norway from Denmark, and made it into an independent kingdom (save for the forced Swedish partnership), the country had practically no literary tradition save that which centred about the Danish capital. She might claim to have been the native country of many Danish writers, even of Ludvig Holberg, the greatest writer that the Scandinavian peoples have yet produced, but she could point to nothing that might fairly be called a Norwegian literature. The young men of the rising generation were naturally much concerned about this, and a sharp divergence of opinion arose as to the means whereby the interests of Norwegian literature might be furthered, and the aims which it should have in view. One party urged that the literature should break loose from its traditional past, and aim at the cultivation of an exclusively national spirit. The other party declared such a course to be folly, contending that literature must be a product of gradual development rather than of set volition, and that, despite the shifting of the political kaleidoscope, the national literature was so firmly rooted in its Danish past that its natural evolution must be an outgrowth from all that had gone before.

Each of these parties found a vigorous leader, the cause of ultra-Norwegianism being championed by Wergeland, an erratic person in whom the spark of genius burned, but who never found himself, artistically speaking. The champion of the conservatives was Welhaven, a polished writer of singular charm and much force, philosophical in temper, whose graceful verse and acute criticism upheld by both precept and practice the traditional standards of culture. Each of these men had his followers, who proved in many cases more zealous than their leaders. The period of the thirties and forties was dominated by this Wergeland-Welhaven controversy, which engendered much bitterness of feeling, and which constitutes the capital fact in Norwegian literary history before the appearance of Ibsen and Björnson upon the scene. A sort of parallel might be drawn for American readers by taking two such men as Whitman and Longfellow, opposing them to one another in the most outspoken fashion, assuming for both a sharply polemic manner, and ranging among their respective followers all the other writers of their time. Then imagine the issue between them to be drawn not only in the field of letters, but also in the pulpit, the theatre, and the political arena, and some slight notion may be obtained of the condition of affairs which pre-

ceded the advent of Björnson and the true birth of Norwegian literature with "Synnöve Solbakken."

The work which was thus destined to mark the opening of a new era in Norwegian letters was written in the twenty-fifth year of its author's life. The son of a country pastor, Bjørnstjerne Björnson was born at Kvikne, December 8, 1832. At the age of six, his father was transferred to a new parish in the Romsdal, one of the most picturesque regions in Norway. The impression made upon his sensitive nature by these surroundings was deep and enduring. Looking back upon his boyhood he speaks with strong emotion of the evenings when "I stood and watched the sunlight play upon mountain and fiord, until I wept, as if I had done something wrong, and when, borne down upon my ski into one valley or another I could stand as if spellbound by a beauty, by a longing that I could not explain, but that was so great that along with the highest joy I had, also, the deepest sense of imprisonment and sorrow." This is the mood which was to be given utterance in that wonderful lyric, "Over the Lofty Mountains," in which all the ardor and the longings of passionate and impatient youth find their supreme and flawless expression. At the age of eleven his school days began at Molde, and were continued at Christiania in a famous preparatory school, where he had Ibsen for a comrade. He entered the university in his twentieth year, but his career was not brilliant from a scholastic point of view, and he was too much occupied with his own intellectual concerns to be a model student. From his matriculation in 1852, to the appearance of his first book in 1857, he was occupied with many sorts of literary experiments, and became actively engaged in journalism. The theatre, in particular, attracted him, for the theatre was one of the chief foci of the intellectual life of his country (as it should be in every country), and he plunged into dramatic criticism as the avowed partisan of Norwegian ideals, holding himself, in some sort, the successor of Wergeland, who had died about ten years earlier. Before becoming a dramatic critic, he had essayed dramatic authorship, and the acceptance by the theatre of his juvenile play, "Valborg," had led to a somewhat unusual result. He was given a free ticket of admission, and a few weeks of theatre going opened his eyes to the defects of his own accepted work, which he withdrew before it had been inflicted upon the public. The full consciousness of his poetical calling came to him upon his return from a student gathering at the university town of Upsala, whither he had gone as a special correspondent. "When I came home from the journey," he says, "I slept three whole days with a few brief intervals for eating and conversation. Then I wrote down my impressions of the

journey, but just because I had first lived and then written, the account got style and color; it attracted attention, and made me all the more certain that the hour had come. I packed up, went home, thought it all over, wrote and rewrote 'Between the Battles' in a fortnight, and traveled to Copenhagen with the completed piece in my trunk; I would be a poet." He then set to writing "Synnöve Solbakken," published it in part as a newspaper serial, and then in book form, in the autumn of 1857.

The next fifteen years of Björnson's life were richly productive. Within a single year he had published "Arne," the second of his peasant idyls and perhaps the most remarkable of them all, and had also published two brief dramas, "Halte-Hulda" and the one already mentioned as the achievement of fourteen feverish days. The remaining product of the fifteen years includes two more prose idyls, "A Happy Boy" and "The Fisher Maiden" (with a considerable number of small pieces similar in character); three more plays drawn from the treasury of old Norse history, "King Sverre," "Sigurd Slembe," and "Sigurd Jorsalfar"; a dramatic setting of the story of "Mary Stuart in Scotland"; a little social comedy, "The Newly Married Couple," which offers a foretaste of his later exclusive preoccupation with modern life; "Arnljot Gelline," his only long poem, a wild narrative of the clash between heathendom and the Christian faith in the days of Olaf the Holy; and, last but by no means least, the collection of his "Poems and Songs." Thus at the age of forty, Björnson found himself with a dozen books to his credit, books which had stirred his fellow countrymen as no other books had ever stirred them, arousing them to the full consciousness of their own nature and of its roots in their own heroic past. He had become the voice of his people as no one had ever been before him, the singer of all that was noble in Norwegian aspiration, the sympathetic delineator of all that was essential in Norwegian character. He had, in short, created a national literature where none had before existed, and he was still in his early prime.

The collected edition of Björnson's "Tales," published in 1872, together with "The Bridal March," separately published in the following year, gives us a complete representation of that phase of his genius which is best known to the world at large. Here are five stories of considerable length, and a number of slighter sketches, in which the Norwegian peasant is portrayed with intimate and loving knowledge. In the treatment of peasant life by most of Björnson's predecessors there had been too much of the "de haut en bas" attitude; the peasant had been drawn from the outside, viewed philosophically, and invested with artificial sentiment. Björnson was too near to his own country folk to commit such

faults as these; he was himself of peasant stock, and all his boyhood life had been spent in close association with men who wrested a scanty living from an ungrateful soil. Although a poet by instinct, he was not afraid of realism, and did not shrink from giving the brutal aspects of peasant life a place upon his canvas. In emphasizing the characteristics of reticence and naïveté he really discovered the Norwegian peasant for literary purposes. Beneath the words spoken by his characters we are constantly made to realize that there are depths of feeling that remain unexpressed; whether from native pride or from a sense of the inadequacy of mere words to set forth a critical moment of life, his men and women are distinguished by the most laconic utterance, yet their speech always has dramatic fitness and bears the stamp of sincerity. It is by these tales of peasant life that Björnson is best known outside of his own country; one may almost say that it is by them alone that he is really familiar to English readers. A free translation of "Synnöve Solbakken" was made as early as 1858, by Mary Howitt, and published under the title of "Trust and Trial." Translations of the other tales were made soon after their original appearance, and in some instances have been multiplied. It is thus a noteworthy fact that Björnson, although four years the junior of Ibsen, enjoyed a vogue among English readers for a score of years during which the name of Ibsen was absolutely unknown to them. The whirligig of time has brought in his revenges of late years, and the long neglected older author has had more than the proportional share of our attention than is fairly his due.

In his delineation of the Norwegian peasant character, Björnson was greatly aided by the study of the sagas, which he had read with enthusiasm from his earliest boyhood. Upon them his style was largely formed, and their vivid dramatic representation of the life of the early Norsemen impressed him profoundly, shaping both his ideals and the form of their expression. The modern Scandinavian may well be envied for his literary inheritance from the heroic past. No other European has anything to compare with it for clean-cut vigor and wealth of romantic material. The literature which blossomed in Iceland and flourished for two or three centuries wherever Norsemen made homes for themselves offers a unique intellectual phenomenon, for nothing like their record remains to us from any other primitive people. This

"Tale of the Northland of old
And the undying glory of dreams,"

proved a lasting stimulus to Björnson's genius, and, during the early period of his career, which we are now reviewing, it made its influence

felt alike in his tales, his dramas, and his songs. "To see the peasant in the light of the sagas and the sagas in the light of the peasant" he declared to be the fundamental principle of his literary method.

We have seen that during the fifteen years which made Björnson in so peculiar a sense the spokesman of his race, he wrote no less than five saga dramas. The first two of these works, "Between the Battles" and "Halte-Hulda," are rather slight performances, and the third, "King Sverre," although a more extended work, is not particularly noteworthy. The grimness of the Viking life is softened by romantic coloring, and the poet has not freed himself from the influence of Oehlenschläger. But in "Sigurd Slembe" he found a subject entirely worthy of his genius, and produced one of the noblest masterpieces of all modern literature. This largely planned and magnificently executed dramatic trilogy was written in Munich, and published in 1862. The material is found in the "Heimskringla," but the author has used the prerogative of the artist to simplify the historical outline thus offered into a superb imaginative creation, rich in human interest, and powerful in dramatic presentation. The story is concerned with the efforts of Sigurd, nicknamed "Slembe," to obtain the succession to the throne of Norway during the first half of the twelfth century. He was a son of King Magnus Barfod, and, although of illegitimate birth, might legally make this claim. The secret of his birth has been kept from him until he has come to manhood, and the revelation of this secret by his mother is made in the first section of the trilogy, which is a single act, written in blank verse. Recognizing the futility of urging his birthright at this time, he starts off to win fame as a crusader, the sort of fame that haloed Sigurd Jorsalfar, then king of Norway. The remainder of the work is in prose, and was, in fact, written before this poetical prologue. The second section, in three acts, deals with an episode in the Orkneys, five years later. Sigurd has returned from the Holy Land, thwarted ambition and the sense of injustice still gnawing at his heart. He becomes entangled in a feudal quarrel concerning the rule of the islands. Both parties seek to use him for their purposes, but in the end, although leadership is in his grasp, he tears himself away, appalled by the revelation of crime and treachery in his surroundings. In this section of the work we have the subtly conceived and Hamlet-like figure of Earl Harald, in whose interest Frakark, a Norse Lady Macbeth, plots the murder of Earl Paul, only to bring upon Harald himself the terrible death that she has planned for his brother. Here, also, we have the gracious maiden figure of Audhild, perhaps the loveliest of all Björnson's delineations of womanhood, a figure worthy to be ranked with the heroines of Shakespeare and Goethe,

who remains sweet and fragrant in our memory forever after. With the mutual love of Sigurd and Audhild comes the one hour of sunshine in both their lives, but the love is destined to end in a noble renunciation and to leave only an hallowed memory in token of its brief existence. Ten more years as a crusader and a wanderer over the face of the earth pass by before we meet with Sigurd again in the third section of the trilogy. But his resolution is taken. He has returned to his native land, and will claim his own. The land is now ruled by Harald Gille, who is, like Sigurd Slembe, an illegitimate son of Magnus Barfod, and who, during the last senile years of Sigurd Jorsalfar's life, had won the recognition that Sigurd Slembe might have won had he not missed the chance, and been acknowledged as the king's brother. When the king died, he left a son named Magnus, who should have been his successor, but whom Harald Gille seized, blinded, and imprisoned that he might himself occupy the throne. The five acts of this third section of the trilogy cover the last two years of Sigurd Slembe's life, years during which he seeks to gain his end, first by conciliation, and afterwards, maddened by the base treachery of the king and his followers, by assassination and violence. He has become a hard man, but, however wild his schemes of revenge, and however desperate his measures, he retains our sympathy to the end because we feel that circumstances have made him the ravager of his country, and that his underlying motive all along has not been a merely personal ambition, but an immense longing to serve his people, and to rule them with justice and wisdom. The final scene of all has a strange and solemn beauty. It is on the eve of the battle in which Sigurd is to be captured and put to death by his enemies. His death was too horrible even for the purposes of tragedy; and the poet has chosen the better part in ending the play with a foreshadowing of the outcome. Sigurd has made his last stand, his Danish allies have deserted him, and he well knows what will be the next day's issue. And here we have one of the noblest illustrations in all literature of that "Versöhnung" which is the last word of tragic art. For in this supreme hour the peace of mind which he has sought for so many years comes to him when least expected, and all the tempests of life are stilled. That reconciliation which the hour of approaching death brings to men whose lives have been set at tragic pitch, has come to him also; he now sees that this was the inevitable end, and the recognition of the fitness with which events have shaped themselves brings with it an exaltation of soul in which life is seen revealed in its true aspect. No longer veiled in the mists which have hitherto hidden it from his passionate gaze, he takes note of what it really is, and casts it from him. In this hour of passionless contempla-

tion such a renunciation is not a thing torn from the reluctant soul, but the clear solution, so long sought, of the problem so long blindly attempted. That which his passion-enslaved self has so struggled to avert, his higher self, at last set free, calmly and gladly accepts.

The two volumes which contain the greater part of Björnson's poetry not dramatic in form were both published in 1870. One of them was the collection of his "Poems and Songs," the other was the epic cycle, "Arnljot Gelline," the only long poem that he has written. The volume of lyrics includes many pieces of imperfect quality and slight value,—personal tributes and occasional productions,—but it includes also those national songs that every Norwegian knows by heart, that are sung upon all national occasions by the author's friends and foes alike, and that have made him the greatest of Norway's lyric poets. No translation can ever quite reproduce their cadence or their feeling; they illustrate the one aspect of Björnson's many sided genius that must be taken on trust by those who cannot read his language. Björnson has had the rare fortune of having his lyrics set to music by two composers—Kjerulf and Grieg—as intensely national in spirit as himself, and no festal occasion among Norwegians is celebrated without singing the national hymn, "Yes, We Love This Land of Ours," or the noble choral setting of "Olaf Trygvason." The best folk-singer is he who stands in the whirling round of life, says the poet, and he reveals the very secret of his power when he tells us that life was ever more to him than song, and that existence, where it was worth while, in the thick of the human fray, always had for him a deeper meaning than anything he had written. The longest poem in Björnson's collection is called "Bergliot," and is a dramatic monologue in which the foul slaying of her husband Einar Tambarskelve and their son Ejndride is mourned by the bereaved wife and mother. The story is from the saga of Harald Haardraada, and is treated with the deepest tragic impressiveness. It was also to the "Heimskringla" that Björnson turned for the subject of his epic cycle, "Arnljot Gelline." Here we read in various rhythms of Arnljot the outlaw, how the hands of all men are against him; how he offers to stay his wrath and end the blood feud if the fair Ingigerd, Trand's daughter, may be bestowed upon him; how, being refused, he sets fire to Trand's house and bears Ingigerd away captive; how her tears prevail upon him to release her, and how she seeks refuge in a southern cloister; how Arnljot wanders restless over sea and land until he comes to King Olaf, on the eve of the great battle, receives the Christian faith, fights fiercely in the vanguard against the hosts of the heathen, and, smiling, falls with his king on the field of Stiklestad.

Despite the power and beauty of an occasional manifestation of his genius during the late sixties and early seventies, the poetic impulse that had made Björnson the most famous of Norwegian authors seemed, toward the close of the fifteen year period we have had under review, to be well nigh exhausted. Even among those who had followed his career most closely there were few who could anticipate the splendid new outburst of activity for which he was preparing. These years seemed to be a dead time, not only in Björnson's life, but also in the general intellectual life of the Scandinavian countries. Dr. Brandes thus describes the feelings of a thoughtful observer during that period of stagnation. "In the North one had the feeling of being shut off from the intellectual life of the time. We were sitting with closed doors, some brains struggling fruitlessly with the problem of how to get them opened. * * * With whole schools of foreign literature the cultivated Dane had almost no acquaintance; and when, finally, as a consequence of political animosity, intellectual intercourse with Germany was broken off, the main channel was closed through which the intellectual developments of the day had been communicated to Norway as well as Denmark. French influence was dreaded as immoral, and there was but little understanding of either the English language or spirit." But an intellectual reawakening was at hand, an intellectual reawakening with a cosmopolitan outlook, and Björnson was destined to become its leader, much as he had been the leader of the national movement of an earlier decade. During these years of seeming inactivity, comparatively speaking, he had read and thought much, and the new thought of the age had fecundated his mind. Historical and religious criticism, educational and social problems had taken possession of his thought, and the philosophy of evolution had transformed the whole tenor of his ideas, shaping them to deeper issues and more practical purposes than had hitherto engaged them. He had read widely and variously in Darwin, Spencer, Mill, Müller, and Taine; he had, in short, scaled the "lofty mountains" that had so hemmed in his early view, and made his way into the intellectual kingdoms of the modern world that lay beyond. The "Weltgeist" had appealed to him with its irresistible behest, just as it appealed at about the same time to Ibsen and Tolstoy and Ruskin, making him a man of new interests and ideals.

One might have found foreshadowings of this transformation in certain of his earlier works,—in "The Newly Married Couple," for example, with its delicate analysis of a common domestic relation, or in "The Fisher Maiden," with its touch of modernity,—but from these suggestions one could hardly have prophesied the enthusiasm and the

genial force with which Björnson was to project his personality into the controversial arena of modern life. The series of works which have come from his pen during the past thirty years have dealt with most of the graver problems which concern society as a whole,—politics, religion, education, the status of women, the license of the press, the demand of the socialist for a reconstruction of the old order. They have also dealt with many of the delicate questions of individual ethics,—the relations of husband and wife, of parent to child, the responsibility of the merchant to his creditors and of the employer to his dependants, the double standard of morality for men and women, and the duty devolving upon both to transmit a vigorous strain to their offspring. These are some of the themes that have engaged the novelist and dramatist; they have also engaged the public speaker and lay preacher of enlightenment, as well as themes of a more strictly political character, such as the separation of Norway from the Dual Monarchy, the renewal of the ancient bond between Norway and Iceland, the free development of parliamentary government, the cause of Pangermanism, and the furtherance of peace between the nations. An extensive programme, surely, even in this summary enumeration of its more salient features, but one to which his capacity has not proved unequal, and which he has carried out by the force of his immense energy and superabundant vitality. The burden of all this tendentious matter has caused his art to suffer at times, no doubt, but his inspiration has retained throughout much of the marvelous freshness of the earlier years, and the genius of the poet still flashes upon us from a prosaic environment, sometimes in a lovely lyric, more frequently, however, in the turn of a phrase or the psychological envisagement of some supreme moment in the action of the story or the drama.

The great transformation in Björnson's literary manner and choice of subjects was marked by his sending home from abroad, in the season of 1874-75, two plays, "The Editor" and "A Bankruptcy." It was two years later that Ibsen sent home from abroad "The Pillars of Society," which marked a similar turning point in his artistic career. It is a curious coincidence that the plays of modern life produced during this second period by these two men are the same in number, an even dozen in each case. Besides the two above named, these modern plays of Björnson are, with their dates, the following: "The King" (1877), "Leonarda" (1879), "The New System" (1879), "A Glove" (1883), "Beyond the Strength I." (1883), "Geography and Love" (1885), "Beyond the Strength II." (1895), "Paul Lange and Tora Parsberg" (1898), "Laboremus" (1901), and "At Storhove" (1902). Besides these twelve plays, however, he has published six important volumes of prose fiction

during the last quarter century. The titles and dates are as follows: "Magnhild" (1877), "Captain Mansana" (1879), "Dust" (1882), "Flags Are Flying in City and Harbor" (1884), "In God's Ways" (1889), and "New Tales" (1894), among which "Absalom's Hair" is the longest and most important. The achievement represented by this list is all the more extraordinary when we consider the fact that for the greater part of the thirty years which these plays and novels cover, their author has been, both as a public speaker and as a writer for the periodical press, an active participant in the political and social life of his country.

Most of these books must be dismissed by us with a few words in order that our remaining space may be given to the four or five that are of the greatest power and significance. "The Editor," the first of the modern plays, offers a fierce satire upon modern journalism, its dishonesty, its corrupt and malicious power, its personal and partisan prejudice. The character of the editor in the play was unmistakably drawn, in its leading characteristics, from the figure of a well known conservative journalist in Christiania, although Björnson vigorously maintained that the protraiture was typical rather than personal. This play was not particularly successful upon the stage, but the book was widely read, and occasioned much excited personal controversy. "A Bankruptcy," on the other hand, proved a brilliant stage success. Its matter was less contentious, and its technical execution was effective and brilliant. It was not in vain that Björnson had at different times been the director of three theatres. This play has for its theme the ethics of business life, and more especially the question of the extent to which a man whose finances are embarrassed is justified in continued speculation for the ultimate protection of himself and his creditors. Despite its treatment of this serious problem, the play is lighter and more genial in vein than the author's plays are wont to be, and the element of humor is unusually conspicuous. Jæger remarks that "A Bankruptcy" did two new things for Norwegian dramatic literature. It made money affairs a legitimate subject for literary treatment, and it raised the curtain upon the Norwegian home. "It was with 'A Bankruptcy' that the home made its first appearance upon the stage, the home with its joys and sorrows, with its conflicts and its tenderness."

Two years later appeared "The King," which is in many respects Björnson's greatest modern masterpiece in dramatic form. He had by this time become a convinced republican, but he was also an evolutionist, and he knew that republics are not created by fiat. He believed the tendency toward republicanism to be irresistible, but he believed also that there must be intermediate stages in the transition from monarchy.

Absolutism is succeeded by constitutionalism, and that by parliamentarism, and that in the end must be succeeded by a republicanism that will free itself from all the traditional forms of symbol and ceremonial. He had also a special belief that the smaller peoples were better fitted for development in this direction than the larger and more complex societies, although, on the other hand, he thought that the process of growth into full self-government was likely to be slower among the Germanic than among the Latin races. In the deeply moving play now to be considered, we have, in the character of the titular king, an extraordinary piece of psychological analysis. The king is young, physically delicate, and of highly sensitive organization. When he comes to the throne he realizes the hollowness and the hypocrisy of the existence that prescription has marked out for him; he realizes also that the very ideal of monarchy, under the conditions of modern European civilization, is a gigantic falsehood. For a time after his accession, he leads a life of pleasure seeking and revelry, hoping that he may dull his sense of the sharp contrast that exists between his station and his ideals. But his conscience will give him no peace, and he turns to deliberate contemplation of the thought, not indeed of abdicating his false position, but of transforming it into something more consonant with truth and the demands of the age. He will become a citizen king, and take for wife a daughter of the people; he will do away with the pomp and circumstance of his court, and attempt to lead a simple and natural life, in which the interests of the people shall be paramount in his attention. But in this attempt he is thwarted at every step. All the forces of selfishness and prejudice and ignorance combine against him; even the people whom he seeks to benefit are so wedded to their idols that their attitude is one of suspicion rather than of sympathy. He loves a young woman of strong and noble character, and wins her love in return, but she dies on the very eve of their union. His oldest and most confidential friend, the wealthiest man in the kingdom, but a republican, is murdered by a radical associate of the "intransigent" type, and the king is left utterly bereaved by his twofold loss. This brings us to the closing scene of the drama, in which the king, his nerves strained to the breaking point, confronts the group of officials and others who bring to him the empty phrases of a conventional condolence. The conversation that follows is in a vein of bitterness on the one side, and of obtuse smugness on the other; the tragic irony of the action grows deeper and deeper, until in the end the king, completely disheartened and despairing, goes into an adjoining room, and dies by his own hand, to the consternation of the men from whom he has just parted. They give utterance to a few polite phrases, charitably accounting for

the deed by the easy attribution of insanity to the king, and the curtain falls.

It may well be imagined that "The King" made a stir in literary and social circles, and quite noticeably fluttered the doves of conventionality and conservatism. Such plain speaking and such deadly earnestness of conviction were indeed far removed from the idyllic simplicity of the peasant tales and from the poetical reconstructions of the legendary past. Eight years later, Björnson prefaced a new edition of this work with a series of reflections upon "Intellectual Freedom" that constitute one of the most vigorous and remarkable examples of his serious prose. The central ideas of his political faith are embodied in the following sentences from this preface:—

"Intellectual Freedom. Why is not attention called over and over again to the fact that for the great peoples, who have so many compensating interests, the free commerce of ideas is one condition of life among many others; while for us, the small peoples, it is absolutely indispensable. A people numerically large may attain to ways of thought and enterprise that no political censure can reduce to a minimum; but under narrower conditions it may easily come about that the whole people will fall asleep. A powerful propaganda of enlightenment under the conditions of free speech is for us of the first and the last importance. When I wrote this piece it was my chief aim to enlarge the bounds of free thought. I have later made the same attempt in matters of religion and morals. When my opponents seek to sum up my character in a few words, they are apt to say: 'He attacks the throne and the altar.' It seems to me that I have served the freedom of the spirit."

In the clean cut phrases and moral earnestness of this *apologia pro vita sua*, which deserves to be reproduced at greater length, we have the modern Björnson, no longer poet alone, but poet and prophet at once, the champion of sincere thinking and worthy living, the Sigurd Slembe of our own day, happier than his prototype in the consciousness that the ambition to serve his people has not been altogether thwarted, and that his beneficent activity is not made sterile even by the bitterest opposition.

We must pass rapidly over the books of the five years next after the publication of "The King." The story of "Magnhild," planned several years earlier, represents Björnson's return to fiction after a long dramatic interlude. There are still peasants in this story, but they are different from the figures of the early tales, and the atmosphere of the work is modern. It turns upon the question of the mutual duties of husband and wife, when love no longer unites them. The solution seems to lie in separation when union has thus become essentially immoral. "Captain Mansana" is a story of Italian life, based, so the author assures us, on actual characters and happenings that had come

within the range of his observation during his stay abroad. Its interest does not lie in any particular problem, but rather in the delineation of the titular figure, a strong and impetuous person whose personality suggests that of Ferdinand Lassalle, as the author himself points out to us in a prefatory note. "Dust" is a pathetic little story having for its central idea what seems like a pale reflection of the idea of Ibsen's "Ghosts," which had appeared a few months before. It is the dust of the past that settles upon our souls, and clogs their free action. The special application of this idea is to the religious training of children. In the play, "Leonarda," and again in the play, "A Glove," the author recurs to the woman question; in the one case, his theme is the attitude of society toward the woman of blemished reputation; in the other, its attitude toward the man who in his relation with women has violated the moral law. "Leonarda" is a somewhat inconclusive work, because the issue is not clearly defined, but in "A Glove" (at least in the acting version of the play, which differs from the book in its ending) there is no lack of definiteness. This play inexorably demands the enforcement of the same standard of morality for both sexes, and declares the unchaste man to be as unfit for honorable marriage as the unchaste woman. Upon the theme thus presented a long and violent discussion raged; but if there be such a thing as an immutable moral law in this matter, it must be that upon which Björnson has so squarely and uncompromisingly planted his feet. The other remaining work of this five year period is the play called "The New System." The new system in question is a system of railway management, and it is a wasteful one. But the young engineer who demonstrates this fact has a hard time in opening the eyes of the public. He succeeds eventually, but not until he has encountered every sort of contemptible opposition and hypocritical evasion of the plain truth. The social satire of the piece is subtle and sharp; what the author really aims at is to illustrate, by a specific example, the repressive forces that dominate the life of a small people, and make it almost impossible for any sort of truth to triumph over prejudice.

Since the production of "A Glove," twenty years ago, six more plays have come from Björnson's prolific pen. Of these by far the most important are the two that are linked by the common title, "Beyond the Strength." The translation of this title is hopelessly inadequate, because the original word means much more than strength; it means talent, faculty, capability, the sum total of a man's endowment for some particular purpose. The two pieces bearing this name are quite different in theme, but certain characters appear in both, and both express the same thought,—the thought that it is vain for men to strive after the unattain-

able, for in so doing they lose sight of the actual possibilities of human life; the thought that much of the best human energy goes to waste because it is devoted to the pursuit of ideals that are indeed beyond the strength of man to realize. In the first of the two plays, this super-human ideal is religious, it is that of the enthusiast who accepts literally the teaching that to faith all things are possible; in the second, the ideal is social, it is that of the reformer who is deluded to believe that one resounding deed of terror and self-immolation for the cause of the people will suffice to overthrow the selfish existing order, and create for the toiling masses a new heaven upon earth. No deeper tragedies have been conceived by Björnson than these two, the tragedy of the saintlike Pastor Sang, who believes that the miracle of his wife's restoration to health has at last in very truth been brought by his fervent prayer, and finds only that the ardor of his faith and hers has brought death instead of life to them both,—the tragedy of his son Elias, who dies like Samson with his foes for an equally impossible faith, and by the very violence of his fanaticism removes the goal of socialist endeavor farther than ever into the dim future. Björnson has written nothing more profoundly moving than these plays, with their twofold treatment of essentially the same theme, nor has he written anything which offers a clearer revelation of his own rich personality, with its unfailing poetic vision, its deep tenderness, and its boundless love for all humankind. The play, "Geography and Love," which came between the two just described, is an amusing piece, in the vein of light and graceful comedy, which satirizes the man with a hobby, showing how he unconsciously comes to neglect his wife and family through absorption in his work. "Paul Lange and Tora Parsberg," the next play, deals with the passions engendered by political controversy, and made much unpleasant stir in Norwegian society because certain of the characters and situations were unmistakably taken from real life. The list of Björnson's plays is completed by "Laboremus" and "At Storhove," both concerned with substantially the same theme, which is that of the malign influence exerted by an evil minded and reckless woman upon the lives of others. From a different point of view, we may say that the subject of these plays is the consecration of the home. This has always been a favorite theme with Björnson, and he has no clearer title to our gratitude than that which he has earned by his unfailing insistence upon the sanctity of family life, its mutual confidences, and its common joys.

During the score of years that have passed since the publication of "Dust," Björnson has produced three volumes of fiction,—his two great novels, and his second collection of short stories. The first of the

novels, "Flags Are Flying in City and Harbor," saw the light during the year following the publication of "A Glove," and the teaching of that play is again enforced with uncompromising logic in the development of the story. The work has two other main themes, and these are heredity and education. So much didactic matter as this is a heavy burden for any novel to carry, and a lesser man than Björnson would have found the task a hopeless one. That he should have succeeded even in making a fairly readable book out of this material would have been remarkable, and it is a pronounced artistic triumph that the book should prove of such absorbing interest. For absorbingly interesting it is, to any reader who is willing that a novel should provide something more than entertainment, and who is not afraid of a work of fiction that compels him to think as he reads. The principal character is a man descended from a line of ancestors whose lives have been wild and lawless, and who have wallowed in almost every form of brutality and vice. The four preceding generations of the race are depicted for us in a series of brief but masterly characterizations, in which every stroke tells, and we witness the gradual weakening of the family stock. But with the generation just preceding the main action of the novel, there has been introduced a vigorous strain of peasant blood, and the process of regeneration has begun. It is this process that goes on before our eyes. It does not become a completed process, but the prospect is bright for the future; and the flags that fly over town and harbor in the closing chapter have a symbolical significance, for they announce a victory of spirit over sense, not only in the cases of certain among the individual participants in the action, but also in the case of the whole community to which they belong. So much for the book as a study in heredity. As an educational tract, it has the conspicuous virtue of remaining in close touch with life while embodying the spirit of modern scientific pedagogy. The hero of the book,—the last descendant of a race struggling for moral and physical rehabilitation,—throws himself into the work of education with an energy equal to that which his forbears had turned into such perverse channels. He organizes a school,—more than half of the book, in fact, is about this school and its work,—and seeks to introduce a system of training which shall shape the whole character of the child, a school in which truth and clean living shall be inculcated with thoroughness and absolute sincerity, a school which shall be the microcosm of the world outside, or rather of what that world ought to be. Björnson's interest in education has been lifelong; for many years it had gone astray in a sort of Grundtvigian fog, but at the time when this book came to be written, it had worked its way out into the clear light of reason. If the future should cease to care for

this work as a piece of literature, it will still look back to it as to a sort of nineteenth century "Emile," and take renewed heart from its inspiring message.

"In God's Ways," the second of the two great novels, is a work of which it is difficult to speak in terms of measured praise. With its delicate and vital delineations of character, its rich sympathy and depth of tragic pathos, its plea for the sacredness of human life, and its protest against the religious and social prejudice by which life is so often misshapen, this book is an epitome of all the ideas and feelings that have gone to the making of the author's personality, and have received such manifold expression in his works. It is a simple story, concerned mainly with four people, in no way outwardly conspicuous, yet here united by the poet's art into a relationship from which issue some of the deepest of social questions, and which enforces in the most appealing terms the fundamental teaching of all the work of his mature years. First of all, we have the boyhood of the two friends who are afterwards to grow apart in their sympathies; the one alert of mind, imaginative, open to every intellectual influence, also impetuous and hot-blooded; the other shy and intellectually stolid, but good to the very core, and moved by the strongest of altruistic impulses. In accordance with their respective characters, the first of these youths becomes a physician, and the other a clergyman. Then we have the sister of the physician, who becomes the wife of the clergyman, a noble, proud, self-centred nature, finely strung to the inmost fibre of her being. Then we have a woman of the other sort, clinging, abnormally sensitive, a child when the years of childhood are over, and made the victim of a shocking child-marriage to a crippled old man. She it is whom the physician loves, and persuades to a legal dissolution of her immoral union. After some years, he makes her his wife, and their happiness would be complete were it not for the social and religious prejudice aroused. The clergyman, whom years of service in the state church have hardened into bigotry, is officially, as it were, compelled to condemn the friend of his boyhood, and even the sister, for a time grown untrue to her own generous nature, shares in the estrangement. In vain does the physician seek to shelter his wife from the chill of her environment. She droops, pines away, and finally dies, gracious, lovable, and even forgiving to the last. Then the death angel comes close to the clergyman and his wife, hovering over their only child, and at last the barrier of formalism and prejudice and religious bigotry is swept away from their minds. Their natural sympathies, long repressed, resume full sway, and they realize how deeply they have sinned toward the dead woman. The sister seeks a reconciliation with her brother, but

he repulses her, and gives her his wife's private diary to read. In this "journal intime" she finds the full revelation of the gentle spirit that has been done to death, and she feels that the very salvation of her life and soul depend upon winning her brother's forgiveness. The closing chapter, in which the final reconciliation occurs, is one of the most wonderful in all fiction; its pathos is of the deepest and the most moving, and he must be callous of soul, indeed, who can read it with dry eyes.

If we were to search the whole of Björnson's writings for the single passage which should most completely typify his message to his fellow-men,—not Norwegians alone, but all mankind,—the choice would have to rest upon the words spoken from the pulpit by the clergyman of this novel, on the Sunday following the certainty of his child's recovery.

"Today a man spoke from the pulpit of the church about what he had learned.

"Namely, about what first concerns us all.

"One forgets it in his strenuous endeavor, a second in his zeal for conflict, a third in his backward vision, a fourth in the conceit of his own wisdom, a fifth in his daily routine, and we have all learned it more or less ill. For should I ask you who hear me now, you would all reply thoughtlessly, and just because I ask you from this place, 'Faith is first.'

"No, in very truth, it is not. Watch over your child, as it struggles for breath on the outermost verge of life, or see your wife follow the child to that outermost verge, beside herself for anxiety and sleeplessness,—then love will teach you that *life comes first*. And never from this day on will I seek God or God's will in any form of words, in any sacrament, or in any book or any place, as if He were first and foremost to be found there; no, life is first and foremost—life as we win it from the depths of despair, in the victory of the light, in the grace of self-devotion, in our intercourse with living human kind. God's supreme word to us is life, our highest worship of Him is love for the living. This lesson, self-evident as it is, was needed by me more than by most others. This it is that in various ways and upon many grounds I have hitherto rejected,—and of late most of all. But never more shall words be the highest for me, nor symbols, but the eternal revelation of life. Never more will I freeze fast in doctrine, but let the warmth of life melt my will. Never will I condemn men by the dogmas of old time justice, unless they fit with our own time's gospel of love. Never, for God's sake! And this because I believe in Him, the God of Life, and His never ending revelation in life itself."

Here is a gospel, indeed, one that needs no church for its promulgation, and no ceremonial for the enhancement of its impressiveness. It is a gospel, moreover, that is based upon no foundation of precarious logic, but finds its premises in the healthy instincts of the natural man. It is no small thing to have thus found the way, and to have helped others likewise to find the way, out of the mists of superstition, through the valleys of doubt and despondency, athwart the thickets of prejudice and bigotry with all their furtive foemen, up to these sunlit heights of serenity.

If Björnsson's essential teaching may be found in a single page, as has above been suggested, his personality evades all such summarizing. In the present essay, he has been considered as a writer merely,—poet, dramatist, novelist,—but the man is vastly more than that. His other activities have been hinted at, indeed, but nothing adequate has been said about them. The director of three theatres, the editor of three newspapers and the contributor to many others, the promoter of schools and patriotic organizations, the participant in many political campaigns, the lay preacher of private and public morals, the chosen orator of his nation for all great occasions,—these are some of the characters in which we must view him to form anything like a complete conception of his many sided individuality. Take the matter of oratory alone, and it is perhaps true that he has influenced as many people by the living word as he has by the printed page. He has addressed hundreds of audiences in the three Scandinavian countries and in Finland, he has spoken to more than twenty thousand at a time, and his winged speech has gone straight home to his hearers. All who ever heard him will agree that his oratory is of the most persuasive and vital impressiveness. In his more intimate relationships, on the other hand, in face to face conversation or in the home circle, the man takes on a quite different aspect; the prophet has become the friend, the impassioned preacher has become the genial story teller, and shares the gladsome or mirthful mood of the hour. Such a personality as this may be analyzed; it defies any concise synthesis. One resorts to figures of speech, and they have been abundantly resorted to by those who have paid him the tribute of their admiration and love upon the occasion of his recent anniversary.

From his early years, Björnsson has kept in touch with the modern intellectual movement by mingling with the people of other lands than his own. Besides his visits to Denmark, Sweden, and Finland, he has made many lengthy sojourns in the chief continental centres of civilization, in Munich, Rome, and Paris. The longest of his foreign journeys was that which brought him to the United States in the winter of 1880-81, for the purpose of addressing his fellow countrymen in the Northwest. His home for more than a quarter of a century past has been his estate of Aulestad in the Gausdal, a region of Southern Norway. Here he has become a model farmer, and here, surrounded by his family,—wife, children, and grandchildren,—his patriarchal presence gives dignity to the household, and unites its members in a common bond of love. Hither come streams of guests, friends old and new, to enjoy his generous hospitality. There is provision for all, both bed and board, and the heartiest of welcomes from the host. And the

stranger from abroad will be greeted, as like as not, by the sight of his own country's flag streaming from a staff before the house, and foreshadowing the personal greeting that awaits him upon the threshold.

TENDENCIES IN MODERN GERMAN SCULPTURE

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WHY do not works of sculpture receive that same degree of public interest and appreciation which is given to the productions of painting, music, and poetry? If we ask concerning the causes, the answers are quite varied. They say, in the first place, that sculpture has been unable to keep pace with its sister arts; for while the other arts have been fortunate in adapting themselves to modern feeling and have given expression to it, sculpture, in the silence of her studio, has been struggling anxiously to give expression to new thoughts in antiquated forms. There has been a lack of stimulating influences from without to guide sculpture toward definite ends. Formerly this branch of art was developed in connection with the decoration of given situations, such as buildings, tombs, fountains, etc., but in recent times it has taken more and more abstract and ideal forms. And this fact has doubtless alienated people of taste and the general public from sculpture.

But the true causes of this alienation lie deeper; they are involved in the nature of sculpture and modern taste itself. A work of painting, for instance, will charm the spectator more completely, for its means of appeal are stronger, they act more directly upon the senses, even though the spectator merely floats along on the waves of vague feelings, in an atmosphere of moods. Plastic representation is limited to form. Now as form there are two points of view in representation,—form as a decorative, ornamental element, and form as the expression of artistic conceptions, the expression of nature animated with a sense of personality.

Considered thus in comparison with the living reality form appears to be something abstract. Those spectators who can comprehend the essence of form are always few. Hence the great majority bring no sympathy to the consideration of a work of sculpture; it expresses a conception that is unfamiliar to them. The modern man takes no time for calm and thorough reflection. He sees too much and thus loses the capacity for so taking in the impressions conveyed by sculpture as to gain a clear conception of them.

Perhaps it is not claiming too much to say that he lacks the practice necessary to see objects plastically, and to judge them from the point of view of their appeal to the sense of form. For, indeed, this capacity must be developed by the study of forms in the outer world, which makes keener the sense of sight and inspires man in many ways to familiarize

himself with the optical relations of nature. Would that the love and enjoyments of sculpture might spring up! For this is the art which, more perfect than any other, expresses our essence and nature in lasting forms.

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In these days when any one undertakes the characterization of artistic products and tendencies, he does not usually conceive the essence of the artistic work as a problem by itself, but goes back of the object in hand searching after the phenomenon, "man," and his personal peculiarities, as well as for the time and the circumstances with their effects upon the work. We shall pursue the same course, and seek everywhere for the relation of the plastic products to the artistic tendencies and problems of the time.

German sculpture began toward the end of the eighteenth century with the imitation of the antique. Winkelmann's declaration that the general superiority of the Greek masterpieces consisted in "a noble simplicity and a calm greatness which far surpassed the beauty of the creations of Nature," became a very gospel to many artists. They turned away from nature and attempted beautiful ideal figures after antique models. They restricted themselves to individual treatment of the most worthy creation of nature, the naked human figure, endeavoring in this to attain the wealth of form, the dignity and the noble proportions of the antique masterpieces. The artist who came nearest to this ideal was Bartel Thorwaldsen. Bartel Thorwaldsen was especially fitted to give direct expression in his works to the artistic aims of his time; he was imbued with a sense of the sensual beauty of form, "the classicist ideal." He had the gift of reproducing in his works forms similar to the antique, just as the skilful actor is able to imitate the appearance of his "study." In the statue of Adonis in the Munich Glyptothek we recognize his endeavor to generalize all the forms of the body in typical fashion and to avoid individualizing any member. Thus the Adonis appears to be the type of a beautiful youth in a beautiful pose. This type of a beautiful human figure appears, indeed, built after the antique model with the standard and proportions borrowed from that source. The execution in marble is masterful; in this Thorwaldsen shows a talent such as few of his contemporaries possessed. But his art appears in another light as soon as it is obliged to leave the realm of abstract, ideal representation. In the portrait his art produced little that is good; it was not equal to the representation of individual personality. In this is manifest a weakness of his talent which attaches to the entire school founded by Thorwaldsen,

—the general lack of original, personal feeling. His faculty for the observation of sensually pleasing beauty of form usually failed to catch the vital significance of the phenomenon which expresses itself under the veil of the form. The considerable influence which Thorwaldsen exercised over his fellow workers in his day seems to us entirely justified in view of the tendency of art at that period. Thorwaldsen's artistic knowledge of antique art, his sense of form and the vigor of his artistic expression, as well as his technique in sculpture, were probably attained and disciplined and developed through his permanent residence in Italy. In this direction he made Italy the master school for young sculptors. After his time we see all sculptors of repute go thither. Thorwaldsen's less gifted followers lost themselves in the tendencies he had cultivated, the purely mechanical imitation of antique forms. The original and independent master, Joh. Gottfried Schadow is already found characterizing Thorwaldsen's art as an imitation of the ideal style of antiquity; he recognized that nature is not framed according to a prescribed standard like that of antique art, and that there is beauty in the individual creations that exceed or fall short of this standard. We see clearly in Schadow's statues of Generals Ziethen and Dessauer his realism, which aims at the characteristic features of his subject, a realism which one would like to call ideal realism on account of its intimate appreciation of nature. He expressed his personal conception of the proper treatment of a monument erected to the memory of a great man as follows: "If fear and admiration are the motives that prompt the erection of the monument, if the hero himself is great, the artist considers his subject as a simple portrait. It needs no extraneous adornment to make him appear great and venerable, and the garments which he wore in life, whatever they may be, are consecrated by the hero."

But even Schadow, eager as he always was to give play to his originality, could not withhold his tribute to the prevailing tendency. He surrendered to the influence of Goethe's artistic opinions which aimed at the ideal reproduction of the subject in a poetic spirit. Under the inspiration of Goethe's poetic allegorical conception of art he produced the full length statue of Blücher at Rostock, in which the general, familiar and thoroughly German figure that he was, is treated in the grand style as a hero in the classicist spirit, with a lion's skin draped about him. We observe how the artist Schadow immediately loses his individual stamp as soon as another point of view than his own is forced upon him. We become best acquainted with his manner in the excellent portrait studies which he has left us, as well as in statuettes and figures, and also in his sketches which suggest Chodowicke's style, and in general in all those

works which he produced independently for himself from inward inclination and enjoyment of his art. In his drawings which are preserved to us, mostly plans for decorative monumental structures, we perceive also how closely Schadow was still bound to the tradition of the eighteenth century.

In Christian Daniel Rauch there rose above the current of his time a talent whose nature seemed fitted to meet satisfactorily all artistic demands and to develop them in harmony with the characteristics of his race. In his works Thorwaldsen's principles appear in more elegant form and at the same time enriched by the artistic demands of romanticism. Rauch was an artist after Goethe's own heart, and such he remained all his life. Form is to him a means to the end of giving expression to poetically conceived ideas. His efforts were favored in a most extraordinary manner by time and circumstances. The wars of liberation were past; the memory of the leaders and heroes was to be honored by statues and preserved to posterity. Rauch was commissioned to execute them. In the statues of Bülow, Scharnhorst, Blücher, York, and Greisevan, the artist manifests an endeavor to render the portraits of the heroes and leaders of a great and exciting epoch as they lived in the idealizing sentiment of their contemporaries. We generalized the purely human type of those men into an ideal. And the importance of the personages represented demanded that the monuments be made conspicuous to the eye and placed in contrast with their local surroundings. And this thought led to the erection of the statues in the midst of an open square. But this caused a quantity of difficulties for the sculptor in his plastic treatment. He had to resort to all sorts of devices for overcoming the monotony of this treatment and for securing a consistent plastic effect. The cloak, which Rauch introduced to this end, is nothing but a forced device from considerations of plastic convenience. But at the same time Rauch endeavored to treat the problem of monumental sculpture as a decorative problem. A monument should express not merely the importance of its subject, but should also have an effect of spatial adornment. In the statue of Frederick the Great in Unter den Linden in Berlin, and with vastly more skill in that of King Maximilian of Bavaria in the Max-Joseph Square in Munich, he created types of a style which is still effective even in our day. In a small portrait statue, "Goethe in His Dressing Gown," and in the statue of the philosopher Kant in Königsberg, Rauch manifests his realism, purified and elevated by a serious view of life and nature, which above all shows clearly his purely artistic purposes. And thus ways and aims were pointed out for the coming generation which began with Rietschel and Hähnel. Then came other less gifted talents which as successors of

Rauch made desperate efforts to follow in the master's footsteps though they were unable to keep his pace, to penetrate his artistic ideas and apply them to new aims. Accordingly they gradually degenerated into the spiritless imitation of a systematic formalism.

Ernst Rietschel, the foremost of them, had learned his art under Rauch, and followed with delicate feeling the ideas of this artist as they appear finally in his statue of Kant. His first monumental work is the statue of Lessing at Brunswick. He produced it independently as a portrait figure and succeeded in reflecting Lessing's character in attitude and expression. It is proper to recall here an expression of Goethe's regarding memorial monuments in general, "The best memorial of a man is the man himself, and a good statue is worth more than any quantity of architectural features." With equal skill Rietschel handled, also, the difficult problem of a double monument of Goethe and Schiller for Weimar. For Rauch had been unable to bring himself to represent the two princes of poetry in what he called the "*sansculotte costume*" (meaning the contemporary garb). Rauch's idealizing taste felt a natural distaste for coat, breeches, and boots, as soon as it came to representing them in monumental works. But to Rietschel's feeling the costume question seemed unimportant; he merely recognized that the costume constituted no obstacle to his artistic conception and execution. In this respect Rietschel's aim was similar to Schadow's. In his later works such as the "Pietà," and the statue of the reformer, Luther, which became so rapidly popular, he shows how his whole purpose aimed at developing the subjective side of the artistic problem. Endeavoring thus with his whole sentiments to appreciate the significance of the form, he attained in the portrait much more lifelike representation than is common to this period. He stood nearer to nature than to the antique, and in this respect also stood in a certain opposition to Rauch, whose endeavor was to see nature through the spectacles of the antique.

The Dresden school of sculpture has a Januslike face, which shows on one side Rietschel's type and on the other Hähnel's. Both left in Dresden, as did Rauch in Berlin, enduring traces of their activity as well as numerous disciples, so that we may fairly speak of a school. Ernst Julius Hähnel is the complement to Rietschel. He is, so to speak, the Thorwaldsen of the romantic tendency. But in the majority of his numerous works he shows himself to be a very superficial formalist. His wide reach and his influence are only to be understood when one considers at the same time the whole fallow field of German sculpture of this period. Hähnel and his school manifested their skill in presenting themes which were attractive for their very subjects under the form of

an agreeable sensual ideal of beauty which was on this account generally intelligible. Even now in the numerous and widely distributed small plaster replicas after works of this school we may observe the influence of this vague ideal of beauty. From these little plaster busts and statuettes which are manufactured wholesale and found in everybody's hands we can judge how low sculpture has fallen. But on the other hand, in the clay and Tanagra statuettes, manufactured wholesale though they be, how profound does the artistic culture of the antique appear to us!

The great ateliers for sculpture in Berlin, Dresden, and Munich, established under the direction of discreet and influential artists, gradually declined to the level of art factories where work was continued only in a mechanical way and after existing models. The period from 1850 to 1870 is marked by this decadence. In monumental sculpture, instead of the serious and harmonious style represented by Rauch, we see the inroads of a manner that contrasts strikingly with the repose and dignity of that style. In order to avoid monotony despite the repetition of one and the same general plan, the artists of this school allowed their expression to degenerate into strained and declamatory poses, while in the treatment of space they endeavored to enliven the structure that had become typical by decorative accessories. The sculpture of the period, like the architecture, shows the stamp of what we may call a theatrical stage style. In the case of single figures all effort was centred in reproducing vividly a pretty subject, such, for instance, as a nymph or a loreley, an Adonis or a maddened Hercules. The whole significance of the subject was found in smooth and rounded beauty of form, and this gave the preference to themes that afforded an opportunity to represent swelling muscles and sensuous curves. In connection with such subjects it was also quite common to introduce animals, beautifully groomed and trained. The animal is to be regarded as a supplement to the chief figure for the purpose of emphasizing its thematic significance. Animals had not at that time become subjects for independent artistic treatment, and indeed we have not even today attained to anything like the art of the French sculptors.

Portraiture, too, was still in a bad way. The treatment was impersonal and without delicate artistic meaning. Such encouragement as came from without was not of a nature to improve this manner of handling the portrait. Commissions were often given, as, for instance in Munich, for the production of hundreds of busts of historical personages of whose character and appearance the sculptor sometimes had not the slightest notion. Accordingly, when we scan the endless rows of plaster heads in galleries and halls of fame, we soon discover that the busts all look alike; our interest grows dull and finally we pass by such

displays with indifference. Even the form of these busts is as unsculpturesque as possible, showing a breast figure hollowed out in the back and supported by a round turned pedestal. Doubtless this was done in imitation of antique bronze busts such as were set into sockets. This rudiment of a form which is in and of itself strictly good style, is retained down to the present day like so many other elements of bad taste, and we see even talented artists exerting themselves to disguise and trick out this unlovely form with all sorts of additions in the nature of decoration. But if we seek in these works for the expression of a more delicate sense and spiritual appreciation of the meaning of form, we find no traces of them. And this superficial treatment is naturally coupled with a coarse technical handling of stone and bronze.

For a long time our artists were quite helpless in facing the demands of correct bronze casting. Gottfried Schadow in 1792 was obliged to make a journey to Stockholm and St. Petersburg in order to learn something of the production of large works of sculpture in bronze. When in 1818 the casting of the full length statue of Blücher at Rostock was successfully completed with the aid of French molders, even Goethe went into details on the subject in his writings on art. From the sculptor, Rauch, we often hear complaints in his letters about the lack of thorough and experienced bronze founders. Rauch's endeavors brought about an essential advancement in technique. In this connection mention must be made of the bronze founders, Stygelmaier and Miller in Munich. Even as early as 1844-50 the Munich bronze foundry was able to undertake the casting of the colossal figure of Bavaria for the Ruhmeshalle.

The lack of competent marble carvers was still more keenly felt at that time; if they were needed the only recourse was in many cases to follow the example of Rauch and import them from Italy. As for the method of procedure, it was the standing custom to transfer the proportions from the clay model to the stone by a purely mechanical process. Free carving from the stone by the aid of a small trial model or sketch was practically unknown. Not until much later did Hildebrand point out this method, following the tradition of the antique. The imperishable masterpieces of antiquity exercised an unparalleled influence upon the sculptors of the beginning of the nineteenth century. They began with the mechanical imitation of antique models, without inquiring, however, into the reasons and conditions for this mode of expression or attaining any technical or systematic understanding of it. But the meaning of the subject of the work and the significance thus added to it for those familiar with classic culture contributed not less than the form itself to make this influence revolutionary. And this point of view was certainly responsible

for the fact that sculpture lost sight of its universal natural functions, as the art of the monumental decoration of space, to devote itself more and more to independent figures in the round, marked by abstract ideality. In many respects the antique idea was entirely misunderstood; the classicists failed to recognize in it an art theory of a unitary and harmonious conception of nature. Still less were these artists conscious of the true significance of the Renaissance. Not until our own time has attention been called to these artistic traditions, in the book, "Das Problem der Form," by Adolf Hildebrand, who has derived his problem of form from the study of their masterpieces. In this way Hildebrand brings modern art into much closer relations with antique art than did the classicists in their day. His theory and his works appear to us like a bridge, built upon the foundation of tradition and leading from antiquity and the Renaissance to modern art.

The essential feature of Hildebrand's theory is a strict development of the conception of form as a spatial phenomenon. He derives this notion, on the one hand, from our conception of the nature of space, and then proceeds to build up the notion of form in the artistic sense. And in so doing he finds that there is involved in the antique relief style a relationship which reveals to us a harmony, a balance, so to speak, of our sense of vision and any given aspect of nature. The relief sculpture harmonizes to our sense of sight the three-dimensional relations of things in space in one unitary impression, and brings us as spectators into a definite relation to spatial nature. In speaking here of the relief, we do not refer to the relief as a form of plastic product, but to an abstract artistic conception derived from it. Thus conceived it is a principle of treatment that finds expression in all the representative arts.

Hildebrand, the artist, who investigates the laws of visual phenomena, and is guided by a conscious purpose to definite goals without at the same time suppressing his intuitive emotions, the source of all artistic creation, is one of those rare natures whose powers and varied capacities attain through favorable conditions and environment a maturity and a development that give to every product the stamp of perfection. Although the most of these products seem in their motives to be alien to the life of the present, yet they stand forth as living creations when associated with local surroundings. They stand, so to speak, permanently in the midst of the present, because they give expression in artistic form to the local, spatial situation. Whether Hildebrand is shaping an individual figure, or, with the aid of architectural means, developing monumental effects in space, in either case he always expresses the significant feature of the individual figure or situation in clear outlines. Whether he is outlining

for us by means of the form the beauty, from the standpoint of steadfastness, as well as the harmony and proportion in the organic structure of the body, as in the statue of "A Naked Man," in the Berlin National Gallery, or whether he is showing us the regular contour of the youthful body, the supple curves at the joints, the fluent repose of the motion in the statue of "A Naked Youth," represented in the crouching attitude of a bowler, he is always guided by the artistic purpose of representing characteristic individual features, as well as, at the same time, in typical fashion the marks of the species. While he reproduces the physical features of the subject in typical forms, he approaches the antique model in such works more closely than all the disciples of the antique before him. And compared with Thorwaldsen's "Adonis" Hildebrand's "Naked Man" shows rare individual animation and naturalistic treatment. In his "Wittelsbacher Brunnen" in Munich, Hildebrand furnishes an excellent example of sculpture treated as decoration for ornamenting space. Through this work he reunites the tie between modern sculpture and historical tradition that had been cut by the classicists at the beginning of the nineteenth century. For this entire creation, which suggests antique forms throughout its whole structure, derives its prime importance from the fact that it gives expression in artistic form to an existing situation in space. The artist puts life as it were into the situation, shapes and groups the space, moulds and forms every member, so that it represents to our thought an animated and significant whole, a world by itself. The fountain is especially beautiful in the summer when the morning sun falls upon it and warms the hard stone with its rays, as it stands against the background of deep green trees which still drowse in the cool shade, in classical silhouette like a reminiscence of the antique world. It adorns a hill that rises from the plain with gently curving slope. A broad, shallow basin encloses another basin that rises somewhat higher and embanks the summit of the hill with a handsome wall, and above this rises a central shaft buttressed with pillars bearing two additional basins, or bowls. The model of the Roman fountain is unmistakeable; and the gushing waters splash and surge and flow and accumulate in the broad basins. On either side of the basins is a group of sculpture. The one shows a rider upon a wild steed hurling with all his might a piece of rock, while the splashing waters roar about him; and the opposite group represents a bull with powerful neck, led as it were by the playful waves, he bears a maiden seated and holding aloft a cup, seeming to implore from the eternal gods a gift of the fructifying and beneficent element. Resting upon the earth this wonderful structure rises with horizontal lines in the midst of purely horizontal surroundings,

while above it rises the perpendicular shaft with its falling waters. We see simply our elemental relations of direction in spatial nature adorned in an organic framework by multitudinous rich lines and forms. Water and earth, the two primitive elements: this thought finds symbolic expression both in details and in the larger conception of the design.

While the plan is expanded on a level plane, retreating toward the background by uniform steps and stages, yet even while limited to this direction the eye is furnished a definite point of view and can easily survey the whole at one moment and gradually shift from form to form as it penetrates the background. In fact, our tri-dimensional relation to nature is here represented with a unitary effect. It is upon this principle that the view which Hildebrand calls the relief effect is based. A group, says Hildebrand somewhere in his book, does not depend in the artistic sense upon a connection arising from the action represented by the subject, but must show a connection in representation, manifested as an ideal dimensional harmony contrasted with the actual space in which it appears.

Passing then to the subject of relief sculpture Hildebrand observes:—

“When in our day we notice so often that representations of an action, instead of finding their natural expression in relief treatment, are treated barbarously enough in the round, the reason for it is in part that there is scarcely any longer opportunity given for relief sculptures. In our day sculpture is nearly extinct, and the modern man understands by sculpture nothing but figures in the round standing in the midst of an open space. These unhappy monuments are almost the only stage remaining upon which the sculptor can give living expression to his imagination, and since he does not wish to sacrifice his conception altogether it receives a form which is artistically impossible. This fact is probably due to the circumstance that the artistic form in such works is usually prescribed by laymen, the so-called committees, whereas the most important task of the artistic ought to be recognized as lying in the choice of the form. This is a condition which would not be believed possible if it were not actual. What would be said if it were proposed to prescribe for a poet or a musician one certain form for his artistic conception, and he were permitted only to introduce so-called motives into a prescribed scene! What indescribable poverty, what eternal monotony do we see on this account in the monumental sculpture of the present! If we were to survey together the whole number of statues that have been erected in Europe in the last twenty years—what a mass of sculptures, all endeavoring to express something new, and yet writhing and struggling unsuccessfully under the spell of isolated representation in the round because all association with architecture or a particular situation is prohibited as though they were condemned to solitary confinement—veritable work of galley slaves! Now the thing that is ever bringing to sculpture new life and joy is the new situation. The act of remodeling the given situation in nature into artistic relations always suggests new conceptions within the laws of art. If this natural association is wanting, the new conceptions are sought in so-called artistic laws which are expected to make twice two equal five. But how can there be any talk of difference in situation when sculpture is restricted to representation in the

round and to exposition in free space in the midst of a square, where it never ought to stand, because then all points of view are alike, there is no foreground or background and the situation counteracts as far as possible the pictorial effect of the piece ! The spectator circles about the monument and has to absorb four different points of view, which is advantageous to but very few works of sculpture and is really enjoyable only in the case of undraped figures."

Both by word and by exemplary works Hildebrand's influence in all branches of sculpture was encouraging, inspiring, and helpful. His disciples are laboring with diligence and talent to revive the art of sculpture. They strive with zeal to understand old devices of technique and old forms, as well as the style and the taste of the old masters. This effort has indeed developed a certain leaning toward the primitive and the archaic. The formalists are altogether too much disposed to hide behind these the naïve artistic feeling that we miss. But we cannot oppose this tendency as soon as we find it trying to arrive at the true understanding of the old form speech, for only thus can there result any really artistic independence as contrasted with the works that merely imitate the classic past, precisely as Goethe expressed it, "What from your fathers' heritage is lent, earn it anew to really possess it."

Joseph Flossman and Erwin Kurz, artists who adopted Hildebrand's programme, cultivate and apply sculpture as an art devoted to the decoration and adornment of space; the modern style supports this tendency with encouragement and assistance and offers abundant opportunity to reanimate sculpture in the direction of its original method. By this means especially sculpture is again restored to its natural connection with architecture, and a rich field of activity is afforded to stone carving, such as existed in the Middle Ages. Hermann Hahn has succeeded in producing some excellent works in bronze; he is an adept in this branch of the art, and follows the taste of antiquity in his statuettes, medallions, and plaques. However, the noble simplicity and plastic beauty of the antique bronzes has not yet been attained. Volkmann, an artist who at the same time with Hildebrand adopted the tendency toward a classic style in modern sculpture, and who passes all his time in Rome, as did Thorwaldsen, manifests similar formalistic principles. In this we see what this school is aiming at, and recognize that it has one point in common with the ambitions of the classicists and the romanticists like Rauch and Hähnel. Like them, Volkmann endeavors in the footsteps of classic antiquity to derive from nature a type of the beautiful human figure, and in his concrete representation chisels away all angles and corners, the individual features, as it were; and what we have before us thus idealized from the rough material of nature is in many respects no better and no worse than

what Thorwaldsen and his followers produced. Volkmann, indeed, has a more genuinely plastic sense, the form in his works has a more organic composition and "fits" as the technical expression is in art. But even this style seems to modern taste unsatisfactory—it lacks the savor of originality.

This movement, in all the works of which we see reflected the struggle with the problem of form as an element of the decoration of definite localities, is accompanied and supplemented by another which has developed in association with modern painting, and which shows in its works a very personal treatment of nature, often in close relation to the manifestations of modern life. This movement really arose from the reaction against the older, formalistic schools such as we have sketched at the beginning of this article. It was a reaction in which repressed personal feeling demanded the right to breathe as against the ossifying tendency of formalistic principles. The watchword was individual freedom in the expression of personal points of view. About the end of the sixth decade of the nineteenth century the adherents of this movement were coming more and more into evidence at the expositions with their boldly naturalistic works. Soon there was recognizable in them a strong tendency to pictorial and quaint effects. There was an attempt to animate the dry outlines shown in the works of the formalists by an exuberant, pictorial treatment. This treatment was especially recognizable in drapery and hair, which often acquired thereby the appearance of dripping with moisture. These effects were favored by the soft and yielding modeling clay which was used as the plastic material. This material was also exceptionally suited to the faithful copying of natural forms. In this clay it was possible to copy every chance feature of the subject, that portion of its structure which gives the pictorial touch, and to hold fast the effect of every transient movement. And this method of treatment in its last consequences led to a pronounced realistic reflection of nature, both in the purely exterior imitation and in the gestures of expression—the mimic expression.

Reinhold Begas in Berlin, Michael Wagnmüller in Munich, Robert Diez in Dresden, and Victor Tilgner in Vienna, were the leaders of this movement; they completed the breach with the outlived formalistic schools, and professed themselves pupils of the great teacher, nature. The foundation seemed to be laid for a new school in German sculpture. While this tendency degenerated in the course of its further development and brought forth certain evident defects in decorative monumental sculpture, nevertheless it brought more love and devotion into the art as a result of its ardent loyalty to nature.

The school made many compromises with the most widely different tendencies. For instance, the ambition of Rudolf Siemering and Johannes Schilling was to give expression to the tendencies of the age in their ideal features, in the character of the style which Rauch had endeavored to give before them. As in his day, so after 1870, there was aroused in the spirit of the nation a joyous enthusiasm which demanded that the heroes of the national achievements should be celebrated in suitable monuments and that artistic expression be given to the final union of the nation itself. Thus these two sculptors and their followers produced a great number of commemorative and military monuments, and this art movement culminated finally in the most monumental creation of modern German sculpture, the colossal Germania statue in the Niederwald, the work of Johannes Schilling. Siemering produced the magnificent Germania monument at Leipzig, as well as the statue of Washington at St. Louis. Siemering and Schilling both show in all their works a tempered realism and a treatment marked by a correct sense of style.

That the leaders of the naturalistic-individualistic movement studied antique models carefully would be anticipated even from their training. Begas comes from Berlin, which is filled with the classicist afflatus to which Schinkel and Rauch gave a typical tinge. Wagnmüller received part of his training in the Akademie in Munich under the classicist, Widmann. Begas' first works in Italy follow antique motives; only the treatment of the form is naturalistic. Naturalism is manifested also in the animated and fresher expression, in the individual stamp of the motions and attitude of his figures, especially of his women and children. This freshness of treatment was especially beneficial in portrait work. Begas and Wagnmüller particularly succeeded with their treatment of the bust in retaining much verisimilitude, many delicate touches caught directly from the observation of nature. This pictorial method managed to produce a much more lifelike suggestion of nature in the reproduction of forms than had been possible for the old, formalistic school. In this line, as, indeed, in all productions for interiors with regulated lights, this style of sculpture proved attractive and fascinating.

But it is another matter when we consider their monumental creations for the open air. The principal works of Begas and his school,—the Kaiser Wilhelm national monument and the Avenue of Triumph (Siegallee) in Berlin, cannot be considered satisfactory as works of monumental decoration. They reveal altogether too clearly their defects and imperfections, like sketches or hasty improvisations, the products of sudden inspiration. In these works, the naturalism of which was constantly growing weaker and more superficial, Begas showed the

influence of the tradition of the baroque style, which has again and again been proved bankrupt for lack of fixed principles. But, after all, the older works in the baroque style succeeded in producing imposing decorative effects, while Begas did not, for the sober light of day analyzes and dismantles these puffy, improvised show dishes despite their clever and mannered forms and their lavish use of decorative adornments. "A group in the artistic sense," says Hildebrand, "does not depend upon a connection due to the action of the figures, but must be a harmony to the eye consisting of an ideal dimensional unity in contrast with the actual space in which it stands." Now if we examine a relief in which the unity of the representative treatment appears, we shall see in those of Schadow, made for the Ziethen monument, a pictorial treatment in keeping with the usage of the baroque style. Figures and even landscapes often appear in them strongly foreshortened in accordance with the laws of perspective; there is no perceptible movement on a uniform surface. Thus the relief loses its clear, pictorial effect. In modern reliefs that are treated pictorially we notice the fact that what is intended to be represented upon them often looks like a confused heap of many sorts of objects. The impressions made do not seem to be united into one clear and distinct image. The attempt of this school is to effect a compromise between the pictorial and the plastic views of form; it confuses notions which, according to Hildebrand should be severely separated and distinguished in the work of representation. In addition to this we find all possible personal devices in a presentation which recalls the strutting, declamatory gestures of the public orator. These creations of modern Berlin suffer by contrast with the solemn pathos and the dignity of the works of Rauch.

The desire for the absolutely natural expression, such as is seconded, on the one hand, by photography, and on the other, by life casts, combined with a loving devotion and restriction to the precise reproduction of the exterior structure of the object,—these are characteristics of the works of Rudolf Maison. Realistic, even painful precision is sometimes combined in them with the flights of an original and unbridled imagination. It is accordingly inevitable that he offends in many of his works against certain principles of his art. Thus in many creations he shows a strong tendency to the representation of transient effects, in which various objects are presented to us in a situation whose harmony of appearance is rather in the objects than in the dimensions of the whole, and consequently ill adapted to be perpetuated in sculpture. Thus, for instance, when Maison shows us a group consisting of a negro and a tiger, representing the negro as falling and the tiger as springing through the air. In a relief this action can be represented as well as in a picture, but as a group of

statuary it seems to us impossible, for this situation cannot last longer than a moment. In large fountain groups we often meet with a similar situation,—but the treatment of the subject is grotesque and boldly imaginative and so stirs our own constructive faculty that we pardon these defects.

In Maison's art we see a consistent advancement in the path of the imitation of nature carried to the utmost limit of treatment. Maison does not conceive of the essence of sculpture as an act of representation in which the artist abstracts certain elements from a given object and retains essential and characteristic features of it as form, but he sees in sculpture an art which can retain every impression as form. In distinct opposition to Hildebrand, who draws a strict distinction between observation and representation and derives therefrom certain important laws of artistic treatment, Maison would undertake to give a sort of sculptured panorama of all objective nature in one creation. This naturalistic-positivist treatment of his, together with the necessity for attaining striking decorative effects, betrayed him into coloring his plastic productions in natural tints.

We can only outline here our standpoint on the subject of coloring sculpture. All nature, it is said, is tinted; if, therefore, the work of statuary is without color it is isolated whatever its surroundings. From this consideration the ancients, and especially the classic age, felt justified in painting works of sculpture, indeed we still find remnants of strong and brilliant colors on ancient statues. In peculiar local conditions and in connection with tinted architecture, such coloring is, indeed, justifiable. But we have not yet ascertained to what extent this was carried. Yet there can be no question that perfectly natural colors are offensive to good taste and opposed to the nature of sculpture if we recognize this to lie in the representation of pure form. But if in sculpture we are representing only form and therefore in our product are deducting something from the colored object in nature, then, when we again veil the form under colors, it amounts to contrasting one effect with the other—obliterating one with the other. A purely artistic consideration that has to be taken account of in the coloring of works of sculpture is the decorative effect. The effect of a figure within a given environment may be improved and intensified by treatment in color. This is especially the case with the employment of materials of various tints, as wood, ivory, stone of various colors, bronze, and other metals. Effects in this line are attempted by Max Klinger. He has succeeded, indeed, in the figure of a "Woman at the Bath" in increasing by means of suitable coloring the effects of delicately felt and natural form. However often

an artist may fail in this experiment, he cannot possibly be dissuaded from believing that he will surely some time solve the problem. Strangely enough, the aims of two such different artists as Maison and Klinger converge in the focus of this problem.

In coming into ever closer relations with nature they have also grown more and more dependent on her. They have endeavored above all to attain in their creation the impression of a given object in nature as they saw it in the model. This endeavor after an accurate reproduction of the natural expression led also to the representation of the modern man, and indeed not simply the reflection of his form, but of his individual gesture and expression. Meunier, the great Belgian sculptor, began at first to represent the people of his vicinity in their life of labor and privation. And he also supported his attempt by the aid of modern painting. Indeed, Meunier himself had first been a painter and, as such, had pictured the life of the workmen in the Belgian colliery districts. Meunier was the first artist who applied himself with great energy of expression to the representation of contemporary humanity. He thereby overcame the objections that were cherished to the representation of the man of today in the garb of today. For in his works he blended the lines of the body and those of the garments as it were into one single form which one may fairly call a picturesque effect elevated to plastic expression. His figures are characterized by a really monumental greatness in expression and pose. They have often been compared with classic statues. Contrasted with the classic style, in which we meet in naked chastity the idealized type, "man," there stands in the work of Meunier the modern man as representative of labor and industry, transfigured likewise by a great artistic conception. In the expression of his figures, unlike those of classic art, we see traits of our life stirred and distracted by social tides, traits of defiance, of energy, and of restrained passion, and at the same time of heroic resignation, contrasting strangely with the calm soul and the undisturbed serenity of the antique statues. The pseudo-idealism of romanticism exhausted itself in the imitation of this world of ideal beauty. It lacked altogether the initiative for forcing sculpture into new paths and filling them with new works in touch with modern life. Hildebrand deserves especial credit for recalling sculpture to its true functions of monumental decoration and thus restoring the connection with classic tradition. But this tendency in the hands of less gifted disciples is in danger through its formalistic principles of again growing stale and barren.

Coming into touch with nature and modern life, which was an achievement of the naturalistic tendencies, and which is most thoroughly accomplished at the present day in the Belgian, Meunier, and the French-

man, Rodin, has opened a new field to plastic art and, especially in the portrait, has enriched it with new expressional values. Down to this time this school, which has exercised a profound influence upon all modern sculptors, has found no congenial representative in Germany. But in August Hudler a youthful talent is just preparing to take the field as a disciple and representative of this school. Hudler shows us in his works themes taken direct from everyday life, but which at the same time appear to be elevated by an intimate and serious view of nature and life. In figures such as the "Harvester," the "Potato Gatherer," a "Mother," the real life meaning of the subject finds expression by means of bits of action which are intensely animated. They are individual representatives of humanity depicted with definite characteristics in their gestures and actions. But he does not depict the typical everyday man only; the artist's delicate sense of form turns by preference to the representation of the undraped figure, giving expression thus to certain definite conceptions. The body appears to him to be not merely a splendid vessel, as it does to the formalists, who proceed from the assumption that the body of itself arouses conceptions and delights us by the sense of beauty, but an object by means of which even the most remote vibrations and impulses of the psychic life are expressed. We see an excellent illustration of this in the statuette, "Narcissus Listening to the Echo," which seems to spring from profoundly genuine feeling and at the same time betrays a sense of form that has been learned from the masterpieces of classic art. Narcissus is generally regarded, like Adonis, as the type of a beautiful youth who is at the same time vain of his own beauty. In Thorwaldsen's statue of Adonis this feeling is made prominent in the treatment. He shows us a beautiful and self-complacent young man, standing in an elegant pose. Hildebrand, in his "Naked Man," gives us in typical fashion a characteristic statue of man, the animal as representative of the species. Hudler, in his "Narcissus," shows us man as the bearer of warm psychic life endeavoring to get in tune with nature. In it the form appears to hint and express a hidden, veiled, inner life, which is expressed outwardly as an impulse of the groping soul, in the delicate lines and curves of the body. Thus the form presents to us a wealth of expression; it seems to express our own relation to nature animated by personal conceptions.

This phenomenon seems to emerge miraculously from the dark surface of the naturalistic currents; in it is expressed the idealism that is awaking from the sleep of unconscious feelings and instincts in the lap of nature. Such phenomena always come singly; in an age that is not given to art they resemble hot-house plants, which live by themselves and demand especial cultivation.

Perhaps the modern style, which is now beginning to expend its activities everywhere upon monuments, buildings, fountains, and tombs, will supply the necessary encouragement and undertakings wherein the representatives of the movements we have introduced in this article may find opportunity to develop their powers, and at the same time may so cultivate and advance sculpture itself that it shall once more as of old take its former position in the dance of the Muses.

THE DECLINE IN PARLIAMENTARY POWER

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AN authority on the English constitution who now has a place in the Imperial Parliament has remarked a recurring contrast between the theory and the practice of English government. Nominally and to the outside world the Crown in person is still the supreme power in the English State. The King appoints and dismisses ministers, assents to laws or dissents from them, makes war or peace, distributes the honors and rewards which crown the career of his successful subjects. Nevertheless, English constitutional history is largely concerned with recounting the story of how nearly all these powers have shrunk to a shadow of their old reality. Sir William Anson, the authority to whom I have referred, sums up in a striking sentence this shrinkage of the regal power and its transference to the hands of the not very ancient English institution which we call the Cabinet :—

“The various duties of the King pass into the hands of ministers sometimes with the result noticeable in our constitution that he comes to be regarded as incapable of discharging these duties for himself. Thus we find in our own country that though every act in the State is in theory the act of the Queen or the Queen in Council (these words were written when Queen Victoria was on the throne), the executive power of the Crown, except as exercised through its ministers, has shrunk to the almost nominal power of appointing them and dismissing them.”

The prerogative of the Crown, says Mr. Bryce, writing as late as 1901, “now means the will of the leaders of the parliamentary majority.” There have, of course, been periods even in recent English history when the monarch has endeavored to revive the old power of independent action. If the Prince Consort had lived to carry out his theories, the Georgian conflicts between the Crown and Parliament might have reappeared, and the early months of King Edward’s reign have yielded one or two examples of the personal interference of the Crown,—an interference not absolutely inconsistent with the constitution,—in political affairs. Lord Salisbury’s resignation was at least accompanied, if it was not caused, by a disagreement on the point of a minister’s responsibility for honors which he did not and the King did desire to bestow. But such events represent the mere flicker of a dying tradition. Today, when we speak of the power of the Crown, we are really thinking either of what Sir William Anson calls the “Crown in Council” or of the “Crown in Parliament.” These phrases practically mean that the government of the

British Empire is divided between the Cabinet, with the departments, and the two Houses of Parliament. It is the growth of the first named authority and the decline of the second, especially of the House of Commons, which is the essential feature of the political situation in England.

Here, again, the surface facts and the inner truths of the hour stand out in striking contrast. To the outer eye the House of Commons seems to be at the apex of its power. The Bill of Rights established its financial control, its ability to upset the entire national machine by refusing the annual supplies for the army. The complete identification of the Cabinet with Parliament, the party system, and popular election would seem to put the Ministry thoroughly at its mercy. If Parliament disapproves the policy of the government, it can strike it down by a single vote. If it objects to a war or a commercial convention, it can refuse the supplies necessary for conducting the one or making good the other. Moreover, there is the regular process of appeal to the electorate as a whole. The Septennial Act tends in practice to establish five year parliaments, and the unstable balance created by the Irish vote may even destroy a government within a few weeks of its formation.

These are large ultimate powers, but they are subject to many limitations. Parliamentary control of foreign policy is necessarily remote and inefficient, and Lord Rosebery's idea,—a most unhappy one for English Liberalism,—has been to eliminate such questions from ordinary party action. The foreign secretary has not for many years sat in the Commons, which has to content itself with an under-secretary who may be efficient, like Lord Curzon, or inefficient, like Lord Cranborne. Diplomatic problems are little known or discussed either in the House or in the country, while the affairs of India are usually dismissed with a single debate on the annual budget, attended perhaps by forty or fifty members mostly inconspicuous for their general political standing. Indeed, the control of Parliament over Indian affairs is rendered nugatory by the fact that neither the Indian Secretary's salary, nor the cost of his office, falls on the parliamentary estimates. Moreover, an increasingly large proportion of the British Empire is outside the sphere of parliamentary government altogether. Mr. J. A. Hobson has pointed out, in his work on "Imperialism," that during the last generation we have added to the British Empire "an area of 4,475,400 square miles with an estimated population of 88,000,000, a territory equal to one third of the expanse of the Empire." Not one of these new possessions enjoys the blessings of self-government. Our new African Empire, which has, as it were, grown up like a Jonah's gourd in a single night, is, with the exception of Cape Colony, placed under the control of practically

irresponsible high commissioners, administrators, and military officials. Most of this vast machinery of government is managed not through Parliament but by Orders in Council, i. e., by the exercise of the powers of the Crown, acting through ministers. Orders in Council apply to crown colonies, to protectorates, and to newly settled countries, and they are really so many embodiments of the will of Mr. Chamberlain, Lord Milner, or Sir Harry Johnston. Parliament need have nothing to do with them and rarely knows anything about them.

Thus the arbitrary act enlarging the borders of Natal, at the expense of what was once the South African Republic, was carried through without reference to the House of Commons. During the whole course of the South African War, Mr. Chamberlain displayed a studious indifference to parliamentary opinion, and rarely even attended the debates in the Commons, alleging the pressing cares of his department as an excuse for a remissness unknown in English parliamentary history.

In many instances Parliament has been seriously misled as to the facts of the war. Every effort was made to conceal from it the views of South African governments, when these were not in harmony with imperial policy. To this day the only return relating to the policy of wholesale devastation in South Africa, alleges the burning of only six hundred farm buildings. So long, therefore, as a policy of imperial expansion holds the field, it is hopeless to expect to see Parliament working in healthy and normal activity. The field where its influence is powerful lies fallow; the area that is outside its sphere grows larger and larger.

"The stability of any constitution," says Mr. Bryce, "depends not so much on its form as on the social and economic forces that stand behind and support it." Apart from what I may call the general anti-parliamentary stream of tendency, the situation is undergoing a number of changes of great significance. Unwritten or "flexible" constitutions, to use Mr. Bryce's word, differ in many respects from written or "rigid" constitutions, and notably in the point that they vary most easily and rapidly. State powers, like the human limbs, may grow slack for want of exercise; others acquire in use a truly athletic vigor. It has so happened that while the House of Commons has much less to do, the Cabinet, or the inner non-elective circle of the executive government chosen by the Prime Minister, has had a great deal more to do. In numbers it has steadily increased until it has attained the maximum and unwieldy figure of twenty. Inside this over-large committee of the government, there are other committees appointed for specific subjects, such as the examination of great bills or the organization of national defence. The development of the committee system has, in its turn, led to a concentration of

practical power in the hands of two or three ministers. In the Salisbury Cabinet only about five members of the Cabinet were of first rate account, Lord Salisbury, Mr. Balfour, Mr. Chamberlain, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, and possibly the Duke of Devonshire or the Lord Chancellor. In the Balfour government two ministers, Mr. Balfour and Mr. Chamberlain, practically divide the supreme power between them. The remainder are either men of the past generation, or are of an inferior and even negligible talent and character.

It is a misfortune that the Prime Minister who wields these great powers possesses little or nothing of the keen regard for parliamentary privilege which was the passion of the old type of parliamentary leader. He is inaccurate, careless in his communications to the House, and tends to slip into the use of force on the smallest provocation: "Mr. Balfour rose in his place and claimed that the question be now put" is the commonest entry in the parliamentary journals. Not a session passes without some exhibition of his indifference to the forms of the House of Commons or his slight concern for its powers. Two examples will be fresh in the minds of students of the session of 1902. The resolution in favor of the sugar convention was presented to the House in a form totally inconsistent with Standing Order, No. 60, which regulates the control of finance. More serious was the palpable trick by which the House of Lords was prompted by Mr. Balfour to evade the canon of our constitution which forbids it to lay a monetary charge upon the people. The Lords, having altered the financial arrangements between the State and the Church embodied in the Education Act in favor of the latter power, tacked on to their resolution, with the connivance of the Ministry, a rider declaring that it should not involve any fresh expenditure from public funds. This made nonsense of the Lords' amendment but also enabled it, on descending to the lower House, to escape the fatal plea that it infringed the privilege of the Commons. When it returned to the representative House the nonsensical rider was promptly knocked out on the motion of one of Mr. Balfour's friends, and the Lords' amendment, in its unconstitutional shape, was then forced upon the House. There seems no reason why this device should not be used to reëstablish that general joint control over taxation which the House of Lords long ago ceased to exercise.

One other development in English politics must be held gravely to qualify the power of the House of Commons as the effective organ of democracy. That is, the decline of the party system and the fact that the House of Lords has come to represent not merely a revising and mod-

erating influence in the State, but a permanent entrenchment of conservatism and of the almost identical landlord interest.

In this respect the constitution is practically at a dead-lock, for it is impossible to see how in future any Liberal government can exist or flourish. Out of a house of nearly six hundred members, the Liberals have now attached to themselves a small body of ex-office holders, representing a little more than one twentieth of the entire assembly. Forty-one peers voted for the second reading of the Liberal Home Rule Bill (1893) and only thirty-seven voted against the second reading of the (Tory) Education Bill (1902). Although the latter measure was resisted by a small body of Conservative and Unionist peers, in many divisions on the committee stage of the Education Bill the Liberals could not rally more than a score of votes. It is impossible to conceive any shifting of the political balance powerful enough to affect this enormous preponderance of the landed and moneyed aristocracy in a body which does not contain a single Nonconformist and only a bare handful of judicial peers standing clearly apart from solid Conservatism. At any moment, therefore, the peers have the power of calling a halt to the life of a Liberal government. And it is safe to say that not a single item of the Liberal programme,—Home Rule, payment of members, the abolition of the special property vote, temperance reform,—would escape their censure. A Liberal administration would, indeed, have to restrict itself to a popular budget and to small measures of an uncontroversial type if it desired to escape shipwreck, in the first or second year of its existence, at the hands of a power that does not come from the people and never returns to them.

But the House of Commons has itself developed an evil tendency that strikes at its seriousness and narrows the stream of its political power. The South African War witnessed a rush of members to the House,—many of them young and inexperienced,—to swell a majority chosen entirely on the melodramatic, unreal issue of the war. These men belong more to the world of fashion or speculative business than to political life. They rarely attend the Chamber except to vote or to cheer their leader in a sensational debate. They are of a class different from the county magistrates and local celebrities who used to enter Parliament, and find in it the crown of laborious days at Quarter Sessions or on the magisterial bench. One of the most experienced of town clerks said to me the other day, "I have in my mind three peers in my county, all of whom did good work in local government. Not one of their sons takes the smallest interest in county affairs." The growing levity of House of Commons manners and the indisposition to master the arts of

parliamentary government depress the abler members. "I shall give up my seat," said a representative of this class to me, "no one cares for the House of Commons nowadays." A sign of this declining public spirit is the falling off of the actual attendance in the Chambers. In spite of the passion developed by the Education Bill, the actual discussions were practically limited to forty or fifty members, whose audiences, as Mr. Balfour remarked, were mainly composed of rival orators.

If politics have not lost their old, steady interest for the English people, it is certain that each session sees a new development of the unserious side of parliamentary life. Fashionable ladies, actresses, members of the "smart set," throng the corridors of the House of Commons on pleasant summer days, spend hours on the river front, and pass from its tea-tables on the terrace to snug dinner parties in its private rooms. In the height of the London season the House of Commons is the gayest resort in town, and though serious members hold aloof and strongly disapprove of these junketings, they sensibly affect its tone and its power of work. A similar weakening of activity has come with two changes in procedure initiated by Mr. Balfour in the present session. The meeting hour of the House has been changed from three to two o'clock, and at the same time a sharp limit has been set to the number and form of the questions addressed to ministers on the floor of the House. Question time is now limited to three quarters of an hour and these interpellations are divided into two parts—some requiring a verbal answer and others only needing to be answered in writing. These changes were introduced to check the supposed abuse of this form of parliamentary control of the acting ministers. The abuse was trivial compared with the priceless value of the weapon of free inquiry. If questions have increased in number, the Empire has grown enormously in area and in complexity, and though Irish Nationalists unduly swell the quota of inquiries, it is fair to remember that Ireland possesses no medium of constitutional government, and that all her complaints must come to Westminster. The measure of the blow dealt to parliamentary life by the curtailing of questions may be seen in the entirely new aspect that has come over the House at its hour of meeting. In the old days, question time was the event of the sitting. The House was crowded, animated, eager, pleased with the shifting drama and the humors that the hour almost invariably yielded. Now it is thin and listless, and the old searching, and often heated cross-examination of the heads of the great departments tends to give place to a few minutes' perfunctory questioning.

The partial loss of the interrogating power is only one sign of the decline in the influence of the private member. His facilities for passing

his own projects of legislation are practically gone. Under the new rules of procedure, the government no longer requires a special resolution of the House in order to deprive him of the scanty allotment of time that he can claim up to the middle of the session. The shears descend automatically, and for the last three months the private member has been little more than a voting machine. He has to be a man of exceptional gifts of speech and force of character if he hopes to play any real part in debates, while the sphere of legislative experiment is practically barred. To crown the indignities that Mr. Balfour has heaped on his head, his special day in the week has been changed from a Wednesday to a Friday, i. e., to the fag end of a week, when the tired House recurs to the pleasure-seeking habit of our time and steals guiltily away to the golf course or the party in the country house.

* * *

This slackening of the parliamentary fibre has gone on side by side with a dramatic change in the constitution of Parliament itself. None of our constitutional writers have yet been able to consider the new factor in the relations between Parliament and the executive that the closure has brought into being. The English Parliament is not a mere legislative assembly. To use an historic phrase, it is "The grand inquest of the Nation." Its business is to "*parley*" till some measure of intellectual agreement is reached. Here its interest is opposed to that of the ministers. They act; Parliament finds reason for acting or not acting. Its method of debate, loose and discursive as it is, furnishes an excellent vent for popular opinion,—a vindication of the right of veto or amendment really reserved not for the Crown but for the representatives of the people. Under the closure, this power of free, if sometimes random, speech is rapidly disappearing. Closure by a bare majority, and on the motion of the government, subject to the almost nominal consent of the Speaker, is now a normal parliamentary instrument. It is applied equally to the financial functions of Parliament and to legislation. The two most important bills of this generation,—the Home Rule Bill of 1893 and the Education Act of 1902,—were carried through the House of Commons by closure; many of the clauses had no form of regular examination. The latter proposal represents, so far as its second half is concerned, almost the unchecked will of the executive, helped by the ingenuity of the parliamentary draughtsman.

In financial procedures it is the custom now to closure the greater part of the estimates "*en bloc*" at the end of a session, after a maximum of twenty-three days' discussion, while earlier in its sittings,

immense sums, amounting to as much as twenty millions, are obtained on a single vote on account. On June 19, 1900, forty-one millions of money were voted after less than five hours' debate, and similar amounts were passed after practically no examination in the Sessions of 1901 and 1902. Thus the national audit is doubly evaded. The old practice was to obtain smaller votes on account at frequent intervals, and to leave unfettered the later financial debates. No one denies that abuses and disorderly procedure caused, and to some extent excused, the first resorts to closure. But the remedy, like a powerful drug, has been applied and re-applied until it has eaten into the patient's constitution. No function of the House of Commons is more closely connected with the setting up of Parliament as the central constitutional power than that of examining grievances before granting supply. Today only three amendments are allowed to a motion which sets up a committee of supply in its three main branches,—the army estimates, the navy estimates, and the civil service estimates.

But the most remarkable, and in some respects the most sinister, change which has come over the English Parliament is that which affects the Speaker. Every one remembers the famous reply of Speaker Lenthall to Charles the First's demand to discover the five patriot members,—that he neither had ears, eyes, nor tongue, in that place, but as the House might please to direct. These brave words supply the key to the place of the Speaker in our parliamentary life. He is the authority, not of the executive, but of the House. His power descends from its free election, and the atmosphere of extreme personal deference that surrounds him marks this Olympian detachment from party interests. But the impartial position of the Speaker was seriously modified when the government placed in his hands the power of allowing a division on the closure on the motion of the leader of the House. When this change was proposed, Mr. Gladstone denounced it with passionate fervor. He saw that it must tend to make the Speaker an instrument of the dominant party, and to create an office built up on the lines, say, of the presidency of the French Chamber. Mr. Gladstone's fears have only been partially realized, for custom sways our constitutional development as powerfully as direct enactment, and no English Speaker could so soon forget the guiding tradition of his office. But the change is working, and the denial of the closure is now so rare that the Speaker's discretionary power may well lapse with time. The last few days have seen him robed with a new authority, which makes him more the master of the House than its servant. In moments of extreme disorder the Speaker is now permitted to bring the sitting to a close without question put. It is remarkable that this

power which, during the struggle with Charles the First, was forcibly denied him, on the ground that to the House alone belonged the function of adjourning itself, was this year yielded without serious protest.

* * *

What is the moral effect,—for, after all, that is the main question at issue,—of the decline in parliamentary freedom on the House and on the nation? In the country its result is seen in the growing indifference to parliamentary proceedings. A controversy which may at any moment be slit in twain by the “abhorred shears” of the closure,—in which the determining element is force not argument,—supplies no ground of rational interest. The great papers are ceasing to report Parliament with care. Two of the chief London daily organs have dropped their special reporting service, and others will probably follow their example. The popular papers content themselves with brief abstracts or highly colored accounts of “scenes.” The effect on the House of Commons itself of the loss of control over its business is precisely that which reveals itself in the character of any man or woman who has surrendered his or her life into the hands of some stronger personality. The closure does not, indeed, invariably shorten debate. It sometimes lengthens it. But it renders it less responsible, more trivial. Mr. Gibson Bowles, perhaps the ablest private member in the House of Commons, and also the most inveterate enemy of the system of closure as Mr. Balfour has developed it, writes to me on this point with much force. “The closure,” he says, “emasculates the House, and renders the minister careless to convince or persuade, since he has his majority and his closure always at hand. The minister’s view is that the measure should be passed, whether adequately discussed or not. The parliamentary view is that it were better adequately discussed and not passed, than passed and not discussed.” It is this instinctive assertion of the will of a debating assembly against that of a minister,—a very different thing from deliberate obstruction of debate,—which is being crushed out of the Great Mother of Parliaments. Take the estimates. Under the time allowance of twenty-three days for supply the heads of the great spending departments can look on with indifference or even with pleasure, while the House fritters away its precious moments on trifles. They have no interest in speeding up or directing discussion; they know that at the appointed hour, the guillotine will fall and their money will be safe. Mr. Balfour, indeed, deliberately adopts this pose of negligence. “You have your time,” he says in effect, “spend it as you please.” As the

minister, so the House. A thoroughly conscienceless mood rests on it; it is not free, and it is steadily losing the virtues of the free state.

The latest changes in the rules of procedure supply two examples of the way in which the ministers evade parliamentary control, and continue to diminish the seriousness, the fighting power as it were, of the House of Commons. What is known as private business often furnishes the most important material of its debates. It includes the great railway and electrical projects, that involve vast expenditure and keen conflicts between public and private interests, or between rival sets of promoters. The House as a whole has never asserted in regard to these proposals the same measure of control as it claims over bills promoted by the government or by private members; it refers the major part of the controversy to committees. But it has been accustomed to take their second reading,—the stage at which their main principles arise,—at the opening hour of its sitting, before any other business. Now these projects, often involving tangled problems of real social urgency, are handed over, in the waste hour of the sitting, between nine and ten in the evening, to scanty audiences of returned diners. To the same dismal time, when the House is only kept going by allowing it to exist in the absence of a quorum, is assigned an immensely important weapon of the House against the Ministry—the power of suddenly moving the adjournment on a “definite matter of urgent public importance.” The value of this right was that it was exercised at an hour when the House was full and excited, and hot over the failure of a minister to reply adequately on a critical subject. Now the government escapes this instant punishment for laxity, this prompt assertion of the legislative power of its right to know, to be clearly informed and honestly dealt with. They escape in a double fashion. Questions have been checked, and the present Speaker discourages cross-examination across the floor of the House. Even if he is caught out at question time, the minister knows that though his conduct is resented, the retort of the House is no longer immediate or even severe, for the government does not really care for the vacant hour into which these motions of adjournment have been contemptuously thrown.

Nowhere in the long process of enfeeblement and degradation, has the House been touched more acutely than in its loss of what is most vital in the impromptu motion of adjournment.

The result of this constant suppression of its substantial rights is that the House has to recover its power by all kinds of indirect means. I have mentioned the case of the Education Bill, the machinery of which, apart from its general tendencies, was hardly discussed at all. But the Sugar Convention was rushed through in a single day, the government and its

friends monopolizing a large portion of the debate. Since then vital flaws have been discovered in this instrument,—mistranslations on the part of our officials, disagreements as to interpretation among the Signatory Powers, grave doubts as to its effect on the great automatic instrument of British trade,—the most favored nation clause in our commercial treaties. These matters were dragged out in question and answer by Mr. Gibson Bowles, or by raising an old, and as the speaker has promptly ruled, now obsolete, right of speaking on adjournment, or by letters in the London "Times." But these disclosures were valueless, for Parliament had lost its right of formal judgment on the convention,—lost it in a single night, in a debate that was no debate closed by the Speaker and the government acting together. What is still more important as a measure of the evil effects of closure, is that the House acted without information. The government concealed damaging facts from it, and cut short debate before it could really be operative.

It will be argued that the rule of closure helps a Liberal government as much as a Tory administration, and that, after all, it only follows the general line of parliamentary development elsewhere. The answer to the first contention is that a reforming government is in no way helped by a drastic use of the closure, for, as the Home Rule case showed, the House of Lords will not accept Liberal bills passed under these conditions, or, indeed, under any conditions whatsoever. The answer to the second argument is that the English Parliament stands alone in its peculiar powers, its historic place in our constitutional system. We have no written constitution placing precise limits on the powers of ministers; indeed, as I have shown, the continual growth of the area of purely despotic government within the British Empire provides continual means of escape from the authority of the elected assembly. Imperialism and popular government will not mix; the nation that is bent on a semi-Roman dominion calls not for liberty but for a Master. It wants not deliberative assemblies but able soldiers, resourceful ministers, unfettered by higgling parliamentarians, and behind them a gaudy monarchy, a great bureaucratic machine, an aristocracy trained in the exclusive work of diplomacy, all the familiar appendages of English society *without* the House of Commons. Is that development impossible? The way for it is certainly being prepared by the growing political indifference of the English people, their decreasing interest in local elections which concern the management of their schools and municipal affairs, their devouring passion for sport, the triviality of their popular newspapers, the want of seriousness in their literature, the absence of any school of political thought based, like that of Bentham and the Mills, on definite and large principles of human

conduct. What are the essential differences between Conservatism, the party now in power, and Liberalism of the Rosebery school? It is clear that only the finest shades of opportunism divide these factions. The country cannot interest itself seriously in such encounters; it must have larger, more real issues before it, presented by vital and imposing figures.

It is true that the House of Commons suffers from its failure to organize its life on modern lines, from its obstinate refusal of Home Rule for Ireland, from its neglect to complete the system of devolution which Mr. Gladstone began, and to face the constitutional issues that such a change must involve. But it must first assert its rights against the continual menace of the executive government, the real repository of the powers of our ancient monarchy. It is impossible to say from what quarter the new parliamentary party will come. Liberalism, for the moment renascent, is increasingly subject to the influence of the group system, and can hardly hope to return to power an absolutely homogeneous body. The most encouraging factor in the English political situation is the deference for parliamentary institutions shown by independent Conservative members of the type of Mr. Bowles and Mr. Winston Churchill, and the appearance, after a long interval, of a powerful Radical group, strong enough in intellect and dialectical skill to hold in check Mr. Chamberlain's ambition and Mr. Balfour's disbelief in free parliamentary government. But till these forces develop, the House of Commons, while it retains its majestic, if rather empty, ceremonial front, must continue to decline as the central force in the British Constitution.

THE FUR SEAL AS AN INTERNATIONAL ISSUE

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FOR the past fifteen years the fur seal question has been an issue of greater or less importance between the United States and Great Britain. It has had its active and its quiescent stages. At present it is lost to sight among the other issues which the Quebec Joint High Commission of 1898 was called to consider, as yet without result. The question is, therefore, by no means settled and must sooner or later become once more a live issue.

In any final settlement, moreover, the interests of Russia must be taken into account. For while the struggle has been thus far chiefly between the two Anglo-Saxon nations, Russia, who owns the second fur seal herd, is equally interested. Japan, too, must now be considered. Formerly her sole interest in the question concerned her practically extinct fur seal rookeries in the Kuril Islands, but of late her pelagic fleet has become more important and, during the season of 1901, it extended its operations into Bering Sea. In the future, therefore, the pelagic sealers of Yokohama must be reckoned with as well as those of Victoria. Consequently the fur seal question today is one between the United States and Russia, on the one hand, as owners of the fur seal herds of Bering Sea, and Great Britain and Japan, as backers of the pelagic sealing fleet, on the other.

The very interesting and important race of animals concerned in this dispute are the fur seals or "sea bears" which yield the sealskins of commerce. These animals have their breeding haunts on certain islands in Bering Sea,—the Pribilof Islands, belonging to the United States, and the Komandorski Islands, owned by Russia. Here the fur seals spend the summer, bringing forth and rearing their young, and resting from their winter-long swim in the open waters of the Pacific Ocean. For with the approach of winter in November they leave the islands and swim away to the south, the American herd reaching the latitude of Santa Barbara, in California, and the Russian herd, that of Tokio, in Japan. Each herd returns slowly along the neighboring coast and early in June arrives again at the breeding islands. During their stay there, the animals make regular excursions for food to certain fishing banks far out in the open sea.

Now the question arises, although the animals on land and within the

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ordinary territorial limit of three miles are manifestly under the jurisdiction of the nations owning the islands to which they resort, does this jurisdiction, with the right of protection, extend to the animals when they are beyond this limit? It is here that the fur seal question becomes an international issue.

The beginning of this question dates back to the year 1821. In this year Russia issued an edict, or ukase, forbidding, among other things, the capture of fur seals in the waters of her newly acquired Russian-American possessions in and about Bering Sea. Such hunting was prohibited within a distance of one hundred Italian miles of the shore, and the penalty was seizure and confiscation. In 1799 the Russian government had granted to the Russian-American Company, exclusive rights and privileges of trade and hunting in these territories. Foreign vessels passing through the sea on business of one sort or another, had incidentally engaged in the capture of fur seals. Complaint was made to the government by the company, and the ukase of 1821 was the result. Russia prepared to enforce her edict by an adequate naval power. Whether for this reason or because the business was of minor importance to those who had engaged in it, no occasion arose to test the question of jurisdiction prior to the transfer of the Territory of Alaska and the Pribilof Islands with their fur seal herd to the United States in 1867. After this time the fur seal interests in Bering Sea were divided between the United States and Russia, the Commander Islands, with their herd, remaining in the possession of the latter.

Russia's extraordinary claims in 1821 did not pass unchallenged. Protest was made both by the United States and Great Britain. From the negotiations thus begun there resulted in 1824 a treaty between Russia and the United States and another between Russia and Great Britain in 1825. Whatever may have been the understanding of the diplomats of 1824 and 1825, as we read these treaties today, they are by no means clear as regards the special phase of the question under consideration. Their ambiguity arises chiefly from the fact that in the American treaty the waters in dispute are spoken of simply as the "Great Ocean" or "South Sea," while in the British treaty the term used is the "Pacific Ocean." No mention whatever is made of the body of water now known as Bering Sea, then more generally known as the Sea of Kamchatka. The ukase of 1821 extended its authority to the fifty-first parallel of north latitude, thus including a portion of the waters of the Pacific Ocean proper. Russia's claims prior to this had extended only to the fifty-fifth parallel. The treaties might be, therefore, reasonably understood to refer to this extension of Russia's claim below the Aleutian chain

of islands and into the Pacific Ocean proper rather than to any claim she might have made to jurisdiction in Bering Sea itself. However this may be, no occasion arose demanding interpretation of the treaties until sixty years had passed and the Pribilof Islands together with the greater part of Bering Sea had passed into the control of the United States.

During the entire period of Russian control, the fur seal industry was conducted on land. The polygamous habit of the animals made the greater part of the male birth-rate superfluous for breeding purposes. The young male seals, forced to herd by themselves, were easily singled out and killed, the breeding female herd being left intact and strictly protected. This safe and economical method of management, worked out by the Russians, was adopted in 1870 by the representatives of the United States and is in use today on both the American and Russian islands.

About the year 1879, a new and rival industry was developed. This was the capture of the fur seals during their migration in the water. The germ of this industry had existed from the earliest times when the Indians of Vancouver Island and the vicinity of Cape Flattery went out in their canoes a day's journey from the land and hunted with the spear such stragglers from the migrating herd as came within their reach. The business was a precarious one, limited by the movement of the herd, and by the necessity of return in time of storm or at night. The catch was small, probably never exceeding five thousand skins in a year. These skins, however, found their way through the traders to the fur markets. In the later seventies, under the management of the Alaska Commercial Company,—the lessees at that time of the fur seal industry,—when the sealskin became a fashionable and valuable fur, this irregular source of supply began to receive attention.

It soon occurred to the white man's ingenuity that this pelagic catch might be greatly augmented by the employment of sailing vessels to carry the hunters and their canoes out to sea, thus enabling them to reach the main body of the herd and to follow its movement, providing a base of supplies and a refuge in times of storm and at night. The first experiment tried in 1879 proved extraordinarily successful. Other vessels were added from time to time, until from a single vessel in 1879, the pelagic fleet grew to a maximum of one hundred and twenty-two vessels in 1892, each having from five to twenty canoes and their hunters. The pelagic catch rose from about five thousand skins a year to a maximum of one hundred and forty thousand skins in the year 1894. This latter figure practically equaled the highest yield of the sealing industry on land. In the days of the herd's greatest prosperity the land catch numbered one hundred thousand a year on the Pribilof Islands,—a figure maintained

for twenty years,—and about half that number on the Commander Islands. With the growth of the pelagic catch, the land catch declined and since 1890 the latter has not exceeded twenty to thirty thousand skins annually.

Starting in the vicinity of the Straits of Fuca, the pelagic fleet in 1879 gradually extended its operations northward with the movement of the herd, until in a few years it covered the entire route to the Aleutian passes. It also began to anticipate the arrival of the herd and went south to meet it, first off the Oregon coast and later even as far as the California coast, until the entire migratory route from the Santa Barbara channel to the passes of the Aleutian Islands was thoroughly patrolled by the sealers. In search of new hunting grounds the fleet crossed over to the Asiatic side and in like manner covered the migratory route of the Russian herd, from Tokio to Kamchatka.

In 1883 a vessel entered Bering Sea and secured a good catch on the summer feeding grounds of the Pribilof herd. Prior to this time pelagic sealing had been confined to the waters of the Pacific Ocean. The success of this schooner, the "City of San Diego," immediately attracted other vessels and from this time on Bering Sea became the favorite sealing ground. This extension of pelagic sealing into Bering Sea revived the question of jurisdiction raised by Russia in the ukase of 1821.

The effect of pelagic sealing on the life of the fur seal herd was not unforeseen. The reduction of male life due to the legitimate killing on land left the herd as found at sea necessarily composed chiefly of females. The method of capture at sea rendered it impossible to distinguish the sexes as on land. The great proportion, therefore, of the pelagic catch consisted of breeding females, whose death with that of their unborn and dependent offspring, cut into the life of the herd and caused its rapid decline. With the year 1890 the inevitable collapse came, and the land catch, depending directly on the birth-rate, fell from an average of one hundred thousand skins yearly, a figure maintained for twenty years, to twenty thousand. The pelagic catch, depending not upon the birth-rate but upon the breeding herd itself, continued to grow, reaching its maximum four years later, since which time it has itself rapidly declined.

In anticipation of the evil effects of pelagic sealing, the United States in 1883 marked the advent of the pelagic fleet in Bering Sea. On taking possession of the Territory of Alaska, Congress passed a law for the protection of fur bearing animals in that territory. Remembering what rights Russia had claimed in 1821, and assuming that her rights passed to the United States by the treaty of 1867, a naval force was accordingly sent into Bering Sea in 1886, with instructions to seize and confiscate vessels found there taking seals in violation of the law.

Among the early seizures in 1886, were three Canadian vessels, the "Carolina," "Thornton," and "Onward." They were brought into the harbor of Unalaska and beached, and their cargo and equipment confiscated. Against these and subsequent seizures Great Britain protested on behalf of Canada. A diplomatic discussion resulted, which dragged along without result through the two following years. Its progress was somewhat accelerated by continued seizures in 1889, and by the collapse of the land industry in 1890.

In February, 1892, a treaty was finally agreed upon between the United States and Great Britain, referring the various questions involved to a tribunal of arbitration. These questions as stated in the sixth article of the treaty were in substance: (1) What rights in Bering Sea had Russia asserted and exercised prior to 1867? (2) What had been the attitude of Great Britain toward these claims? (3) What was the meaning of the term "Pacific Ocean" in the treaties of 1824-25? (4) What of Russia's rights passed to the United States by the treaty of 1867? And finally, What rights of protection and property in the fur seal herd did the United States possess when the herd was beyond the ordinary three-mile territorial limit?

In view of the fact that a decision adverse to the claims of the United States would leave the herd without protection, the treaty further provided that in this event it should be the duty of the tribunal to frame regulations for such protection, these regulations to be enforced jointly by the two nations. In anticipation of the need of information to intelligently prepare such regulations, the two governments had by special agreement in 1891, when the progress of negotiations seemed to warrant such action, sent commissions of investigation into Bering Sea to study and report on the facts of seal life for the instruction of the arbitration tribunal. During the progress of these investigations, and pending the decision of the tribunal, a *modus vivendi*, which covered the seasons of 1891, 1892, and 1893, was agreed upon by which pelagic sealing was suspended in Bering Sea and land killing limited to such animals as might be sufficient to provide for the wants of the native people resident on the fur seal islands and depending upon the fur seal industry for support.

The arbitration tribunal, composed of two representatives from each of the two nations concerned, and three other representatives, appointed by the King of Norway and Sweden, the President of France, and the King of Italy, met in Paris in the spring of 1893, and reached a decision the following August. This decision was unfavorable to the United States and accordingly the tribunal set about framing regulations. These followed the analogy of game laws, familiar to both countries. A closed

season to cover the breeding period of May, June, and July, was established when sealing was prohibited. A protected zone of sixty miles' radius about the breeding islands was fixed upon within which at any time sealing was prohibited. This was intended to provide a safe feeding ground for the mother seals when they should go to sea in August after pelagic sealing was resumed.

The regulations were a compromise. The two commissions of investigation had been unable to agree as to the facts and presented before the tribunal diametrically opposite views. The important issue was the protected zone. The British Commission held that the mother seals did not leave the immediate vicinity of the islands while their young were dependent upon them; the American Commission contended that they fed at long distances from the islands and that any zone to be effective must practically include the entire sea. The tribunal, composed of lawyers, not naturalists, fixed the limit by a majority vote at sixty miles.

As a matter of fact later investigations prove the correctness of the American contention, establishing the fact that the feeding grounds are distant from one hundred and fifty to two hundred miles from the islands. Naturally the protected zone was inadequate and the mother seal, preserved to bring forth her young in July, was killed in August when the need for food took her to sea. Her dependent young died of starvation on the rookeries. Thus the regulations of the Paris Award proved utterly futile. They in no wise restricted the work of sealing, but rather helped to strengthen it, by giving it a legal basis of existence and freeing it from interruption. The brief season of enforced cessation was necessary to enable the vessels to refit for the summer cruise, and the seals which they were prevented from taking in May, June, and July, were found in August and September under even more favorable conditions on the feeding grounds far beyond the confines of the protected zone. The regulations first went into effect in the summer of 1894, and no better proof of their failure can be asked than the record of one hundred and forty thousand skins for the year, the most successful catch in the history of the pelagic industry.

The United States at once sought to secure revision of the regulations but Great Britain would not consent to this until at least the trial period of five years established by the regulations themselves should have elapsed. In preparation for the need of such revision, Great Britain consented in 1896 to undertake a new investigation of the facts relating to seal life. The two commissions of investigation visited Bering Sea in the summer of 1896 and again in 1897, and in the fall of 1897 were ready to report their conclusions.

Up to this time the negotiations had been carried on between the United States and Great Britain. Realizing that any final adjustment should secure the coöperation of such other powers as might be interested, the United States, in the summer of 1897, sought to bring about a joint conference of all the nations concerned, including Japan and Russia. The consent of the two latter nations was readily secured. Great Britain at first acquiesced in the arrangement, but afterwards withdrew from it. This withdrawal came after the delegates of Japan and Russia had started on their mission. On their arrival at Washington it seemed advisable that the three remaining powers should carry out the proposed conference, reaching, if possible, an agreement from their own point of view. This meeting was held in Washington in October, 1897, and resulted in a treaty by which the three nations, each owning islands frequented by fur seals, agreed to prohibit pelagic sealing by their citizens and subjects, as soon as the adherence of Great Britain, standing for the interests of the Canadian sealers, should be obtained to such an agreement.

The treaty could have only moral effect. Russia already had in force a law prohibiting her subjects from participation in pelagic sealing. And for the present the treaty did not bind Japan to suppress her small but growing fleet. It had, however, one salutary effect in that it awakened Congress to action and helped secure the necessary legislation to put a stop to pelagic sealing by American citizens. Prior to this time the United States had been in the anomalous position of crying out against the pelagic industry as the cause of threatened destruction to her fur seal herd, while at the same time a considerable portion of the pelagic fleet was owned and operated by her own citizens under the protection of her own flag. The law of 1897, prohibiting pelagic sealing to American citizens, enabled her henceforth to carry on the struggle with clean hands.

Though Great Britain was unwilling to join with Japan and Russia in the International Fur Seal Conference, she was not unwilling to meet the United States alone and accordingly a second meeting known as the Conference of Fur Seal Experts was arranged to take place immediately after the adjournment of the first meeting. In this meeting Canada was represented. It was in effect a conference of the two commissions of investigation and the delegates were empowered only to discuss the results of their labors and were expected, if possible, to reach an agreement as to facts. The conference had no power to settle the question and was explicitly directed both by Great Britain and the United States not to suggest or discuss methods of settlement.

Prior to this meeting all the pertinent facts in the case had been more or less in dispute. The result of its labors was a substantial agreement

on all essential points. The fact of decline was established; its approximate measure as a whole and rate during the period of investigation were fixed, and its cause determined. This cause was, briefly, the killing of female seals in pelagic sealing, with the cumulative effect of the destruction of the unborn and dependent young. The agreement, without stating that fact, clearly foreshadowed the conclusion that the continuation of pelagic sealing was incompatible with the protection and restoration of the herd.

On the basis of this agreement the fur seal question passed into the hands of the Joint High Commission convened at Quebec, in September, 1898, to be considered among a number of other questions at issue between the United States and Canada. This commission has not as yet succeeded in doing anything, and it is not clear that it will be able to reconcile the conflicting claims and interests involved in the various questions referred to it.

This, then, is the present status of the fur seal question. In the meantime the pelagic sealing fleet of Canada and Japan are continuing their inroads upon the diminishing herds. The only gain thus far has been to shut out the American sealer, which probably means no more than that his interests have gone over to Victoria and to the protection of the British flag. With the diminished herd the pelagic industry has itself declined. The fleet which numbered one hundred and twenty-two vessels in 1892, numbered in 1901 about thirty, and its maximum catch of one hundred and forty thousand in 1894 has fallen to about thirty thousand in 1901.

While the results of the negotiations thus far have been meagre, there has been some gain. The disputed questions are now settled. What remains to be done is simple,—merely to find a way to abolish pelagic sealing. The treaty of 1897 with Japan and Russia becomes important in this connection. If the United States and Great Britain can find a way to end pelagic sealing, this treaty binds Japan to coöperate. The coöperation of Russia goes without saying. The absence of precedent for making laws concerning the high seas, so keenly felt in 1893, exists no longer. By mutual agreement the two nations at the Paris meeting in 1893, assumed to regulate the pelagic industry by establishing meets and bounds for it. It should be but a short and easy step by a similar agreement to abolish the same industry and to establish an international game law which shall protect the most valuable of the animals of the sea.

The facts in the fur seal case are all made known by the Merriam, Jordan, and Thomson Commissions. They are agreed to in the report of the joint conference of 1897. All that is now necessary is that a

joint conference of naturalists be appointed to draw up a series of regulations which shall actually do what the regulations of the Paris Award pretend to do,—protect and preserve the fur seal herd. Then let another commission decide on the amount to be given to citizens of Canada and Japan in return for the yielding up of their destructive but now unquestionably legal right to hunt the fur seal herd at sea. It should not be a matter for political bickering, or even for diplomatic pulling and haggling. It is a plain matter of duty and of business in which every civilized man is in some degree interested to preserve this valuable and most interesting of all the mammals of the sea. Once free from attack on its feeding grounds there can be no question that the herds will before many years regain their former size and value. As in this condition the United States and Russia will be financial gainers, it is but fair that the nations who abandon the mischievous but once profitable business of pelagic sealing should receive generous recompense.

But no public duty can be plainer than that resting on the United States to protect the fur seal herd. This protection can be accomplished by the abolition of killing at sea and in no other way.

THE NEGRO AND PUBLIC OFFICE

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SOON after he became President, Mr. Roosevelt laid down a very simple rule in regard to selections for public office. In substance it was that the final test for all candidates, no matter what their backing, must be their fitness,—they must have good character and reasonable qualifications for the service. In regard to the South, he said that whenever he could find Republicans who met the test, he should appoint them, without regard to their color, and that when he could not find Republicans who met the test, he should appoint Democrats. So far as negroes were concerned, he should submit them to precisely the same test that he enforced upon white men,—they must be fit for the place, their color in no degree modifying the test.

In obedience to this rule, he has taken action in two instances which have aroused a storm of protests in the South. In order to get a clear and accurate comprehension of the issue that has been raised by these acts, it is necessary to set forth the facts about each in some detail. Mrs. Minnie Cox, a colored woman, was appointed post-master at Indianola, Miss., by President Harrison early in the second year of his term, serving under him three years. When President McKinley came in she was again appointed in 1897, nearly six years ago. Her character and standing in the community are indorsed by the best and most reputable people in the town. Among those on her bond is the present Democratic state senator from the district, together with the leading banker of Indianola, and an ex-state senator from the district, also a Democrat. She and her husband own from ten to fifteen thousand dollars' worth of property in the county. The reports of post-office inspectors who have investigated the office from time to time, according to a statement of the case given out at the White House in January last when she tendered her resignation, show that she has given the utmost satisfaction to all the patrons of the office, that she is at all times courteous, faithful, competent, and honest in the discharge of her duties. Her moral standing in the community is of the highest. Her reputation is of the best. Few offices of this grade in any State are conducted better.

She forwarded her resignation, to take effect on January 1, but the report of inspectors and information received from various reputable white citizens of the town and neighborhood show that the resignation was forced by a brutal and lawless element, purely upon the ground of

her color, and was obtained under terror of threats of physical violence. The mayor of the town and the sheriff of the county both told the post-office inspector that if she refused to resign, they could not be answerable for her safety, although at the same time not one word was said against her management of the office. On January 1, the bondsmen of the post-master telegraphed that the post-office was closed, that the post-master claimed that her resignation was in the President's hands to take effect January 1, and that there had been no advice of the appointment of her successor. The telegram closed with this statement, "Prompt action necessary for relief of business interests." The President refused to accept Mrs. Cox's resignation, ordered the office at Indianola to be closed, and all mail matter addressed to it to be forwarded to Greenville, twenty-five miles away. He also authorized the statement that in his view the "relief of the business interests, which are being injured solely by the action of the lawless element of the town, is wholly secondary to the preservation of law and order and the assertion of the fundamental principle that this government will not connive at or tolerate wrong and outrage of such flagrant character."

A few days after this action was taken, President Roosevelt sent to the Senate the nomination of Dr. W. D. Crum, a colored man, to be collector of the port of Charleston, S. C. During his visit to the South in the autumn of last year, the President had asked leading citizens of Charleston about Dr. Crum and they had made certain charges against his character which, if true, would disqualify him for office. These charges were subsequently made formally in writing to the President and he had them thoroughly investigated, finding them to be both false and foolish. Dr Crum's accusers then fell back upon his color as their sole ground of objection to him for public office. He is a man of good education, a graduate of Howard University, with a degree of M. D., has a large and lucrative medical practice, and is conceded to be a wise and conservative leader of his people. He was one of the commissioners of the Charleston Exposition, having charge of the negro department, and conducting it in such a manner as to receive the warm commendation of the exposition company. His white opponents admit, if they are honest, that he compares favorably with the average white applicant for offices of the Charleston collectorship rank, and that if he were not a negro, there would be nothing to be said against appointing him.

I have taken pains to gather the arguments which are advanced against these acts of the President, not only in the South, but in the North. These can be summed up briefly as follows:—

The appointment of negroes to office in the South is offensive to the

white people of the South because of a deep and ineradicable race prejudice which regards all such recognitions of the negro as efforts to establish social equality between the races, and consequently is not to be tolerated; this race prejudice is so strong it is useless to attempt to overcome it, and folly to fly in the face of it; it goes back to the days of carpet-bag government and is associated with the question of negro supremacy; the whites are the superior race and should alone be the governing class, since it is the intelligent class that has most to do with the business of government and consequently the only class that comes into business relations with federal office holders. In regard to Mrs. Cox, admitting that she was intimidated by a lawless element in the community into resigning her office, it is held that the President had no right, by closing the post-office, to punish a whole community, innocent and guilty together, for the offense of a few of its members. Instead of closing the office, he should have instructed the district attorney for that section to proceed against the guilty persons under the law which makes intimidation a crime and bring them to justice.

Let us consider these arguments first in relation to Dr. Crum, because in relation to that appointment the President has stated the great issue involved in both instances with a clearness and force that cannot be improved upon. He had received letters from two prominent citizens of Charleston, one of whom had said, "We have sworn never again to submit to the rule of the African, and such an appointment as that of Dr. Crum to any such office forces us to protest unanimously against this insult to the white blood." And the other, in stating his objections to Dr. Crum, had said, "First he is a colored man, and that of itself ought to bar him from the office." In replying, the President said that in view of these utterances which had "concerned and pained" him, he thought he ought to make clear his attitude in regard to all such appointments. This he did as follows:—

"I do not intend to appoint any unfit man to office. So far as I legitimately can I shall always endeavor to pay regard to the wishes and feelings of the people of each locality, but I cannot consent to take the position that the door of hope,—the door of opportunity,—is to be shut upon any man, no matter how worthy, purely upon the grounds of race or color. Such an attitude would, according to my convictions, be fundamentally wrong. If, as you hold, the great bulk of the colored people are not yet fit in point of character and influence to hold such positions, it seems to me that it is worth while putting a premium upon the effort among them to achieve the character and standing which will fit them. The question of 'negro domination' does not enter the matter at all. The question raised by you and Mr. — in the statements to which I refer is simply whether it is to be declared that under no circumstances shall any man of color, no matter how upright and honest, no matter how good a citizen,

no matter how fair in his dealings with all his fellows, be permitted to hold any office under our government. I certainly cannot assume such an attitude, and you must permit me to say that in my view it is an attitude no man should assume, whether he looks at it from the standpoint of the true interest of the white man of the South or of the colored man of the South,—not to speak of any other section of the Union. It seems to me that it is a good thing from every standpoint to let the colored man know that if he shows in marked degree the qualities of good citizenship,—the qualities which in a white man we feel are entitled to reward,—then he will not be cut off from all hope of similar reward."

Is not that impregnable ground for a President of the United States to hold? Suppose he were to take the opposite position, were to acquiesce in the view of these South Carolina critics, and say that a man's color should be an insuperable bar to office, where would he stand? Why, in support of the contention that nine millions of American citizens, simply because Divine Providence had decreed them to be born black, should be denied rights of citizenship which all other American citizens are permitted to enjoy. That would be an extraordinary position for a President of the United States to occupy,—denying to nine millions of citizens their rights and privileges under the constitution, and denying to them also the recognition which character and merit bring to all other American citizens. The President says truly that the question of negro domination does not enter into this matter at all. The question in it which dominates it and must dominate all questions in this republic is the right of individual freedom. Is race prejudice so sacred and so unassailable an attribute that it must be permitted to nullify this right? Does it justify such nullification to say that race prejudice in the South is so strong as to be ineradicable and incurable? Would not that be a defense for any act of injustice or intolerance? Nay, worse, is it not made the defense of lynching and all other crimes against the negro? Can the President of the United States, as the upholder of the constitution and the laws, yield to this prejudice in consenting to deny nine millions of citizens the right to hold office any more than he can acquiesce in the lynching of negroes who commit or are suspected of committing crimes?

In like manner this right to individual freedom is involved in the case of Mrs. Cox. It seems to me to be a very weak thing to say in criticism of the President's act that he had no right to punish an entire community for the lawless conduct of a few of its members. Why did the entire community submit to that conduct in a minority? Did the rest of the community, the alleged majority, do anything to counteract what the minority did? Not a thing; they did not even protest against it, but by their inaction made themselves parties to it. As a community they

acquiesced in the forcible denial of the woman's right to hold office as the authorized agent of the federal government because of her color, though for nine years she had been a faithful and efficient official and had led a blameless life. As for prosecuting the persons responsible for the intimidation, the President has ordered that to be done, but that is a slow process and in a Southern community a hopeless one from the start, for nobody will give evidence against white men accused of such proceedings. If the President had contented himself with that act alone, and had in the meantime appointed a successor to Mrs. Cox, the community and the intimidators would have been content, for they would have accomplished their purpose.

But individual freedom was not the only great principle involved in the case of Mrs. Cox. She was forced to resign a federal office against her wish, and her resignation was both dictated and accepted by a mass meeting of citizens of the town. President Roosevelt had indubitable evidence of these facts. Was he, as President of the United States, to consent to have a federal office vacated under duress by local pressure? Was he to say that the authority of a local mass meeting was superior to the authority of the United States government? Surely, this is a question above and beyond all color lines or race issues. If the President had answered it in any other way than he did, he would have admitted that the principle upon which the Civil War was fought and won, the right of the federal government to enforce its laws and protect its property and to carry on governmental business all over the United States without the consent of States or localities, that this principle was no longer supreme throughout the land. If the federal government, as the war decided, is not dependent upon the consent of States to the exercise of its governmental functions, it is much less dependent upon the consent of cities, towns, and villages. Senator Spooner, in pressing the point, in a debate in the Senate a few weeks ago, put the whole issue very clearly when he said:—

“Is it to be admitted for a moment or permitted for a moment that the people of a village or city may close a post-office established and officered under the constitution and laws of the United States by *forcing* the agent of the government to quit because they do not like that agent? Is the conduct of a post-office by the general government to be made to depend upon the approval by the patrons of the agent chosen by the government? May the choice of a post-master or a marshal or district attorney be taken practically from the President and the Senate and made to depend upon the dictation of the people of a locality? And if one post-master, chosen by the President and Senate, may be forced to quit and a successor appointed, why may not one successor after another be forced to resign until one *satisfactory to the locality* shall have been chosen? And then who, in fact, will have appointed the official? The federal

agent must be appointed by the constitutional methods, and obstructions in any way in the discharge of federal functions by localities cannot be permitted. This principle, so essential to the existence and efficiency of the national government, has cost too much of life and blood and treasure and is too well seated to render tolerable any violations of it anywhere for a moment."

It should be borne in mind constantly in considering this question that the President cannot accept the Southern view of the negro, cannot consent to refrain from appointing negroes to office without acquiescing in the contention that his color deprives the negro of his rights as a citizen. Southern critics of the President's course accuse him of "keeping the race issue alive," of "drawing the color line anew." They forget that they raised the race issue when they sought by intimidation to get Mrs. Cox out of office, and drew the color line anew when they objected to Dr. Crum as a candidate for office before he was nominated. In both instances, if the President had done nothing, if he had allowed Mrs. Cox to be bulldozed out of office and had simply refrained from appointing Dr. Crum, he would have acquiesced in the Southern contention that the negro has no rights as a citizen which white men may not deny him if they choose to do so, even in defiance of the supreme power of the federal government. He would acquiesce in the same contention if during his administration he were to refrain from appointing any negro to office. By demanding that he shall so refrain, the South makes it impossible for him to do so, raises the race issue in such a way as to compel a decision against itself. It is idle for the South, after doing this, to try to shift the responsibility from its own shoulders to those of the President.

Nobody denies that the problem is a very serious one. Nobody denies that the South has a grievous burden to bear and that it has provocation for its conduct. But this does not alter the great fact in the case, namely, that no president of the United States, if he be worthy his high office, can give his consent to a deprivation of the constitutional rights of any citizen, can consent to a denial of the supreme power of the federal government. Those are the supreme questions in this problem, and there can be only one solution of them. The South should have accepted the position which the President took when he said that he should not appoint any negro to office because he was a negro, but should only appoint him when he met the same test of character and fitness that was exacted of white men. Instead of doing that, the South said, We will not consent to the appointment of a negro, either fit or unfit, for we consider all recognition of the race in that way to be an effort to force social equality between whites and blacks, and that is a deadly peril to our social and political existence. How could the appointment of a negro to the

collectorship of Charleston tend to bring about social equality in the city and State? Has the appointment of any negro anywhere in the South had the slightest effect in that direction? Social equality has never been secured anywhere in this country by appointment to office, or by election to office, and never can be. New York City for the greater part of half a century has been ruled by a decidedly inferior element of its population, but the result has not been social equality. The objection is specious, and is the outcome of a race prejudice that is so intense as to blot out all sense of right and justice. Nobody denies the existence or the intensity of this prejudice,—but is its existence a sufficient reason for saying that it must be bowed down to at the cost of individual freedom and in defiance of the constitution of the United States? Will it be made less unreasonable, less intense, by yielding to it? If nothing but time and the improvement of the negro are sufficient to ameliorate it, how is progress in that direction to be made if the “door of hope” is to be shut in the negro’s face, and kept shut by denying him the recognition of character, intelligence, and progress which is granted to any other citizen and is his right under the constitution?

One would infer from the uproar which has been made about the President’s conduct that he had appointed more colored men to office than any of his Republican predecessors. As a matter of fact, he has appointed fewer than any one of them since Lincoln, and the character of his selections has been immeasurably higher than the average of theirs. He has appointed seven in all,—three in the North and four in the South. President McKinley appointed nearly seventy. So far as Dr. Crum is concerned, he was the superior in qualifications and character to any white man mentioned for the place. The office pays to its incumbent between eleven and twelve hundred dollars a year, according to its business, and is not, consequently, a position either much sought for or of very large responsibility. To assert that putting such a man as Dr. Crum into it is a dangerous attempt to force “social equality” in the city and State is an obvious absurdity.

THE PANAMA CANAL TREATY.

Secretary Hay’s success in negotiating a satisfactory treaty with Colombia for the construction of a canal at Panama, crowns a record of achievement in the State Department which none of his predecessors has surpassed and few have equaled. The terms of the treaty are recognized universally as just and fair to both parties to it. The United States will pay to Colombia ten million dollars on the exchange of ratifications, and

two hundred and fifty thousand dollars annually, beginning nine years after the date of ratification and continuing during the life of this convention. This country has under the treaty absolute control and jurisdiction over the six-mile canal zone and the right to appropriate all waters tributary to the canal, on a lease of one hundred years with the right of renewal at our sole option. The zone is to be exempt from taxation, and the United States is to have absolute power to fix the rates and establish regulations for operating the canal. It will also have the use of the islands in the Bay of Panama for coaling stations. The American government pledges itself to begin the actual work of construction within two years and to have the canal opened for traffic within twelve years more, or fourteen in all. "If the United States should at any time determine to make such canal a sea-level canal, then such period shall be extended for ten years further."

Not only is the sovereignty of Colombia over the territory preserved, but its continuance is practically guaranteed, and formal disavowal is made by the United States of "any intention to impair it in any way whatever or to increase its territory at the expense of Colombia or of any of the sister republics in Central or South America." "On the contrary," it is declared, "it desires to strengthen the power of the republics on this continent and to promote, develop, and maintain their prosperity and independence." This reference to other republics has been criticized as being out of place in a treaty applying to Colombia alone, but while this may be a point well taken, the fact remains that it will serve a useful purpose as a notification to the world at large, including other American republics, that the United States has no designs upon the territory of the latter.

DANGERS IN LARGE FOREIGN IMMIGRATION.

An analysis of the figures of the foreign immigration for 1902 gives ample reasons for the enactment of more restrictive legislation in regard to arrivals at our ports from all parts of Europe. There has been a very serious deterioration in the quality of the immigrants during the past twenty years. That period is convenient for comparison because the total arrivals for 1882 and 1902 are the largest in our history and are about the same,—seven hundred thousand in each of those years. In 1882 Germany sent two hundred and fifty thousand, Great Britain and Ireland, one hundred and eighty thousand, and the Scandinavian countries, one hundred and five thousand, or in all, five hundred and thirty-five thousand people; whereas Italy only sent thirty-two thousand, Austria, thirty thousand, and Russia, twenty-one thousand, or a total of eighty-

three thousand. In 1902, on the other hand, Germany sent only twenty-eight thousand, Great Britain and Ireland, forty-six thousand, and the Scandinavian countries, fifty-four thousand, or a total of one hundred and twenty-eight thousand people; whereas Italy alone sent us one hundred and eighty thousand, Austria, one hundred and seventy thousand, and Russia, one hundred and seven thousand aliens. The total aggregate arrivals from the three last-named countries reached the enormous figure of four hundred and fifty-seven thousand. In other words, the immigration from Germany, Great Britain, and the Scandinavian countries is today almost as insignificant as was twenty years ago the immigration from Italy, Austria, and Russia.

The momentous importance of this change in the sources from which the bulk of the immigrants are drawn is revealed in its destination after arrival. Twenty years ago a very large proportion of the new-comers, nearly all the Germans and Scandinavians, went west, acquired farms, and became valuable factors in the development of the country. They became not merely producers, but householders and good citizens. When the silver craze swept over the West, these new citizens stood firmly for sound money and for the preservation of property. In Bryan's two campaigns, these foreign-born citizens voted in almost solid mass against him, turning all the great States of the Northwest and Middle West away from him. Immigration of that kind is of incalculable value to the country and it would be a good investment for the country to pay a handsome inducement *per capita* for it to come here. But the figures cited above of the present immigration show that it is of a very different kind. It not only comes from other countries, but is in every way of an inferior quality. Out of seven hundred thousand who came last year, about three thousand were professionals, eighty thousand were skilled workmen, four hundred and twenty thousand were unskilled laborers, and one hundred and fifty thousand were women and children with no occupation. The average amount of money is shown by the records to have been less than six dollars *per capita*. Only seventy thousand were possessed of over thirty dollars each. Seventy per cent intended to settle in New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts. New York State alone received two hundred thousand. Considerably less than ten per cent went west, and about two per cent south. The statistics show that the great stream of immigration today is a city immigration, and that the bulk of the immigrants do not go and cannot be urged to go into the unsettled parts of the United States for the purpose of developing them.

Some idea of the burden of this enormous addition to our city population may be gained by a glance at the statistics of pauperism and insanity.

Pauper statistics show that about thirty aliens out of every ten thousand become objects of charity, whereas in the case of the native-born, both white and colored, only nine out of every ten thousand persons become such. Mr. Goodwin Brown, for many years a member of the New York State Commission of Lunacy, and a high authority on lunacy statistics, says there are twenty-four thousand inmates of insane hospitals in New York, that they are increasing at the rate of about seven hundred a year, and that one half of them are foreign-born. He predicts that within ten years the foreign-born insane of this country will cost the United States fifty million dollars a year, and that New York State now pays more than five million dollars a year to support its insane. Many of those who are admitted become public burdens very soon after arrival through inability to earn a livelihood. The Out-of-Door Poor Department of New York cites over two thousand, five hundred such instances as having occurred during the twelve months preceding June, 1902, and the large number of aliens and children recently arrived who are receiving charitable support in our almshouses afford further proof. Finally, between August 1 and January 1, over six hundred aliens who had arrived within twelve months signified their inability to earn a living and requested assistance or deportation.

There have been complaints in some quarters because some arrivals have been refused admission, but these are founded in either ignorance or malice. For the year ending with June, 1902, less than four fifths of one per cent of all those applying for admission at all the ports of the United States were refused. At New York during December, when the prospect of a more strict immigration law had caused tremendous activity in the poverty-stricken districts of Europe on the part of immigration agents and steamship company agents, leading to a particularly objectionable flood, Commissioner Williams refused admission to about nine hundred, or less than three per cent of the total arrivals. It is very clear that what is needed is not less but more restriction, unless this country is to be made the dumping ground for the pauperism and lunacy of Europe.

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PROFESSOR HERMAN GRIMM

ELIZABETH von HEYKING

CITY OF MEXICO


LOOKING out on the great ocean, we sometimes see in the midst of troubled waves one sheet of water which is smooth and quiet, reflecting the sky and giving the impression of calm and depth; we cannot explain how in the surrounding turmoil just this one spot can preserve its tranquility, where restlessness and agitation seem to have no power to disturb. And it occasionally happens that we meet in the increasing hurry and pushing activity of our modern surroundings, a man who impresses us like calm, deep water, a man of whom we at once feel that although he dwells in our eager every-day world, yet the sphere and foundations of his real life lie far from us. He stands apart from the crowd like a direct heir of former ages, who has widened his own personality to the extent that to him Past is like Present, who sees far ahead into the Future, thus discerning much that to others is hidden, and finding an explanation and consolation for present imperfection in the distant vision of the final righting of things.

Such a man was Herman Grimm.

He was born at Cassel in 1828, was appointed professor of the Berlin University in 1873, and died there in June, 1901. His most celebrated works are the "Life of Michelangelo" and "Goethe." He wrote also novels, books on Raphael and on Homer, and innumerable essays.

Herman Grimm traveled in Germany, Switzerland, and Italy. He never crossed the seas; he never knew the cares of poverty or the worry of great wealth; he never wore the yoke of official life and he kept aloof

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from all state functions; his latter years were spent in almost complete retirement. Thus his outward life seems to us, restless, excitement craving, and change loving children of a younger generation, uneventful enough, yet he was, as he himself said of another great man, "a world's citizen," for he had thought on all things and the most notable aspect of his genius was breadth, a faculty to embrace and to understand the most widely diverse and foreign subjects. A "world's citizen" must stand on a deep and broad basis. Herman Grimm possessed these solid foundations; his studies linked him to the far past of all nations. He seemed as completely at home in old Greece as he was in the literatures of Italy, Spain, France, England, and America.

But for all his knowledge and understanding of foreign art and literature, he was yet firmly rooted in his own country; not a homeless cosmopolitan genius, but a man who through inherited family relations stood in connection with the great people of Germany's classical literary epoch. To understand him well, a little of that world, long since disappeared, in which he grew up and which strongly influenced him, must be known.

Herman Grimm was fond of talking of the past and there are some of his essays in which he tells us about his ancestors and the many prominent men whom he knew from his youth. He describes the old Hessian family of Protestant clergymen from whom he came and one of whom he mentions particularly, Rev. Friedrich Grimm, who lived in Hanau in the seventeenth century. Intellectual work was a tradition centuries old with all the Grimms. To live meant to work and material aims were always subordinate to ideal interests. Herman Grimm's father was William Grimm, his uncle, Jacob Grimm. These two inseparable brothers, who lived and worked so entirely together that one rarely speaks of one alone, and always hears them mentioned as "the Brothers Grimm," were the first to make their name famous. Their standard, scientific works are a German grammar and a German dictionary, and Herman Grimm tells us that from his earliest youth he helped to compile the latter. But the Brothers Grimm are more widely known by young and old through their collecting the old German fairy tales, the treasures of folk-lore that up to that time lay hidden. Everybody in Germany has thus heard about the Brothers Grimm. Children grow up in the love for their name. It represents fairy land, twilight hours, in which we first heard by the fireside, that "once upon a time there lived a beautiful queen"; when we have peeped into the room's fast darkening corners, half dreading, half hoping that one of the tiny grey dwarfs might sit there, who once carried Little Snow White in her glass coffin.

In 1829 the Brothers Grimm had been called from Cassel to the Hanoverian university of Göttingen and there both were appointed professors. Herman Grimm tells us that in Göttingen the whole family felt like people transplanted into a far distant land and we read with a faint smile, that Jacob Grimm held his first academical lecture in that university on the subject of "Homesickness"—home being a few hours away. But in those olden times different worlds lay close side by side, you passed a turnpike and felt yourself in a strange land. A loving loyalty to small communities was general in those former epochs and a great love for their Hessian home formed a characteristic trait of the whole Grimm family. It has been handed down to Herman Grimm, who finds tender notes, which come straight from his heart, when he writes about the visits to Cassel, which during his childhood the family made every year, starting out in a lumbering coach as though upon a great undertaking.

Herman Grimm's earliest recollections revealed his father and uncle incessantly working, surrounded by books, which they treated "like subordinates who are entitled to consideration." They possessed true savant's natures; their natural element was quiet and their only wish through life was to be allowed to work undisturbed; they had no personal ambitions and all eager pushing was foreign to them, but they were independent, loving men and they cherished a high conception of right. Of this they were destined to give a proof, which would be remembered in German history.

Hannover, of which Göttingen formed a part, was ruled in those days from England, but when William IV. died in 1837, according to German law Ernst August, Duke of Cumberland, became King of Hannover. The joy of the people at having their own resident German sovereign was unbounded, but it was not destined to be of long duration, for one of the first deeds of the new monarch was to overthrow the constitution. Then the feeling of independence and the love of freedom of the Brothers Grimm came out strong and they together with five other professors protested against the arbitrary deed of the king. The "Göttingen seven," as they are called, were expelled from Hannover, but the sympathy, generally shown them, proved for the first time that even in the divided Germany of those days and in the midst of its many antiquated institutions, a public opinion about men's rights was growing up. In our days it is scarce possible to realize the sensation created by the events of Göttingen. On little Herman Grimm, who was not yet ten years old and who heard them constantly discussed, they made a deep impression. He says that they were the origin of his first historical con-

victions, that from them dated his belief that history is made by a few leading men, his father and uncle appearing to him as the first examples of this type. The expulsion from Göttingen had material consequences, which even a child could not but notice and he felt that in his small person he was taking part in the fatherland's destinies.

Among those who applauded the Göttingen seven was Bettina von Arnim, the widow of the poet Achim von Arnim and the old friend of the Brothers Grimm, who, many years before, had dedicated to her the first edition of their "Fairy Tales." She lived in Berlin surrounded by the halo of literary fame, which she had acquired through the publication of "Goethe's Correspondence with a Child." In those days of censure, when public life and opinion had no mouthpiece, Bettina von Arnim occupied a privileged position, which she shared with her great friend Alexander von Humboldt, of whom it has been said that he was ever in the opposition yet ever in the ante-rooms of kings. The two had acquired the right of saying much which would have been forbidden to others and of saying it to those who could mend wrong. Bettina has been one of the rare political women of Germany. From her early youth she considered herself the advocate of those who were oppressed and to her large minded, liberal nature all injustice seemed intolerable. She never shrank from using her widespread influence to the utmost, when she thought that there was wrong which ought to be redressed. Herman Grimm tells us that it was only through her efforts that King Frederic William IV. of Prussia, with whom she was in frequent correspondence, called Jacob and William Grimm to the Academy of Sciences at Berlin, after their expulsion from Göttingen. They accepted this new appointment and from that time until their death they stayed in the Prussian capital.

Thus it came to pass that Herman Grimm as a young lad was brought to Berlin, where he so completely took root that he stands in the memory of many as one of the last representatives of old Berlin, of a time and group of scholars that is fast disappearing. Among the influences that were strong upon him there, none can be rated higher than the home circle of Bettina von Arnim's, which then was and long remained the centre of intellectual life in Berlin. Men like the great liberal theologian, Schleiermacher, Schinkel, the architect, the jurist, Savigny, Prince Tückler, Varnhagen, the Humboldts, assembled there and all foreign celebrities, who passed through Berlin, eagerly sought admittance to this unique circle. First as a child, then as a young man, Herman Grimm was a daily guest in Bettina's house. He says that he never would be able to enumerate all that he owes to her, nor to tell how much he learned in her house and

that he always looked upon her as a double of his own mother. Fate later on willed it that Herman Grimm could really call Bettina von Arnim his second mother, for he married her youngest daughter, Gisela von Arnim, who also was a poetess.

Many of the men whom Herman Grimm met in Bettina's house, later on formed the subjects of his essays. In these he gives descriptions of that period, in which German life seemed outwardly to have come to a standstill, but during which the best minds of the land were yet so to say secretly building up its intellectual unity. From the depressing realities of the present they fled into the arms of that greatest comforter, "Work"; Herman Grimm says, "it is wonderful to think of all the work done in those politically disheartening days and it is the proof that so-called happy times are not always the best for a people, but rather those when misery obliges all to the highest effort." This is an historical conception often recurring in Herman Grimm's writings. In the political misery of those days, art and literature seemed a consolation; outward might and power, which appeared forever unattainable, were intentionally taxed low, while art, literature, intellectual aspirations in general, to which the road was left free, were raised upon a pedestal as alone being worthy.

It is natural that Herman Grimm's thoughts should have turned with longing towards that country which has always been considered the home of art, par excellence, and where human individuality seems once to have attained its highest and most beautiful development. Herman Grimm early in life cherished a great longing to see Italy. He always felt drawn towards the Italian Renaissance more than towards any other period of history. Its wealth of strong, fully developed men seemed an example of what humanity can achieve, a comfort in times when true greatness seemed to have disappeared from the world. When he went on his first journey to Italy in 1857, he started forth in the spirit of a pilgrim, who expects finally to be blessed with a special grace. Goethe in 1786 had gone to Italy with a similar expectancy of finding there something which could not be found elsewhere. In an essay on Goethe in Italy, Herman Grimm tells us how Goethe had left Weimar dissatisfied with his official life and its narrow surroundings, undecided about his future, and how he found in Rome (as he wrote in a letter to the Duke Karl August) "his own self"—that is, the conviction of his own true artist's calling. Herman Grimm explains this by saying that nowhere does the preëminence of genius show so plainly as in Italy, that there where perfection surrounds us in an abundance of artistic works we feel lifted up and

encouraged to believe in ourselves, whilst in other countries the mediocrity of what has been achieved depresses us. He says:—

“In Rome we recognize that to be able to rule and direct political events, does not necessarily show the strength of a nation, nor does it indicate its rank in history. Above everything else stands the intellectual work of a people. Who, looking on Michelangelo's works in the Capella Sixtina and on those of Raphael in the Vatican, could harbor any doubts that the production of such creations is the noblest and highest occupation to which mankind can rise. Art, taken in its broadest sense, is always the life giving principle. Art shows best how nations rise and sink, and teaches us to judge rightly the worth of centuries. If we conquered half the world and made it subject to our will, the future generations would still ask what was achieved in art and science during those days when so much else was obtained, and on the answer their final judgment about us would depend.”

Italy became for Herman Grimm what it had been for Goethe. He discovered here the plans for his future work, particularly his first great book, “Michelangelo,” who now became a living reality to him. Italy also explained and revealed much to Herman Grimm about Goethe, who realized in his person a German continuation of the Italian Renaissance, who seemed to belong to the line of its most remarkable men, themselves late descendants of the ancient Greek heroes of art and thought.

Herman Grimm applied to his work in Italy a love for the past and a faculty of patient searching for the meaning of sayings and pictures faded by age, which were qualities inherited from his father and uncle. From them also he derived the gift of identifying himself so entirely with the spirit of a former epoch that he seemed to become part of it and to know intuitively how people had thought and lived then. His father and uncle reconstructed for us the world of German myths, they unraveled the quaint stories in which ingeniousness and depth so strangely mix,—and Herman Grimm, their spiritual heir, showed in his works that same dual nature of a critical historian and an inspired poet, which all those should have, who, in a work about the past, are not satisfied to give us a chronicle of dry facts, but whose higher aim it is to revivify what is gone, by the power of their own reconstructive imagination. Herman Grimm was as much an artist as a scholar, a creator as well as a critic.

It was wonderful how thoroughly he knew Italy and how entirely he felt at home there. Once it was my good fortune to be with him in Florence and never shall I forget the meaning which all the remnants of the past assumed when seen through his eyes. He approached the past reverently and nothing was unimportant to him. All small details, which we overlook, spoke to him as manifestations of a well nigh lost feeling for art, so general and so intense that it transfigured everything showing even in the veriest trifles of workmanship of its time. How quickly he

detected on old buildings amidst the wonderful, mellow, ancient parts, in which each architectural line seems the embodiment of a great spirit's dream, some well meant modern restorations, trying to reproduce the old, as a good schoolchild in a copybook tries to imitate stroke after stroke the headline written by the master and yet never catches the real form.

It was as if all the old palaces, the churches, and pictures, whose lot it is to be stared at year after year by the average tourist, guidebook in hand, felt that here at last came one who knew. It was as if all the old Italian works of art were smiling a welcome to the man who hailed from a distant northern land and who yet understood them so well in their southern charm and beauty.

Nowhere, perhaps, has Italy been described as in Herman Grimm's book about Michelangelo, which first appeared some forty years ago, when a journey over the Alps was yet a great undertaking, when Rome loomed up in the hazy, golden distance, a mysterious, holy town, which the devout pilgrim only reached after many weary days.

The book was like a revelation, for in those days, through the mere difficulty of travel, comparatively little about Italian art was known. It spread in many thousands of copies. And now after all these years, at the end of his life, Herman Grimm has had the great satisfaction of seeing a new edition completed, with excellent illustrations, such as only the most perfect modern technique can produce. When he first wrote this book such illustrations would have seemed as unlikely to achieve as the tunnelling of Mount St. Gothard, and Herman Grimm says in the introduction "that he will try to describe the works of art so that those not blessed to see them with their own eyes, may yet gather a notion of them." He certainly succeeded in this. But the beauty and value of the book was not due alone to the genius of the art critic,—the historian, the politician, the poet, all were represented by Herman Grimm's genius and contributed as well. His was not the kind of mind which ponders about and composes a volume to prove in what special year a picture was painted; he describes the picture until you think you have painted it yourself and he writes about the life of that time so that you live in the midst of it. He always gives the essence, the characteristic points of an historical epoch.

Thus he describes the life in Florence: the wars between Guelphs and Ghibelins, the feuds between different towns and parties, the rise of the Medici, the great outburst of art in that blessed town. All that we vaguely feel and remember when the magical word "Florence" strikes our ears, he evokes before us with lifelike pictures. He tells us what Florence meant to its own sons, how none stood aloof from the affairs of

the state, but how they felt that whatever concerned their commonwealth, was also each individual's concern. By this working of all for the whole, freedom was preserved. For liberty really lives only where each single individual realizes that he is a necessary part of the basis on which the entire state rests, where he knows that his personal progress advances the progress of the whole, where he jealously guards his right to be heard on all questions. If in a country a whole caste stands apart, indifferent to the business of the state and considers those interests beneath it,—then the outlook for liberty begins to darken and with liberty art also will fade and die. Herman Grimm tells us that the history of the Florentine commonwealth has had as much part in the works of art as the individual genius of the artist, so that each Florentine artistic production seems to be an embodiment of all Florence.

The book contains so much more than a mere description of the life of Michelangelo that the author would have been justified in giving it a name indicating that it comprises a whole epoch. But it is not a mere accident that the works of Herman Grimm all bear the name of some great man. It is the expression of his conception of spiritual evolution. For he is essentially an aristocrat of the spirit, to whom all progress is represented by the appearance of a few great men. In all his writings this conception appears. He divides history and art into certain parts, each bearing the name of a great man, as I have seen here in Mexico large estates divided into fields, each having a saint for godfather. He repeats the names of the heroes that stand for certain times, currents of thoughts, and ideals, until we cannot help remembering them. They become great stars, each lighting up for us part of the dark space which lies behind us. To him the study of history is to ascertain in what relation events stood to great men, for they form the principal point, the centre from which the whole picture must be constructed. When looking back into the past, he seems to gaze on a wide expanse of water, in which he recognizes currents, immovable bits of surface, and whirlpools striking against each other, all of them unaccountable until we discover that the motor strength behind the outward effect is always some great, powerful being, who directs millions by the enormous influence of its genius and to whom lesser, obscurer spirits must necessarily submit. He also likens heroes to rocks, upon which we can take a hold, when bending over and trying to fathom the endless sea of ever recurring facts. He abounds in pictures and comparisons when speaking about great men and it is a subject to which he ever recurs.

Many of his essays deal with a chosen few of the greatest and the great men. He looked upon these articles as detached chapters

and pages of a gigantic work on the development of Germanic genius through the ages, which lived in his ever working mind and which, as he expressed it, "he attacked from many sides." In his way of working he more and more acquired the method of summing up, of condensing events into their simplest form; if he had been allowed the years necessary to finish this great undertaking, he would perhaps have written it all in essays, dedicated to those who played the most important rôles in this long epical poem. Herman Grimm is one of the few Germans who really mastered the essay, which is a bright, crisp, sparkling form of literature, rather foreign to the German genius. His essays, many of which were published in the "*Deutsche Rundschau*," appear to us like little masterpieces, like those small pictures of Fra Angelico's, where a single angel stands out from a golden background, playing the violin, yet letting us divine the whole chorus of heavenly harmony. The subjects cover a wide range, from classical Greek days to the most modern manifestations of literature and art. For if Herman Grimm's soul chose the past for its favorite abode, if all that he really loved lay in bygone times, yet he was a man who took an ever fresh interest in the events of the day. If an occurrence of modern life particularly struck him he would write about it as easily as about some far away literary or historical question. It seemed, then, as if he felt the mission of writing and I remember hearing him say "that had to be told," when alluding to an article in which he deplores the wanton destruction in modern days of some of mediæval Rome's historical beauties, adding "that they had been like a trust, belonging in reality to the whole world." They certainly had belonged to him. There are a few people to whom all that is beautiful in the world belongs by right, because they understand it. Souls which like calm waters reflect heaven above.

But the most striking proof that Herman Grimm understood his time and that he was a modern man, is given by the inborn comprehension and the high appreciation he had for America. He took the word "Germanic" in its widest sense, embracing all relatives on both sides of the Atlantic. Several of his essays deal, therefore, with American questions. In articles on "The Lowell Commemoration at Berlin," on "The Poems of Paul Hamilton Hayne," on "Iphigenia in America," on "Alexander Thayer," and in speaking about George Bancroft, Professor Richardson, Professor Griggs of California, Professor Kuno Francke, author of "*Social Forces in German Literature*," he insists on the close relationship existing between American and German universities and he repeats that common scientific work and artistic aspirations unite us. He always professed a particular interest and admiration for the United States.

"Go to America and learn there to be a man of your time," he advised one of his pupils, who had just ended his studies. He looked upon America as upon the youngest member of the same family, the bearer of the most wonderful possibilities, the land of the future, destined to achieve more marvelous things than what the fairy tales, "those most ancient mythical history books," tell us of the past. He watched and followed the intellectual development of our great cousin across the ocean, he received her sons, whom she sent him as students, like relations who come from far and made them his special favorites; he never was more pleased than when a token of consideration came to him from America,—and all that he began doing many years ago and long before those, who today seem to cherish the fond belief that they have discovered the New World, ever thought of America.

Herman Grimm knew what he personally owed to America. Among the modern men, who have influenced him, an American stands foremost: Ralph Waldo Emerson. Early in life Herman Grimm became acquainted with his works. In 1857, the year of his first journey to Italy, he translated Emerson's essays on Goethe and Shakespeare. In 1861 he described in an article the first impression which Emerson's books had made on him, and this essay belongs in my opinion to the very best he has written and I hope it may some day be worthily translated into English. Later on they met and stood in personal connection and then in 1882, after the great American's death, his German friend and admirer published a necrologue about him. One of the first in Germany, Herman Grimm recognized the importance of Emerson, and felt the beauty and purity of his thoughts. In every word that he wrote about him you feel the ring of profound admiration and entire conformity with his views; often have I heard him speak in the same strain. And if I mention Emerson's influence on Herman Grimm I do not mean mere outward signs, such as Herman Grimm being perhaps led through Emerson's example to a predilection for the essay as literary form,—I mean the deep hold which an older man can obtain over a younger, if he is to him like the revelation of his own still dormant and unclear conception of life. Emerson seems to have been just that for many and something similar he was for Herman Grimm. He had attained to that degree of harmony, to that belief in final good which ever were Herman Grimm's ideals. In the essay of 1861 Herman Grimm says that when he first read Emerson "his sentences seemed to float like an enchanted atmosphere to my heart, the whole world's worn out old machinery was suddenly brightened up and I felt that never before had I breathed such pure air." He compares Emerson to those greatest artists, who, unravel-

ing life's thread for us, show us that in reality a hidden glory surrounds all earthly things, and that the inner beauty of creation only awaits to be unveiled. He says that Emerson may be named with the best of all ages, with Raphael and Goethe, because like them he knew the secret of how to reconcile us with the world. Emerson, he says, showed the road to inward freedom and to contentment; he was like a great messenger of comfort and nobody can read him without being deeply moved by his elevation of thought, his lack of all vanity, the earnestness of his convictions and, what is most, his love of mankind, which ennobles and renders fruitful each of his words. The deepest reason for the fascination which Emerson exercised on Herman Grimm can perhaps be traced to the influence which the works of Goethe have exercised on the American philosopher. Herman Grimm always felt attracted wherever he found a knowledge and comprehension of his own favorite and greatest hero, Goethe.

For such Goethe has ever been to Herman Grimm and he could well say of himself in relation to Goethe, "we Germans are all so many Marquis Posas; we never rest satisfied until we have discovered the place where, without abdicating our intellectual independence, we may yet devote ourselves to him whom we feel has a legitimate right to our services."

In accordance with the whole spirit of his age and through old family traditions Herman Grimm from his youth onward always turned towards Goethe. And mysterious elective affinities also were at work there. Herman Grimm says, "happy is he who early in life makes one of the great men of history the object of his veneration and study. Humanity contains many such great ones. We each can choose *the* one who gives us the impression that by our work some special side of him may be brought into the proper light." His meaning seems to be that in the election of a favorite hero, the obscure feeling of a certain inner relationship will always guide us. We can only throw "proper light" on what we know and understand. And what do we ever really know and understand but that which we find in ourselves? Herman Grimm's ideal was harmony, classical perfection, and repose; he could not but turn to Goethe, who realized completely all this and who once said of himself "my element is the conciliatory one." Herman Grimm looked on the great men as given by Providence to a people like examples of what may be attained in its own special nationality; he says that the study of history does not awaken in us mourning over the disappearance of better days, but on the contrary the certainty of their future appearance; he possessed the pessimism of the present, but an optimism for the future and that is the

characteristic attitude of mind on which all great progressive movements have rested. Religious reformations, political revolutions, unification of races, abolition of social injustices,—all things which led humanity a step forward have ever been accomplished by men, who in their days would have endorsed what Goethe expressed in 1820 as “the feeling of the absolute worthlessness of the present,” but who firmly believed in the perfectibility of the world, who held the conviction that gradually and by the infinite pains of many the tower of discernment is rising, however slow its progress may seem. An optimism truly productive, because it forces all to the greatest effort and wholly different from that self-satisfied contentment with the present which has its roots in weariness and dread of action, which like opium lulls men into a dream full of an unreal world’s visions, and which is as barren as despairing pessimism. In this noblest form of optimism Herman Grimm also was a true descendant and disciple of Goethe.

Over Herman Grimm’s life Goethe stands like a great star which led him on and in whose light he saw all things. A great part of his lifetime was devoted to the study of Goethe and specially to the fathoming of his conception of existence. In 1874 Herman Grimm began to hold lectures on Goethe at the Berlin University, of which his hearers still speak with enthusiasm. Young students and old men, we are told, sat side by side to listen to him. These lectures have formed the basis for his book on Goethe, but besides this great work many of his essays treat of some special subject of Goethe’s life or writings. He always found new stand-points from which to view his hero, new thoughts about him “which had to be told.” He was always eager to hear about distant countries and he wished to know about the intellectual standard of foreign people, but more particularly what they knew and thought of Goethe, for he judged of the condition of all modern civilization by the relation in which it stood to him. Herman Grimm always recurred to Goethe in his writings as he did in his conversation.

Such conversations with my uncle belong to my most precious recollections. How often have I sat in his study at Berlin, the windows wide opened and looking out on large gardens, and listened to his words, to that wonderful mixture of knowledge, enthusiasm, and sharp wit, all tempered by great kindness and by a mild, half ironical judgment of human weaknesses. Yes, how often,—yet now it seems so seldom! There remained so much to ask, which he perhaps might have answered. It is the eternal regret of all those that are left, for those that are gone.

During years we corresponded. His letters were like spiritual gifts and they have ever been my great joy, particularly so in those distant lands, where all that belongs to intellectual life, as understood by the white race, has to be imported, just as entirely as the comforts of material existence. In his last letter he wrote to me from Berlin, "everything here is going on well, which does not exclude that you may find people who will tell you that everything is going wrong,—but there have always been those who would say that."

This shows him as he had grown to be in old age. Harmony and placidity, his lifelong ideals, surrounded him like a halo. He was, indeed, like a calm surface of water reflecting heaven above. Goethesque he appeared in his attitude of Olympian repose. Ever rising higher, trifles faded before his gaze and he believed that even the worst and deepest misery must finally lead to good, that everything is capable of being glorified. He considered the world as a whole, ignoring its ugly details, turning away from bitterness, discontent, and evil, not out of want of pity and sympathy, but because these things seemed to him as a transient phase, sure to change and to be transfigured in the course of evolution, in that far, far distance, where the explanation of the world's riddle lies.

Thither he confidently toiled on.

A THEORY OF THE COMIC

WILLIAM NORMAN GUTHRIE

CINCINNATI

TO write of the spirit of comedy in all seriousness seems droll enough, which is perhaps the reason there is in English no satisfactory treatise on the subject. The first effort at a statement of the nature of comedy is, so far as I know, Meredith's essay on "The Comic Spirit," of value assuredly to whoever is able to read it; yet, is one ever quite sure one has got out of it what Meredith put into it? At all events it has not been popular, nor very generally illuminative. For my part I was obliged to do some thinking of my own (because, probably, I did not fully understand Mr. Meredith), and to present succinctly the results of that process is the purpose of this paper.

Comedy does not necessarily manifest itself in any one particular literary form. The word "comedy," therefore, as used by me designates a spirit, a mood, an intellectual and emotional attitude which has, to be sure, manifested itself chiefly in drama, but had long ere that employed the fable, the epic, and has since found the novel, the short story, the epistle, the essay, the ballad, or even the lyric poem, each in its way a congenial form.

The comic spirit follows close in the wake of the tragic, because it proceeds in part from it. What seems to me the psychological view of the origin of comedy can be stated as follows. There is an instinct in every species for the preservation of the type. The barnyard fowl, distinguished by a coat of paint, is not envied. Considered singular, he is jocosely eliminated. It is the instinct of the species to preserve itself from whimsical variations. Monstrosities, produced naturally or artificially, are removed. A most fortunate instinct, only it operates somewhat less happily with man. Of animals the survivor is the most competent to meet the needs of his physical life. No variation can maintain itself unless distinctly in the direction of greater strength, speed, cunning, courage, love. But schoolyard and barnyard are in this respect unlike. With humanity the "fittest," using the word in its best sense, that of subserving the greater interests of the race, is not always by any means he who is best armed for defence, most competent to find the means of subsistence, most formidable in aggression. Wherefore it is an early discovery that when we have reached man this instinct requires some check. While on the whole the brave man fares better than the coward, the bravest dies first, and always and inevitably must die first.

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It were, therefore, very well to be brave, yet not too brave, else one would be eliminated, without a chance to pass on one's special temperament and disposition, either by continuously obtruded example, or by actual procreation and rearing of offspring. Now, therefore, the hero song appears always more or less a calamity song, the calamity gloried in as proving the hero to the uttermost, and the tragic spirit is the soul of this hero song which first assumes some such form as the song, the ballad, the lay, the epic, yet ultimately finds its proper body in the well knit drama. It compensates the hero for his life, cut short, and it raises up offspring unto him by setting forth his example when he is not there to do so in person. Thus tragedy may be termed a device to advance the species, obviating the danger first apparent in man's breed, of the "best," the most redoubtable, the most beautiful, inevitably perishing. So taught, we call him who perishes, because the best, a "fool," to be sure, but piously add an epithet which changes everything and as "God's fool" he imposes on us and exacts worship. Now tragedy does not deter men from following in the footsteps of the "God's fool." On the contrary it encourages, incites to rivalry, for, thanks to human courage, death allures, provided it be a death to some purpose. The death of the hero has worth then as a display of courage and an appeal to courage. Moreover it assigns new worth to its cause; it indicates the high purchase price of virtue, and is the origin of moral values. Thus the hero's calamitous career does not dishearten; the death of the hero is not a punishment of his deserving but a revelation, a precious privilege, an ecstatic reward, an allurements of glory. Such is the *Vis Tragica* and the *Ars Tragica*: to set forth and further commend by an appeal to the æsthetic sense, the reasons for such a death; to make it fascinate supernaturally because it leads without fail to some god, or some godlike perfection of man.

Now when tragedy is well established, and has come to dominate the finer intellectual life of men, certain errors gain more or less general acceptance. First, since the hero is a singular person, all singular persons are heroes. The old instinct, tending to eliminate the peculiar, odd, and strange, is quite reversed. Artistic dime museums are temples of a new religion, and set up therein, for popular worship, any person who is sufficiently singular! Every "monster" supposititiously a hero, godman, or avatar, is to be fostered and feuded, lionized and aped! Second and worse, as peace more and more settles down upon the culture community, the hero's rôle is perceived to be interesting with peculiar immunities and perquisites; a rôle that can be affected with profit after some preliminary study. The "sham hero" then appears and breeds his

kind prolifically. Now these two, the "monster" and the "sham hero," result from the ascendancy of the tragic spirit over the mind of civilized man. A corrective is required which is instinctively and inevitably somewhat in this wise: First, the tragedy, which has grown in intensity (each artist endeavoring to outbid his predecessor for popular favor), becomes so grossly exaggerated, makes so excessive a demand on the credulity of the ordinary person that all honest awe passes away, and the common man suddenly aware of his advantage, takes his revenge on the "hero" against whom deep down in his soul he has always cherished a grudge, because arrogantly greater than himself. Putting it another way: by the natural, instinctive self love of the "hero" the growth and development of tragedy along the line of least resistance occurs. When it has traveled too far in the direction of melodrama, it is overtaken by the literary reaction, namely, the first attempt at artistic comedy. It exposes the "monster," and does so by a more heavy overcharging of all that the tragic artist has been doing or misdoing, till its product is quite incredible and preposterous, and supplies the occasion for the instant reversal of judgment and feeling. Soon the "sham hero," when burlesque has had its little turn, is directly attacked, and often very subtly and cunningly. We have seen the "hero" and know just what he does in adversity (having always been in adversity, at least when officially presented to us), and so we are quite armed if we be the "sham hero" for all contingencies—except prosperity. Just as in tragedy, therefore, the hero meets calamity, in comedy the cunning "sham hero" is embarrassed by not meeting the calamity when it fell due, and the "sham hero" convicts himself; or the calamity is held in such malign suspense that the honest "would-be hero's" watchings have wearied him, until he betrays the fact that he is not altogether so well prepared for actual calamity as he had believed; that he had only been ready for the *appearance* of calamity, and not for the appearance of *calamity*! But, of course, the exposure of the "monster" and the "sham hero" and the foolish "would-be hero" is the truest vindication of the real "hero"; wherefore we see comedy has but come to the rescue of tragedy at its critical hour, and is not its foe but its loyal fellow and friend.

It is strange that history, in a frolicsome moment, when naming her first great comic artist should have perpetrated a pun. As his name etymologically affirms (or can be made to affirm by some violence to its integrity), Aristo-phanes was in his works a "display of the best,"—the best for his breed and race. What tragic artists like Æschylus and Sophocles had displayed by suffering, he displays and champions with

laughter. The God of Life is still very good; and ecstasy, the stand out of and above self, his holiest boon; and enthusiasm, the sense of his divinity, within the pledge of his favor. But to illustrate the intimate connection between comedy and tragedy let just a few examples be suggested. The solemn balderdash of scholastics in theology and law without true literary expression; then Rabelais. Later, for similar reasons, Erasmus. The mediæval romantic lay in verse, then volubly in multiple volumes,—and Don Quixote with Sancho of the Paunch ride forth. The first part of the "Tale of the Sorrowful Knight" was to kill a craze; the second, to kill his hero for fear others might live by exploiting him if left alive. Yet the result—a profound, world-moving comedy of the mad idealist and the gross man of the senses. Richardson, sweetish sentimental, self-consciously chaste, and Fielding's "Tom Jones." Or further back, the early tragedy of Marlowe, then comedy with Jonson and Shakespeare. Then tragedy once more, Shakespeare, Webster, Ford, and through Fletcher and Massinger to riotous comedy. Not that each mood always finds its worthy artist, but the sequence of moods and their interdependence remains for the historian to record, and the student of æsthetics to ponder.

II.

Now what is the psychology of the comic spirit? Why do we laugh? Should we go to the psychologist for counsel and the solution of our problem; he is so solemn a personage that he probably could not catch laughter in his laboratory to isolate and analyze. Hence we shall have to dispense with his aid as best we can. Two things suggest themselves without the aid of his profounder specialist wisdom, as indispensable conditions of the genesis of laughter.

First, a perception. That is the flattering trait of comedy, that in consequence it is only for more or less intelligent people such as we. A perception? Ah, yes, a perception of unreason. And that is not to be had, God willing, of any but reasonable individuals. A perception or illogicalness, incongruity, unfitness of means to ends! Hence no comic perception without some knowledge of the world. And comedy notably does not belong to the young, nor appears to rejoice a wholly unsophisticated period. It comes most buxomly welcome to a period of accumulated experience, knowing what ought to happen, and would better happen, and therefore schooled to detect absurdity, should the opposite occur and soberly present its credentials. A perception, then, first and foremost.

Next, something else and more. To see things unreasonable and illogical, to realize the incongruities and the "mésalliances" of life, is not, I think, the essence of good cheer. Usually it might be expected to entail a fit of melancholy, spleenful disgust with life, or lacrymose despair of good. But when such a perception is preceded, ushered, guarded, and decorously followed up by an inveterate, stalwart, omnipresent optimism (often true child of a good digestion); when it is compelled to hobnob with a vital, vigorous conviction as to the rightness of things, or their indefinite capacity for righting themselves or being righted; the faith that the universal order, odd to relate, will somehow continue quite well without even ourself to superintend evolution, and that God manages, none knows how, in his Heaven after all and on his earth much more than half the time at the worst; why, then, the above mentioned perception of the incongruity, absurdity, perversity—insideoutness or upsidedownness—results in another and totally different emotion than the classic blues of Burton and his bilious confraternity. This secondary emotion (dispelling the primary, should it have chanced to outrun faith a little and ventured into the open of consciousness) is the comic. I cannot describe it nor define it. I can only assert that it arises without fail from the "perception" aforesaid, if concurrent with that quick, essential "faith." Then you have the flash from the two poles, the meeting kiss of extremes.

But some one objects: there is also a laughter that proceeds *not* from faith? To be sure. Yet such laughter is of quite a different nature from that above called "comic." It is rather what we denote by "cynical" or more picturesquely still by "devilish laughter." It is due to a perception of incongruity, and a perverse theory apparently demonstrated by it. The malignant joy arises from vanity gratified, superior intelligence advertised, and a chance of the company envious misery loves. It is an odious, dogmatic unfaith bred of "the dog in the manger" and fed on the shadows of "sour grapes," a diet so unnutritious as to explain its ravenous hunger for any lickerish morsel of veritable mishap. The degrees of the sincerity of such a faith in evil and death will measure the hideousness of the laughter. A cynical moment may sometimes give the zest needed by comedy,—the zero point for vital temperatures, the minus to offset the plus; but a cynical piece of art is a contradiction in terms, as an art work must, to be such, please nobly and no noble pleasure can be had (save by inhuman ghoul) from mere insults hurled by such laughter at truth, good, and beauty, at man and God. It is most unfortunate that a careless use of words has often caused the

"cynical" and the "comic" to be confounded to the serious prejudice and misvaluation of the latter.

A brief summary may here be apposite. Comic emotion originates from the co-existence of a perception of incongruity and a persistent conviction, not probably more than half conscious and in all likelihood quite unexplicit, that in despite of such incongruity things are right. The error, the failure, the insanity, if you please, of the particular life form under consideration, only serves to emphasize the success of life on the whole, an instance of the exception cited for the more effective proof of the rule.

If we turn now to the victim of our comic perception, to the mask, type, rôle realized for the nonce in a living individual as a person, we find ourselves obliged to recognize a distinction created by the mood in which we envisage him and his predicament. If the victim is regarded as responsible morally for what he misdoes and suffers, if his errors, sins, shames, are all held to be of his own wilful, stupid making, then we are perhaps aware of a certain antipathy for him, or indignation, and our laughter is of the sort known as "satiric." The satire may become so virulent as to lapse into invective and irate diatribe, till it lose every vestige of artistic form and charm. On the other hand, if the victim is plainly not responsible, or if we feel kindly towards him of our kinship and common kind, and endeavor to make out to ourselves that he is not really responsible, but some fate, genius, imp of ill luck, sprite of good-hap, whim of dame fortune, we look at everything the victim does and says and suffers quite differently. The laughter is gentle natured, the comedy of the variety called "humor," and "humor" may range to "farce" and vulgar "horse play" when it waxes uproariously rollicking, easily straying beyond the limits of art.

Out of sympathy and antipathy, then, for the "victim" of the comic perception arise "humor" and "satire" and should that personal feeling caper too madly for the restraints of good breeding and artistic form, they degenerate, and this degeneration is shown in a coarsening of the caricature which almost inevitably characterizes such comic work.

If, however, the "victim" is considered neither responsible nor irresponsible, or both at the same time for divers reasons, we have the shake of the brain rather than of the belly, betraying itself in the wicked twinkle of the eye, and the gracious waver of the mouth corners; the dispassionate laughter of the gods on Olympus, whence the inspiration for impartial, divine comedy in a truer sense than Dante's, as playful on pure surfaces, as disinfectedly severe to festering deeps as the rays of the all-seeing sun, yet ever uninvolved, unembittered, not forfeiting dignity,

serene, aloof. This supreme sort of comedy, neither humorous nor satiric, perchance an equal blend of both,—a chemical combination, not a mechanical mixture,—is difficult of production, and still more difficult of general understanding; the reason, simply that most folk are not habitually dwellers on Olympus, nor prepared to laugh sublimely with the immortals. So the comic artist, however serious and high his intention and stringent his self-imposed abidance by the subtlest laws of his art, asks frankly the assistance of humorous antic or satiric scowl, setting himself up now as judge, again condescending as fellow to the fool, now wit, now wag, now prophet, now clown, so as to sustain by digression the interest in his main work of those who cannot for long relish the fine flavors of nectar and ambrosia, whose comic sense is in the belly rather than the brains, to borrow Meredith's epigram. Such is an explanation of the paucity of masterpieces in pure comic art and the adequate apology for the usual confusion of genres.

III.

Now the imposed brevity of this paper forbids all specifications, illustrative suggestions, rebuttals of charges fair and foul. We cannot call for help on the great Molière, king once of the united kingdoms and scattered principalities of the comic, or his latest royal scion, King George, surnamed Meredith, that the populace might ascribe to him the authorship of "Lucile," and be caught unawares in a jest. The Daudet of "Mima Roumestan" and the Daudet, also, of the "Pope's Mule" and of "Tartarin de Tarascon"; Juvenal, austere and dire, and Ben Jonson, exquisite in "Volpone," brutally realistic in "Bartholomew Fair." Ah, for allowance, the girth a Falstaffian book might grant, to call up the shades—nay, materialize the men! Aristophanes of the "Birds" and the "Frogs"; Lucian of the "Trip to the Moon" and the Olympian and philosophic topsiturvidous; La Fontaine of the "Fables," ay, and of the "Contes" (let us mention them *sotto voce*); Le Sage with his beloved ne'er do weel of a "Gil Blas" or Beaumarchais with the deviceful barber who loves "close shaves"; Rabelais, the ogre omnivorous and alas, obscene; Fielding, in eighteenth century costume, yet betrayed by his speech, lineage, and blood; Heine of the augustly droll "Alta Troll," of the North Sea with its salt winds of satire; Byron of cutting "Don Juan"; Hugo of "les Châtiments"; Swift with his awful "Gulliver"; Nietzsche with his brilliant "Larathustra"—enthusiasts all (each in his way) for a diviner breed of men;—Dickens or Thackeray; the gentle Shakespeare of "As You Like It" and

the serious Shakespeare of "Measure for Measure"; the savage ironies of the Bible; the grim "bonhomie" of such a paternal "father" as Tertullian; the exquisite malice of such an anti-reformer and lover of monks as Erasmus! How one would like to put them each and all in the witness box and proceed to swear them in! It is only right to state that whatever in this essay has been put with oracular dogmatism, was gained by wholesome commerce with these worthies, now a bit and then a bit, and would not ever have been reduced to order, save for that need of defence felt by all their friends and lovers against the advocates of an unjoyful, iniquitous, soporate gravity and gloom, who stalk abroad lugubriously devout in broadcloth or in sackcloth to the shame of the earth and the despair of heaven.

Youth, for all its natural excess of happiness, nay, perchance because of it rather, is wont at times to take itself with becoming seriousness and solemnity, with a flaunted yet blushful self-pity for its gifts of head and heart and their disproportionate recognition. Its self-consciousness and naïve egotism induces it to cherish the doleful domino, and hug philosophically the shadowed side of every street. The mature man, who has suffered much and survived more, knowing few hurts mortal, and fewer still immortal, walks out freely in the open, if such there be, and deems the road not ill. In our teens the gruesome elegies, and in the forties or ripe fifties the pyrotechnics of the boy! The truth is, perhaps, that what we contribute to our life is what we value most, in youth our melancholy, and later on our gaiety; only what the spirit has created for itself will it make much of, and therefore it is the older man who is glad that the worst things are usually ready to hand, and the best things scarce, that he may address himself bravely to the production of these, and take a creator's joy in the process. If wilful optimism be the saddest pessimism as some maintain, we suppose a willess pessimism must be hilarious! Heine, at all events, is well aware that the future ages would scarce be edified to learn that he loved Agnes,—some Agnes or other, once upon a time,—any Agnes for the matter of that, saint or sinner,—if he should be permitted to write his little legend across the firmamental blue, with a Norway spruce for pen and the fire of Ætna for indelible red ink! He is romantic no more, and has wooed the comic muse. Figaro, on the other hand, has acquired the habit of instantaneous laughter at every turn of events, because of the long experience of misery. He laughs at once lest he should catch himself weeping, and he is sure one comes out better in the end by using one's wits than by an abuse of the lachrymal ducts. Such his "brave philosophy" and it wins the reader and the day.

Molière, the sick man, mocks the physician of his times and the sick man likewise, and feels then almost well; cheated husband and lover, he makes no end of mirth at the expense of male egotists who deem they hold securely human hearts in the hollow of either hand, or in the still hollower pretences of their moral codes. Molière, the deeply religious man, exposes the pious hypocrite; impractical, often baffled enthusiast for sincerity and truth, mercilessly assails in "Don Juan" the man that proposes always to be himself by indulging every whim, in "Alceste" the moral man who makes of his morality an anti-social force. Whom, then, has Molière been all the while victimizing, if not himself, or at least what was closest kin to him.

Is it fine to die in battle? Is it not as fine and finer may be to die for years by inches, and wittily, as Heine? If William Blake falls asleep singing in songs of his own improvising the glory of his God, and triumphs over the world, the devil, and the flesh, what of Scarron, the tortured knot of nerves that flinches not nor wails, expiring in a jest that makes his friends about him riot with laughter for the last time?

Much, I fear, ought still to be said on this and many points, but in conclusion let me vindicate (or rather concisely suggest modes of vindication) our inherent right to laugh with the masters and the gods; nay, if needs were at the gods even, and the masters, or laugh, if such a thing as yet be thinkable, at our own very selves.

First: Is laughter irreligious? On the contrary, laughter is religious since it involves faith. Not necessarily a theological but a religious faith is at the core of it, a faith that if I perish the world will go on nevertheless, and that perhaps if I should fall it may advantage the world, hard as that may be to believe. The Greeks went to the length of laughing at their god, the god of laughter, not because he was *per se* ridiculous (for he is most deeply serious and worshipful) but because in laughing at the misconceptions of the god of laughter they could summon him the sooner into their midst.

Second: Is laughter unphilosophical? Most assuredly. The comic artist always hates the philosopher and there is a reason for this. If Aristophanes pillories Socrates, it is not the fault of Aristophanes, but of Socrates. Socrates is after all a sophist. He seeks to further the contemplative life. He would have us stop to think. But he who stops to think will never even start to do anything in this world. You do not want to stop for discussion, you want to go on and do, and discuss when you have done it, provided you are lucky and survive the deed. Socrates is, therefore, the natural enemy of Aristophanes, who stands for the active life, and believes in *unconsciousness* knowing that nothing can

really satisfy that proceeds from self-consciousness, and therefore gaily offers men the ecstasy of self-oblivious laughter. Stop laughing by all means if you want to be a philosopher.

Third: Is it immoral? That is a very important objection urged against comedy from generation to generation. It is not only *not* immoral, but it is the preservation of morals to cultivate by use a faculty for all sorts of laughter. It is the hallucination of prevalent evil which drives men to despair. Now evil always seems to be prevalent when you scrutinize it, for scrutiny involves confined attention to what lies immediately under the lens in the focussed light. Being wherever we see, we surmise, nay, affirm it to be everywhere. But were it really everywhere, you and I could not be here to express such an opinion. Clearly the thing to do, then, is to belittle the evil by fair means and foul, to undignify it and so rob it of its horrors that we shall not lose wits or heart. By laughing at the evil, we get rid of the false impression of its omnipotence, we get a little courage and our despair turns a somersault up into glory from the swinging trapeze of faith.

Fourth: Is laughter superficial? Of course it is superficial. In one sense, however, and not in another. But then some people prefer to be driven as a plummet to the bottom of the sea, rather than float as a boat on the surface. The child comes into the world with the art of wailing perfect; the art of laughing has to be learned. Ignorance is bliss, and as we must have some bliss, we must have some ignorance, which would better be of the wilful sort lest it be too summarily surprised by our city cousin's wordly wisdom. If you call that "being superficial" let us be superficial, by all means.

Fifth: Is laughter unsympathetic? This is another great objection raised against comedy. Of course it is unsympathetic; but, ought one to be always and everywhere sympathetic? Some people say one ought. "Laugh and the world laughs with you; weep and you weep alone." How sad! Thank God, when you weep everybody does not weep, that there is some limit to the spread of infection. Sympathy has value in life, great value, and it should be cultivated, but it ought to be understood as vicarious sensation, sensation for another through the imagination, and this sympathy can at most only tell me what is amiss, not what I should do to remedy the ill. Therefore, I shall not expect to be saved by sympathy. It is not sympathy that we require for social salvation, but good, simple common sense, the comic sense, which neutralizing egoism does away with both *alter* and *ego*—leaves us a plain perspective—the gay bird's eye view of the gods.

Sixth: Is the philosophy of laughter unheroic? I do not believe it. Let me compare briefly two men, Corneille and Molière, chosen because they stand in their characteristic attitudes for a complete contrast. Corneille is tragic; he tells us how to do and die, and live in the offspring of others. Molière tells us how to be less intensively, extensively more, how to live and not die, how to rear offspring of our own for ourselves, and offspring, also, for the departed heroes. Which is the nobler function? The hero sacrifices his social qualities to his individual perfection of a particular sort, whatever that may be, while the common man sacrifices his individuality to his social obligations as he conceives them. The hero becomes a kind of specialist while the poor common man has meaner but more manifold qualities. The reward of the hero is thoroughness and worship which is a fine reward. The reward of the other is some love, perhaps, for his amiability. Then you may say that the one is an instance of a particular, definite perfection of life for which the world is not altogether ready, the other, an instance of the vital compromise which it demands. Which is the more *heroic*, in the sense of courageous, of the twain? Think of it! Death unto life is the hero's way, the tragic method—surrender of society, surrender of love; and the way of the common man is the surrender of distinction, the surrender of worship, of ecstasy, of self-admiration in order to engage in the ordinary business of life. Which is really, all things reckoned, the greater *man*, the complete common man, or the complete hero? It may not be for us to choose which we shall endeavor to become, and our function is no doubt quite definitely settled for us. Still, if it be settled in the paths of the common man, let us take this comfort: society needs us more, perhaps, even than she does the most harrowing of heroes, and our high priest, the Comic Artist, is not without his special service and reward.

THE DRAMAS OF PAUL HERVIEU¹

EDOUARD ROD

PARIS

MONSIEUR PAUL HERVIEU is a man of forty-five, of grave face, cold demeanor, distinguished and restrained manners. He speaks little, but each of his words has a purpose and attains it. His personality gives the impression of intense reflection and calm energy. He is one of those who know what they want and do not let themselves be turned from their path when they have once fixed a course in their mind. He began in 1882 with a little volume of fantasies called "Diogène le Chien," which some clear sighted confreres, Guy de Maupassant among them, alone noticed. Then he sought his talent through a series of works, "L'Alpe Homicide," "L'Inconnu," "Flirt," etc., which, though they bear witness to an undeniable ability, show the uncertainty of a mind that has not yet found its equilibrium; of an artist who is seeking his "formula" and is not yet in full possession of his powers. All at once his mastery asserted itself in "Peints par eux-mêmes," a novel that one may call a "chef d'œuvre," followed by another novel, "L'Armature" (1895), very powerful too, but less perfect and less original in its art. Meantime M. Paul Hervieu was turning his attention to the theatre, whose rejuvenescence during the last twelve years is one of the most important facts of our literary life. In 1890 he brought out at the Cercle de l'Union Artistique a witty adaptation of the story "Point de Lendemain" by Vivant Denon. Two years later the production of "Paroles Restent" at the Gymnase a little preceded the publication of "Peints par eux-mêmes." The play, though very remarkable, had less success than the novel, but complete success was achieved by "Les Tenailles" and "La Loi de l'Homme," which put their author in the first rank of dramatists, as he was already in that of romancers. His last two plays, "La Course du Flambeau" and "L'Enigme"—the second composed it is said, before the first—were received by the public and the critics with a favor that bordered on

(1) Œuvres de Paul Hervieu, *Théâtre*, 2 vols., Paris, Lemerre. M. Hervieu's plays are, in chronological order of their representation: *Point de Lendemain*, 1890; *Les Paroles Restent*, 1892; *Les Tenailles*, 1895; *La Loi de l'Homme*, 1897; *La Course du Flambeau*, 1901; *L'Enigme*, 1901. See also his *Pessimisme et Comédie* in the *Revue de Paris*, April 15, 1900, and *Le Métier d'Auteur dramatique*, an interview, in the *Revue Bleue*, for August 10, 1901. There are critical studies of Hervieu by F. Sarcey, J. Lemaitre, E. Faguet, A. Hallays, R. Doumic, G. Larroumet, and others.

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enthusiasm. Whatever new works M. Paul Hervieu reserves for us, the six plays that we already owe to him constitute a totality sufficiently complete to allow us to deduce from them the literary tendencies and social or moral aspirations of their author. Such an analysis is the object of the following pages.

I.

Many writers for the stage,—since the time when our great classic dramatists themselves wrote “examinations” of their plays,—have taken pains to explain to us their ways and means in prefaces or theoretic studies. M. Hervieu has said little about these things. So far as I know he has confined himself to a lecture delivered in 1900 to the fashionable audience of the Société des Conférences and afterward published in the “Revue de Paris.” Later, one of the contributors to the “Revue Bleue” questioned him about “the present formula of the stage.” He replied by repeating and defining the points of view expressed in that lecture, which should suffice to show that they state his doctrines satisfactorily. They do but corroborate the general observations that the reading of his six plays suggests.

What strikes at the first glance in these plays is that they differ considerably from those that the former generation had applauded, as much as the dramaturgy of the author would have differed from that of M. Sardou, if M. Sardou had ever elaborated one. Neither that “master,” nor Augier, nor Pailleron, seem to have exercised the least influence on our author, who has hardly any traces even of Alexandre Dumas, fils, whom he resembles by the quality of his subjects and the choice of his environments. M. Hervieu has no taste for the “tricks of the stage” from which the successors of Scribe never quite emancipated themselves, and he has a just scorn for those conventions which for a half century replaced on our stage, not without loss, the simple and logical rules of classic art. It is to this rather that he goes back, and we shall see with how just and deep a sense of the best traditions of French literature, as well as of eternal truth, which alone prints on literary work a durable character.

When the romanticists undertook the reform of the stage, they directed their efforts not against what was arbitrary and superannuated in the classical drama that was slowly degenerating around them, but against the most reasonable parts of its æsthetics. They attacked especially the rule of the three unities, and the principle of the separation of genres, and they thought, after they had indefinitely extended the permissible duration of the action, had authorized changes in scenery, and mixed fitly the

grotesque with the tragic in Shakespearean fashion, that they had renewed an exhausted art, or created a new one. The lamentable balance sheet of their dramatic work shows how far they were mistaken. But their immediate successors, in bringing the drama back to commonplace proportions, still preserved in their plays the hybrid character which the romanticists made a condition of truth, and which in their hands had soon become the most false and foolish of conventions. M. Hervieu, consciously, resolutely, renounced this prejudice, and made the basis of his formula a return to simplicity of genres. He tells us so in these words: "Whatever dramatic inventions may have attempted in blending tragic and comic motives, it seems as though a law of nature makes these genres return to their simplicity. Classic tragedy with its solemn forms seemed to withdraw from a world where wigs were no longer worn. Comedy, with the breadth of its generic title, seems almost sufficient to include today dramatic writing whose scope is mainly 'bourgeois' and familiar. But there is one resisting species embraced by comedy in her rubric, the gloomy, that will not let itself be absorbed; it turns instinctively to the tragic form, but to tragedy renewed as modern conditions suggest; not superbly draped, but contemporary, rationalizing, prosaic—bloody no longer, but using its dry knife without the scaffold."¹

This return to simplicity of genres involves a return to simplicity of means. M. Hervieu has not yet gone so far as to demand the reestablishment of the three unities, but he is not very far from practicing them on his own account. He holds very strictly to unity of action, which, however, has never disappeared from French dramatic art, remaining there rather as a distinctive national trait through all revolutions of taste. As for the two other unities—time and place—he does not compel himself to observe them, but he recognizes that in them was a source of the force of classic works and he strives toward them. In fact the long intervals that separate the second and third acts of "*Les Tenailles*," the first and second acts of "*La Loi de l'Homme*" and of "*La Course du Flambeau*" surprise and disconcert, as if such gaps, filled by important events, revealed by brief allusions in the dialogue, or by traces of age in the characters, were really incompatible with the fair severity of a studied composition. In "*L'Enigme*" they have disappeared, and this continuity of line is perhaps one of the reasons that assured effect and success to that play. As for unity of place, M. Hervieu has not tried to restore it. It seems of the three the least necessary, one might even say that it is no longer justifiable since the art of stage setting has made the illusion of environments possible. But if

(1) *Pessimisme et Comédie.*

M. Hervieu does not hesitate to transport his characters from one drawing room to another, or even from Paris to some watering place, at least he has deliberately refused to distract the attention of spectators by rich and complex decoration. For this he should be praised. It endangers the true beauty of a work when decorative painters, costumers, and upholsterers, become the collaborators of the principal author. Art asks no optical illusion; it lives and ought to live by its own strength. The magic of great spectacles, while indispensable to opera, adds nothing to the intensity of tragedy. And this is the proper word for the plays of M. Paul Hervieu. Their form, their architecture, if one may say so, attaches them directly to the drama of Racine, so ill understood outside of France, yet the purest and most perfect product of our literature. Let us consider their subjects.

II.

Leaving aside the dainty trifle borrowed from Vivant Denon we can divide the five plays of M. Hervieu into two groups. In one are "Les Tenailles" and "La Loi de l'Homme," in the other "Paroles Restent," "La Course du Flambeau," and "L'Enigme." The first two are problem plays, or, if you will, social dramas. The three others are studies of passion. The former place the interest in the demonstration of a postulate, the confirmation of which would involve a reform in the civil code; the interest of the latter rests alone in painting the movements excited in the soul by the shock of events.

Let us begin with the first group: Irène Fergan does not love her husband, though she has no fault to find with him, but as she loves love she does not resign herself to her destiny. A divorce law has just been passed. She would like to be one of the first to profit by it. This desire is so much the more intense because she has found again a child-friend, Michel Davernier, who happens to love her just as she dreams of being loved. But Robert Fergan, the husband, will not hear a word of divorce, for he is one of those men who cling above all things to social decorum and the appearance of order. His wife represents in his eyes "the revolt against society," while he represents to himself "the defence of law and respect of morals" (II.8). He insists on keeping her, then, because it would not suit him "to be only a divorced man,—a man who sells half his furniture, empties half his pocketbook, who has only a half front left in society" (II.9). He will take her away from the enervating influences of Paris; will bring her to the country, where she shall appease the romantic exasperation of her nerves in the calm of the fields. And he does as he said he would. For ten years (supposed to elapse

between the second and third act) he has the illusion of success. Irène seems reasonable or resigned. She has preserved of her former character only an extreme, morbid tenderness for her son. The child, having reached his tenth year, Fergan wants to send him to boarding school. Irène on the contrary wants to keep him. She is still anxious about his health and, as Fergan still tries to impose his will upon her, she is reduced to reveal her secret to him. The child is Michel Davernier's, who died a consumptive, and he is threatened with his true father's malady. This time Fergan demands the divorce and Irène refuses it. Her husband has against her only her avowal, invalid in court. She proposes to keep for her son at all costs "all the consideration that is due to his legal birth" (III.8). Fergan in his turn is caught in the vise in which he had once clamped her. "What then would you have me become?" he asks, "thus face to face with you, always, always? What sort of existence would you have me lead?" "The same that you have made me lead to this day," responds Irène. "We are riveted to the same ball and chain. Try at last to feel its weight and to drag it with me. I have been pulling it long enough alone" (III. 8). Such is the subject of "Les Tenailles." That of "La Loi de l'Homme" is more complex.

Count de Raguais is false to his wife. He is the lover of Madame d'Orcieu. Laure de Raguais finds it out. But she possesses no legal proof and cannot establish by juridical means the injury that she suffers. Her husband, from motives analagous to those of Fergan, as well as because he wishes to preserve his mistress's reputation, will not hear of divorce nor even of separation. With some trouble Laure extorts from him the concession of an amiable separation in which she shall keep her daughter at the sacrifice of part of her dowry. Years pass. Isabel, brought up by her mother, passes each year a month of vacation with her father at Cabourg. She meets there the d'Orcieu and their son André, who becomes attached to her and wins her love. As there is no avowable reason for crossing the inclination of the two young people, and as the only obstacle arises from the secret attachment of the father and mother, these have to give their consent, unless they reveal to M. d'Orcieu the true nature of their relations. They do not resign themselves to this without anguish, sure of striking against the unrelenting opposition of Madame de Raguais who, in fact, revolts with all her power against this alliance, the mere thought of which wounds her to the depth of her soul. She reveals to her daughter the secret of her isolation; she enlightens M. d'Orcieu. In vain: M. d'Orcieu insists on the marriage and that the Raguais shall live together, because this solution, which his paternal tenderness also urges upon him, seems to him alone compatible

with the exigencies of their respective situations. "We are reduced to hide ourselves behind appearances. If society has suppositions that affect my honor, which is, alas, too probable, I must confound them, and put them off the track, even by a defiant challenge. This marriage, cost what it may, must take place."

These two plays have a double fault, inherent in problem plays. In the first place they do not prove what they try to prove, because invented anecdotes cannot demonstrate a general truth, any more than facts that are borrowed in isolation from real life can do it. Then, too, the author who pursues an abstract aim is impelled in spite of himself, to arrange the concrete material that his observation furnishes. No doubt M. Hervieu does not for a moment cease to be sincere. "I have no higher ambition," he said once,¹ "than that one should see in this effort toward truth the distinctive mark of all my literary efforts." He remains faithful to this programme. But truth, for him, is found less in the observation of the human or social phenomenon that inspires him than in the thesis which he undertakes to demonstrate. This ceases, then, to be an objective truth, and becomes a subjective, that is, a discussable one. Objections of all sorts rise against it. Fergan, Raguais, d'Orcieu,—husbands of a type still found, alas, in our old world,—seem too exceptional to be really significant. Their fierce and narrow despotism inspires veritable horror, though this horror does not necessarily rebound upon the defects of the code. For it is not a defect of the law that makes these men at once cruel and powerful; it is the force of their prejudices, the folly of their social environment. Imperfect as it is, the divorce law would quite suffice for the separation of these unhappy households. What keeps them together is the fear of opinion, a thousand times more tyrannical and absurd than the law. In fact it is always before the exigencies of this opinion that they bow. They sacrifice to it their happiness, their dignity, their moral health and that of their children, they rate the safeguard of appearances far above that of reality, what people will say far above the approbation of their own conscience, the "point d'honneur" far above honor. And from their acting thus M. Hervieu concludes that the divorce law is imperfect. I for my part am not opposed to its revision, but, as long as manners in a certain part of society are such as M. Hervieu describes, modifications introduced into the civil code will not have much significance. For it is not respect for the law that makes Fergan, Raguais, and d'Orcieu the abominable tyrants that they are, but rather the cultus of prejudice, and no law will ever prevail against that cultus.

(1) *Revue Bleue*, August 10, 1901.

We shall come back later to this point. All that we need draw now from these observations is that in these two plays the fine qualities of M. Paul Hervieu are fettered by the necessities of demonstration. We shall see them expanding at their ease where they are more free.

III.

If we compare "*Paroles Restent*" of 1892 with "*Peints par eux-mêmes*" of 1893, we shall be tempted to think that these two works sprang from the same source of observation or perhaps of emotion. For they are both studies, very simple and very strong, of fierce folly, of pettifogging malice, of criminal stupidity, of stupid prejudices once more in those social circles which people call the world,—as if that vast word of infinite significance could be applied without irony to the petty, crude, and chattering interests of that infinitesimal part of the human species which assumes the name. The novel, "*Peints par eux-mêmes*," is a large fresco on which one sees interacting, in masterly foreshortening, the errors, follies, faults, vices, and crimes of a narrow circle. I believe that of all the novels of society that have been written for twenty years,—and heaven knows there are enough of them—this is the most profound, the truest, and in some respects the most surely based on observation, the one which posterity will probably preserve in order to know and judge the special compartment of our society which is at once described and scourged in it. In the drama, "*Paroles Restent*," M. Paul Hervieu has confined himself to an episode, frequent, however, in the life of the idle rich, calumny.

One day the Marquis de Nohan, a reputable man—such people sometimes commit the worst infamies—lets fall in the ear of a lady to whom he has been paying attentions, Madame de Maudre, a hint, exceedingly compromising for Régine de Vesles, a young lady, somewhat free in her behavior, who also has appearances against her. Madame de Maudre does not keep the poisoned word to herself. It takes its course. The imprudent originator recognizes his error, falls in love with his victim, is going to repair his fault by a marriage in which both will find happiness. But the cursed word is still there; though pardoned it kills them, aided by the sword of another reputable gentleman, who thinks he is fulfilling a debt of honor, and by the tongue of Madame de Maudre, which pursues its work to the end.

This play, of which a dry analysis gives a very imperfect idea, obtained but partial success, yet it is finely managed, vigorous and very moving. Besides, it is the one in which M. Paul Hervieu has, so to speak, created his own proper form. Simplicity of plan, sobriety of

means, a dialogue very personal in style,—these make a worthy prelude to the works in which his mastery will become assured.

“*L'Enigme*” has perhaps succeeded best of M. Hervieu's dramas, although the subject is of minor interest and less novel. We have to do here with one of those dramas of adultery, which have furnished matter for so many novels and plays that they almost make a literary genre of their own. The social station of the characters, which are still of the middle class, does not accentuate the play's significance. All its merit, which is very great, is in the intensity of tragic emotion that the author succeeds in arousing.

Two brothers, Raymond and Gérard de Gourgiran, are spending a few days in a hunting lodge with their wives, Léonore and Giselle, an old kinsman, Marquis de Neste, and their friend Vivarce. Both brothers are equally hard, unrefined, rudimentary. Instincts govern them. That of possession is so developed that if injured it would excite immediately the instinct of vengeance even to murder, as among primitive people. They would not hesitate, either of them, to fire on poachers who meddled with their game, without asking if the life of a rabbit or a deer is worth that of a man. If their wives deceived them, Raymond would kill, Gérard would leave alive that he might torture the longer. They talk over this matter of conjugal right one evening after reading in a newspaper a tale of passion. Now, the very next day, as they are going off before dawn to ambush some poachers, they surprise Vivarce as he comes out of the lodge and must be leaving the chamber either of Léonore or of Giselle. Which? The question is asked, discussed, urged through a series of scenes of ever intense,—interest. Vivarce tries to explain his presence by *maladroît* pretexts. The culpable wife does not betray her guilt. But when a musket shot tells her that her lover is killing himself she proclaims her fault with a gesture of despair.

This short play held the spectators spellbound with emotion and terror, and the effect is maintained in the mere reading. Yet after the enthusiasm that greeted it on the evening of its first performance objections arose. Fault was found, not without reason, with the local arrangement which makes the visit of Vivarce to his mistress quite improbable. The starting point of the play was criticized, and in fact it is open to criticism. But, alas, there is always some degree of convention in dramas as in novels, and any author can be taken to task on his preliminary assumptions. But whatever these may be, we may well accept them, for they are never quite so impossible as the dilettante critics pretend. Observation of life shows that anything may happen and that reality constantly permits itself improbabilities that would startle the most fantastic imagination. In the

present case, however, the interest is not in the management of the circumstances by which the adultery is discovered, but in the course of the incidents that prepare its final consequences. If Vivarce had not been surprised that morning in that way, he would have been on another day in another way, and the tragedy, though differently started, would have worked itself out through other events, perhaps, but under the inspiration of the same passions in the chief figures, and arousing the same suspense and pity in the spectator. "L'Enigme" has been criticized, too, for being only a newspaper story in dialogue. The title may give this reproach an appearance of reason. It seems in fact to grant that the most poignant question, for the author as well as the public is, Which of the two women is culpable? But that is not the case. Whether it be Léonore or Giselle our sentiments will remain somewhat like those which we should feel, for instance, at the sight of a fire that endangered two persons under conditions where one of the two must perish. If we follow with growing terror the progress of the drama it is not that we have greater fear for one who appeals to us more than the other. We are moved somewhat as we should be in watching a mortal duel, because we know that beneath our eyes death is going to strike one of two beings in the fulness of vigor, youth, and beauty,—because all that is human in us shares in their desperate defence and hopes for them an improbable rescue,—because the struggle in which they are engaged opposes to one another the two eternally irreconcilable and dramatic principles that so many poets have incarnated in the tender, feeble, and culpable wife, and the brutal, harsh, and fierce husband,—in a word because we are face to face with a simple drama of Love and Death. This time we feel very far from the problem play. The movement and life of the scenes that bear us on with them are such that we rarely note that they, too, have anything to prove. At last these scenes are no longer, as in "Les Tenailles" or "La Loi de l'Homme," a demonstration, an argument illogically cut into acts, or some syllogism transported on to the stage. So, too, the idea that inspires them is no longer a legal thesis to be defended. Properly speaking it is not even an idea; it is a sentiment, it is revolt against that "right to kill" which usage and laws, a relic of barbarism, still sanction when there is violation of the conjugal contract. To the famous "Kill her" of the "Femme de Claude," it opposes a teaching more indulgent, sager, by which the old Marquis de Neste,—a wise man of the world,—tries in vain to recall Vivarce who wishes to die:—

"No, No! The murderous morality of these savages must not triumph. There must be justice in this world, and none must pay too great a penalty for his fault! Smiles, kisses, carresses must not be

expiated, like poisoning and parricide, in the blood of those whose only fault under the sun is pleasure."

With no plea, the play ends in a great cry of revolt against "the reign of Cain." This enlarges its significance and explains, perhaps, the deep feeling which, from its first scenes, interpenetrates it with a sort of majesty, like that which bore up ancient tragedy when it sought as they used to say in the time of Louis XIII., "to purge the soul of passions" by terror and by pity.

If "La Course du Flambeau" seems to us less perfect in execution, this is solely because of the long interval filled with too many unknown incidents which separates the first from the second act. With this reserve the work is even loftier, more original especially,—so original that I know no antecedent to it.

This time it is indeed an *idea* that M. Hervieu develops, and a very subtle one. The image of the torch that the Athenian torch-bearers passed one to another expresses it in a striking way and one of the characters, Maravon, declares it yet more precisely:—

"No, you see, humanity struggles to persuade itself that it is no errant girl. Now it is one, congenitally, just as, congenitally too, it is the good mother. * * * Read again the commandments from Mount Sinai: not a word about duties to children. Why? Because that was superfluous. Because all creatures, by instinct, had cared for their young. But duties to parents;—that was no matter of course, not a thing to be taken for granted. 'Honor thy father and thy mother that thy days may be long in the land.' Not the injunction alone, but, as a lure, the promise of a reward to be got in this world. * * * Believe me, filial gratitude is not spontaneous; it is an effect of civilization, a fragile essay of virtue!"

Oppose in a feeble soul the maternal passion to filial duty, suppose that circumstances intensify this opposition, which in the peace of custom may remain dormant and ignorant of itself and you have a conflict, that may reach even to crime. That conflict is the base of "La Course du Flambeau."

Sabine Revel is a widow. Her husband, ruined in business, died after having spent all his wife's dowry and all that his father-in-law was willing to add to it. She would be poor, were it not for his mother who aids her generously and will provide her daughter, Marie-Jeanne, with a dowry. Sabine thinks she loves alike that excellent mother, who supports her, and that charming daughter whose blossoming she watches. Such is her tenderness for the latter that for fear of hindering her in a hypothetical marriage which she likes to think still far away, she refuses to take for second husband a friend of her childhood, Stangy, whom, however, she loves. Perhaps she would not do this, if she did not think she was making a like sacri-

fice to her mother. But that does not hinder her from turning his own teaching against Maravon, who,—human animals are so consistent in everything,—has just stripped himself of his property in favor of his son. And when that son, Didier, who loves Marie-Jeanne and is loved by her, asks her daughter in marriage she haggles with her consent,—perhaps to show how much of the personal, egotistic, and blind lurks in her maternal passion.

They are married. Time passes. Didier, who has started a machine shop, does not succeed. To avert disaster, Sabine who has nothing, can only have recourse to her mother. But she turns a deaf ear. Her husband, on his death-bed, has made her promise never to touch the capital which, whatever happens, may provide bread for his descendants. To keep this promise she has taken all possible precaution to guard the dowry of Marie-Jeanne, so that that unhappy man is in the dreadful situation of making his creditors lose what he owes them while he himself remains in affluence. There is Stangy, to be sure, who has gone to America and who would not refuse to help the son-in-law of one whom he loved as friend before loving her as lover. The step costs Sabine the sacrifice of all her pride. She takes it though because her daughter demands it and she can refuse her nothing.

But the answer does not come. The bankruptcy is announced. Didier is watched at every step to prevent his suicide. He is struggling with a last hope, a settlement that he can make by paying his creditors a hundred thousand francs. And Marie-Jeanne, incapable of bearing her husband's suffering, possessed by the fixed idea of saving him, is fading and wasting away. It is no longer her son-in-law that Sabine is trying to save, but the very life of her daughter. And always she strikes against the intractable stubbornness of Madame Fontenais. She tries to rob her. She forges her signature. Her imposture is discovered by the family lawyer. She comes almost to hate her mother,—and her old friend, Maravon, her confidant, is justified in recalling to her their old talks:—

“My friend, my poor friend! You told me I had been a bad prophet that day when I said that filial piety does not stand the test. And today, when fate tries you, your cultured soul goes suddenly back to the level of the Red Skins. I hear you speak of your mother's aged hands with the same feeling that those have who make the head of the family climb a tree and then shake it to see if he can cling on or if there is nothing left but to club him” (III. 5).

She revolts at that simile as she had at that of the torch's course, and yet she is on the brink of crime.

The doctor orders an immediate change of air for Marie-Jeanne, the

mountains; and he advises Sabine not to take with her Madame Fontenais whose weak heart would hardly bear the climate of the Engadine. Now Madame Revel, at a time when Marie-Jeanne seemed sinking, had promised Didier the necessary funds, entangling herself in the falsehood that she invented to assure her daughter. And on her word Didier has gone to ask three months' delay. The situation then is as serious as possible. And Madame Fontenais insists on sharing in the journey. She will.

So the crime is committed. Sabine kills her mother and loses her daughter, for Marie-Jeanne will follow her husband to America, whither the reformed Stangy takes her, sacrificing without a scruple filial love to marital, breaking with little effort, hardly even heeding the tie that bound her to her mother, who is left henceforth alone with her unavowable remorse.

This very difficult subject is treated with an art quite worthy of Racine, simple, limpid, without a weakness, and with an exceptional knowledge of those mysterious recesses of the heart where circumstances may pile up shadows and prepare most terrible tempests. That is the "modern tragedy" which Diderot conceived an hundred and fifty years ago, whose advent the romantic drama postponed, and which at last is developing itself in the new generation of dramatists who have been won to the cause of truth and simplicity. Of this M. Hervieu is perfectly aware:—

"I have adopted the tragic form, because it seemed to me best suited to realize my conceptions. I have tried to interest by exhibiting simply the suffering of beings like ourselves, to move by the sight of conflicts in which we may ourselves be involved through illusions that we have not wholly cast off. To attain tragic emotion I have complied with all the requirements of the genre. I have rejected all that interferes with the sober exposition of a situation. I have put aside every agreeable episode that would draw the action aside from the rigid framework of logical development and would interrupt the inevitable chain of events. Therefore, no decoration but what is indispensable; no scene when the mere telling can be substituted; no artificial character to incarnate one of those illusions in which the public delights."

In "*L'Engime*" and in "*La Course du Flambeau*" work and doctrine are in perfect accord. The first of the two plays is more perfectly adapted to the chosen model; the second, however, far surpasses it by the importance of its subject and the deep significance that it involves. For this reason it seems to us, to hold till now, the place in the dramatic work of M. Paul Hervieu which belongs to "*Peints par eux-mêmes*" in his novelistic production.

IV.

Thus the tragic form, adapted to subjects and characters of modern life, grows more perfect and pure from one play to another. It becomes, too, stricter and conforms more to the simplicity of the laws observed by the masters of the seventeenth century, in proportion as the subjects gain in breadth. Confined in "Les Tenailles" and in "La Loi de l'Homme" by the necessity of demonstration, in "L'Enigme" and especially in "La Course du Flambeau" the thought of M. Paul Hervieu rises above the contingencies of the code or of manners to that "feeling for the tragedy of destiny" which ennobles the work of his classic predecessors.

These, it may be recalled, placed on the stage only heroes of royal race that the catastrophes might have greater effect either by their vastness or by their historic consequences. The lesson seemed more impressive when it involved the life of an entire people. The sacrifice of Titus or the crime of Nero shares in the whole grandeur of Rome. Figures like those of Orestes, Iphigenia, or Phædra, carried with them naturally something of the profound significance of the myths which they recall. M. Paul Hervieu, who confines himself to the scenes of our present life, has been constrained to choose a portrait gallery at once more modest and less restricted. You will notice, however, that he has confined himself to a single category of persons, to a single one of the very diversified social environments which go to make up our society. All his heroes belong to that limited circle which,—as though by unconscious irony,—has appropriated to the pettiness of its habits, its prejudices, and its manners, that vast term, "the world." Some people in it work, for instance, Didier Maravon, but they belong to that aristocracy of industry which borders on the élite group and itself constitutes a sort of aristocracy, by its social position and its luxury if not by race. They are all rich,—at least for Europe. I mean they have enough income to figure in society. They are all alike in education, in intellectual level; they have the same habits, the same needs, occasionally a title of nobility. It is a portrait gallery that corresponds pretty nearly to that affected by the younger Dumas. Save for Didier Maravon, these people have no ties with active workaday life whose fatigues or difficulties would hinder the play of their passions. I suppose it is just in order that his psychological observations may not be hindered at all by the cares and necessities of ordinary existence, that M. Paul Hervieu confines himself to this environment. The "world," some of our contemporaries think and say, is the most favorable place for the study of psychologic phenomena because these are freer there. A merchant, a shopkeeper, a doctor, a lawyer, are all constantly interrupted by their clients, their affairs, or their plans, while a

man of the world has leisure to follow to the uttermost the development of his sentiments or to abandon himself without reserve to the ravages of a passion.

I have heard this theory expounded more than once. M. Paul Hervieu seems swayed by it, though to my knowledge he has never defended it. I wish, in concluding, to say why I think it wholly false in itself, in spite of the fine works just examined whose production it has not prevented.

The first reason is that idleness takes the edge from passions far more than work hinders them, and that under its depressing influence personality, far from developing more freely in such social surroundings, is contracted, narrowed, and attenuated, as it were, between the rollers of prejudices, preconceived ideas, conventional lies, accepted hypocrisies. "Society people" in all countries are all alike. They have read the same books, made the same tours, gone through the same cycle of experiences that have been regulated in advance by the wisdom of their parents or of their teachers. They are slaves of fashion or of cant which imposes on them alike their social relations and their purveyors; the cut of their clothes and the color of their enthusiasms, if such a word has any meaning in this connection; the ceremonial of their marriages as well as of their burials; the shade of their political opinions; the fervor of their religious practices; the novel that they must read; the theatre where they must spend the evening; the picture they must admire. No doubt they have the leisure that seems at first an excellent culture medium for the microbe passion. But how the advantages from this point of view are balanced by the tyranny of the conditions that limit this leisure and the nothings that occupy it! The reading of newspaper incidents, instructive always, shows that "the world" furnishes a very small part of the daily supply of real tragedies. When chance lifts the veil that covers its adventures they seem in general much nearer to shamelessness than to passion. Anxiety for what people will say, moral feebleness or scepticism check violent expression. Among the populace real dramas are much more frequent. Among the working "bourgeoisie" they are rarer but more terrible. Beside this first reason which would alone suffice, there is a second. Wealth singularly mollifies the ravages of passion and even sometimes makes them impossible or improbable. Consider, for instance, "*Les Tenailles*" and "*La Loi de l'Homme*": In reality those women whom M. Paul Hervieu shows us tyrannized over by their husbands could shake off the yoke with the greatest facility, if it were not for the fear of scandal. Their husbands do indeed refuse to give them their independence because they fear that by that they would lose a part of their social position, but they know very well, those men, that they would lose a good

deal more of it by going to court. If, then, their wives simply answered them: "Yes, it is true, you have the laws and the code on your side, but we will only yield if you insist on your right by the application of them. If we leave the conjugal domicile you can have us brought back by the gendarmes. Very well, we are going, and we will come back only when we are brought by the rural police. You have been unfaithful to us. We cannot legally establish your adultery. Never mind. We will prosecute you with the proofs we have, and even supposing we should lose our case, we'll see what will be left of you and your mistresses." If these unhappy women spoke and acted in this way I am sure they would triumph, in spite of the queer tricks of legal procedure, and probably without even needing to resort to the courts. If they recoil from this it is because their passions are really feebler than that fear of public opinion which they have imbibed with their milk and which is, perhaps, in final analysis, the sole powerful sentiment of their class. Every one will see that this is a greater check to passion than work and cares and that it narrows and paralyzes the passions, that inexhaustible subject of the poet, far more than the difficulties of active life and daily bread, even if it does not stifle the passions altogether and substitute for them vagrant fancy or vice without love.

In reality neither laws nor morals in our real world can make two incompatible beings guard their common chain; but money can. Suppose, in place of people abundantly provided with comfortable incomes, M. Paul Hervieu had put on the stage some of those couples, such as you meet constantly, who depend entirely on one another. Suppose, for instance, that the wife, if she withdrew her dowry from the shop or business that she sustains, could ruin her husband, or suppose that the husband, if he disappeared, would take with him all the resources of the home, the burden of which he bears. How far more poignant and inextricable would then appear these dramas of irregular passion or conjugal hate. It is, indeed, when it descends on these sometimes very humble homes that passion takes on its most tragic character. It is there that its play exhibits in her antique horror Fate, blind, all-powerful, inexorable, nursing amid all the grace of illicit tenderness the terror of bloody catastrophe.

The criticism that I have indicated here is applicable also to a general tendency in our literature to which others than M. Paul Hervieu have sacrificed much, and more than he has done in his plays. For whatever may be their environment he has been able to realize in them all his thought with an intensity that could hardly be stronger, and if we still hope to see tragedy, on his general lines, ultimately penetrate all circles

of real life we must in any case praise him without reserve for having restored that form of it which is the most noble and the most perfect that dramatic art has produced in France.

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

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FEW Americans have read Buckle or Montesqueiu, but all Americans have a lively sense of indebtedness to our national domain. Without subtle theorizing upon the relation which intellectual greatness bears to peculiarities of soil and climate, they intuitively feel that this nation is destined to achieve great things because it is sovereign over a vast expanse of almost virgin continent and the possessor of immeasurable resources. Since the first great westward movement of population began, into the boundless region beyond the Alleghanies, a dominant note in American thought has been the conviction that our great expanse of prairie, plain, and mountain slope must necessarily breed great ideas and great enthusiasms. Our literature from the first has reflected this feeling. It is expressed especially in the writings of typically western men of genius, like John Hay, Bret Harte, and Joaquin Miller. Closely associated with this conviction has been another, namely, that the great ideas and enthusiasms thus generated would inevitably prove to be an all-sufficient power to hold indissolubly together all sections of our population, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and to mould to one common American type all the heterogeneous elements that might ever come to our shores in search of freedom and opportunity.

The domain to which we attribute this power to create characteristically American habits of feeling and of thought embraces a land area of 2,970,000 square miles of continuous territory between the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans, and from British North America to Mexico. Under the American flag, also, are Alaska, with 531,000 square miles, the territory of Hawaii, with an area of 6,640 square miles, Porto Rico, with an area of 3,600 square miles, the Philippine and Sulu Islands, with an area of 114,000 square miles, Guam, with an area of 200 square miles, Tutuila, Manua, and other small islands in the Samoan group, with an area of 79 square miles, a total area under American sovereignty of 3,625,519 square miles. While the acquisition of our more distant and insular possessions has expanded the national consciousness, the sense of boundless opportunity and the conviction that here should be the home of such freedom and equality as had not hitherto existed in the world may be said to have come into existence with the Louisiana purchase under Jefferson's administration, and to have been fully rounded out by Fremont's explorations and the acquisition of California.

It is not mere territorial extent, however, which has been chiefly instrumental in our national development. There have been and there are greater empires in the world if area alone be regarded. But no other domain of equal extent within the limits of a temperate climate is so diversified in features and so richly endowed with natural resources. The Atlantic coast region east of the Alleghanies has a varied soil, superb forest growths, a marvelous wealth of iron and coal, and great river systems, furnishing power for manufacturing industries. It has also a score of great harbors, including that of New York, which is without equal in the world. The Mississippi valley, of unrivaled agricultural fertility, divided into wheat and corn belts in the north, cotton and sugar regions in the south, is likewise abundantly provided with the raw materials for manufacturing industry, and natural facilities for transportation. The whole region east of the one hundredth meridian enjoys a fertility almost unknown elsewhere outside of the tropics. In no other land of equal extent does the soil bring forth so great a variety of products fit for human use. No other continent enjoys such a system of internal lake and river connections. The shores of the Great Lakes have the maritime activity of a seacoast, and the lake traffic alone exceeds the commerce of any but the greatest European nations. The shipping that passes the port of Detroit exceeds annually that of the port of Liverpool. To the westward the great plains have become the most important ranching region of the world. The mountain systems of the Rockies and the Sierras contain unestimated riches of gold and silver, while California, as Professor Royce once pointed out in the pages of this review, enjoys a climate and a combination of natural features all tending to produce an effect upon the human mind experienced only in Greece.

Human nature and its migratory instincts being what they are, such a domain could not fail to attract the most energetic of the earth's inhabitants, and under conditions of freedom they could not fail to develop the resources on a stupendous scale. Had freedom been lacking, as it certainly would have been if Spain could have extended her sovereignty over the entire American continent, or if the French despotism of Louis XIV. could have been perpetuated in the Mississippi valley, the nineteenth century would have witnessed no such growth of American population as that which our later census enumerations have revealed. This continent would have been closed to the peoples of other lands, as Russia is today. Russia is an empire of magnificent resources, to which under the operation of self-interest and of economic law, the overcrowded populations of western Europe would naturally send millions of emigrants, but the political conditions of that empire forbid. Long before despotic

sovereigns could have succeeded in placing upon this continent a sufficient number of their own subjects to take effective possession of it, men of sturdy English fibre began to come in search of mental, religious, and economic freedom. Daring men in search of new experiences came as adventurers and discoverers. Men of moral daring came in search of religious and civil freedom. Men of industrial and commercial daring came in search of larger opportunity. These men established ideals, and set standards, and created tendencies for a nation. And they came in such numbers, and they multiplied with such rapidity, that long before the potentates of Spain and of France realized that their power in the new world was threatened, it had become certain that this land was to be held by a liberty loving race, and was to welcome all men energetic enough to break away from any kind of bondage in older realms.

What has been the result? A growth of population to which all past human history affords no parallel. The first census of the United States, taken in 1790, enumerated a population of 3,929,214 souls. The twelfth census, taken in 1900, enumerated in the States and territories, not including Indian Territory, Indian reservations, Alaska, and Hawaii, 75,568,686 souls. Of this number no less than 20,901,816 have come as immigrants since the year 1820. The smallest immigration in any one year since that date was in 1823, namely, 6,354 persons. The greatest immigration in any one year until the present was in 1882, namely, 788,992. The total immigration for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1903, promises to surpass that for 1882. The fluctuations have been governed chiefly by economic conditions. Years of great prosperity have been followed by an increasing number of arrivals, while after years of depression the number has as regularly fallen away. On the whole, this immigrant population has been in point of physical health and energy a select stock. A small percentage of our foreign born has from the first consisted of the relatively helpless and inefficient, but a large majority has consisted of men and women that have had the enterprise and the resolution to accumulate the means necessary for the Atlantic journey, and voluntarily to cut loose from old associations.

The relation between environment and national growth is exemplified in the distribution of the American people according to certain natural features within the United States even more strikingly than in the total growth of our population. Few, even among the educated, realize what large portions of every continent are either unfit for human habitation, or present such obstacles to domicile that the great currents of migration flow all around or across them without leaving much permanent trace. Of our entire population no less than 12,104,275 or 15.9 per cent live

at sea level, that is to say, at an altitude of less than 100 feet, and within an area of 184,584 square miles. At an altitude of between 100 and 500 feet live 16,611,853 persons, or 21.8 per cent of our total number. The land area at this level is 376,372 square miles in extent. At an altitude of between 500 and 1,000 feet we have a land area of 545,480 square miles, and here live 29,402,207 persons, or 38.7 of our population. At an altitude of between 1,000 and 1,500 feet we have a land area of 394,449 square miles and here live 11,173,113 persons, or 14.7 per cent of our whole population. Thus within a little more than half of our land area, in regions which lie at less than 1,500 feet above sea level, live more than nine tenths of all our inhabitants. Since 1880 the drift has been down hill rather than up. Thus in 1880 it was 15.1 per cent of the population that lived at sea level, 23.1 per cent that lived at an altitude between 100 and 500 feet, 40.5 per cent that lived at an altitude between 500 and 1,000 feet, and 14.6 per cent that lived at an altitude between 1,000 and 1,500 feet. There has, however, been a marked increase in the population living at altitudes above 3,000 feet, which include portions of the ranching, as well as the more important mining regions.

Most interesting of all, perhaps, is the distribution in accordance with drainage basins. Rich in resources as is the great Pacific coast, and enormous as its population one day will be, its share of our total inhabitants at present is less than four per cent. To be precise, 95.7 per cent of the American people live in the country which drains to the Atlantic Ocean; the remainder dwell on the Pacific coast and in the Great Basin. On the other hand, the region east of the Alleghanies, which comprehends the original thirteen States, has ceased to be the dominant section of our country as measured by population and the economic and political power which population carries with it; for no less than 53.4 per cent of our inhabitants now live in the region which drains to the Gulf of Mexico. The growth of the Mormon population in the Great Basin has always been regarded as phenomenal, and so, indeed, when regarded absolutely, it has been. But how small it is relatively is revealed in the fact that the entire population of the Great Basin constitutes only five tenths of one per cent of our total inhabitants.

Of our foreign born population 93.1 per cent live in the region which drains to the Atlantic Ocean; 34.4 per cent are found in the region which drains to the Gulf of Mexico; and 6.1 per cent dwell on the Pacific coast. Of the negro population 99.8 per cent live in the regions drained to the Atlantic Ocean, and 61.4 per cent in land that drain to the Gulf of Mexico. No less than 22.4 per cent of the negro popula-

tion live at sea level, and 48.2 per cent at an altitude of 100 to 500 feet.

From this account of the dimensions of the population which has sprung up on the middle zone of this continent in a little more than a century, and of its distribution in accordance with natural features, let us turn to a consideration of its composition. If we have regard not to New England and Virginia alone, but to the entire area of the United States, there has never been a time since the constitution was adopted when our population has not been composite. In the colonial period the Dutch had settled New Amsterdam, the Swedes had come to New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware, the French Huguenots to the Carolinas, the Germans to Pennsylvania, and the Scotch-Irish to Pennsylvania and the valleys leading southward through Virginia to Carolina and Georgia. In the Northwest Territory there were many descendants of the French colonists. Others were added to the American people by the Louisiana purchase, while the acquisition of Florida, Texas, New Mexico, and California brought in a Spanish element, most of which, however, presently disappeared into Mexico and Cuba.

It thus appears that the popular notion that the American people were at one time of almost purely English blood, which has since 1820 been suffering dilution through foreign immigration, has never been quite true to fact.

In attracting men of many nationalities our country has exemplified another great law of the action of environment upon a people; in this case we might say in creating a people. A region of few resources or opportunities usually has a homogeneous population, and particularly is this true if the region is isolated. Its population is increased only by a birth-rate in excess of the death-rate. But to regions which offer opportunities of various kinds, men of all tongues come, to commingle there in a free struggle for existence. Regions of agricultural fertility, again, are more likely to have homogeneous populations than are those which offer mineral wealth, manufacturing opportunities, or, above all, opportunities for commerce.

To see how fully this is illustrated in American conditions we have only to glance at the geographical distribution of our foreign born. Of the total foreign born population,—10,356,644, enumerated in 1900,—4,762,796 were dwelling in the North Atlantic division, 216,030 in the South Atlantic division, 4,158,474 in the North Central division, 357,655 in the South Central division, and 846,321 in the Western division. The North Atlantic division is preëminently the manufacturing and commercial region, closely followed by the North Central. Finally, to take note of the most striking fact of all, the great manufacturing

valley of the Merrimac River has a foreign born population of 51.6 per square mile, the valley of the Delaware has 49.6 per square mile, and the valley of the Housatonic has 29.1 per square mile.

In and of themselves the figures of the foreign born and their distribution are not particularly significant. The important question is: Of what ethnic elements is this foreign born population composed? The chief American stock in colonial days was English, notwithstanding the admixture of other nationalities which has been mentioned. Before the Civil War the immigration was chiefly of English and Irish. Then began a great German immigration, followed by a large arrival of Scandinavians, which reached its maximum in the eighties. During the last ten years the immigration from western Europe has fallen off, while that from southern and eastern Europe, including Italy, Austria, and Russia, has increased.

The question of real interest, therefore, is, Will the American people of the future be on the whole English, or Celtic, or Teutonic, or Latin, or Slavic, or will it be some new and hitherto unheard of amalgam of all these elements? Much foolish speculation and more foolish pessimism has been indulged in on this subject. The census returns enable us to answer the question with assurance, yet, curiously, the answer, so far as I know, has never hitherto been worked out from the data at our disposal. Let us see what this data is and what it reveals.

The various nationalities which make up our foreign born population fall naturally into five ethnic groups, namely: the English-Teutonic, including Australians, Danes, English, Finns, Germans, Hollanders, Poland-Germans, Norwegians, and Swedes; the Celtic, including the Irish, the Welsh, and the Scotch; the Celto-Latin, including the Belgians, the French, and the French Canadians; the Ibero-Latin, including the Greeks, the Italians, the Portuguese, and the Spanish; and the Slav, including the Austrians, the Bohemians, the Hungarians, the Poland-Austrians, the Poland-Russians, the Roumanians, and the Russians.

If the census statistics of nationality be classified according to these ethnic groupings it will be found that in the North Atlantic division 35.98 per cent of the foreign born are of the English-Teutonic stocks. In the South Atlantic division 51.63 per cent; in the North Central division 71.44 per cent; in the South Central division 54.22 per cent, and in the Western division 57.53 per cent are of these stocks. In the entire United States 52.9 per cent of the foreign born are of English-Teutonic stock. In the North Atlantic division 29.40 per cent of the foreign born are Celts; in the South Atlantic division 23.32 per cent; in the North Central division 11.97 per cent; in the South Central

division 14.64 per cent; in the Western division 18.77 per cent are Celts. In the whole United States 20.9 of the foreign born are Celts. Practically 75 per cent of the foreign born in America are of English-Teutonic and Celtic stocks. When we remember that the English people was created by the amalgamation of Teutonic with Celtic blood, we see how little reason there is to expect that the American people will ever be anything but essentially English.

The distribution according to ethnic races further illustrates the point already made, that commercial and manufacturing regions become heterogeneous in population, while the great agricultural regions tend more strongly toward homogeneity. The North Atlantic division is becoming highly heterogeneous, with 35.98 per cent of its foreign born English-Teutonic, 29.40 per cent Celtic, 8.16 per cent Celto-Latin, 8.62 per cent Ibero-Latin, 17.12 per cent Slavonic. In the North Central division, embracing the most important farming lands of the country, 71.44 per cent of the foreign born are English-Teutonic, 11.91 per cent are Celtic, 3.32 per cent are Celto-Latin, 1.54 per cent are Ibero-Latin, and 10.23 per cent are Slavonic.

These nationalities and their ethnic groupings represent all three of the great racial subdivisions of the population of Europe. The white race in its entirety is of two great sub-races, the Eur-African and the Eur-Asian. The Eur-African is so called because its habitat since prehistoric times has been Mediterranean Africa,—north of the Sahara, and western Europe. The Eur-Asian is so called because it has dwelled from prehistoric times in central and eastern Europe, and in western Asia. The Eur-African sub-race is distinguished by a head long in proportion to its breadth,—it is dolichocephalic. The Eur-Asian race is brachycephalic, it is broad headed. Another name for the Eur-Asian race is the Alpine, because its most typical representatives are dwellers in the highlands of central Europe. The Eur-African race is further subdivided into two great branches, namely, the Mediterranean and the Baltic. The Mediterranean man is short in stature, of dark complexion tending to olive, and has black eyes and black hair. The Greeks, the Italians, the Ligurians, the Spaniards, the black eyed Irish, and the black haired, black eyed Welsh, belong to this branch of the Eur-African race. The Baltic race is tall, fair, light eyed, and light haired. Its typical representatives are the Saxons, Scandinavians, Danes, and Rhenish Germans. The physical differences of these three racial varieties are of no particular importance. Their temperamental, emotional, and industrial differences are pronounced and significant. These will engage our attention directly. Here it is enough to remark that the vast majority of the American

people hitherto has been of the Baltic race. Now we are getting relatively large numbers of the Mediterranean race, and, for the first time, a large number of the Alpine peoples, especially of Slavs.

The social qualities of a people are facts of the mental and moral life, and upon these depends the power to coöperate in great undertakings, including the creation of institutions, the working out of political destinies, and contributions to the art and science of the world. Passing, then, from a survey of the merely physical characteristics of the American people, we must now examine their mental traits, and ask what influences, including great enthusiasms and ideals, have shaped and are yet shaping their coöperative activity.

Observations of mental and moral traits are necessarily biased by the subjective attitude of the observer. It is only when the views of many observers of various nationalities, and of differing prejudices substantially agree, that we can feel sure of the scientific value of their descriptions of the mind of a people. When to such agreeing testimony we are able to add evidences contained in art, literature, religious beliefs, laws, and institutions, we have a fairly adequate basis for conclusions and comparisons.

Americans have been much visited and much analyzed by Europeans of all degrees of cultivation. The two most important general descriptions of a people written in modern times are De Tocqueville's "Democracy in America" and Bryce's "American Commonwealth." Less judicious than De Tocqueville and Bryce but in their perception of the minor traits of American character keener and more humorous, have been Dickens, Thackeray, and Paul Bourget. All of these distinguished men, and a thousand others less well known, have agreed in one observation, namely, that whether or not the American mind is as substantial as the English or the German mind, or as clear and logical as the French mind, it is quicker and more adaptable than the mind of any other nation. No other population in the world is so sensitive to all manner of impressions, no other responds so quickly to all manner of stimuli. This would be a serious defect if our responsiveness were to those influences only that appeal to the senses and the emotions, because it is a commonplace of psychology that deliberation and all of that calm reasonableness which goes with deliberation, are incompatible with over-quick reflex action and with emotional impulsiveness. American quickness, however, is different from the swift, passionate fire of the Italian or the Spaniard. It is an intellectual quickness, which has been acquired through long practice in the art of practical judgment and of rational deliberation; until these very processes, slow and painful in the past history of mankind and in most

other nations today, have in America arrived at almost the quickness of intuition. It is like the swift deftness of an accomplished pianist, who with amazing rapidity fingers combinations of notes that when he began his training could be achieved only with the most toilsome effort. The American, in short, combines in a rare degree the power to deliberate when calm deliberation is still necessary, with the quickness of perception and the rapidity of decision acquired through long practice of deliberation in the past.

Emotionally and temperamentally the American people are by no means all of one sort. There are noticeable differences between the people of one geographical section and another, as the North and the South, the East and the West, and there are, of course, all the differences that go with that compositeness of blood which has already been described. It is generally recognized that the New Englander of the older stock is emotionally more sombre than the lighter hearted people of the South and the frankly natural, unrepressed people of the West. It is a serious question whether the temperamental gloom which undeniably was a characteristic of New England puritanism, and which has been in a measure diffused throughout the population that moved westward through New York, Ohio, Michigan, northern Indiana and Illinois, and on into Iowa, Kansas, and Nebraska, has not been correlated with the pathological phenomenon which is known as American nervousness, and especially with the susceptibility of American women in the northern States to "nervous prostration." Certain it is that the so-called New England conscience is less a fact of morals than of temperament. It is a disposition to look too much upon the evils of life and the shortcomings of mankind; to be less kind to virtue and blind to faults than infallible in discovering sin. Naturally with this temperamental quality the people of puritan blood and traditions in their emotionalism have tended somewhat toward fanaticism. The spontaneous expression of human feeling cannot habitually be repressed, and the world cannot habitually be looked at in a spirit of condemnation, without creating forces which at times will burst forth in destructive activity. To one familiar through his historical studies with the teaching and the practice of New England puritanism two hundred and fifty years ago, it is wonderful not that the witches of Salem should have been burned, or that the Baptists and Quakers of Massachusetts should have been expelled, but rather that there should not have been extensive persecutions, accompanied by great cruelty and widespread criminality. It speaks volumes for the average good sense and the high intelligence of the people of New England and their descendants, that the fanaticism which undoubtedly they have exhibited at one and another

time has been relatively mild and harmless, and that it has almost without exception been called out by evil conditions that right feeling men could not fail to abhor. The anti-slavery movement, for example, was not devoid of the element of fanaticism; the prohibition and allied temperance movements have had their measure of it, especially in Maine and in Kansas. The anti-Mormon feeling in the days when the followers of Joseph Smith were being driven from New York to Ohio, from Ohio to Illinois, and from Illinois to Missouri and beyond, was marked by both fanaticism and criminality, and it is safe to say that calm minded men two hundred years from now, who read the anti-imperialistic literature which has been put forth since the Spanish War, will find it not wholly free from the fanatical spirit.

Emotion and temperament are closely bound up with qualities of imagination, peculiarities of belief, and habits of reasoning. These mental complexes, as exemplified in the American people, can best be understood if we look for their manifestations in the three European racial varieties. The Mediterranean stocks are emotionally quick, easily excited, and as easily quieted. The Baltic peoples are slower to awaken, but their feelings once aroused are persistent. The Alpine stocks, differing from both the Mediterranean and the Baltic, are slow, contemplative, and tender hearted. The imagination of the Alpine peoples is sentimental, concerning itself with subjective moods and fancies, and is often singularly beautiful in its play of feeling. The imagination of the Mediterranean peoples is plastic, seeking expression in architecture, sculpture, and painting; that of the Baltic peoples is dramatic, seeking expression in action, and in dramatic art.

Among the Mediterranean peoples belief is determined on the whole objectively, by external suggestion, falling short, however, of evidence in a scientific sense of the word. Among the Alpine and the Baltic peoples there is a tendency towards a subjectively formed judgment,—an acceptance of beliefs suggested and moulded less by external facts, evidential or otherwise, than by emotion, mood, and temperament. This trait has been revealed especially in the powerful hold which dogmatic theology has had upon the northern European mind, and in the German fondness for speculative philosophy. The habit of inductive research, and of arriving at conclusions by a scientific weighing of evidence, seems to be correlated with a mixture of bloods; of Baltic with Mediterranean or Alpine, or of Alpine with Mediterranean. This has been shown in Galton's studies of Englishmen of science, and it is further rendered probable by the geographical distribution of the scientific mind elsewhere in Europe. Science has been developed chiefly where these

racial varieties have most thoroughly intermingled and amalgamated.

So far, then, as the fundamental qualities of mind are concerned no harm can come to us through the infusion of a larger measure of Mediterranean and Alpine blood. It will soften the emotional nature, it will quicken the poetic and artistic nature. We shall be a more versatile, a more plastic people; gentler in our thoughts and feelings because of the Alpine strain, livelier and brighter, with a higher power to enjoy the beautiful things of life because of the Celtic and the Latin blood. And probably, through the commingling of bloods, we shall become more clearly and fearlessly rational; in a word, more scientific.

In disposition the Alpine stocks are somewhat lacking in ambition; they care little for the outward circumstances of life and still less for all that we mean by the phrase "keeping up appearances." The economist would describe them by saying that their standard of living is relatively low. The Mediterranean stocks are leisure loving, but not indolent. They lack aggressiveness, and in so far as they work upon human beings in their industrial and political activities, they are instigative rather than domineering in their methods. The Baltic peoples are aggressive, domineering, and creative. In energy and ambition they surpass other branches of the white race. The great predominance of the Baltic stocks in the American population hitherto, combined with the conditions peculiar to a new country, have made us preëminently an energetic, practical people, above all, an industrial and political people. There is no reason to suppose that the dilution of the Baltic blood which is now going on will be sufficient to impair seriously these qualities, particularly in view of the fact already presented, that the Mississippi valley, overwhelmingly English-Teutonic in stock, industrially and politically dominates the continent.

In every people four great types of character may be observed. There is the forceful man who cares only for rude activity and the pleasures of sense. There is the convivial man, fond of leisure and sociability, not averse to the indulgences of appetite; if cultivated, a stickler for the forms of politeness and complaisant in his attitude toward all problems that involve the question of pleasure versus restraint. There is the austere man, who believes that virtue consists in denial and self-sacrifice; and there is the rationally conscientious man who believes that self-denial has no virtue in itself, but that it may be a necessary means to the highest attainment of personal power and the rational enjoyment of life. In the United States these character types have been exhibited in a large way, with less of restraint upon their perfect expression and unfolding than anywhere else in the world. The forceful man has been

superbly developed in that pioneer life which has crept mile by mile across the continent, from the days of Daniel Boone to those of the ranchmen and the miners who have taken possession of the vast plains and the mountain camps. As the free wild life of those days becomes a memory only, the forceful man will yet survive in a thousand dangerous callings that demand nerve and forgetfulness of self; in the fisheries, the railroad service, the mining industries, and in the commerce of the lakes and of the sea. Each war in which the United States has been engaged since the Revolution has but served to demonstrate the paradoxical proposition that here is a people loving peace and its pursuits, but yet of the stuff to make such fighters of as no commander of old world armies has ever had at his disposal. The military abilities of the American people, superbly demonstrated in the Civil War, did not at that time fully arrest the attention of European observers, because the actual facts did not become known to any but a comparatively few professional students of military operations. The Spanish War, which by comparison was little more than a series of minor engagements, did arrest attention and awaken the conviction that the American people were a good fighting stock. It will conduce to the future peace of the world if European powers come to a full realization of this truth by other than experimental demonstration.

The convivial character at its best, stripped of objectionable features, and displaying to advantage its most engaging ones, was developed on a large scale in the southern white population of the plantations before the Civil War. There was a hospitality, a beauty, and a graciousness of social life, which, unhappily, we are not likely to see again in this land for many generations, if ever. The convivial character that is developing here today is of a far less engaging sort. It is that of the luxury-loving classes in the great cities, reckless in their expenditures of wealth and vulgar in its display. In the less well-to-do stratum it is that of a middle and working class public, fond of cheap theatres and concert halls, a public which will not soon be transformed by more refining influences.

After all it has been the austere character, shaped in New England and by New England puritanism which has, on the whole, dominated American thought and morals. It has stood fearlessly, I am tempted to say relentlessly, for all the ten commandments, not excepting those referring to graven images and Sabbath observance. Its geographical distribution is along a well marked zone extending from New England to Kansas. Throughout this northern belt of States it has continuously antagonized all amusements that are by the common consent of mankind demoralizing, and, until recently, it has been almost equally uncompromising in its

opposition to the diversions of dancing, card playing, and the theatre.

The rationally conscientious type of character is the offspring of the austere, and no one can become familiar with the history of the liberal movement in theology and in politics, which has counted among its great leaders such men as Parker, Emerson, Channing, Dewey, Youmans, Fiske, and George William Curtis, without realizing that here in America, this splendid progeny of the austere character has not been devoid of influence upon our national life, even if its numbers have been relatively small.

The rationally conscientious character is usually found combined with an intellect that approaches, if it is not completely of the scientific quality. It is at least critical, always scrutinizing the premises as well as the logical processes of thought. The austere character is on the whole correlated with deductive or speculative habits of reasoning,—with a certain dogmatic cast of mind. With the convivial character is usually associated a lightly emotional nature, and a habit like that which has been attributed to the Latin peoples, of arriving at judgments or of accepting beliefs upon external suggestion rather than through speculation, and yet without critically weighing evidence. This combination may be described as an ideo-emotional type of mind. The austere character and the habit of deductive reasoning constitute the dogmatic-emotional mind. The scientific habit of thought in combination with the rationally conscientious character makes the critical-intellectual mind. An overwhelming majority of the American people is of the ideo-emotional and dogmatic-emotional types. The evidence in support of this assertion cannot be repeated here. It is found in the composition of the people by nationalities, in their religious preferences, and in their intellectual achievements. I have elsewhere presented it in detail.¹

Our survey thus far of the composition and qualities of the American people, has revealed not only a great variety of ethnic factors and of mental characteristics, but also a distinct tendency toward a geographical segregation of these various component elements. The North Atlantic division of the country is in the highest degree heterogeneous, in both blood and mental qualities. From the earliest days its intellectual quality has been dogmatic, with a tendency toward the critical, or scientific. Its character types in the colonial period were forceful to austere in New England, austere but not forceful among the Quakers of Pennsylvania, and forceful to convivial in New York. The North Central division, far more homogeneous in blood than the North Atlantic, is also far more homogeneous in mind and character. The dogmatic habit of thought,—

(1) *The Psychological Review*, Vol. viii., No. 4, July, 1901, pp. 337-349

the phrase is used in no spirit of condemnation but in a purely psychological or technical sense,—and the austere character, dominate the life of that section. In the farther West and in the South the blood is relatively homogeneous, the character type is forceful to convivial, and life is correspondingly free and natural. It has been inevitable that with such a distribution of blood and qualities there should have grown up in each region a sectional consciousness. The people of each grand division know their own kind with almost as clear a perception of the differences between themselves and the people of other parts as one finds in the different nations of continental Europe, if allowance be made for the agreement in language here and the differences there. There is, in short, in each geographical section of the United States, a perfectly distinct consciousness of kind among the people dwelling there, and its expression in sectional pride or “provincialism” has long been one of the stock subjects of American newspaper humor. Within each of the great sectional divisions, again, there are minor groupings, sometimes based upon ethnic similarities, as, for example, in the case of the Pennsylvania Germans or of the northwestern Scandinavians, sometimes based upon peculiarities of religious belief and practice, as among the New England Congregationalists or the Pennsylvania Quakers, and sometimes based upon an unusual predilection for political activity, as among the Tammany forces of New York City or the Republicans of Ohio. Each of these groups has its own intense consciousness of kind, a consciousness in which sympathy, agreement in taste, or in interest, or in belief, and a common sense of difference from all the rest of mankind are indistinguishably combined.

Nevertheless, a sense of the difference of group from group, of section from section, even of nationality from nationality, has been from the first delicately balanced, and kept within bounds by powerful forces of assimilation. Communication and travel have left few spots within our national domain in practical isolation. Ideas, fashions, fads, “crazes” of every description, are carried by imitation from east to west and from north to south, through the length and breadth of the land, with unfailing certainty and with astonishing rapidity. Above all, our educational methods, our complex and intense industrial life, and our democratic politics, are a solvent which foreign traditions cannot long withstand, and in which sectional prejudices cannot often become unduly acrid. There is in America a universal, a national sympathy, a national sense of kinship, and of things mental and moral in common, which binds the American people in one vast social system. To the causes of this national consciousness of kind we shall revert again.

Inevitably it has happened that a people physically and mentally composite, differentiated, and distributed into sectional and minor groupings, has displayed the utmost variety of purpose and method in its coöperative activities. All groups and sections have responded as circumstances have determined, to those influences which everywhere among mankind are stimuli creative of concerted volition. Economic opportunity, unusual events, example, suggestion, the impressive power of a strong personality, a sense of the value of association, injuries and wrongs, beliefs, dogmas, and ideals, these all, in their various degrees and in endless combinations, have acted upon the minds of the American people, inducing or irresistibly impelling them to a social activity educational, religious, industrial, political, so intense, so varied, so intricate, as to be the marvel of the world.

Among these causes, however, some have, of course, been dominant, and some have been felt more strongly in one section than in another. Economic opportunity has from the first been an all-compelling stimulus to coöperative effort. It was the chief inducement to colonization, it caused the westward migration into the regions beyond the Alleghanies, it lured the Argonauts of 1849 to the golden lands of California, it drew the ranchers to the plains. But economic opportunity has been a stimulus that has divided no less than it has united. Economic opportunity was one thing to the cotton planters and the sugar growers of the South in the days before the Civil War; it was another thing to the mill owners and the trading classes of the North. It was one thing to the money lenders of the East and another thing to the mortgaged farmers of the West in the days of populism and the silver agitation. Belief and dogma have played perhaps as large a part in creating common purposes in America as elsewhere in the world in modern times; although no modern phenomenon of this nature can be compared with such great movements as the rise of Mohammedanism or the organization of the Crusades. It will never be forgotten by Americans that religious beliefs were a powerful determining influence in New England colonization, and in the colonization of Maryland and of Pennsylvania, while nothing comparable with the rise and growth of Mormonism and the Mormon Church has been seen in any part of the world since the days of the Moslem power in Spain. Twice the American people have been moved to coöperation on a gigantic scale by a sense of wrong to be redressed, once in the conflict of the Civil War, and again in the war for the liberation of Cuba. Of personal power, and of great ideals as stimuli of concerted volition in American history, I shall have a word to say a little later on.

It is time now to ask whether, in mental traits and practical activities, the American people are, after all, fairly homogeneous, and so capable of continuing to feel a strong sense of unity, a national consciousness of kind; and of coöperating indefinitely as an entire people in national affairs; or whether they are so heterogeneous that sectionalism or factionalism must sooner or later break us into fragments, or leave us a prey to the imperialistic ambitions of a dictator. Another glance at our census statistics will help us to answer this question.

Nothing else is so serious a barrier to community of thought as a difference of language. This barrier will for generations prevent a universal coöperation of the peoples of Europe. Astonishing, indeed, by comparison is the unity of language in the United States. On the mainland of the United States in 1900 there were only 1,403,212 persons unable to speak English, and of these 86.7 per cent were foreign born whites, whose children with few exceptions will speak the language of the country of their adoption.

Next to differences of language, illiteracy and the ignorance which it generally implies is an obstacle to unity of thought and purpose. Here, again, as compared with all parts of the world except northwestern Europe, the people of the United States are relatively homogeneous. The whole number of illiterates found in 1900 on the mainland of the United States was only 6,180,069. Of these only 3,200,746 were whites, and only 1,913,611 were native born whites.

Next to ignorance, differences of religion have been a barrier to successful coöperation on a large scale, since history began. One of the chief efforts of every empire which has sought to create a moral solidarity among its subjects has been to establish by persuasion or by force a unity of religious belief. Two of the greatest powers of modern times, however, have for more than a century adhered to a policy of the widest toleration. One of these, the British Empire, is in the matter of religious belief the most heterogeneous aggregation of men in the world. Christians, Mohammedans, Buddhists, each faith numbered by millions, swear allegiance to the British crown. America, on the other hand, is practically a Christian population, the representation of non-Christian faiths in the United States being almost infinitesimal. The most radical differences of religious belief that we have, are represented by the division into Catholics, Protestants, and Mormons. Religious statistics were not taken in the census of 1900. The census of 1890 found a total of 20,612,806 communicants or church members in the United States, of whom 6,231,417 were Roman Catholics.

In occupation the American people has been undergoing continual

differentiation for a century, but especially since the Civil War: Of 29,074,117 persons engaged in gainful occupations on the mainland of the United States in 1900, 10,381,765, or 35.7 per cent were engaged in agricultural pursuits; 7,085,992, or 24.4 per cent were engaged in manufacturing and mechanical pursuits; 4,778,233, or 16.3 per cent were employed in trade and transportation; 1,264,737, or 4.3 per cent were occupied in professional services, and 5,691,746 or 19.4 per cent were employed in domestic and personal services. Here, obviously, we have great differences of interest, and varied points of view, of all questions of practical policy.

Since the organization of the Whig and Democratic parties an overwhelming majority of the voting population of the United States has been divided between two great political organizations of national extent. The total vote for Mr. Bryan in 1896 of 6,502,925 and for Mr. McKinley of 7,106,779, and of less than 1,000,000 for all other candidates, is fairly indicative of the normal tendency of voters in this country to array themselves in two leading organizations. This fact, however, does not indicate any tendency toward political disintegration. Quite the contrary, for in every campaign the minds of voters North and South, East and West, and of the most diverse local interests and prejudices are centred on the same issues. Important as party spirit is, there is from first to last an underlying consciousness of a common country and of policies which are of interest to the entire population.

Thus it appears that on the whole we are a fairly homogeneous people, and because we are such we are a free and democratic people. The most profound truths of sociology relate to such facts as those to which attention in this article has been drawn. The spirit and the organization of a people are determined by its physical and mental composition. A simple, homogeneous folk is spontaneously sympathetic, and its individual members are naturally helpful to one another. Their common purposes are almost unconsciously formed, and, if they admit of realization at all, are easily achieved. An assemblage of heterogeneous human elements becomes a coöperative community only under the influence of some very powerful appeal, or of some irresistible pressure. The one organizing force to which men of the most varied traditions and qualities respond is a powerful personality, a great leader. Throughout human history it has usually been a dominating personality that has proved equal to the task of welding various ethnic elements, conflicting economic interests, and antagonistic religions into imperial systems. The Alexanders and the Cæsars, the Norman Williams and the Bonapartes, these have been able to draw together in practical coöperation elements

which otherwise would have been totally incapable of any common effort.

In general, homogeneity of composition is favorable to liberty and to democracy; heterogeneity is favorable to boss rule, to despotism, and to imperialism. Nowhere has this truth been more clearly illustrated than in our State and municipal politics. The democracy of the New England town meeting was the political system of homogeneous communities. The political machine of a Croker, a Platt, a Quay, or a Carter Harrison, is an organization of the most miscellaneous political forces.

When, however, a people though composed of varied ethnic elements, and highly differentiated in respect of mental and practical qualities, is yet homogeneous on the whole,—that is to say, when it presents more points of resemblance than of difference, it is capable of being organized by other influences than personal power. It may be responsive to great ideals, and, if so, it is able in a democratic spirit to create an extensive and complex organization, and to carry out in a true spirit of national coöperation great policies of public welfare. In this truth we have the real key to the explanation of American achievement. Composite as they are in blood, various as they are in mental qualities, interested as they are, as individuals, as local groups, and even as great geographical sections, in the most varied pursuits, beliefs, and purposes, the American people from whatsoever nationalities descended, and of whatsoever confession, are men and women who have been inspired by the greatest ideals that could create and mould a nation. Differing as they may in all other respects, they are alike in this, that they have been chosen, selected from the nations of the earth by their responsiveness, beyond the responsiveness of their kindred, to the ideals of freedom. All who have come to our shores have come because they have wanted more opportunity to live, to be men among men, and have believed that here the opportunity would be found. They have wanted economic freedom, religious freedom, freedom of mind, political freedom. Thus in respect of precisely that kind of mental and practical similarity which is essential to a great national organization, which shall combine unity in the greater matters with endless differences in minor things, the inhabitants of the United States are the picked men of the world. They may for a time submit to the dictation of bosses in politics, or permit great corporate interests, over-riding right, to threaten the democratic character of their institutions, but it is impossible to believe that they will not, in the long run, compel all interests, factions, sections, to conform the collective life whether in industry, in religion, or in politics, to the spirit of freedom and of equality. This is the American spirit that will overcome all elements of unrest, of ignorance, and of corruption, the spirit which will

enlighten and convert the most unpromising foreign born citizen who now votes in ignorance, but who will one day vote in wisdom. Kipling has prophesied the transformation :—

“Lo ! imperturbable he rules,
Unkempt, disreputable, vast—
And, in the teeth of all the schools
I—I shall save him at the last.”

THE PHILOSOPHICAL MEANING OF ENERGY

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IT is a fact already emphasized by Hume, that all culture is based on foresight. Each animal is regarded as so much the more developed, the more it is capable of regulating its behavior with respect to future changes. First of all, there are the regular, periodic changes, coming daily and annually and requiring an appropriate mode of behavior. Adaptation to these changes is so frequent a phenomenon that it passes as a matter of course; yet, the existence of the individual as well as the race would be imperiled if the proper adaptation to these inevitable future happenings were not present. Similarly universal is the solicitude evinced beforehand for the preservation of the young, which is all the more present, the more helpless individual forms of development may seem to us. It is certainly more correct to reverse the statement and say that the more favorable the conditions of existence prove to be for the young, just so much the less developed may they leave the mother's body. But, however one may regard these circumstances, a consideration of coming conditions not yet at hand may certainly be recognized as essential here. However deliberate and appropriate such behavior may seem, we are not in the habit of speaking of it as culture, since, in so far as we can judge, such an adaptability to regularly recurring and periodic conditions is a possibility and even a reality without the coöperation and therefore without the presence of consciousness, memory, and arbitrariness; we call it instinct. —

On the other hand, we ascribe to intelligence and culture the suitable mode of behavior of a living being in the presence of such conditions as arise irregularly and by chance. Here the "instinct" ceases, and for the necessary assumption of the proper reaction there must be present the ability to foresee the impending event, that is, to predict future things from present or past things.

This applies not only to highly developed animals and to the simpler acts of men, but it has an inevitable application in the highest domain of human thought and will. All science, art, and politics hinge on the question: Given a definite combination of things what results from them? The degree of development which a man has reached is determined by the extent to which he can answer this question and by the certainty with which he answers.

For politics this is at once manifest; that it holds true for art is made

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clear by proper reflection. The artist must, in order to produce a work of art, first be clear in his mind as to the effect which he wishes to produce, and then as to the means by which he can attain this effect. Both are questions that concern the future; when the painter or poet approaches his work he knows no more about it than he can foresee, and he will achieve his purpose with much the more certainty if his foresight is clear and detailed.

Finally, science is nothing but prevision. This becomes particularly clear when we follow the historical development of science. It starts always with the practical purpose of anticipating the results of given or chance circumstances or events. Whether we consider the beginnings of astronomy among the Egyptians, with whom it served to forecast the periods of the Nile's overflow, or the beginnings of medicine, which served to obtain a knowledge of the reactions that would be called forth in the human body by the operation of definite exterior agents, it is always the same problem of determining future matters from those now present. From rules based on experience, and originally very simple and quite limited in their application, there have been built up, by a system of constant development, other general rules, and these have made possible a correspondingly larger degree of certainty and universality of prediction.

We may now apply this criterion to the science of our own days, and we may even maintain that it is the safest and the most comprehensive of all for the purpose of characterizing the worth and the significance of a science. It serves, also, to determine the degree of development that a given science has attained.

There can be no doubt that mathematics is the most highly developed of all sciences. Hence it is that in it we see results predicted to an incomparably greater extent and with an incomparably higher degree of certainty than in all other sciences. If we combine three equal straight lines into a triangle, we may make the prediction, which a countless number of times has proved and which has ever been found in accordance with the reality of facts, that in this triangle there will be three equal angles of sixty degrees each. This confirmation of the prediction, being free from exceptions, inclines us to consider this geometrical principle as absolutely true, whereas, as yet, it is only a fact of experience which has been pretty generally confirmed. For no less a personage than Helmholtz has discussed the probability that in the case of very large or very small triangles we may meet with exceptions to this law, and that at any rate we should not deem it valid for any wider domain than that already covered by experience.

According as we proceed in the series,—physics, chemistry, biology,

and psychology, the degree of certainty and the range of the prediction diminish. That an electric current, if we turn it into metallic conductors, will acquire a degree of strength which is in direct proportion to the electro-motive force and in inverse proportion to the resistance, is a prediction that comes true in very many cases, but not in all. If the conductor consists of different metals, we note less strength in the current than is predicted by this law (Ohm's law). We ascribe the deviation to the generation of thermo-electric forces at the points of contact of the various metals, and we can predict the deviation in the case if we know the laws and constants concerned. But still, if self-induction, magnetization, and the like, be present in the circuit, deviations appear, and therefore the certainty of prediction is much less in this domain than in mathematics and geometry.

Still less is the certainty in the other sciences mentioned above. This gradation is very naturally due to the increasing complication of circumstances to which our predictions are to relate. The angles of a triangle are proved by experience to be the same, whether we trace out the triangle on paper, marble, or steel, or in any other fashion; on the other hand, the conductivity of electricity varies with the form and the nature of the substance, the temperature, the pressure, and other factors. So it is that we can much more easily and more safely make predictions with respect to the angles of a triangle than with respect to the conductivity of an electric current. What sort of substances result when we combine certain materials is a question which chemistry undertakes to answer. But the answer can be given to this question only in very simple cases and with but a limited degree of exactness, for the number of possible chemical combinations producing different results exceeds by a good deal the number possible in physics, and therefore our knowledge based on experience is in this case much less extensive and profound. In increasing ratio the same holds true of biology and psychology.

Objections to this method of rating the sciences may already have occurred to the attentive reader. There are vast domains of scientific activity, which, contrary to what has been said, seem to concern themselves, not with the predetermination of the future, but with researches into the past; these are mainly the historical sciences. Shall all of these be excluded from the category of true sciences?

To this question I might give the following answer: the historical branches are sciences only in so far as they have the aim of making possible a determination of the future from a knowledge of the past. According as they lose sight of this aim, they renounce the right to be

considered sciences. As a matter of fact, such a conception is, consciously or unconsciously, everywhere at the basis of our historical studies. That statesmen and politicians, who make the shaping of the future their particular profession, study history with the greatest zeal and with the express purpose of finding a basis for their own activity, is a fact that has often been proved. Even the purely scientific study of history, although it may seem to take the standpoint of mere observation, as declared by Ranke, may be traced down to similar foundations. For an historical fact has not been fully observed and described until there have been clearly recognized the psychological factors by which the phenomena under consideration have been influenced. But, on its side, this psychological understanding of the matter rests on the knowledge of certain general laws of a "collective psychology," that is, of a psychology of the masses, and it assumes the following form: If I know the conditions that preceded the event, and if I know the psychological characteristics of the group of men that played a part in it, then I can predict the course of the event; and only in so far as this possibility goes may we speak of an understanding of an historical fact.

Farthest removed from this view of affairs seem to be the representatives of the so-called *classical* studies, who concern themselves with the description and examination of the individual phenomena of Greek and Roman antiquity. For, by them we often hear the opinion expressed that such a condition of human perfection as was attained by those peoples is wholly beyond the reach of the people of our time, and, filled with pious admiration, we must be satisfied to learn as much as possible about the nature of that splendid past. But these very men make the most earnest endeavors to convey this knowledge (perforce, if it need be) to a circle of pupils as large as possible, that is, through this knowledge they seek to influence the future of the pupils, and even though they generally stress the hopelessness of the endeavor to attain to those models, still they have the conviction, at least in so far as they are concerned individually, that considerable progress in that direction is not, or was not impossible.

So, for our further investigations, we shall apply the principle that the value of every individual instance of scientific progress is to be measured by the amount of foresight that it makes possible.

Such instances of scientific progress assume, when most highly developed, the form of a so-called *law of nature*. This law may almost always be reduced to the following terms: if certain premises are given, then a certain conclusion follows. The natural laws assume their strongest and most unmistakeable form, when they permit of expression in mathematical terms, that is, are reduced to computable quantities.

Although this is the goal which the sciences as a whole seek to reach, it is first reached only by the simpler among them; so we may remark the mathematical status now being established in chemistry, against all possibility of which Kant argued a little more than a hundred years ago. The beginnings of this same development are also visible in physiology and psychology.

Now, what position does philosophy take with respect to these endeavors? The answer is that every philosophy is, or at least seeks to be, the comprehensive statement of the sciences of its time. The various systems of philosophy are distinguished from each other only by the difference in their estimation, knowledge, and application of the scientific results with which they deal and on which they are built. But it happens that a further diversity arises as a result of the fact that, in imitation of the unfortunate example of the Greek philosophers, there not only has been admitted into the sphere of philosophy that which within the domain of the individual sciences has (accurately or inaccurately) been ascertained through investigation, but that most philosophers consider themselves obliged to fill out the lacunas in our (or their) knowledge, by stating what, in accordance with their convictions, the nature of these unknown things must be in order that they may fit into a rational cosmology, that is, into their system. This division dealing with theories about unknown things is called metaphysics, and for many philosophers their metaphysics is really more characteristic and important than their physics. Unfortunately, it must be admitted that even in the domain of the individual sciences a great deal of metaphysical speculation is carried on. This exerts its harmful influence all the more freely since it is regarded as real physics. The theories of a luminiferous ether in physics and of atoms in chemistry are examples of such a metaphysics.

Thus it may be seen how exceedingly difficult it is to establish a good system of philosophy. Obstacles are presented not only by the very metaphysical tendency evoked in each one of us by the metaphysics instilled into us during the period of our training, but also by the fact that the best constructive material that the philosopher can procure, namely, the results of the individual sciences, may already be contaminated by metaphysics. Then this material not only forms an insecure part of the structure, but it may contaminate the other parts and, sooner or later, occasion the collapse of the whole structure. An example of this last named process is afforded by the materialistic form of philosophy, which prevailed in the second half of the nineteenth century, and which even now, after its scientific downfall, has many partisans, who have learned nothing from this downfall. In this case the meta-

physical evil is found in the doctrine that all natural phenomena are due to mechanical processes. This doctrine has been current as a philosophical fact ever since the splendid development given to mechanics and astronomy at the end of the eighteenth century, and only by degrees have we discovered that it is nothing but an hypothesis which in the vast majority of cases cannot be subjected to an examination, not to speak of its being proved or even made probable. Therefore, we cannot blame the philosophers of this period for basing their systems of philosophy on this doctrine; on the other hand, we must be ready to give up along with the doctrine its dependent form of philosophy.

So, when we undertake to develop a form of philosophy appropriate to our own time, we must do so conscious of the fact that we are liable to commit errors similar to those of our predecessors, and that in the course of a century or in a still shorter period our system of philosophy may prove as transient as, for example, materialism. One might ask why we engage at all in so useless a work. The answer is, that what is transient is not therefore necessarily useless. The clothes that we wear, the food that we take, the intellectual faculties that we cultivate, are all of them transient in their nature, but not useless. Our striving to substitute for untenable materialism a better system of philosophy rests upon the circumstance that we have previously examined the materialistic philosophy with respect to all possible aspects of its efficacy. We have come to know its errors, and it is not probable that in any new attempt we shall commit the same errors; in so far, at least, our new system of philosophy may prove to be better than the old one.

But one may put the further question: supposing we succeed in establishing a better system of philosophy, what will it avail us? The answer has been given in the introductory arguments; it will avail us in acquiring a prevision of future events, and will therefore enable us to organize our mode of life in a more appropriate and rational way. Herein we see, also, that the hopelessness of obtaining a wholly perfect system of philosophy not permitting of any improvement is inevitable and not entirely detrimental. For the appropriateness and the expediency of our method of organizing our lives depends not only upon the degree of our knowledge, but also upon the nature of our environment as constituted both of men and things. What may perhaps be most suitable in the distant future is today, as a result of the nature of the environment, still inappropriate, and if the philosophy of the present day is to provide that for which it exists, it must be constructed on the basis of the facts existing today, and not on the basis of possible future conditions.

There are doctrines in our knowledge and consequently in philosophy

which we assume that to be valid for all time; this is the case, for example, with the principles of logic and mathematics; and the general laws of physics and chemistry are also usually reckoned in this same category. But if we consider that the time is not yet so far behind us, when the character of the species of the animal and vegetable kingdoms was thought to be independent of the time; if we consider, furthermore, that one of the fundamental principles of chemistry, namely, the law of the conservation of weight in chemical processes now proves to be incorrect,¹ then we shall feel a certain hesitation about claiming absolute authority for any doctrine.

For our conviction of the authoritativeness of a doctrine is based only upon its being in accord with experience, and since in no case is there unlimited experience at our command, we have no right to claim unlimited authority for any doctrine.

We come, then, to the conclusion that we must endeavor to develop a system of philosophy as appropriate as possible and in accord with the science of our time, even though we be convinced that in the future it will prove to be inadequate in many points, for we need it in our lives. So it is that we do not desist from eating, even though we are sure of being hungry again in a few hours.

If we examine the ideas that lie at the base of the form of philosophy most in vogue at present, we shall find that, however different the views may be with regard to particulars, they agree almost without exception in admitting that matter and mind are the two essential elements of all reality. This conception, the development of which may be traced back through the philosophy of the Fathers of the Church to Plato, was given its modern expression by Descartes and Spinoza. Thought and extension are the two fundamental qualities of beings; that which thinks is mind, that which has extension is matter. The defect to be found in this definition, namely, that the mutability of all existence with respect to thought needs no further explanation (for thought implies change), whereas, on the other hand, in the idea of extension mutability is not connoted, is remedied by the fact that all change in that which has extension or in matter is ascribed to motion. As may at once be seen, this further conception has the majority in its favor even down to our days.

~~X~~ This way of thinking has obviously arisen from the notion that there is so great a difference between the intellectual and the physical phenomena that the formation of an idea embracing both seems impossible and

(1) In a very recent publication, H. Landolt has stated that in his latest experiments, carried on with all measures of precaution, changes of weight in the course of chemical processes have proved to be real and unmistakeable.

therefore is not to be attempted. To be sure, Spinoza especially has postulated the unity of mind and matter, and by the remark that thought and extension are two different aspects of one and the same absolute entity has sought to define this unity. But beyond the *desire* to establish this unity he has made no headway, for he has not explained how these two so different things can be aspects of the same entity, he has sought to extricate himself from the difficulty by using illustrations and comparisons.

Now we may always admit the possibility that the world known to us cannot be solved in better terms, and that, therefore, that theory is a proper statement of the sum total of our knowledge, but we must ever lay it down as a fact that these two worlds, the physical and the intellectual, react upon each other and mutually influence each other in their changes. They must, therefore, have some definite relation to each other and this fact has been given expression in only an unsatisfactory way by the systems of philosophy of Descartes and Spinoza. For if we do not know in what way and according to what laws the mutual reaction of these two worlds upon each other takes place, then we cannot predict the influence which a voluntary or an involuntary change in the one will have upon the other. Therefore, we would fail to understand countless phenomena which are of essential importance for the make-up of our lives.

So, then, we see at once that the philosophical development returns ever with unflagging energy to the question, how the reciprocal action between mind and body is to be conceived. Even so profound a thinker as Leibnitz cannot see any other way out of the difficulty but that of assuming a preëstablished harmony between the two worlds, which in themselves are wholly independent of each other. And that this problem has even in our day lost none of its acute interest, is revealed at once by a glance at the philosophical literature of the present moment, for this literature is full of endeavors to bring the theory of psycho-physical parallelism (which is nothing but a repeated statement and not a solution of the old problem) into some intelligible form that will be compatible with our other forms of thought.

The continual and ever repeated experience of the failure of these attempts at unifying the two, necessarily led long since to the inquiry, whether the unsurmountable difficulty is not perhaps to be sought in the way in which the problem is stated. In fact, if into the problem there are admitted assumptions which are incorrect or inappropriate, then no amount of acuteness can lead to a satisfactory answer. If we cannot in any way bring about a proper union of the two ideas, matter and mind, although the basal facts of the two ideas constantly and everywhere reveal

to us the close relations between the two, then there arises the suspicion that these two ideas have been themselves formed in an inadequate way. It may be conjectured that in them elements have been left out of consideration, or that elements have been taken into consideration, whose presence or absence would be necessary for the purpose. We shall examine both ideas in this direction, that is, we shall ascertain whether the presumptions to which the two ideas give occasion agree with experience and therefore permit us to draw a safe conclusion as to the future.

In so far now as the idea of *matter* is concerned, this has been so framed as to give expression to the fact that we know countless things in our exterior world, to which we cannot ascribe any intellectual nature, that is, things whose behavior and mode of action show no resemblance at all with those of beings endowed with the power of thought, sensation, and volition. Such especially are phenomena of the inanimate world, physical phenomena in the widest sense of the term, including the chemical on the one side, and the astronomical on the other.

If we ask whether with the idea of matter we have obtained a perfect description of phenomena of this class, then we must at once answer, No. It is true that it was possible for Descartes to think that he had accomplished this purpose. For, since he thought that he could reduce all physical phenomena to extension and motion, his idea of matter, into which these two qualities had been expressly admitted, necessarily seemed sufficient to him.

In the further development of physics this assumption has been proved erroneous. For example, the impossibility, proved by experiments on an extensive scale, of changing one chemical element into another, stands in so surprising a contrast with the ease with which we may change any extension or form into any other, and likewise any kind of motion into any other, that hitherto no one has really succeeded in giving from a mechanical standpoint any plausible explanation of this fact of experience. Rather does experience compel us to recognize the impossibility of change in the chemical elements, and therewith admit the fact that there are various kinds of "matter," which cannot be reduced to form and motion merely.

Furthermore, physics has made us acquainted with phenomena, which, although they belong to the inanimate world, do not permit of being conceived in a material way. Such are found particularly in the domains of *light*, *electricity*, and *heat*. As is known, the attempt was first made through the assumption of a light matter, an electric fluid, and a heat substance, to include these things in the concept of matter. But since the property of form or definite occupancy of space could not be demonstrated for them, the attempt had to be given up at once. Of decided

influence, also, was the circumstance that these things showed themselves to be independent of weight and mass, properties which, as a result of the discoveries of Newton, it had been the habit to assume were present in all true matter.

As a result of the similar development that began with Galileo, the idea of force came to the front and displaced that of motion in the description of mechanical phenomena. This happened again on account of the incomparably greater ratio of prevision that was attained. Galileo had already shown how the movements of heavy bodies in the neighborhood of the earth's surface could by means of this idea be stated in very simple formula, if one employed the idea of force for the purpose, and Newton had by a further very simple addition extended the utility of this idea to the whole domain of astronomical bodies and movements.

After the movements in the great domain of the stars had thus been reduced to some few simple formula, which made it possible to predict their groupings for years and centuries, there seemed feasible an extension of the use of these formula in a direction which would permit the laws discovered to be applied in a similar fashion to the world of atoms. Ever since antiquity people had been accustomed to the thought that all things were made up of small corpuscles, whose movements controlled their action; and Descartes had developed the thought in his own way. Now that the laws of motion had been ascertained for the heavenly bodies, it seemed simply a question of the application of these laws, in order to explain all other physical phenomena, even though, apart from their movements, little was known about the celestial bodies. So, also, we see that Newton in his "Optics" after explaining the phenomena of light attempted all sorts of physical and chemical applications of his ideas; but he did it only in the form of "Queries" that were to be the subject of future elaboration.

Today it must be acknowledged that the results aimed at in this way have been far from answering our expectations. Newton's mechanical theory of light phenomena has been generally abandoned, however readily we have acknowledged and accepted his definite experimental advancement of the problem. And in chemistry the development of the fundamental idea of a theory of chemical affinity had not been carried out until the attempt had been given up to ascribe this affinity to an attraction of the atoms to each other, and instead thereof we had formed the ideas, free from hypothesis and based on experiments, of concentration and reaction velocity.

Now, summing up this development briefly, we find that the pair of ideas, extension and motion, has, as a result of the development in science,

been replaced by the pair, substance and force. But the inadequacy which had occasioned this change was remedied thereby only imperfectly. Nay, the state of affairs had really become worse, for to the irreconcilable duality of body and soul or of matter and mind there was now added the duality of substance and force, which was much more difficult to combine than the old duality of extension and motion, since in this latter there existed at least an apparent connection. In truth, what is the relation between force and substance? A subordination of the one idea to the other is not possible, since each of them has characteristics that are lacking in the other. It is even less feasible to place them beside each other in independent relations, for experience acquaints us neither with substance without force nor with force without substance.

From this we may judge already of the fate of the endeavors at once begun to make it possible to have the one idea conveyed within the other. In Boskovich's theory the attempt has been made to find force without substance in the composition of the world, by attaching force to points which, apart from their position in space, were supposed to have no other property. The opposite course has proved, in the long run, to be just as little practicable. Within the kinetic molecular hypothesis, the development of which was begun with great hopes in these last thirty years, the endeavor has been made in vain to substitute motion again for force. Even though a portion of the phenomena might thus be described after a fashion, vast domains (for example, that of electricity) still remained inaccessible, especially all those in which the idea of weight and mass do not play any part.

So the formation of these ideas of extension-motion and substance-force, of substance-motion and extension-force has steadily failed to fulfil the purposes for which they were formed. The same must be said of the idea of soul or mind. It was created in order to express the peculiar nature of sensation, thought, and volition as opposed to physical things. It has been successful in making this distinction, but at the same time the necessary consideration of the connections has been left out of view. The separation had been made much more absolute than had been intended, and it was no longer possible to unite the severed parts in the a way that the facts demanded. And in truth, as time went on, the connection between the two domains revealed itself as ever closer, so that the impropriety of that separation was found ever greater.

Considerations like the foregoing are generally put forward only when their author thinks that he knows a means by which he may overcome the drawbacks whose harmful nature he has so forcibly described. Such is really the case here; I think that I can demonstrate that a course lies

open before us, by which the inadequacies and difficulties of the older views may be avoided. There is really an idea which bridges over not only the chasm between force and substance but also that between mind and matter, and which is of a nature sufficiently manifold to embrace the totality of our experiences, the interior as well as the exterior.¹

This idea we term energy.

It is known how the idea of energy arose. It has been demonstrated by Mayer, Joule, and Helmholtz, that there is an immaterial factor, that is, one endowed with neither weight nor mass, which in a quantitative way is just as unchangeable as the mass and weight of material substances, and which exactly like these latter can undergo qualitative transformations of all kinds. But while the power of transformation in material things is not unlimited, but rather by the chemical law of the preservation of the elements is confined to very definite limits, that other factor, energy, may be converted from every one of its forms into every other; and its power of transformation is therefore unlimited. Herein exists already a fundamental advantage of this idea as compared with that of matter, since in this way it acquires the property of comprehending in a uniform fashion the *whole* domain of the corresponding phenomena.

At once we may so understand the state of affairs due to the immaterial nature of energy as to seek to substitute the idea of energy for that of *force*. The opinion that this can be done has been quite widespread and will still continue to be the predominant view. An important advantage would result from it, for while the idea of force has an exact sense only in mechanics and can be carried over into the other domains of physics only in an hypothetical and correspondingly uncertain way, the idea of energy finds everywhere its definite and exact application as a result of the law of quantitative conversion.

But the utility of the idea of energy is really much greater. It may be substituted not only for force, but also for matter. In order to demonstrate this in all particulars, an excursion through the whole domain of physics would be required. For that, space is here lacking; moreover, it has already been done in another place.²

I will here seek to do the same thing in a briefer way.

(1) I am, of course, aware of the fact that in the further course of its development, my solution of the problem will also meet with difficulties and insufficiencies. Such obstacles, however, usually appear only when the essential parts of the new conception have been exhausted. That we are still far removed from such a period needs no proof, since now for the first time the application of the new idea to the old problems is attempted and, therefore, there can as yet be no question of its being exhausted.

(2) W. Ostwald, *Vorlesungen über Naturphilosophie*, Leipzig, 1902.

Physics concerns itself directly with the changes which take place in the outer world (in so far as they come to our knowledge). Now it may be proved that every change, and consequently every process, may be fully described by a statement of the kind and amount of energy, considered with respect to time and place, that has undergone conversion. This is true particularly of the processes by which the apparatus of the senses is put in activity; such processes may ever be reduced to exchanges of energy as between the outer world and the apparatus of the senses. So it is that the sum total of the experiences out of which we construct our outer world consists in the exchanges of energy that have been experienced. It necessarily follows that the idea of energy must be ample enough to represent the amount of experience that has been accomplished by its aid. In fact, the attempt to carry out this principle has met with confirmation in all particulars. The idea of energy has not only been everywhere ample enough (along with that of space and time), but it has thus far continued to be the only means of making possible a statement of experience which is free from hypotheses, that is, one by which the especial concepts requisite in each individual domain shall be composed of demonstrable and, if possible, measurable properties to be found in the domain in question.

It can further be demonstrated that the characteristic properties of matter, its inertia or mass, and its weight, prove to be especial aspects or factors of certain forms of energy, of the energy of motion and of that of distance. By the term matter, we therefore indicate only certain complex forms of energy embracing the aforesaid kinds of energy. The law of the conservation of mass and the law of inertia or the law of the conservation of the centre of gravity are merely particular instances of a much more general law of conservation, which concerns a large class of factors of energy (the capacity-factors). Consequently, we should not place the so-called law of the conservation of matter, which is more properly to be called the law of the conservation of mass, weight, and the elements, on the same plane with the law of the conservation of energy. The latter is by far the more universal, and the former group of laws plays, in comparison with the law of energy, a much more subordinate part. That so many earthly phenomena have to do with weight and mass is only the consequence of a process of selection, since the complex forms of energy that are destitute of weight and mass cannot persist on the earth's surface, and therefore cannot come to our knowledge.

In this way, concerning which particulars may be consulted in the book already mentioned, the dual nature of force and substance may be abandoned, since they disappear within an idea embracing them both.

Now there arises the following problem. If, in the other pair of ideas, *mind-matter*, we substitute energy for the second member, then there results the pair, *mind-energy*. In what relation do these two things stand to each other; do they form an irreconcilable opposition or may they be unified?

This question has already been asked several times in other connections; it has usually been determined in the negative sense. A careful consideration of all the arguments known to me, both *pro* and *contra*, has led me to conclude that it may be answered in the affirmative. *I deem it possible to subordinate to the idea of energy the totality of psychical phenomena.*

To begin with, all psychologists agree with the physiologists in believing that not a single psychical process is carried out without the occurrence of a "simultaneous" physical process. But hitherto in our conception of nature, it has been the feeling that a physical process is a material one, and that what is psychical cannot be comprehended under the idea of matter, so that it was necessary to arrange the two things side by side, and there resulted the modern form of psycho-physical parallelism. To our mind, the word "material" is first of all to be replaced by that of "energetic"; the principle that no psychical process is carried out without a change of energy in the organism will continue to be quite generally admitted and we may accept it as correct.

Now while with matter we can only coördinate the psychical phenomena, and that, too, on the assumption that all material processes are mechanical, nothing prevents our subordinating them to the energetic phenomena or including them within these latter. In all that we know of intellectual processes, there is nothing to hinder us from regarding them as a particular form of energetic activity. The exhaustion of the human organism (that is, the excessive use of its supply of energy), unfortunately so common nowadays, as a result of excessive intellectual labor, compels us formally to such an assumption. So, also, in the language of almost all nations there is included in the idea of *work* intellectual activity as well as the generation of mechanical energy (both of which are carried on at the expense of the supply of chemical energy in the organism) and has, therefore, since the earliest times furnished a basis for the idea of *psychical energy*.

The appearance of physical ^{psychical} energy is associated with the presence of nervous organs and its production becomes impossible if these organs are destroyed, or if the requisite amount of convertible energy (mostly of a chemical kind) is not at their disposal. This parallels the fact that, for example, especial adjustments of chemical energy must be present (in

Volta's pile), in order that electrical energy may be generated from chemical energy, and that with the consumption of the latter the pile can produce no more. Only we must perforce regard it as much more complex and difficult to state the conditions under which psychical energy arises than those concerning the rise of electrical energy.

Occasionally it has been alleged, in opposition to the possibility of an assumption like ours, that with the destruction of the nervous apparatus psychical energy in the organism is likewise destroyed and therefore disappears, which contradicts the law of the conservation of energy. But since this latter law holds only *for the sum total of all kinds of energy*, there is no contradiction in the fact that one of the forms in question disappears entirely under certain definite conditions, in order to be converted into other forms. As, moreover, nothing opposes the rise, in the case of the disappearance of intellectual energy, of an equivalent amount of another form, for example, of heat, clearly no contradiction exists. On the contrary the disappearance of one form of energy and the rise of an equivalent quantity of another form is certainly the typical phenomena to which all physical processes may be reduced. Thus, for example, the electrical energy of a charged conductor disappears entirely when it is put in contact with the earth, in order to convert itself into heat in the connecting wire.

Whether psychical energy is to be regarded as a form of energy in and for itself, like heat or kinetic energy, or whether it is only a particular of several combination energies, as is known to be the case with sound and is probably so with light, must here remain undetermined. I should not be able to allege any arguments for or against the one or the other view. The absence of such arguments is an indication that the determining of the alternative within the range of our present knowledge can have no influence on the main question.

The main question is this: whether the peculiar properties of the psychical phenomena permit them to be included in the idea of energy, or whether, as in the theory of psycho-physical parallelism, the psychical phenomena must be regarded as accompanying the energetic phenomena, which, to be sure, always appear simultaneously with them, but in their essence differ from them. I have been able to find nothing which can be brought against this first view except that it is an unusual one; this, of course, is no real objection.

What seems to be most difficult is to comprehend the fact of self-consciousness, the *ego* or the personality, as a phenomenon of energetics. Yet, to me it seems that this difficulty is lessened by the fact that by no means all psychical processes are carried on within our self-conscious-

ness. We may very often note, by observed results, that psychical processes have taken place in our nervous system and our central organ of which details have escaped our consciousness, and we are obliged to admit in general the possibility of unconscious psychical processes. If, then, consciousness is not really a general property of psychical processes, the difficulty of explaining the *ego* does not pertain to the question of a *general* conception of psychical phenomena, but is irrespective of the general conception and belongs within the *especial* domain of psychology.

I should hope not to be so far misunderstood as to be thought to deem the energetic nature of psychical phenomena something fully proved. In order to adduce such a proof, it would be necessary to show that, with the appearance of psychical energy, a corresponding quantity of another (for example, chemical) energy disappears, and that the equivalent thereof cannot be shown to be present in another form. On the other hand, with the disappearance of psychical energy its equivalent should reappear (for example, in the form of heat). Up to the present, no attempt has been made to give a clear and unmistakeable answer to this question. Besides, the exceedingly great difficulties in the way of such experiments are obvious. But I do not look upon them as impossible, and an experimental determination of this fundamental problem is within the bounds of human capability.

Until this determination has been brought about, it will certainly be proper to examine from all sides the idea of the energetic nature of psychical processes. The extent to which we facilitate and simplify our understanding of the things of reality, and therefore, also, our prevision as to future happenings, justifies every effort in this direction.

THE PSYCHIC LIFE OF FISHES

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THE psychic mechanism of any creature has the same purpose biologically as its sense organs, nerves, and muscles, namely, to become keenly sensitive to the favorable and unfavorable features of environment and active in seizing upon the one and escaping the other. One of the first questions about the psychic life of fishes will therefore be: To what do they respond? what senses have they?

The best observations yet made upon this question are contained in a paper by Bateson, and from that source mainly the following items are summarized.¹ A few have been drawn from a study of fish memory by Edinger, to which fuller reference will be made presently, and from other sources.

Most fishes seek their food by sight, and some seem to have good powers of discrimination as is shown by their peculiarities in taking or refusing artificial bait. Their eyes are adapted for near vision, three or four feet or less, but they can recognize the approach of a person at fifteen feet. They do not see well equally in all directions; quite a number appear oblivious to food lying on the bottom and take it, if at all, as it falls through the water. The brilliant colors of many marine animals and plants would make probable a corresponding ability in fishes to discriminate colors, and there is some casual observation that indicates that they have this power; they seem at least to recognize attendants by the color of their clothing. Special tests of the color sense of fishes, however, have so far had little or no result.

From their other senses the thirty-four species of sight feeders studied by Bateson seemed to get little help. None showed any excitement when the juice of food was put into the tank. A few, however, when not too hungry, would sample the food by smell, taste, or touch, before taking it.

About a dozen species, including the skate, conger, rockling, sole, and other night feeders, seem to sense their food habitually by smell. The juice of a squid poured into the water, even in the day time, would soon bring them out of hiding and keep them hunting for a considerable time, feeling about with noses, barbels, or other tactile organs. Some of these fishes could undoubtedly see moving objects, but they behaved in

(1) Bateson, *The Sense Organs and Perceptions of Fishes; with Remarks on the Supply of Bait*, in the *Journal of the Marine Biological Association of the United Kingdom*, N. S., vol. i., 1889-90, pp. 225-256.

the same way whether food was present or not, by day or by night, and (in the case of the rockling and conger) whether they could see or had lost their eyes. When, on the contrary, the olfactory surfaces in their nostrils had been destroyed, these same two species were unresponsive to food at a distance and would take it only if it was brought very near. Such visual sensations as they have seem to be connected with other activities than that of feeding; in other words, only a portion of their visual sensations has any meaning for them. Bateson's observations on this point are so interesting and throw so much light on the general question of fish intelligence that I give them in his own words:—

“Positive evidence as to the class of objects which they distinguish is difficult to obtain owing to the general absence of facial or other expressions among fishes; and it should always be remembered that the fact that animals take no notice of objects is no proof that they do not see them. For example, wrasses, mullet, and other fishes with excellent sight take no notice of a handkerchief suddenly flipped against the glass of the tank in which they are, which would scare away a terrestrial animal; but it is perfectly certain that they see the handkerchief, for they will snap at a worm hanging by a thread or sticking to the outside of the glass. Similarly they take no notice of a *straight* wire held up and waved outside the tank, but if the wire be bent into a sinuous curve like the body of a swimming worm they (pollack) will often dash at the glass in the attempt to seize it. It would appear, however, that fish are by no means slow at gaining knowledge of this kind. A curious instance of this kind occurred in the case of the rockling (*Motella tricirrata*). When I first began to observe the mode of feeding of this fish I was inclined to believe that it did not *see* worms, etc., thrown in for food. As mentioned above, it does not come towards them until they have been for some time in the water, and then, moving its head and fins, it swims wildly about until it comes in contact with the food, even though it be hanging freely in the water directly in the line of sight. But one of these fishes which has been living for some months in a shallow tank has been constantly fed by persons leaning over the top; and now when hungry not only comes up and splashes on the surface of the water as soon as any one approaches, but will lift its head out of the water to snap at the fingers held above the surface, which it obviously sees and recognizes. When last observed, however, it still did not appear to have learned to recognize a worm swimming in the water, but only the presence of the person feeding it. When it is remembered that this fish naturally hunts by scent, the acquirement of this new instinct seems somewhat remarkable, and suggests that it is not the vision which is defective but the power of appreciation. Being a nocturnal animal, it must be supposed to have never *seen* food, or to have seen it so rarely that it made no impression on it. These considerations suggest the possibility that these fishes may in the course of time learn to distinguish food by sight as they are now habitually fed by day.”¹

The tactile sensations of fishes have already been referred to. Some species are provided with special tactile organs in the barbels attached about the mouth, or, in the case of the gurnard, in a finger-like adaptation

(1) Bateson, *op. cit.*, pp. 238 f.

of several of the forward rays of the pectoral fins, while still others make use of these fins entire. But apart from special organs fishes seem very sensitive to excitation of a tactile character conveyed through the water, such as jars, changes of pressure, and the like. Fishes that have lost their sight have no difficulty in avoiding large objects thrust into the tank, apparently because the object cannot be put in without disturbing the water; for if a wire net is put in when the fish are at a distance they may run into it. So keen is their sensibility, however, that even a single wire will be avoided if a finger is placed on the top of it, the movement communicated to it by the finger being sufficient to warn the fish. Professor Eigenmann also reports a similar refinement of tactile sensations in the blind fish, *Amblyopsis*, and its congener, *Chologaster* :—

“*Chologaster papilliferus*, a relative of the blind fishes, living in springs, detects its prey by its tactile organs, not by its eyes. A crustacean may be crawling in plain view without exciting any interest unless it comes in close proximity to the head of the fish, when it is located with precision and secured. The action is in very strong contrast to that of a sunfish, which depends on its eyes to locate its prey. A *Gammarus* [a small crustacean] seen swimming rapidly through the water and approaching a *Chologaster* from behind and below was captured by an instantaneous movement of the *Chologaster* when it came in contact with its head. The motion brought the head of the *Chologaster* in contact with the stem of a leaf, and instantly it tried to capture this also. Since the aquarium was well lighted, the leaf in plain sight, it must have been seen and avoided if the sense of sight and not that of touch were depended upon. In *Amblyopsis*, the largest of the blind fishes of the American caves, the batteries of tactile organs form ridges projecting beyond the general surface of the skin. Its prey, since it lives in the dark and its eyes are mere vestiges, is located entirely by its tactile organs. This is done with as great accuracy as could be done with the best of eyes in the light, but only when its prey is in close proximity to the head. Coarser vibrations in the water are not perceived or are ignored, and apparently stationary objects are not perceived when the fish approaches them. If a rod is held in the hand, the fish always perceives it when within about half an inch of it, and backs water with its pectorals. If the head of a fish is approached with a rod, the direction from whence it comes is always perceived and the correct motion made to avoid it. This reaction is much more intense in the more active young than in the adult. One young, about ten mm. long, determined with as great precision the direction from which a needle was coming as any fish with perfect eyes could possibly have done. It reacted properly to avoid the needle, and this without getting excited about it.”¹

It is not unlikely, on the other hand, that tactile sensations may be wholly neglected when they have no definite meaning in fish experience. Some aquarian fishes may be touched freely on various portions of the body without being frightened, if the person keeps out of sight and does not move the fish bodily.

(1) Personal communication to Prof. C. O. Whitman, reported by him in his lecture on *Animal Behavior*, *Woods Holl Biological Lectures*, 1898, pp. 303 f.

It is probable that extreme tactile sensibility is at the bottom of the reputed ability of fishes to hear. Bateson observes that some, though not all, of his fishes were startled by blasting in the neighborhood of the laboratory; none, however, took notice of sounds made in the air. The study of fish hearing has been continued by Kreidl and Lee,¹ who have found that when other means of perception are wholly excluded (vision, jars, etc.) fishes do not respond to sounds. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that their sensitiveness to jars is so great that they may perhaps at times react to water vibrations caused by sound waves in the air, and thus indirectly to the sounds.²

When Bateson's work was published it was judged that some fishes, at least, had sensations of taste because of their behavior in the presence of food, but exact information extended little further. It is known now that certain fishes have sense organs closely resembling the "taste buds" of other vertebrates, located not only in the parts about the mouth, but also distributed widely over the whole surface of the body. Special experiments of Herrick's on catfishes have proved the gustatory function of these organs.³ He finds it probable "that the sense of sight plays very little part, the sense of smell and the sense of touch considerable parts, but the sense of taste clearly the chief part in their detection of food. These fishes appear to taste not only in the mouth, but by contact with sapid substances by the barblets or skin of the body at any point as far back as the root of the tail fin."

Of other sorts of sensation, particularly of heat and cold, those brought about directly or indirectly by muscular contraction, and those from the visceral apparatus, there is hardly anything to be said. No attempt has been made, so far as I know, to study them carefully, and

(1) Kreidl, *Ueber die Perception der Schallwellen bei den Fischen*. Pflüger's *Archiv.*, lxi., 1895, pp. 450-464, and *Ein weiterer Versuch über das angebliche Hören eines Glockenzeichens durch die Fische*, *ibid.*, lxiii., 1896, pp. 581-586. Lee, *The Functions of the Ear and the Lateral Line in Fishes*, in the *American Journal of Physiology*, i., 1898, pp. 123-144.

(2) Experiments reported by Parker at the Washington meeting of the American Association, Dec.-Jan., 1902-03 (*Science*, February 13, 1903, p. 243), seem to throw the question open once more, and make it possible that some fishes actually do respond to sound stimuli received by way of the internal ear.

(3) Herrick, *The Sense of Taste in Fishes*, report of a paper read at the Pittsburg meeting of the American Association, June-July, 1902, (*Science*, August 29, 1902, p. 345). Cf. also the report of a paper by the same investigator read at the Washington meeting of the Association, Dec.-Jan., 1902-03 (*Science*, February 13, 1903, p. 251).

we can only conjecture with more or less plausibility that fish may have them. The work of Professor Lee and others¹ has shown that fishes possess the physiological apparatus necessary for adjusting themselves to rotary movements and the force of gravity, and for regulating the force and distance of their movements of progression. These movements are so accurately adjusted that blind fish, though they move freely, do not run into the walls of the aquarium. How far they have the corresponding sensations we do not know. Sensations of this kind usually come but little into human consciousness.

It is uncertain, also, how far fishes feel pain. The evidence for it is general and indirect, and there are many things that seem to point the other way. It is not enough that they show the bodily signs of pain, movements of resistance or flight, for these may be purely reflex, as are almost certainly the analogous reactions of still lower creatures.² Fish that have carried off hooks in portions of their bodies that might be expected to be exquisitely sensitive are occasionally taken, and instances are reported of their return to bite again after severe mutilation. Norman observed that sharks and flounders on the operating tables at Woods Holl reacted slightly or not at all when portions of their heads were cut away to lay bare their semi-circular canals, provided only that the stream of sea water was kept flowing through their mouths and gills to enable them to breathe. On the other hand, the existence of sensations of pain in the case of the higher animals can hardly be doubted; and if resistance is no proof of the presence of pain, the absence of resistance can hardly serve as proof of the absence of pain. Richet thinks that we may take the capacity to learn as a criterion.³ A creature that could learn would profit by the association of a powerful deterrent with harmful acts or objects; a creature that could not learn but depended for preservation entirely upon the inherited capacities of its nervous system, would receive no benefit from it. Richet seems to doubt whether batrachians and fishes have such sensations. The question is certainly an extremely difficult one and can be settled only by a careful study of the whole behavior of the animal in question.

A set of sense organs along both sides of the head and body in fishes,

(1) Lee, *op cit.*

(2) Norman, *Do the Reactions of the Lower Animals Against Injury Indicate Pain Sensations?* in the *American Journal of Physiology*, iii., 1899-1900, pp. 271-284; also *Woods Holl Biological Lectures*, 1898, pp. 235-241.

(3) Richet, *Étude biologique sur la douleur*, in the *Proceedings of the Third International Congress of Psychologists in Munich*, 1896, pp. 21-39. Reprinted also in the *Revue Scientifique* (4), vi., 1896, pp. 225-232.

the "organs of the lateral line," have sometimes been supposed to serve for sensations of some sort not shared by man, but the best evidence points to their connection with the perception of movements or resistance in the water. They might thus serve indirectly for the maintenance of equilibrium; Bateson doubts if they do so directly.

Fishes are well equipped with sense organs, as the summary just given shows; they may have all, and certainly have most, of the senses possessed by other vertebrates; but something more is necessary if they are fairly to be credited with a mind. They must be able to learn, must profit in some degree by experience.

The fact that fishes can learn is established for most aquarian forms by their coming to expect food when they see the keeper approach at feeding time, and some individuals even overcome their instinctive wariness so far as to allow themselves to be handled.

A mud fish (*Cobitis fossilis*) repeatedly caught by the attendant when cleaning the aquarium, comes finally to slip into his hand of its own accord and to lie curled up there; trout fed by an attendant in uniform swim close to any one wearing a similar uniform; fish which usually swim up to the attendant make haste in the opposite direction if he carries a net. Sometimes these artificial habits persist through a considerable interval of time, reappearing when original conditions are restored. Fish which had become tame in an aquarium were timid, as is usually the case, when transferred to a pond, but showed their former tameness at once when returned to the aquarium after an interval of four months. Fish learn with great promptness to avoid persons that have abused them or places where they have been frightened. A tame trout lifted from the water by its tail kept away from its tormentor for several days after the experience; and fish which congregated near the surface in an eddy of a sluice-way soon learned to remain nearer the bottom after they had been attacked by fish-eating birds.¹

Their ability to learn is uneven, however; a few things they learn quickly, others with great difficulty, the difference depending perhaps on the strength of the instinctive tendency against which the new habit has to make head, or the instinctive direction of the fish's powers of apprehension. Bateson reports, for example, that none of his fishes seemed to learn permanently the nature of the plate-glass wall of the

(1) These instances are taken from a large number gathered by Professor Edinger from fish culturists and keepers of aquariums. See his paper entitled, *Have Fishes Memory? A Communication to the Neurological Section of the Congress of German Scientists and Physicians at Munich, 1899*, translated in the *Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution for 1899*, Washington, 1901, pp. 375-394.

tank, the same fish knocking his head time and again against the wall in trying to get at things on the outside. After a number of trials the fish would stop for the time, but some, even after a year in the aquarium, were not able to carry over the memory from one occasion to another with sufficient clearness to restrain them from snapping at tempting objects on the outside. But fish that had lost their sight, on the other hand, learned to avoid obstacles against which they had swum but a single time. The fact that fish fail to learn any particular thing does not prove their general inability to learn. The thing required may not be in the line of their aptitude.

Of specific experiments on the educability of fishes there have been very few. Dr. Edward L. Thorndike has tested the salt water minnow (*Fundulus*) and found that it can learn its way through a series of pierced partitions, gradually eliminating blundering, and shortening the time of its transit;¹ and years ago Möbius observed that a pike could be taught not to attack small fish upon which it was accustomed to feed. The original account of Möbius' experiment not being accessible to me, I cite the summary given by Darwin:—

“A curious case has been given by Professor Möbius, of a pike, separated by a plate of glass from an adjoining aquarium stocked with fish, and who often dashed himself with such violence against the glass in trying to catch the other fishes, that he was sometimes completely stunned. The pike went on thus for three months, but at last learned caution, and ceased to strike the glass. The plate of glass was then removed, but the pike would not attack these particular fishes, though he would devour others which were afterwards introduced, so strongly was the idea of a violent shock associated in his feeble mind with the attempt on his former neighbors.”²

Doubt has been cast on these results by Bateson and Edinger,³ but apparently without careful repetition of the experiment itself. Bateson suggests “that perhaps the result of the famous experiment of Möbius has been wrongly interpreted,” and that “the explanation should perhaps be referred to that paradoxical instinct which is widely developed among animals of many kinds, in obedience to which they occasionally do not

(1) Thorndike, *A Note on the Psychology of Fishes*, in the *American Naturalist*, xxxiii., 1899, pp. 923-925. Professor Herrick also finds, *op. cit.*, that catfish can learn to adjust their reactions to varied sensory experiences. He says: “Gustatory and tactile sensations arising in these cutaneous areas commonly coöperate in evoking the reflex of seizing food, but by training, the fishes can be taught to discriminate between the gustatory and the tactile elements in the stimulus and to respond only when both are present, ignoring simple contacts.”

(2) *Descent of Man*, pp. 75 f.

(3) Bateson, *op. cit.*; Edinger, *op. cit.*

eat or molest those with whom they are constantly associated." It is difficult, of course, to say why the fish refrain, but a parallel experiment, carried out three or four years ago in Clark University Laboratory by Dr. Norman Triplett with two perch instead of a pike, seemed to confirm the original experiment in its essential particulars.¹ While Dr. Triplett's perch never perhaps reached a point where, if they had been long without food, and if the smaller fish began darting about wildly, they would not seize it, yet they did come gradually to refrain under ordinary conditions of hunger. The very imperfection of the learning gave opportunity for observing the inhibitory influence of recent experience in struggle with the older reflex tendency. And the interpretation, which looks upon the matter as one of education, is made more natural by the fact that the perch learned at the same time to keep from striking the glass partition in their ordinary swimming to and fro, and when it was removed hesitated at first to cross the region where it had stood formerly.

These observations and experiments leave no doubt that fish of the species tried are able to learn, that they have what Professor Loeb calls "associative memory," and thus a rudimentary intelligence. Whether such memory as they possess requires the assumption that they also have some sort of consciousness is an open question. Edinger thinks it at present an insoluble one. He says:—

"I found no observation making inevitable the opinion that fishes not merely are open to impressions but are actually aware of them, and that they were in a single instance influenced by them to change their conduct in a way possible only when an impression has been observed, has been meditated on, and is applied in a subsequent emergency. All the phenomena were capable of a simpler explanation. For a stimulus to evoke a secondary effect it must not necessarily be observed, and its later application does not absolutely demand conscious memory."²

Here, as with so many psychological questions, much turns on the meaning attributed to the terms used. Edinger seems to be speaking of *reflective* consciousness which is indeed unlikely in fishes. But consciousness in general is an affair of infinite gradations, and that some of its low and twilight forms should be present in fishes would seem much less improbable. To this we shall return in another connection.

So far we have said nothing about the instincts of fishes; we can now turn to them with advantage. An instinct, as the word is commonly used, is thought of as a sort of inner helmsman who guides his charge

(1) Triplett, *The Educability of the Perch*, in the *American Journal of Psychology*, vol. xii., 1900-01, pp. 354-360.

(2) Edinger, *op. cit.*, p. 394.

through activities whose purpose and method are beyond animal comprehension. In a stricter sense, it is found to be such an adjustment of the simple habits of the animal to the special circumstances of his life that desirable and sometimes complicated results are brought about without foresight on his part. Young chicks, for example, have an instinct to follow and nestle under the hen and this results in their securing food and protection. When this instinct is examined, however, it is found to be the result of two simple adaptations. The chicks tend to follow almost any moving object and to nestle under almost any object that is warm. This usually attaches them to the hen because she is there to be followed and nestled under; but with changed conditions, as, for example, when chicks are hatched in an incubator, it might attach them to almost anything else having the requisite qualifications of movement and warmth. The success of an instinct is thus as much an affair of the environment as of the animal. The key is made to fit the wards of the lock; the opening of the door is an affair of both. In this view an instinct is not an explanation but a problem to be explained. And happily in some cases at least we are able not only to resolve a complicated instinct into its component parts, but even to show with some plausibility how the instinct itself has grown up.¹

Let us take as a concrete case that of the salmon which has been very carefully studied. The main facts with regard to the Sacramento salmon (*Oncorhynchus tshawytscha*), the large salmon of the Pacific coast, are these. In the spring and again in the fall, the fish enter the rivers in large numbers, generally the rivers in which they themselves were hatched, and, after more or less delay in the estuaries, make their way up stream, without food and often in the face of great obstacles, to the upper waters, sometimes covering distances of many hundreds of miles. The streams which receive the spring run are those fed by melting snows and delivering a considerable volume of water. The fall runs seem less dependent on the volume or temperature of the water though perhaps the flooding of the streams by the fall rains is a factor. The fish ascend till stopped by insuperable obstacles or (in case of the later comers) till overtaken by

(1) How futile "an instinct" is as an explanation was never more neatly shown than in the following conversation reported as having occurred between a little boy and his still smaller sister with reference to a turtle with which they were playing. As the turtle crawls about, the little girl asks:—

"What makes the little turtle crawl away?"

"He is looking for water."

"How does he know where to look for water?"

"Instinct tells him."

"Is instinct another little turtle?"

the spawning time. When that time arrives, in November or thereabouts, the spawning pair seek out a place where the water runs swiftly over a gravelly bottom. Over the spot selected the female takes her place and extrudes a few eggs. The male immediately follows and emits a portion of milt; and thus they alternate every few minutes through a number of days. Many of the eggs are carried off down stream by the current and devoured by other fishes. A few lodge in the gravel and are thus protected. As the spawning progresses, the gravel is dug up from time to time by the female with her tail (or, as some say, by the male), with the double result of covering with fine silt some of the eggs that have drifted off and of building up a little mound of gravel which breaks the force of the current and gives lodgment for still more of the eggs. This is the "nest" of the salmon. The spawning over, the "nest" is left to its fate, while the fish themselves drop down stream with their heads to the current. They have often reached the spawning ground much worn by the journey and their fast, have been attacked by fungus and parasites, and in the end all perish; some, it is said, perish even before they spawn. The fry hatch out in about fifty days, and begin to migrate seaward as soon as they are well able to swim; most of them go out to sea between the middle of January and the middle of March of the next year.¹

The migration instinct appears on analysis to be tolerably simple. All that is necessary to account for the run of the fish from the ocean to the upper waters of the rivers is a tendency to move from warmer toward colder water (or from salter to fresher) and a habit of swimming against the current. The first turns the fish from the ocean to the estuaries, and the second leads them with unerring certainty to the upper reaches when they have once come into the river current. That the fish should move at this time from warmer to cooler water (or from salter to fresher) is very likely dependent upon the gradually ripening condition of their reproductive organs, but it need not involve any greater intelligence than that required for moving in the direction of increased comfort rather than the reverse, for apparently they do not start until the cooler and fresher water has reached them in the ocean.

The tendency to swim against the current seems almost as mechanical as the turning of a weather-vane to the wind. The fish not only swim up stream in the rivers, but in the estuaries, where they are subject

(1) For further details the reader may consult the article on this salmon by Cloudsley Rutter, in the *Popular Science Monthly* for July, 1902, or the still more popular one by the same author in the *Overland Monthly* for February and March, 1902. See, also, the account by David Starr Jordan in the *Standard Natural History*, vol. iii., Boston, 1885, reprinted also in his volume of *Science Sketches*, Chicago, 1888.

to both river and tidal currents; they swim against the rising tide (i. e., toward the sea) while it lasts, and against the ebb tide while that lasts, and reach the steady river current in the end only because the river and ebb tide together make the outflow longer than the inflow. The delay thus caused in the river mouth has sometimes been described as a playing or dallying of the fish before setting out in earnest on his up-stream journey, but its real nature is as I have stated. The same thing happens in an exaggerated form to fish of various sorts when resting pools are mistakenly placed in the fish-ways intended to help them over dams and up waterfalls. The pools are full of cross currents or eddies in which the fish seem to get lost, and, instead of making their way up stream, settle down to swimming round and round against the current in the pool.¹ The head-to-current position is a common one with many fishes when lying in the stream; it is the position of the young salmon in their migration down river in the spring, and, as already stated, that of the old after spawning. It is a good one for breathing, and in the case of the young, for feeding. Thus in taking the head-to-current position the fish appears to be taking the position of least physiological resistance. If this is so, the up-stream swimming might turn out to be, as far as the fish himself is concerned, nothing more than an insistent impulse to *swim*, the current determining where. It thus would seem to be only another example of the familiar restlessness which so often in other animals heralds the approach of the mating season.

The return to the same river is even simpler. The fish range in the ocean but a short distance from the place where they first enter it, and most of them when ready to spawn are reached by the waters of the stream from which they came out.

The habit of inland spawning has been plausibly traced by Gurley to a habit of beach spawning still practiced by distant kindred of the salmon. Varying from this in the direction of fresh water spawning, the salmon have been lead on by natural selection (working through the advantages of spawning in running fresh water) to their present state,—a result to which the gradual lengthening of the rivers coincident with the geological elevation of the continent may also have contributed.

The other features of the spawning process, the refusal of food, the choosing of a suitable place for spawning, and the scraping up of the "nest," are probably all equally simple reactions to some feature of the inner or outer conditions in which the fish finds himself at the moment,

(1) For a full discussion of these matters, and others connected with the migrations of the salmon, see an article by Dr. R. R. Gurley on *The Habits of Fishes* in the *American Journal of Psychology* for July, 1902.

and into which his previous reactions have brought him. He does in each case the thing that lies before him to do (and which the structure of his nervous system makes it nearly impossible for him not to do) and so in the end accomplishes that for which, unknown to himself, his journey has been undertaken. His condition is like that of a sea captain who goes from port to port, finding at each the owner's orders as to what he shall do there and where he shall go next, and knows nothing of the ultimate destination of his vessel. The fish carries in his physical structure, especially in that of his nervous system, the proper orders for his voyage, each opened for him *seriatim* and at the proper time by the physical and physiological conditions in which he happens then to be. His orders are appropriate at each stage, because through countless ages those fishes whose neural orders were not appropriate have failed in their spawning, and thus left no issue to continue their maladjustment.

One's estimation of the intelligence of the salmon is a good deal lowered by hearing the conclusion of the spawning process. Rutter says:—

“It is not spawning itself that produces this effect [great emaciation and general wreck], but the continuation of the spawning efforts after all ova have been extruded and fertilized. Usually there is considerable vitality in both sexes at the time of the complete extrusion and fertilization of the ova, and they have enough energy left, in many cases, to carry them back to the ocean. But they exhibit no inclination to go. Instead, they continue on the spawning beds, persevering in their efforts to spawn and to fertilize more eggs. When one fish of a pair dies, the other seeks or is sought by a new mate. Probably the female never notices the death of the male, as there are nearly always several males fighting around each ‘nest.’ If there happens to be no salmon in the vicinity when one of a pair dies, the survivor continues his or her efforts alone, futile though they are.

“* * * There is no instinct whatever to return to salt water. It is even doubtful whether they would revive if taken back. The dog salmon and hump-back salmon spawn in small streams that empty directly into the ocean, and then are found dying or dead in brackish water. The fact that all salmon, of the genus *Oncorhynchus*, die immediately after spawning once cannot be questioned.”¹

It is indeed a mistake to attempt to argue the intelligence of an animal from the adaptation of means to ends that are discoverable in his habits, however beautiful this may be. The most that can be said is that higher intelligence probably goes with more complicated habits and lower intelligence with simpler, on the ground that the more complex the conditions to be met and the nicer the adjustment to them required, the less likely would it be that the whole detail of the animal's behavior could be left to the unaided neural mechanism. It is worth observing, on the other

(1) Rutter, *op. cit.*, p. 211.

hand, that great fixity in the main features of an instinct and great stupidity in carrying it out do not exclude some coöperation of intelligence of a limited sort in executing the details. Thorndike's minnow in following its fixed instinctive preference for a darkened resting place profited by experience in learning the shortest road thither; and the same is conceivably the case with the salmon in his longer up-stream journey. As Professor Whitman remarks:—

“The clock-like regularity and inflexibility of instinct, like the once popular notion of the ‘fixity’ of species, have been greatly exaggerated. They imply nothing more than a low degree of variability under normal conditions. Discrimination and choice cannot be wholly excluded in every degree, even in the most rigid uniformity of instinctive action. Close study and experiment with the most machine-like instincts always reveal some degree of adaptability to new conditions.”¹

The three topics considered thus far, the sense responses of fishes, their ability to learn, and the interplay of their instincts and environment, are objective phenomena and approachable by direct observation and experiment. If we attempt to go further and discuss the nature of fish intelligence, we can do so only by inference and on the assumption that the mind of fishes is similar, at least in its plan and elemental activities, to the mind of man as we know it,—as like, perhaps, as the fish body is to the human body. We shall, therefore, be dealing with probabilities and plausible conjectures rather than demonstrable facts, and the statements that follow should be read with this clearly in mind. What justification there is for the assumption of such a similarity we shall consider after we have completed our picture.

In view of the facts already stated, it does not seem very violent to assume that fishes have some sort of perception of things about them, that these percepts are associated with one another according to the common “laws of association” (that is, according to recency, frequency, and vividness), and that they are, if often repeated, retained in memory, though not necessarily subject to voluntary recall.² Bateson's observation that smell feeders do not recognize food by sight, though well able

(1) Whitman, *op. cit.*, p. 331.

(2) Edinger seems to deny association to fishes, saying expressly (*op. cit.*, p. 393), “Not a single fact forces upon us the assumption that these simple processes are accompanied or dominated by the mental process of associating of ideas.” But the contradiction is probably more in appearance than in reality. Edinger, I take it, is referring to the association of fully *conscious ideas*, and my statement is made with reference to such association as may take place in the formation of the simplest neuromuscular habits, e. g., when a baby is learning to grasp with his hand under guidance of his eyes.

to see, shows the existence of natural apperceptive groupings among the percepts. That these same fish are roused up to hunt for food when they sense it in the water, and that the sight feeders gather at the margin when they see the keeper approach shows the presence of a spontaneous or reflex attention. That they learn by experience would seem to show that some of the percepts are agreeable and others disagreeable. Their behavior in the presence of enemies, mates, and rivals, and in the case of those that protect their nests and young, when near their nests, would make it seem likely that they may experience in rudimentary forms the fundamental emotions of fear, sex love, sex rage, and the love of offspring. The fact that their actions under such circumstances are mainly reflex does not by any means exclude the simultaneous experience of these emotions. Further, if the stories of the luring of certain fishes by lights are true, and if the phenomenon is not a purely physiological one like the flight of a moth into the candle, they may perhaps possess the beginnings of curiosity. They seem also subject to confusion when their surroundings are suddenly changed, as for example, when the aquarium is turned about.¹ Their actions are either reflex or impulsive in lowly sort; but now and then, as in overcoming an instinctive fear, there may be a struggle of impulses,—the minute bud from which in man blossoms out voluntary action. The total of consciousness which these make up can hardly be other than low in intensity and narrow in range, equivalent, perhaps, to the lowest idiocy when measured by human standards.

Such a technical catalogue of inferences as that just given is not very illuminating; let us try to reach something more concrete by starting negatively and throwing out from mental life as we know it all that is

(1) The following observation upon a stickleback is given by Lloyd Morgan, *Animal Behavior*, London, 1900, pp. 130 f. "A nest had been built in a round glass bell jar which stood near a window. Some aquatic vegetation grew in the tank, and the nest was built on the window side. An experiment was made by turning the large bell jar through a right angle. The male stickleback searched for its nest in the old direction on the window side,—that is to say, the same position in reference to the incidence of the light. The search was, of course, fruitless, and a new nest was begun in this position. Presently the old nest was discovered, and was then vigorously destroyed in just the same way as the nest of a rival is pulled to pieces and scattered. Here a new incidence of light and new direction of shadows seemed to have completely transformed the visual situation."

A repetition of this experiment in the Clark Laboratory last spring showed substantially the same results, though the tank was restored to its original position before the nest itself was attacked. The tank was turned through one hundred and eighty degrees. The fish swam back and forth a number of times between the old and the new positions, examining both, not quite satisfied with the nest in its new place and not finding it in the old.

characteristically human or by inference belongs to the higher animals, and after that, giving a little more rein to conjecture, try to picture to ourselves what a mind so reduced would be like.

In the first place no fish is ever conscious of himself; he never thinks of himself as doing this or that, or feeling in this way or that way. The whole direction of his mind is outward. He has no language, and so cannot think in verbal terms; he never names anything; he never talks to himself. As Huxley says of the crayfish, he "has nothing to say either to himself or any one else." He does not reflect; he makes no generalizations. All his thinking is in the present (with the adjacent past and future) and in concrete terms. He has no voluntary attention, no volition in the true sense, no self-control.

Physiologically considered, his life consists of certain inner and outer excitations and of the movements appropriate to them. A few of the excitations,—those that at the moment are accompanied or followed closely by others causing feelings of unusual discomfort or satisfaction,—rise for a moment into obscure consciousness and are perceived; and they continue thus to rise as occasion demands until the formation of a new habit has avoided the discomfort or until familiarity has brought down satisfaction to the customary level. Then they relapse into their former unnoticed condition. Not all the excitations to which the fish is exposed are likely to give him discomfort or satisfaction and thus win their way into consciousness. He notices in the whole mass of things about him only those that his inherited organization and his experience have made significant for him. The rest pass unperceived, and are as though they were not. Food, enemies, mates, and rivals at the spawning time, the nest and young among nesting fishes, companions among shoaling fishes,—these and a few like them are the things that win their way into the consciousness of the fish. But even then they are perceived in gross, as unanalyzed wholes, and saturated with feeling—rather as things delectable or fearful than as having qualities of their own. Only in the rare and uncertain cases of curiosity or confusion might an object receive attention for itself. Even the percepts which do rise above the level of native inattention are apt to remain isolated, form few connections among themselves, and do not easily recall each other. As a learner a fish is in most matters extremely stupid.

On the development of a percept action follows as a matter of course, with little or no further consciousness. When there is hesitation, as in the case of a new sort of behavior partly learned, there is probably nothing more to be met than an alternation in attention of the conflicting aspects of the situation. The mental state is an unanalyzed whole,

like that of a tennis player uncertain whether the ball will bound high or low. His mind is on the moving ball, he is drawn by contrary impulses, but he does not analyze his mental state; the uncertain situation and the differing movements necessary to meet it are all inseparably joined; now one aspect of it (with its appropriate movement) and now the other taking precedence in consciousness. States like these, emerging infrequently and partially from a condition resembling inattention, or even sleep, save for its bodily alertness, would, if I am not mistaken, make up the highest level of the mental life of fishes.

So far we have used freely the terms of human psychology as the easiest in which to discuss the questions before us. It is time that we should go back and state the grounds, such as they are, for supposing that animal minds are, as we have assumed, in plan at least, like human minds. What right have we to talk, for example, about a fish's *seeing*, *feeling*, or *remembering*?

The naïve belief that other creatures have minds like our own rests on an inference from act to mental state. Our fellow men do the things that we do, therefore they think and feel as we do; the animals do things like those that we do, therefore they think and feel as we do. The inference is fully justified only when applied to the behavior of creatures *exactly* like ourselves in structure and conditions of life. With men living in the same community it is so nearly correct, however, that social action is safely based on it. As the resemblance decreases, the inference becomes more and more uncertain; and it would have little force when applied to animals low in the scale were it not supported by the belief that man's mind, as well as his body, has been derived by evolutionary processes from animal ancestors. If his mind is so derived, it might be expected to bear some resemblance in its fundamental features to the minds of creatures to which man is akin physically, even though the kinship is not very close. The argument needs great caution, of course, in its application to creatures far removed from man. It is necessary that inferences be based on significant resemblances and that the preliminary analysis of human psychic states should be adequate. The inferences must also be checked at every turn by the fullest possible knowledge of the behavior and normal environment of the animals in question. Properly guarded there is no reason to question the probability of the results reached.¹ We are justified in expecting to find animal minds in plan like

(1) Professor Minot in his presidential address before the American Association at its Pittsburg meeting, 1902, remarked of this argument, "As regards at least mammals—I think we could safely say, as regards vertebrates—the proof is the whole sum of our knowledge of the structure, functions, and life of these animals." P. 15 of the reprint from *Science*, N. S., vol. xvi., pp. 1-12, July 4, 1902.

that of man—as like roughly, I repeat, as his physical form and functions are like those of man.

But even when we have our general warrant for arguing from one to the other, we are sadly at a loss as yet to know how the mental life of fishes would look from within. The best that we can do is to try, as we have already done, to reduce ourselves by subtraction to the level of fish activities, and then to inquire how little of consciousness would be required for their performance. A relatively high pitch of consciousness is usually found when adjustment to a new situation is demanded, i. e., when some change in customary behavior is necessary, when something must be learned. From this it grades downward to the unconsciousness of complete inattention or to that of deep sleep. What degree of human consciousness then is required, if we follow our parallel, for learning such things as a fish learns? Could a man learn them when sunk in the depths of sleep or when wholly preoccupied? If so, it would be evidence, so far as it goes, that the learning consciousness of fishes is about on a level with that of a man in deep sleep or preoccupation. A clever experimenter might perhaps bring this matter to a definite test; for the present, however, we are confined to casual observation and to experiments undertaken with other ends in view, none of which give us very much light. It seems not unlikely, however, that a minimum of consciousness may be necessary for acquisition, and, though we do not at all know, such a minimum has been assumed in the conjectural sketch above.¹

It is, of course, perfectly possible for any one who cares to do so to contend that even the capacity to learn does not justify us in crediting fishes with a mental life even in the remotest degree resembling our own; and no one can definitely prove him in error, for as Huxley says again in reference to the crayfish, “nothing short of being a crayfish would give us positive assurance that such an animal possesses consciousness.” But few would be willing, I suppose, to apply such a principle with full rigor, for it would not only forbid us to attribute experiences resembling our own to the higher animals, but even to other human beings. If one draws a line at the higher animals or at man, he must admit other

(1) Lloyd Morgan recognizes three grades of consciousness in the animal series: *sentience*, when consciousness is a mere accompaniment; *consentience*, when consciousness has become a guide; and *consciousness in a restricted sense*, when it has become reflective and rational in a high degree (*op. cit.*, pp. 61 f.). The sort of consciousness which seems to me fair to attribute to fishes is the first of these (*sentience*) of a limited sort, breaking over at times into the borderland of *consentience* when they are acquiring new habits.

criteria of consciousness than introspection and thus surrender his main contention.

The most interesting aspects of fish psychology,—turning away from these theoretical matters,—lie not in the estimation of the psychic rank and ability of the fishes themselves, nor in the discovery of the nature of their consciousness, but in the contribution such a study may make to the wider problems of the origin and development of mind in the animal series. The evolutionary psychologist is at an enormous disadvantage in comparison with the morphologist. Animal behavior has not been preserved in the rocks as animal forms have been. Nevertheless, it seems possible, by the comparison of the habits of different species of the same genus and of different genera of the same family, and so onward through the scheme of classification, to arrive by a sort of triangulation at some useful notion of the habits of ancestral types and of the derivation of later habits from these. A broad study of the habits and mental powers of fishes, as the lowest of the vertebrates, may be expected to throw light upon the original forms of neural and psychic activity from which the habits and mental capacities of the higher animals and man have sprung. The work is nearly all to do and must cover not only the fishes but all the other types between them and man. A hint of how illuminating such a study might be is given in Professor Whitman's lecture on "Animal Behavior," already referred to, where he traces the incubation instincts of birds and the similar habits of reptiles and fishes to the simple protection of the eggs by the female, who from physical exhaustion incident to the ripening and depositing of them, sinks to rest near by them, and in a similar way connects the habit of stalking the prey, found also in some fishes, and the pointing of dogs to a distant original in timidity.

THE GONCOURTS

BY (THE LATE) L. MARILLIER

WHEN Edmond and Jules de Goncourt, who had already won enviable distinction by their historical works, published in 1860 the first of their novels, "Men of Letters" (Charles Demailly), in which their power as writers unmistakably manifests itself, they were bitterly disappointed to find that nearly all the critics were either disdainfully hostile or sourly indignant, while the public remained silently indifferent, its habitual attitude towards wearisome books that are not fortunate enough to provoke laughter by some peculiarity. Readers insist on being entertained, and they bear a grudge to writers who have induced them to spend three francs, fifty centimes, or five francs, as the case may be, and who have not, in return, given them good measure of tears or laughter; they are apt to revenge themselves on such writers by forgetting their very names. It strikes us, forty years later, as singularly unjust, and at first sight inexplicable, that a master-work like this should have proved a failure, considering that the De Goncourts had put into it all that was best, most delicate, most incisive, most sparkling in the way of the thoughts they had turned over for ten years; a book in which descriptions of natural scenes, filled with tender and penetrating grace, alternate with scenes of literary life written with incomparable fire, dash, and vigor; a book in which the feminine mind has been analyzed with a pitiless clear-sightedness that at times equals that of Balzac or Stendhal.

Yet it is not difficult to ascertain the causes that led to the temporary failure of a noble and most persevering effort. First and foremost, in that boldly dashed off sketch of the world of journalism and letters, more than one free-lance of the minor press and more than one advertising tout and scandal monger had recognized his own portrait, and had been at once angered and annoyed by the likeness. Critics, poets, and novelists alike were wrathful—and the angriest were those against whom the sharp but healthy satire, so fresh and fine in its justice, was not directed—that any man should have dared to lay hands upon the sacred ark of literature, and exhibit to the public the seamy side of the stage setting, the substructures of the stage, and all the secret weaknesses, the cleverly concealed flaws, and the vices of colleagues whom they themselves prized at their real worth, or even somewhat below it.

Members of the upper ten and of the middle classes adopt, in the matter of new plays, the judgment of the dramatic columns of their

Translated by Professor F. C. de Sumichrast of Harvard University.

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papers, and where novels are concerned, they are even more chary of holding opinions differing from those of the writers whose signatures figure at the end of lives and literary talks in reviews and newspapers. If the book is entertaining it is read, but nothing is said of the fact; if the play moves to tears or laughter, these good people go to see it, more than once, it may be, but they regain their self-esteem by taking a very high tone in the drawing rooms with regard to the ridiculous drama or the insipid farce to which they have done the honor of listening for lack of something better to do.

It was just the same in 1860, and it is no wonder that the public of that day should have trusted to the decision of experts and declared, on their authority, that this book, which, to be properly appreciated, called for attention and reflection, and which could not be understood if read in a jolting railway carriage or amid the empty buzz of the talk of a casino, was unreadable. Then the French are very apt to insist that a man shall not upset the idea that has been formed of his powers, and when a writer has been put down as an historian, it is thought to be strangely erratic on his part to indulge in the composition of novels or the rhyming of sonnets and to attempt literary criticism, forsooth! Such conduct on his part compels men to strike out the label that has been placed under his name, and that is a nuisance, the public being lazy and much annoyed by whatever interferes with its habits. Therefore it blames the landscape painter who tries his hand at portraits and the sculptor who forsakes the chisel for the brush. It is true that Goethe's universal genius is admired, but then he is a German, and foreigners are treated in this respect with peculiar indulgence. Lucky is it for Voltaire and Diderot that they were born in the eighteenth century!

The Goncourts' first novel had been forgotten, and deservedly so. It had seen the light some ten years before this time, and sixty copies only had been sold. Barring a few pages in which their gift of style revealed itself, a style so original and so peculiar to them, and that vision of things that has the very color and motion of life, and which imparts such marked interest and piquancy even to the least note of theirs,—barring these two qualities, the book was unmistakably a youthful work in which the authors were seeking to ascertain the effect their prose would produce once it was set up in type and dressed in a yellow cover. Such works have nothing interesting in themselves, unless they are followed by other books really worthy of the name, in which case they help one to understand the formation and growth of the author's talent. Otherwise their proper place is the stall of the second-hand bookseller, and it is a mere waste of time to remove them from the shelf on which they are exposed to the weather.

The Goncourts were themselves so well aware of this, that they destroyed with their own hands the whole edition that then cumbered a garret in their house. Edmond de Goncourt, at the earnest request of M. Kirstmaekers, had the novel reprinted subsequently, but only when the position he had acquired among men of letters was such that the liveliest interest was felt in the various documents that might throw some light upon the hard apprenticeship he had served to the business of author. Putting aside for the time any further attempt at novel writing, making up their minds indeed not to clothe in clever and brilliant, though somewhat affected and bespangled dress, the articles in which accurate and painful observation of reality was concealed under the multiple arabesques of style, and which appeared in their cousin De Villedeuil's papers, the "Éclair" and "Paris," side by side with lithographs by Gavarni, their intimate friend and master of social and philosophical sciences, they devoted themselves ardently to writing the history of manners in the eighteenth century, a period that had fascinated them from the first by its grace, its elegance, its wit, and its easy ways.

They published in quick succession a "History of French Society During the Revolution" (1854), a "History of French Society During the Directoire" (1855), a study of "Sophie Arnould" (1857), two volumes of "Familiar Portraits of the Eighteenth Century" (1857 and 1858), a "History of Marie-Antoinette" (1858), and by 1859 they had begun to bring out in parts the masterly work they intended to devote to "Art in the Eighteenth Century," which was not completed until 1875. Henceforth they were classed among historians, especially historians of the reigns of Louis XV. and Louis XVI., and of social life in the days of the Revolution. The fact that they were taking upon themselves to be art critics and to portray both Watteau and Marie-Antoinette was in itself a marked violation of the accepted rules, a violation aggravated by the further fact that they illustrated their works themselves, being as clever water color painters and engravers as they were clever writers.

Still, this much was forgiven them, though they had reached the very limits of the public's long suffering kindness, and they could not expect public opinion to be indulgent when it occurred to them to study the very society of which they formed a part, and to present to readers their own observations and reflections upon the middle classes, men of letters, and actors, and this not in the form of a learned essay upon contemporary society, with a wealth of figures and references, that some heavy review would have taken under its wing, but mingled with descriptions of landscapes rivaling in execution the paintings of Dupré and Corot, and linked together by the slender thread of a romantic plot, too

simple and straightforward to win the hearts of female readers who, besides, were bound to be shocked by the disdainful bitterness with which the authors spoke of love.

Then both the subject itself and the manner in which they treated it were calculated to upset the classifying mania of critics and the public alike, so that the Goncourts were speedily termed polygraphs and amateurs. Amateurs! Nothing worse could be said of them. Was it not scandalous that men who were neither professors nor members of the Institute of France, neither former students in the *École Normale* or in the *École des Chartes*, nor corresponding members of any academy, men who held no other university degree than that of Bachelors of Arts, who belonged to no society of political economists, who had always lived apart from politics and had never dabbled in them, that such men should assume the right to produce big books crammed full of unpublished and interesting facts, should take up the business of historians and excel in it, and all this without asking any one's leave?

Still more scandalous was it since these unauthorized persons were writers by profession, who actually published books because it pleased them to do so, and who could be sure of dining every day of their lives even if they let their ink dry up in the bottle! Intolerably scandalous did it become when these historians whom Michelet, a competent judge in such matters, treated as colleagues and with a sort of touching equality, when these men transformed themselves into novelists without a word of warning! It really did seem at first sight as if they were after other men's bread, and public opinion is severe towards grabbers.

But the public was soon reassured on this point. This publishing business was merely an aristocratic fancy not to be taken seriously. Yet Jules de Goncourt died of it, killed, at the age of thirty-nine, by excess of continuous labor and lack of rest. Not until his death did the critics and the public learn to call no longer "amateurs" these two men of letters who so devotedly loved their profession and who lived for it alone. Of course the Goncourts did bear the name De Goncourt—although even their right to their own name was questioned—and this fact did not tend to make them acceptable to their fellows in the world of letters. Probably in these snobbish days of ours matters might be different, but at that time it was quite sufficient to justify their being treated with the somewhat disdainful condescension that professional writers adopt towards newcomers and to justify, also, the jealousy entertained towards them. Between them the Goncourts had about twelve thousand francs a year, and they were, therefore, classed among society people, wearers of kid

gloves, and public opinion, as manifested in literary beer gardens and the cheap press, was hostile to them.

There were other and deeper motives, however, for the hostility which, until Jules de Goncourt died, was exhibited towards the two brothers, whose dignified life, high, intellectual probity, disdain for vulgar success, and perseverance in work ought at least to have secured them respect. Every one of their novels caused a scandal, and, strange to say, in spite of the noise made about them, these novels failed to secure readers. This double ignoring of their talent was due to the same cause: their very originality that disconcerted the habits both of the critics and of the reading public. The novelty of their methods of composition and of style, the novelty of their conception itself of the novel scarcely attract any attention today. We admire their works, we enjoy their power and charm, we feel in them the free and spontaneous expression of the least conventional, the least factitious, and the most individual of talents, but there is nothing in them to shock our customary modes of thought, our usual way of looking at things. Perchance at times we are struck by a certain unfamiliarity in some chapter or some page, but the reason is that they contain peculiarities of style that are now obsolete, and ideas that strike us as somewhat old fashioned and that indicate the date of publication of the work. The audacity of which the two brothers gave proof in the selection of their subjects, in the plot of their novels, the boldness of the opinions they have put into the mouths of their characters, the liberties they take with the conventions of every-day grammar, and the harmoniously balanced and constructed periods of academic speech, their use of inversions and neologisms, their habit of introducing into their style, which is always highly wrought and exceedingly literary, every carelessness of familiar conversation, technical terms drawn from the vocabulary of artists, and the slang of every business, whether reputable or not, their mode of writing itself, which is practically a means of transposing sensations of color into verbal images, all these things, it must be owned, appear to us the most natural possible, and it becomes necessary to make an effort in order not to deny the authors a portion at least of that innovating originality to which they are unquestionably entitled.

It is because we have ourselves adopted the best part, the most individual part of their style and their modes of thought that the novels of the Goncourts no longer startle any one nowadays, even when read for the first time. Most of our contemporary novelists are their disciples, unwittingly at times; and their imitators, whose name is legion, have, though they did not set out to do so, transformed the revolutionaries of yesterday into the classical writers of today.

Art criticism and literary criticism have felt their influence just as deeply as the novel, while it is possible to find marked proofs of it in nearly every column of the newspapers and table talk. But it is probably the stage that has most felt that influence of theirs, and it might be maintained, without indulging in a paradox, that they have been the invisible and involuntary collaborators of the authors of many a play produced by Antoine.

Our historians have very often in recent years, and without being aware of it, adapted their works to the new taste the cultured public has exhibited for accurate and colored descriptions, for life-like and picturesque details, for unpublished documents, for narrations drawn from the memoirs of the people who witnessed or shared in events. It is now a recognized custom to greatly enlarge the number of illustrations in serious works and to draw from the best sources the images of life in the past that are to be placed before readers. And historians have contracted this habit not only because they themselves felt more clearly the need of explaining events by a direct view of the environments in which these events occurred, not only because they were led by their critical scruples to break with the conventional local color to which romanticism had accustomed its adherents, but because they had to take into account the new exigencies of the public, and the share of the Goncourts in giving rise to these exigencies is larger than is generally believed.

Their very keen appreciation of French art in the reign of Louis XV. and that of Louis XVI., of the furniture, the statuettes, the tapestries, the Sevres and Dresden china, the elegant and graceful trifles collected around them by the women of an age that Michelet declared to have been an age of greatness, but that knew at the same time how to surround its loftiest and deepest thoughts with infinite, witty good humor, that appreciation contributed unmistakably to determine the profound transformation in the modern fashion of furnishing and decorating homes. True, fashion has changed once more and Empire furniture contends for the pride of place in our drawing rooms with tables of the times of Henry II. and coffers made out of panels removed from the stalls in old churches, but we have grown up in the artistic atmosphere created by the writings of the Goncourt brothers.

Then it is to them also that Asia owes its entrance into our lives, that the kakimonos and fukousas of Japan, the bronzes, porcelains, ivories, and jades of the Empire of the Rising Sun, the delicate and suggestive works of the Outanaros and the Houkousais have been enabled to open up a broader way into our dwellings. Artists have, in their turn, observed that their own view of nature and their own notions of decora-

tion have become greatly modified by the influence of that subtle art which suggests rather than imitates and expresses. The drawings, the pastels, the designs for furniture, the crystal ware set in bronze, the stone ware with which their fancy has played, have rendered more striking still the exoticism in our homes, where the soft colors of an eastern rug are outspread at the feet of a placid Buddha. We live in the very setting in which the Goncourts chose to place their life of men of letters, and that setting has been drawn with their own hands, every ornament in it has been skilfully wrought by them, and they it is who have given it that patina which, in their opinion, best sets it off. Their mode of speech has unconsciously become our usual mode of speech, and by dint of repeating their paradoxes, which we are quite unaware of not having invented, they have ceased to be paradoxes for us.

It is not surprising, therefore, that we do not find in their works that piquancy and startling novelty which repelled the reading public of the Second Empire while irresistibly attracting a few of the more refined, who, tired of the monotonous diet to which they were condemned by the epigoni of romanticism, disgusted by the wretched style of the champions of realism, and that of their master Champfleury first and foremost, eager for unexpressed sensations and seeking a more youthful beauty yet thrilling with that life which these wizards of the pen knew how to communicate to their creations in pages, many of which recall the transparent splendor of a painting by Turner, they turned to these works, that overflowed with poetry and reality, for the revival of their minds. They perceived but dimly the fecundating power that resided in these few novels; they did not assign their true rank to the men who had written them with the very essence of their souls, and who had lived them ere writing them, but they patterned their methods of composition, their style, and their way of looking at things even, after the methods, the style, and the point of view of the authors of "*Germinie Lacerteux*," "*Manette Salomon*," and "*Madame Gervaisais*," and this without seeking to do so or being aware that they were doing so. Yet in these books, the spell of which they owned, there were many turns of speech, many peculiar points of view, and fashions of judging, and ways of feeling that disconcerted and bewildered them, and which even the members of the Magny dinners, save and except Théophile Gautier, could not always manage to accept willingly.

Those of us who have lived since our earliest years in the intellectual environment created, towards the close of the Second Empire, by the works of the Goncourts and those which were more or less kin to them, cannot enjoy as keenly their novel originality, and there is nothing in

them to offend us save here and there some old fashioned reminder of the style and of the wit of the Goncourts, who were the models followed by these other writers. In order to estimate at their true value the innovations introduced by the two brothers into fiction, we must separate ourselves from our own environment and our own times, put aside our own ideas and feelings, and deliberately go back some forty years. Twenty-five years hence it will be easy to appreciate them as they deserve to be, for by that time their conception of the novel will have been replaced by another, and we shall have learned to look upon the world with other eyes, as indeed some are already trying to do. But that time has not yet come, and it is through the glasses, the lenses of which have been so ingeniously cut by them, that we still naturally look upon men and things

Their fame is declining; since the death of Edmond de Goncourt the shadows of forgetfulness have been falling denser and denser upon their memory; the very men, among our younger writers, who owe most to them, think least often of them, yet they are acting more powerfully and more deeply than ever upon our minds. Here is the proof of it: Some twenty years ago, when I read "Manette Salomon" or "Renée Mauperin," I was stopped at every page by a sentence that struck me as eccentric or affected, by an image that was strange or far-fetched, or by a thought that seemed to me expressed in that particular way with the somewhat puerile intention of startling the average reader. For the past few weeks I have been re-reading some one of the works of the Goncourts, and I have failed to experience my former sensations. As I peruse these complex and teeming books, written in a subtile and iridescent style, I marvel at times at the sobriety and closeness of the composition, and I incline to the belief that the affectation and the elaboration I believed to exist in the novels of the brothers were due to my imagination alone, or to my prejudices. But at other times my memories of my reading of these books in former days revive so strongly and so sharply in me, that for a moment I cannot bring myself to believe that the works I am glancing through now are the same which I read of yore in my little student's room. The books themselves have not changed, however, but I have lost the mental attitude I had acquired through my classical education. I no longer look upon the world through a page of Corneille, Bossuet, or Pascal, and the visible universe has acquired in my eyes an amount of importance and reality it did not then possess. It is not the direct influence of the Goncourts that has brought about this change, but it is due to my living amid environments in which prevail modes of thought, and even more, ways of looking at men and things that, in more than one respect, might be—and possibly should be—attributed to them.

Yet it is surely allowable, even now, when, after all, to speak of them is, to some extent, to speak of ourselves, to indicate the main features of the lasting originality of their works, though it is true that we are not yet fully freed from the influence they have exerted upon the books and the newspapers we read, the modes of expression of the people we meet in the street or chat with in drawing rooms, the form and origin of the furniture with which we surround ourselves, and the æsthetics of the painters whose pictures hang upon our walls and the posters that figure upon our buildings.

Two aptitudes are to be met with, in different degrees, in novelists that are something more than mere tellers of pathetic, marvelous, or comic stories. On the one hand, the capacity to analyze psychological events, and the inward motions of the soul, and the power to note the gestures, attitudes, habits, and actions by which these manifest themselves outwardly in innumerable ways; the comprehension also of the structure of the social environment and of the multiple actions and reactions one upon another of the beings who constitute that environment; and on the other hand, the capacity to see the people who come and go in the streets, the houses and trees, the hangings and furniture, the color of the sky, and the shimmer of the water as a painter would see all these things, not in a mass and confusedly, but in every detail, in their minutest peculiarities, in the aspects that depend upon a particular light that changes as the day changes, upon a passing cloud, upon momentary weariness, upon a breath of wind, upon an open window or one that is shut; and further, the capacity to be moved by these multiple aspects of things and to express them in forms of style that render at once the sensation they cause us and the image they leave in our memory.

No doubt a certain importance must be granted to the weaving the story of a novel, the arranging of the plot in which the characters move, the way in which the story itself is told, the art of bringing forward the heroes of the humble drama or of the solemn comedy, the leading them to express by the adventures into which the writer's fancy involves them, the characters he has chosen to give them, and the skill required to make them talk in a way conformable to the situation in which they have been placed. And it is quite possible that a writer who has never cared to listen to what goes on in the mind of a man or the heart of a woman, and who utterly ignores the color of the paper upon the walls of the room in which his life is spent, may have attained a place among the masters of the novel without any injustice being done. It is a precious gift to be able to tell a story well, and it would be the more impertinent to despise it that it is far less common among writers than might be supposed. Men

like Mérimée and Maupassant are rare, nor are Alexandre Dumas much more numerous after all. But it is none the less true that a novelist,—who is, after all, a man whose business it is to write down at first hand the private life of those whom official history ignores and always will ignore, the history of the first creature that happens to come along and also that of the exceptional beings whose very peculiarities furnish a valuable contribution to our acquaintance with the mechanism of thought and of the will, and cast an unexpected light upon the manners of other days,—that a novelist, I repeat, must be essentially a psychologist who is at the same time a painter, a psychologist whose mind is less given to abstractions and who is more susceptible to the shades of feeling than to the general laws which rule all feelings; a painter who has preferred the pen to the brush because, though it renders the multiple aspects of things with less precision, accuracy, and power, it is endowed with more suppleness, lightness, and vivacity, if I may so put it, and succeeds in rendering what scarcely existed a moment since and has now already ceased to exist.

It is exceedingly rare, however, that one of these two capacities does not prevail to the extent of reducing the other to play a very secondary part. Stendhal and Benjamin Constant are marvelous analysts but most inferior painters, and although Paul Bourget has abundantly proved that he is able to make a landscape vividly visible with a few strokes of the pen, he has not cared, as a rule, to finish as fully as might have been desired the rich sketches of the environments in which he has chosen to set his characters; he describes, he enumerates, but he does not paint. Théophile Gautier and Victor Hugo have painted, with a power that the greatest artists might well envy them, scenes of human life, faces of men and women, views of sea or forest, palaces, and low hovels, but they have not bethought themselves of penetrating very far into the secrets of the mental mechanism that leads their heroes to act as they do. Balzac himself, whose prodigious genius dominates all literary work in France during the century that has just closed, and who reveals himself on every page of his books as being possibly the most sagacious of all the observers of the human soul and of its primitive passions as well as the best informed and the most searching of the historians of social life, Balzac makes inventories of furniture, counts the trees on a walk, describes with the accuracy of a tailor or a dressmaker the costumes worn by his characters, and with a single word imprints upon his reader's memory the essential features of their physiognomy, but he does not compel us to *see* the furniture, the clothes, the trees, the angelic or the perfidious smile.

At the time when the Goncourts were publishing their first novels, Flaubert was about the only writer who had managed to combine in himself the consummate learning and the calm reflection of a psychologist of the first rank with the marvelous gift of evoking the life-like aspect not of men alone but of the things in which they leave something of themselves, of the things which have made them what they are and a reflection of which still clings to their faces. These qualities are met with in the Goncourts, but multiplied, increased, and exaggerated, if I may say so; exaggerated to such a degree that the happy equilibrium which existed between them in the case of Flaubert, became impossible through their very excess. "Madame Bovary" is a perfect work, and the same expression rises to the lips when one recalls that delightful tale entitled "Simple Hearted." Numerous, too, are the pages to which it would be proper to apply that epithet in those works of Flaubert that are not as highly finished, merely, it may be, because the great writer, ever dissatisfied with himself, has somewhat deformed them by repeatedly working them over. This is why, if he has not yet acquired a standing in the schools, he is already reckoned a classic for the same reason as Racine, La Bruyère, Chateaubriand, and Victor Hugo.

But it is very doubtful if this shall ever be said of the uneven and elaborated work of Edmond and Jules de Goncourt. The various elements out of which Flaubert composed his characters are all borrowed from real life, but the characters themselves are never exact copies of the individuals that served him for models; these have all undergone a transformation that has raised them to the dignity of types; he has at one and the same time simplified and filled them out; he has, in a word, and if it be allowable to borrow a term from the vocabulary of decorators, given them style. Besides it is his habit in general, to allow facts to speak for themselves; his characters do not describe themselves, and the author intervenes as seldom as possible, and then only in the most discreet manner, when he has to explain the way in which the mechanism works. Of the men and women who come and go in the pages of his books, we see just so much as we would see of their prototypes in real life: their actions, their attitudes, their hobbies, their customary ways; we can hear them talk, and at times the great novelist will tell us what they are thinking, feeling, desiring, or suffering when they themselves are unable to do so. But his analysis ever preserves the narrative form, and it often seems as though he himself knew little more about his characters than they know themselves, though confusedly and obscurely, it is true. He gives a definite form to their state of mind, unravels it, makes it intelligible for us by depicting in an accurate and life-like manner the environ-

ment in which his peasants, his bourgeois, his artists, or his employees live, move, and have their being, and by telling us what they have done, believed, and thought ere they appeared on the stage to which he has chosen to call them. But he does not dissect their hearts and minds in our presence as Balzac or Stendhal would do it; he supplies us with the most reliable documentary knowledge of them through the apparent deformation of his models, due to his vigorous talent that brings out strongly every feature and gives it its fullest value. It is for us to interpret them. On the other hand, Flaubert seems to take no interest in his characters, or at least to feel such interest only as a naturalist takes in the plants and animals he studies. They haunt him, they possess him at certain times, but he is possessed by them only in the way in which an histologist is possessed when he sees outlined on the paper on which he is writing the epithelial or the nerve cells he has long examined with a microscope. He has not lived their life, he has not suffered as they have suffered, he has not shared their joys, he observes them from outside, and the beings created by his imagination have, so far as he is concerned, precisely the same independent and objective reality as the passers-by he elbows in the street. They are the product of his recollections and of the laborious effort of his thought, but no part of his heart beats within their bosoms. Thus it is that after reading his works one knows but little of the kind of man he was, of his loves and his hatreds, of the particular form of his sensibility, of his mode of acting and of living.

Whoever, on the contrary, is somewhat familiar with the novels of the Goncourts, feels as though he had been intimate with them. Their tastes, their habits, their gestures, their prejudices, the capricious and changeful shades of their likes and dislikes, the sufferings of their frames exhausted by work and of their excitable minds, are as plain then as those of one's closest friends, or of the relatives whose life has been constantly interwoven with one's own. In every turn of the phrase the men appear under the writers, and not dressed up either, but in their books exactly such as they are in their daily life. They are constantly on the stage by the side of their characters, often without desiring it, often, too, without being aware of it. They live the same exciting, nervous life, and weep over the same sorrows. This is why their literary work exhausted the two brothers, and why, turning to their historical work, to their etching, to their water color painting, in which they reproduced on paper the play of the sunlight upon the stones of an old house or upon the rosy cheeks of a young girl, seems to have been a relaxation for them. Then the reality in which they thus infused their souls was not reality harmonized, arranged, and managed with careful, intelligent thought of

the effect to be produced, and with the consummate skill in composition that makes Flaubert the equal of the greatest orators and dramatists of every age; it was reality itself, throbbing and burning, with its incoherences, its peculiarities, and its contradictions.

There is no novelist who has more faithfully reproduced in his work what he has seen than the Goncourts have done. A methodical comparison of their novels and their "Journal," is exceedingly instructive in this respect. Whole pages of the "Journal," have been transferred to all the books they have produced and even to their dramas, without other change almost than corrections in the style. If it be not the world as it really is that is reflected in their works, it certainly is the world as they saw it. The dramatists whom Antoine welcomed to the Théâtre Libre have often boasted of having put on the stage "slices of life," but long before they had thought of writing, Edmond and Jules de Goncourt had introduced "slices of life" into their novels.

Their one and only thought was to turn out true, living, intense work. They considered that care in composition was of inestimable value, and it satisfied their artistic scruples and their passionate longing for beauty. They very seldom attempted to create types; they reproduced those they saw as accurately, I might almost say, could such expressions be used of such artists, as docilely, as servilely as in them lay. Unquestionably other painters would not have copied these models in the same way, and might have given us portraits of them that, if not so accurate, would at least be more consonant with generally received beliefs. The reason of this difference lies in the fact that the Goncourts did not see stockbrokers and newspaper men, nuns and physicians, servants and workmen, in the same way as they would be seen by an observer studying them with the quiet mind and calm nerves of a botanist examining the veins of a leaf or the petals on a corolla. The Goncourts could not separate themselves from them, they could not help throbbing as they came in contact with their flesh and blood, they unconsciously transfused into them something of the nervous and quivering sensibility that filled them to overflowing. Unconsciously, too, they slightly modify every one of the characters that appear in their works, and bring out strongly in them those features only that have made a marked impression upon their imagination or that have aroused in them a feeling of sympathy or repulsion. They observe emotionally, anxiously, passionately, as do George Eliot, Tolstoi, Dostoiewski, Dickens, and Michelet, as later observed their great friend, Alphonse Daudet, who, having reached mature age, became the disciple of the elder brother.

They were, therefore, incapable of writing a novel in which there

should be no figure of man or woman that did not attract attention by the beauty or the ugliness of its soul, by the complexity of its thoughts, the singularity of its attitude, capacity for suffering or loving, by fancifulness of imagination, in a word, by a strong and original personality manifesting itself in word and action. They were quite unable to conceive or carry out such a novel as "*Bouvard and Pécuchet*," that monument erected by Flaubert to the folly and dead mediocrity of people who can think only as others think, and who feel only as they are told to feel.

It appears to pain them if they have to separate themselves from their characters, and whenever circumstances allow of it, they come on the stage themselves, with so ill fitting a mask that the meanest observer cannot fail to recognize them. They are Charles Demailly, and they are Denoïsel in "*Renée Mauperin*," while it is their own life, in its entirety, that they have retraced in that of Gianni and Nello, the two clowns whose feelings are so fraternally delicate. The story of the two poor acrobats that one glances over rapidly, is the story, to be read between the lines, in "*The Zemganno Brothers*," of the two great writers who for twenty years worked together.

Occasionally the man, under his own name, and not the writer, intervenes directly in the action of the tale, as, for instance, Edmond de Goncourt in the last chapter of "*Eliza the Slut*." The presence of the author of the novel in that silently tragical scene is both a blunder and artistically a mistake; it takes from the dolorous pages a part of the funereal sadness that wells up out of them, renders them less sincere and less apparently true. Mme. Daudet, for whom Goncourt felt the liveliest friendship and whom he trusted implicitly in matters literary, told him this time and again, and her husband, for whose judgment he had the highest respect, laid great stress upon it, but in vain. The pity Goncourt felt for the unfortunate woman whom he looked upon as the victim of a barbarous penal system, could not have been satisfied in his book had he not been present in person at her death.

When the authors do not appear personally in their novels, they are represented by some member of their family, or by some friend who has been intimate with them. In "*Germinie Lacerteux*" it is their cousin; in "*Madame Gervaisais*" it is their aunt; their father and their uncle are found in "*Renée Mauperin*," and a friend of their youth, an intimate friend, Pouthier the painter, enlivens with his pleasantries and his laughter every page of "*Manette Salomon*." Indeed, Germinie herself is none else than their own servant, who was as passionately and faithfully attached to them as the poor creature, mad with love and affection, was

attached to Mlle. de Varandeuil. In "Chérie," the last work of Edmond de Goncourt, remembrances of childhood abound alongside of similar family recollections, many of the incidents being taken from the lives of the two brothers themselves.

Among the ten novels produced either by Edmond and Jules de Goncourt or by the elder brother, after death had deprived him of the other half of himself, I note but two in which their intervention is less immediate and less direct, "Sister Philomena" and "Faustina." And in "Faustina" itself there are often found transposed into another tone feelings that Edmond de Goncourt had experienced himself and traces of which are to be met with on many a page of the "Journal." At times, indeed, the manner in which these are expressed has undergone scarcely any change, and more than one incident of their common life has been introduced into the web of the story, coloring it with a warm reflection of reality and passion. Their souls have dwelt so long in the hospital where the pure and warm hearted nun nursed the sick with her slender hands and wept by the body of the man whom she would have loved had she remained a woman, that a portion of themselves has clung to the stones and wanders down the long corridors. They could not possibly keep themselves out of the book in which flutter the white wings of Sister Philomena's cap.

Nor is it, again, their ever throbbing and sickly sensitiveness that causes them to bend thus over souls and that makes it difficult for them to part with the men and women to whom they have communicated the magic gift of life, it is also their ardent curiosity. It is not enough for them to describe attitudes, to narrate thoughts, to tell of actions, they must also understand them. It does not satisfy them to know what a man feels and wills if they do not know why he wills and feels as he does. Consequently they must penetrate into his most secret being in order to attempt to discover the hidden motives that give birth to the resolves, manifest to all, and to follow the many phases of the slow, inward labor that leads to resolutions and action.

They very often have recourse to physiology and medicine; they love to talk with physicians, for they consider such conversations to be filled with suggestions and revelations for the novelist, and they have wonderfully profited by these talks and by their great range of reading also. Themselves almost constantly ailing, their own perspicacity has been sharpened by the minute and painful observation of their physical troubles. Better than most novelists they have understood that very often one could translate into physiological terms and explain by the disorders of which our bodies are the seat, what cannot be explained by the action

upon our consciences of external events and the innumerable sensations that penetrate into us through our eyes and our ears. They studied, with a care and an accuracy which many professional psychologists might envy, the part played by heredity, and of that social heredity, possibly no less powerful than biological heredity, which is called tradition; the share that belongs to education and to examples placed under the eyes of very young children, to the modes of thought, to the ways of feeling, and to the manner of willing of adults; the action exercised upon the turn of the mind by the material environment, by the conditions of living, by the sight of the things with which the individual cohabits constantly, the modification of his judgments and even of his sensations due to the business he has selected or which circumstances have compelled him to follow.

But there are cases that none of these things suffice to explain, so that the only plan to adopt is to note still more closely and to endeavor to surprise feelings in their birth and thoughts at the moment when they are yet scarcely formed. As a matter of fact, explaining a psychological phenomenon means determining the laws of its genesis and evolution, and this the Goncourts clearly understood. Hence there is not in their analyses that mechanical and artificial feeling that strikes one at times in Stendhal's analogous work. They enable us to penetrate into the secret places of the conscience and to witness the slow transformations by which, influenced in many ways, emotions, desires, and passions change one into another. Their masterpiece in this line is the story of the conversion of Mme. Gervaisais to Roman Catholicism, which forms one of the finest chapters in mystical psychology and which is at the same time one of the most profound ever written. From these tendencies of their minds it is easy to deduce the uneven and stumbling aspect of their published novels: narrations, biographical notes, medical reflections, subtle and refined psychological analyses, scenes hot and throbbing with realism, cries of restrained pain, expositions of æsthetic, literary, or social doctrines; thoughts on passing events and public personages are mingled and confounded in them in an apparent disorder in which comicalities are cheek by jowl with grave dissertations, and sinister portrayals are placed side by side with the most delicate and exquisite accounts of feminine emotions.

Then the excessive side of their marvelous artistic qualities and the peculiar style consequent upon their restless and penetrating way of looking at things intensifies somewhat this impression, disconcerting to those who have not been long familiar with the works of the Goncourts.

Flaubert has given us incomparably powerful, brilliant, and solid

descriptions of Normandy and of the Forest of Fontainebleau; he has painted with a brush at once fiery and skilful unforgettable aspects of Paris, Algeria, and Palestine, but his descriptions, however carefully finished, are the work of a literary man, and in his landscapes one does not feel the hand of the painter. Besides, these descriptions enter into his novels only because they serve as settings for his characters, because they help to make us understand these characters better and enable them to be presented to us in a better light. They are linked to the tale in so natural and so evident a manner that they are thoroughly incorporated with it and could not be separated from it without mutilating the book. It is otherwise in the work of the Goncourts; anything and everything affords them opportunities for describing and painting: a house, a street, a passer-by, a workman in a forge, a woman bending over her child, a horse dragging a cart, the satiny sheen of the shoulders of a society woman, a cloak veiled with lace, the sward in front of some old castle on which the whiteness of peacocks makes splashes of light, the proud grace of a gesture, the elegant curve of the back of an arm-chair, the transparent delicacy of porcelain, and the soft, caressing shadows of an etching. They care little,—and for this much thanks,—whether the pictures they paint with such consummate understanding of the play of light, and in which they turn to account their thorough knowledge of the idiom of painters, are or are not linked to the action of the tale. If they had cared overmuch for this, we should have been heavy losers indeed.

Fromentin is perhaps the only one who rivals them in the difficult and delicate handling of those choice epithets that express those most fugitive tints that play upon the surface of things and make them shimmeringly iridescent like the shades that incessantly flush and swoon on the breasts of doves. The moment they feel an impression they endeavor to render it with as much accuracy, subtle lightness, vigor, and feeling as they can compass with the imperfect instrument of writing, in which words with clear cut contours and frozen meaning, words that are heavy with innumerable remembrances, and call up, by tenuous and distant associations, a whole world of confused images, take the place of the colors on the painter's palette that docilely obey his will, colors that can express anything and will render only what the painter desires to express.

The overmastering spell of art fascinates them, and every object on which a human thought, whether graceful or vigorous, has left its mark, holds their attention in spite of them and compels them to do artistic work in their turn by describing it. They love to dwell amid beautiful stuffs, porcelains with complex and delectable tints, ivories and jades with broken and bold outlines, and the elegant beauty of the many trifles

which constituted feminine luxury in the eighteenth century. Their eyes need to be excited by the color and form of the treasures of art with which they patiently filled their home, and Edmond de Goncourt derived probably greater pleasure from translating into words the impression they produced upon him as he contemplated them and the image they left in his memory than in simply gazing upon them. The beauty of things delights them as it does painters, true painters, who care little for the subject of a painting, for they know that in all paintings there is the same thing: the play of light and shadow that models and brings out at will faces and objects. Nature does not affect them with quick emotion as do works that still bear the imprint of the human hand; indeed, nature appeals to them only when saturated with humanity and impregnated with history. They would have been bored to death in any part of the world where men had not, for many centuries, lived, suffered, and loved. The feeling of sociability is so strongly developed in them that it destroys or attenuates every other. The highest pleasure they can think of is conversation with men of letters, and in this respect they are the legitimate heirs of that eighteenth century in which their minds so long dwelt.

Yet, though they do not care for nature, they see it with the eyes of painters, and there is not one of our novelists, Gautier, Hugo, Daudet, Zola, not even Loti himself, who has equaled them in the power of making us behold the slow flow of waters between the green fronds of plants, the silvery shimmer cast by the noonday sun upon the still surface of the streams, the robust grace of trees, the sumptuous agony of day in the purple of the west, and the awakening of plants that at dawn stretch out their limbs stiffened by the chill of night and open their corollas. Every touch of color they put upon their canvas is right, and the words into which they transpose them allow them to be seen so plainly that while reading certain pages, one would swear the painting was growing of itself upon the margin of the book.

Their style is absolutely the best fitted to attain the end they seek. Their sole object is to make the reader see the men and the things of which they speak as clearly as if these were present, and to make him understand the state of mind of the various characters whose lives they are engaged in relating. Small, however, is the number of people for whom "the visible world" exists, and most difficult is it for any one not a psychologist to lay aside his own self and to feel, if but for a brief time, as others feel. It is repugnant to the best minds to admit into themselves the mystical notions of a woman like Madame Gervaisais, the carnal impulses of a Germinie, or to apply themselves to the quivering of leaves trembling in the breeze or the changing colors of a veil of mist

that reflects the rosy light of morn. The reader's attention fails, and it must be compelled not to fail, hence that style will be the best that will manage to do this, and will do it without sacrificing any part of the analysis or of the description, which are the very "*raison d'être*" of the pages on which they figure. The problem the Goncourts had to solve, and which it may almost be said they did solve, was to render as delicately and accurately as possible the most subtle and fleeting color effects, to analyze with the utmost clearness and minuteness of which they were capable the inward motions of the mind, and to compel the reader, who cares in nowise for all this, to become absorbingly interested in it. They were bound, therefore, to cast aside whatever did not bear directly upon the end they desired to attain. They have not Théophile Gautier's unconscious certainty of language or the fluid ease of George Sand; they are not indifferent to form as was Lamartine, who cared only to move those who listened to his melodious song, yet style, the skilful and complicated structure of periods, the harmony and sonorousness of words, the harmony and cadence of phrases, does not greatly preoccupy them. It is not with them as with Flaubert, to whom these matters were of the supremest importance.

The Goncourts have not much musical sense, and their qualities as writers are the very antithesis of oratorical qualities; it is, indeed, difficult to read their works aloud. What is important in their view, is appropriateness of expression, intensity, and finish of rendering, and the use of novel turns that shall compel attention; anything else scarcely appeals to them; they do not mind incorrections or repetitions. For them the characteristic trait of a writer is the finding of an unusual epithet, by which must not be understood a curious word or a deliberate singularity, but the expression that brings out an unperceived characteristic in an object, an almost effaced trait in a figure, and which is the one and only expression that will do this. Genuine verbs, verbs that describe, abound in their speech, and from this point of view their vocabulary is incomparably rich. To describe by means of verbs is almost to describe the "*becoming*" of beings; it is describing the soul of them, while the epithet merely gives the external appearance, the contour and the color of them.

They were exceedingly fond of technical terms, of words drawn from the speech of the people, of local expressions, which give a clearer and fuller impression of an environment and brings out more strongly the individuality of the one who makes use of them.

Yet they do not waste time upon curiosities of style, to which Edmond de Goncourt objected as strongly as to the platitudes of academic speech;

their sole object is to communicate to others the sensations they themselves experience when they come in contact with events, persons, and things. They seek for combinations of words that shall surprise the reader and awaken his attention. The order of their words is not the logical order, but as in English, as in ancient languages, very often, as in children's speech, it is the emotional order, yet the sentence, though filled with anacoluths and inversions, remains clear, precisely because of the psychologically accurate notation of all the shades of thought and passion. Further, it is not only the feelings that exist in the characters that their style is marked with, but also the feelings that animate the authors themselves. Their quick and painful sensitiveness, their excessive impressionability, the trouble and dismay which is caused in them by the most commonplace happenings in life, the delicacy and mobility of their impressions of nature and art, the disgust, the repugnance they feel, their coldness, their impulsiveness, their childish tenderness, and their melancholy due to disallusion, their perpetual physical weariness and the brilliant and sombre visions that fill their nights are all reflected even in the most delicate shades of the language they use, and which they often make others use, for they are led by a sort of natural affinity to give the place of honor in their novels to those characters whose wounded and easily moved souls makes them kin. And as they feel the sufferings and disappointments of their heroes as keenly as they do their own, there is no style more bewildering, more broken, more loose, more uneven than theirs; none which communicates more suddenly the very throbbing and quaking of life.

Yet in those very parts in which passion exhibits itself most freely, in which the dialogue is the most natural and at times the most brutal, there is never a trace of vulgarity or platitude, and the women dancers of the Boule-Noire, and Jupillon, the glove maker, express themselves in language ever marked by the striving after beauty. No doubt this beauty lacks both nobility and delicacy, but the sentences are well turned and the expressions are delectable; they satisfy the eye like a medal with fine and sharp lines, and no one cares whether the image upon it is that of Vitellius or not.

The marvel is that a work of art, the unity of which, in spite of its wondrous diversity, is so evident, and the style of which is so homogeneous, should have resulted from the collaboration of two writers, of two minds; a collaboration so thorough that, as a matter of fact, it was prolonged for a long time after the death of Jules, and the books which bear the name of Edmond de Goncourt alone are one and all filled with the soul of the brother who had gone before. Yet the two were far from

being replicas of the same model, and at the beginning of their literary career there did not exist that sort of identity of their two minds which was gradually brought about by their living, meditating, and working together. They were quite unlike in temperament, though things impressed them, strangely enough, in a similar way and their judgments of men and ideas did not as a rule differ.

Jules was naturally gay, unreserved, impulsive, while Edmond, on the contrary, was inclined to be melancholy, thoughtful, and reserved. Eight years older than his brother, he had a clearer and more personal feeling for reality, which was most curiously united in him with a marked liking for the vague and mysterious images that suggest to the mind what they cannot evoke. He was irresistibly attracted by the impenetrable unknown that throbs in the very heart of things, and that he did not yield to it is due to his brother's influence and to that of Théophile Gautier, which was marked in his case. After his brother's death, he allowed himself to follow the bent of his own imagination, and by the side of "Eliza the Slut," that strong, cruel book, so masterly in its simplicity, and which he never liked, appeared novels woven out of dreams, such as "The Zemganno Brothers" and "Faustina." His favorite poets were Edgar Allan Poe and Heinrich Heine, and his soul, like Shelley's and Renan's, was full of sorrow and tenderness. But he was passionately fond of erudition and research, passionately fond of "human documents," of observations noted on the spot and put down in their brutal reality, and it was the patient study of the dapper and witty society of the eighteenth century, so fond of pretty things and so careless of the world beyond, the study, also, of the Paris of the Second Empire, thirsting for wealth, eager for enjoyment, and resolutely realistic, that made of him the great novelist and penetrating analyst we have known.

His constant contact with the fanciful spirit, the caustic and pretty, disdainful wit, and the chronic scepticism of his brother, had its share, possibly the chief share, in this momentary and partial transformation of his way of feeling. Jules Janin's influence had also been very marked in the case of the younger brother at the beginning of his career, as had Gautier's upon the elder brother. It was to the constant perusal of Janin's works that Jules owed his affected, spangled style, his fad of passing abruptly from one idea to another, his lack of sequence, his boyishness of thought, his dandyism, and his airy impertinence that at times make the reading of the first works that he wrote in collaboration with his brother rather wearisome. But his admiration for Jules Janin merely helped him on the way to which he was already inclined by temperament, and he had to strive a long time ere he could become

natural and simple. The affected and elaborate manner, the striving after witticisms in words, the glittering style, the fondness for bravura passages and sensational tirades which mark the articles published by the Goncourts in "l'Éclair" and "Paris" (see "Recovered Pages," "Creatures of the Day") lead one to think that it was Jules who, at that time, did most of the writing and that he made his brother adopt his own ways. A very good reason for this is that he was better endowed as a writer; he had a greater mastery of sentences; he knew better how to light upon an ingenious tone, a difficult expression, and he had the gift of dialogue rarely acquired by those who have it not naturally. Consequently he was passionately fond of the drama, and it was not his fault that the literary career of the pair was not directed towards the stage. He has a large share in "Henriette Maréchal," in "The Fatherland in Danger." He could write a note like a contemporary of Louis XV., and he was charged with the care of the whole of their joint correspondence.

Edmond's feeling for natural scenery was much truer and more direct; he experienced, when in contact with artistic objects, the emotion of a dilettante whose glance rests amorously upon a polished ivory or the faded rose of an eastern rug, and this to a degree never attained by his brother; but he did not equal him in his freedom in sketching, his perception of the effects attainable in etching, his limpid touch in water color painting, his semi-instinctive knowledge of methods. And the case was the same in the realm of style.

The Goncourts were turned into writers first by their note-books of travel, and next by their "Journal." To the former they owed it that they did not remain painters; to the latter they were indebted for their originality. It was these brief, truthful notes, these impressions written down while still instinct with life, the direct vision of men and things translated into words that had no thought of being clever, that cured Jules of his pranks and his pretentiousness, and that rendered more flexible the somewhat heavy and awkward sentences of Edmond. Their artistic education inspired them with their wondrous understanding of the visible world, their direct feeling for color values and the play of shadows, their sensitiveness to the beauty of objects and forms, apart from whatever they may mean, which cause them to differ so strikingly from the French writers of the last century.

They might, however, have remained impressionists of the pen, and precursors of the impressionists of the brush, had they not received a system of philosophy from a man and learned a method from the historical works to which they long subjected their artists' imaginations. The man was Gavarni, for strange to say, it was from this caricaturist of

genius that they borrowed their general view of things, or at least their attitude in presence of the universe. They were deeply impressed by the disdainful and pessimistic, at once cruel and pitying conception of the world and society evolved by the author of "The Sayings of Thomas Vireloque," that sceptic, who was free from no prejudice, the man of tradition, who was neither the captive nor even the loyal subject of any creed. It should be added that they handsomely paid their debt of gratitude to him in the noble work they consecrated to his life and work, which was the last book signed by both brothers, who wrote it in 1869-1870. It was published in 1873.

It is to their researches into the eighteenth century that they owe their respect for facts, their love for details, not merely the picturesque but the true details, and their skill in working up documents. The dry, curt, finished tongue of the writers of that day accustomed them to the use of accurate and appropriate terms, to precision of thought, to rigorous analysis. Their intercourse with the men and things of that period taught them not to think in images only and not to mistake metaphors for reasoning.

Then their own ancestry had almost predestined them to the historical labors they undertook. They were sprung from a sound provincial stock; they belonged to that class of the smaller nobility crossed with a strain of the higher middle class in which had survived traditions long since dead and forgotten in the world of finance and trade, and which the sons of the proletariat no longer remembered.

They belonged to the very small company of those realists,—they are called realists at times,—who, though carried away by the observation of contemporary life, never forgot that the world was not made yesterday, and that nothing of what surrounds us is capable of being understood unless one knows accurately what the men who created the society in which we live, and who have transmitted to us the particular turn of mind, the instincts and tendencies which cause us to be what we are, what these men thought, felt, and did. The peculiar merit of the Goncourts lies in the fact that they studied the antecedents of the characters in their novels, not merely as naturalists, psychologists, and physicians, but as historians, just as they had studied "The Mistresses of Louis XV." or the great actresses of the eighteenth century.

The environment in which they had grown up was a family one, a normal and healthy environment. It is not with the eyes of Bohemia or of the frequenters of cosmopolite drawing rooms that they look upon the society of their day. They are not men who have been uprooted; every fibre of their hearts clings to the soil of old France; they have

remained faithful to their blood, to their name. They lived in constant intercourse, in close intimacy with honest women who were relatives of theirs; they knew them in the healthy, bright, sweetly dignified atmosphere of the country houses of old. And it is this intercourse with their aunts, their cousins, and the friends of these ladies, along with their own remembrances, that explains how it is that, in spite of its audacity, their work has remained chaste. Nowhere in it is the lust of the flesh visible; they have depicted reality freely, but even in their boldest books, such as "*Germinie Lacerteux*" and "*Eliza the Slut*," not a single erotic sentence is to be found.

Aristocrats by instinct, and still more by choice, artless admirers of the well born, the well dressed, and the well mannered, they were fortunately men of refined minds and thinkers. They were opponents of popular suffrage and of government by the masses, but they did not feel for the poor and humble the cutting harshness, the disdainful indifference of the "*parvenue*." To them a workman was a man, and the sufferings of *Germinie* or wretched *Eliza* moved them as deeply as the sufferings of a lady of the great world. The preface of the book in which they have related the cruel story of a servant who fell a victim to her love, is a profession of humanity that Tolstoi might have signed. They themselves, however, were surprised to find that they had bowels of compassion for the poor; their heart spoke, but their theories of society prevented any echo.

The virtue they most successfully practiced was perseverance in work. Jules died of it. It is this incessant labor, this constant giving out of themselves which explains the gradual transformation, as the years went by, of the character of the gay and careless youth, the quivering nervousness, the susceptibility to all manner of painful impressions, to all things that hurt, the powerlessness to enjoy simple, frank pleasure, the irritated weariness which are reflected in the pages of "*Manette Salomon*" and of "*Madame Gervaisais*."

When Edmond de Goncourt made the effort to live on after the tearing of his inmost self, after the joy and pride of his life had been laid in the grave, after the hours of agony when it seemed that the France he loved so tenderly and ardently was passing away,—Jules de Goncourt died on June 20, 1870,—it was once more in work that he sought relief from the pain that gnawed at his heart. But years elapsed ere he could bring himself to sign a book with his lonely name. It seemed to him that his dead brother was still by his side, writing at that big table where they had so long written together, or smoking a cigarette while outstretched on a divan. Yet, while blinded by his tears, the writer, still

athirst for fame, once more took up his task of beauty and truth; his artist's eye lingered caressingly upon the drawings hung on the walls of his house at Auteuil, upon the furniture, the delicate, fragile objects, the porcelains, the silk stuffs with their soft, bright colors, the Japanese paintings, the lacquers, and the Persian rugs, which recalled to him both the France of yore in which he had so long lived in company with him who now was sleeping his long sleep under the trees of Montmartre, lulled by the rumor of the mighty city, and the East to which, in the loneliness of his soul, his dreams repaired in search of forgetfulness.

THE EXPLORATION OF THE TCHAD

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I.

THE actual occupation of the banks of the Tchad by a European power marks an important date in the penetration of central North Africa. With this occupation there ends, so far as this part of the interior is concerned, the period of exploring expeditions, of rapidly conducted discoveries demanding no less luck than sagacity, and of more or less fragmentary geographical sketches; and the era of continuous observation, methodically conducted on the spot by regular relays of investigators constantly stationed there, begins.

Incorporated in three empires, and now regularly included in the budget of a European power, the Tchad has finally entered the cycle of history. Its general character, its physical and economic conditions, and the human societies that live on its banks, will soon become the subject of scientific study and knowledge. Is this great lacustral tract of central Soudan destined to gather upon its shores a productive population, to attract to itself as a centre and bind together the future highways of communication converging from the different coast establishments toward the interior of North Africa? Or is the Tchad, in fact, as it is called by the English periodical, "West Africa," only a "great inspirer of illusions"?

The very name of the Tchad calls up one of the most important problems of African hydrography, and the problem which longest remained unsolved. With the streams that flow into it, of which the river Chari (or Shari) entering it from the south is the most important, the Tchad forms a hydrographic inland basin with no outlet to the sea. With its length of fourteen hundred kilometres, which makes its river Chari the equal of the river Senegal, with its area of nine hundred thousand square kilometres, which gives to its basin the sixth rank in the continent of Africa, this hydrographic system, separated from the Mediterranean by the whole extent of the Sahara, is shut into the interior of Africa, at the very centre of the Soudan, between the watersheds of the Niger-Binue, the Congo, and the Nile. The indentations of the Mediterranean coast and the Atlantic coast, the latter especially being hollowed inward so deeply by the Gulf of Guinea, bring this lacustral-fluvial system into comparative proximity to the coast of Tripoli and the mouths

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of the Niger. While, on the other hand, the first and up to this time the only European power established on its banks, namely France, is precisely the one whose coast establishments are farthest from the Tchad, it was from Algeria, the distant Mediterranean colony on the extreme north coast of Africa, from Senegal, a base of operations on the Atlantic ocean, at the extreme western point of the continent, and finally from the Congo, that France sent toward the Tchad converging expeditions, thus approaching the whole basin from the further side.

The essential outlines of this hydrographic system were not fixed until our own times, beginning in 1823. Now, eighty years later, only the principal depression of the basin has been settled and mapped out with exactness. The many branches of this chief depression have been barely touched upon, crossed here and there, or followed for a short distance. As for the intricate net work of affluent rivers, the regions where they rise, the outlines and exact limits of the fluvial basin as a whole, these still remain to be investigated and defined. Only recently, the official geographer of the Congo Free State, Mr. Wauters, editor of the "*Mouvement géographique*," of Brussels, carried away by his desire to bring a tribute of new territories to the river sea of tropical Africa, constructed a very interesting theory to support his claim to the river Wom, which has since been found (as the French explorers had foreseen) to belong to the basin of the Tchad.

The fact is that in this inland tract which is the central section of North Africa, the field of hypothetical geography, though it has been gradually restricted of late years, is still far from exhausted. Many a river, the upper section of which has been observed, remains to be identified with some watercourse now known by a different name but of which it is the origin. To what confluent, already known, does its altitude, its flow, its general character, seem to direct its course? On the one hand, we have fragments of rivers touched upon and studied by travelers, and their continuation indicated, in accordance with information gathered from the natives, along conjectural lines below the point where they were abandoned; on the other hand, we have the outlets of rivers which have been followed up for some leagues, but we do not know in what region they rise, or of what upper affluents and tributaries they are the outlets. A great many problems still remain to be solved. A methodical survey will be necessary.

Theoretic ideas concerning the limits of hydrographic basins, which have long been recognized to be deceptive, are once more, and more than ever, at fault in central Africa. The lines of separation of the watercourses are indistinct; the dividing lines of the watersheds are often

imperceptible. It is indeed a common fact in oro-hydrography that the line of division of the watersheds does not coincide either with the lines of maximum altitude or with any of the important mountain ranges of the country; the Patagonian Andes and the Himalayas furnish noteworthy examples of this. International conflicts have only lately arisen from boundary treaties based upon false theoretic ideas, upon conceptions of a purely abstract and far too simple oro-hydrography, such as have already figured in the treaties of Utrecht, where mention is made of the supposed watersheds of the Alps, or such as were boldly formulated in the famous memoir presented by Buache in 1752 to the Academy of Sciences of Paris, "An essay in physical geography, in which is proposed a general theory of the sort of *framework* of the earth, composed of mountain chains that traverse the sea as well as the land * * *."

According to this theory, the immense hydrographic basins into which the African watersheds are divided, should be separated by real mountain barriers. But if ever mountain chains had a right to the name of "Mountains of the Moon," it is surely these! For the truth is, as against the theory of the framework of the earth, that the "parting of the waters" of the great African rivers, Congo, Nile, and Niger, which in this respect are like the mighty South American rivers, the Amazon, the Rio de la Plata, and the Orinoco, is accomplished far from the high altitudes, on plateaux and in marshy depressions. This topographical idea, as exact as it is contrary to the attractive theory of a world framework, was handed down from ancient geography and maintained by the Arabian and mediæval map-makers. It held its own, under various forms, up to the beginning of the nineteenth century. But it had been badly interpreted and needed to be brought up to date. This indispensable service has been done by the explorations of the past century.

II.

Antiquity has bequeathed to us the idea of a water current running from east to west in the interior of Libya or Ethiopia, between the tenth and twentieth parallels. In the map of the world of Ptolemy and of Alexandria, about the years 130 or 140 A. D., this line of water, called the river Niger, joins a great western lake, the Nigritus Palus, with a central lake, the lake of Libya (Libya lacus), in which it rises. There are, however, to the east of this latter sheet of water (whose longitudinal position very closely corresponds to the actual longitude of the Tchad), other lines of water, with lakes and marshes flowing in a general westerly direction, and continuing this transversal hollow of the interior of Ethiopia.

Later, as we shall see, other attempts at map-making will prolong this transversal line, in one direction to the western ocean (the Atlantic), in the other to the valley of the Nile. But before this mistaken extension was made did we not have here, at the very beginning of our era, an embryo of the fluvial-lacustral system of the Chari-Tchad,—confused, to be sure, with that of the Niger-Binue, as it will be later with that of the Senegal?

Oriental cartography with Edrisi (1160), mediæval cartography with Marino Sanuto or Sanudo (Venice, 1321), Ranulphus Hyggeden (1360), Picigani (Venice, 1367), the Catalan Map (1375), Andrea Bianco (Venice, 1436), Fra Mauro (Venice, convent of the Camaldules, 1457), maintain the traditional water-line from east to west, across Ethiopia; in Edrisi's map, this river of the Soudan is called the "Nile of the Blacks" to distinguish it from the Egyptian Nile; Sanudo calls it Niger, and Picigani, Nile. With Edrisi and Sanudo it empties into the ocean; with Picigani, Andrea Bianco, and Fra Mauro, it connects both with the ocean and with the Nile; and with all of them, but with the latter group especially, the fluvial system is not simple but complicated with marshy out-spreadings and with a great lake, which has, however, no fixed place, but is somewhere along its course.

The fifteenth century, the era of great sea voyages, throws no light on this traditional confusion, but rather darkens it. Discoveries by sea naturally direct people's whole attention to the coast. The interior of the African continent is represented in an incoherent and shapeless fashion on the globe of Martin Behaim (Nuremberg, 1492); there remains, however, the great central lake with its affluent rivers. With the map of the world by Diego Ribera, pilot major of the Indies, cosmographer to the Emperor Charles Fifth (Seville, 1529), attention to the coast lines and river mouths becomes not only predominant but exclusive. What he gives is less a map of Africa than a port-list of its coast. Representation of the interior is entirely given up, and the transversal water-line which previous ages had handed down now disappears completely.

Not until the map of the world by Ortelius (1587) do we again find this hydrographic depression, which is here clearly separated from the Nile. It starts from central Soudan, extends westward to the ocean at Cape Verde, and has along its banks, to the north, the towns or rather kingdoms of Borno, Guanguara, Cano, Tombotu.¹ It is to be noted that these place names, with the exception of Tombotu, which is the "Tenbuch" of Picigani and the Catalan Map, here make their first

(1) In this retrospective review of cartography, the spelling of the names taken from each document is strictly preserved.

appearance on any map. From this point on they will help us in identifying the watercourses and in distinguishing what tradition had confused. The map by O. Dapper, almost a century later (Amsterdam, 1676), is hardly more complete than that of the master-cartographer of Antwerp; it represents the river Niger as coming from the southeast (which is exactly the general direction of the Chari) and filling Lake Borno in the country of Guangara; then, flowing toward the west across Nigritie, watering on the north Casseno and Cano, and further on Tombotu, beyond a second great lake through which it passes; and from there, prolonged in the rivers of the shore maps of the western coast, it empties, through three or four arms, both north and south of Cape Verde.

For the interior, tradition maintains itself with remarkable uniformity, though there are some changes and additions of forms and names; toward the coast the confusion is even greater than formerly; all the exact ideas that have been gathered *de visu* are combined with the vague ideas of the unknown interior, into a single system which is inextricably confused.

Critical cartography, which hardly began till a hundred and fifty years ago, with D'Anville, will strive to bring order out of this chaos.

D'Anville, correctly informed by travelers from western Africa, finally cuts off all connection between the rivers of the west coast, Senegal and Gambie, and the inland watercourse of Nigritie. The latter becomes once more a mere fragment, without any outlet to the sea, uniting two distant lakes; or rather the traditional watercourse is divided into two fragments: one, the Niger, a river of Tombouctou; the other, quite distinct from it, the Nil des Nègres (Nile of the Blacks) rising in Lake Bournou, and running, contrary to the tradition of centuries, not westward but eastward; watering the countries of Bournou and Kanem, both situated to the southeast of the lake; and finally becoming, once more, a tributary of the Nile. The false junction is thus reestablished between the Nile of Egypt and the central lake of Nigritia,—the latter set far from its usual place, or rather divided into two basins. So, if the distinction between the Senegal and the Niger is clearly established by D'Anville, if the individuality of the Niger itself is separated both from the Senegal and from the Nil des Nègres, there is on the other hand, complete confusion between the Nil des Nègres and the western branch of the upper Nile which is today called Bahr el Arab, Bahr el Ghazal.

Meanwhile many years have yet to pass before the inland region is once for all isolated, and separated from the Niger itself. In the map by Major Rennell, published in 1790 and annexed to the first volume of the "Proceedings" of the British African Association, which had just been founded in 1788, the Niger or Nil Abid, as in D'Anville's careful map,

runs eastward through Ghana (Kano) and disappears in the deep central depression of the marshes of Ouangara, which occupy the actual position of the Tchad. Only some distance to the northeast of this depression, and separated from it by a sand desert, do we find the countries of Kanem, Bornou, and Bagherim, through which run the Bahr el Gazal and the Bahr el Fittra, whose junction forms the Bahr Misselad (the *Gir* of Ptolemy); but the last is no longer a tributary of the Nile, as the river of the countries of Bournou and Kanem was in D'Anville. This last point is a distinct gain; though the junction of the Nile of the Blacks with the Nile of Egypt finds a last partisan in the traveler Hornemann (1800) who in the last letter received from him, still repeats that this junction exists, but only in the rainy season.

Thus appear, and it is another gain to be noted, several of our actual modern names: Kanem, Bornu, and Baghirmi,—all three of them countries of the Tchad,—now wrongly placed, to be sure, as far north as Tibesti; and also, beside these names of countries, the town of Kouka and its equivalent Kaouga, situated on a lake of the Bagherim; and the town of Ouara, and still others that are easily identified with real localities, just as in the region of the Tchad we find a Bahr el Ghazal and, in fact, in the eastern part, a Lake Fitri. Ideas are growing more exact, even in the confusion which still reigns, and the principal cause of this confusion is the illusory presence of the Niger in this central region. And the Bahr Koulla (Ptolemy's Coloè), which comes from the southeast to empty into the marshy depression of the Ouangara—as the Niger is still supposed to do from the northwest—and there to be lost by evaporation, offers a striking resemblance to the Chari, the real tributary of the Tchad. Up to this time, then, although the upper Niger already has its true place on the map, its lower course remains a problem; instead of bending it downward from Timbuktu-Kabra toward the Gulf of Guinea, thus making it describe a large curve toward the south, it is still directed straight toward the unknown interior of the continent.

Meanwhile the controversies grow keener. Scientific curiosity is aroused by the irritating enigma of this river whose outlet remains unknown. The zeal of explorers is stimulated by the discussions of geographers, who are unable to clear up the mystery; many travelers perish in the attempt, by rapids or by fevers. The impassible Isis remains veiled, Africa keeps its secret.

Two principal hypotheses divide men's minds: one, to which the illustrious name of Mungo Park is attached, gives to the Niger below Timbuktu a course concentric with the curve of the Guinea coast, and finally connects it beyond the equator with the Zaïre (Congo), whose

vast estuary had been known since the fifteenth century through the discoveries of the Portuguese,¹ but whose course was still unknown. The other hypothesis, that of Reichard (which proved to be true, and was verified upon the spot, but not until 1830, by Lander, the intelligent and faithful servant of Clapperton, who followed its course), turns it toward the Gulf of Guinea, where the numerous mouths of its vast delta, between Benin and Calabar, had not been observed by the Portuguese navigators, and had remained absent from the map until just before 1830.

This year, 1830, therefore, marks a date of prime importance both for the geographical history of the Niger which is at last individualized and complete, but which does not concern us here, and, indirectly, for that of the inland basin of North Africa, now finally separated from the fluvial course with which, according to a wrongly understood tradition, it had been persistently confused for so many centuries.

Thus the traditional line of water running across the interior of Africa now stands by itself; it has been separated first from the river Senegal, then from the Nile, and finally from the Niger; becoming circumscribed and defined this hydrographic region appears where, on the very site of the lake of Libya and the marshes of Ouangara, we shall see the Tchad.

III.

Direct exploration will now replace cartography by hearsay, will decipher the enigma, explain the vague traditions, and give precision to hitherto indefinite ideas.

Though there were some earlier native accounts of the kingdom of Bornu, it is from the journey of Ritchie and Lyon, from Tripoli to Murzouk (1820) that we must date the earliest information that reached Europe about Lake Tchad.²

But the general position of this sheet of water,—not to speak of its outlines in detail, which even today are still to be determined,—was not fixed until the expedition (1822-24) of Major Denham, Dr. Oudney, and Lieutenant Clapperton.³ They started from Tripoli, and on February 17, 1823, they entered Kuka, the capital of Bornu, near the west shore of the Tchad, after having accomplished the first central crossing of the

(1) That is, the Rio do Padrão, or River of Padron, of Diogo Cão (1482), with whom (though this fact has been doubted) the Bavarian cosmographer, Martin Behaim, maker of the Nuremberg globe (1492) is said to have traveled.

(2) Lyon, *Travels in North Africa*, accompanied by geographical notices of the Soudan, 1821.

(3) *Travels and Discoveries in Northern and Central Africa*, 1826.

great desert ever made by Europeans. Denham, who followed the south shore of the lake, and crossed the rivers which flow into it, is also the first European who ever saw the Logon-Chari, the great southern affluent of the basin. The name "Lake Waterloo" which he gave to it did not survive; this warlike note sounded by a traveler in the centre of Africa has only a certain interest as retrospective psychology.

Scientific exploration, however, in this case as well as for the whole of the Soudan, does not precede the journey of Barth (1850-56), the "master of African research."

After having crossed the Sahara with Overweg and Richardson by way of the oases of Air, Barth also reached Kuka. While his companion Overweg visited the island population of the Buddumas, in the archipelago of the lake, he penetrated toward the southwest and discovered the Binue, the great eastern branch of the Niger. He passed through Musgou, Kanem, Baghirmi, and Sokoto, stopped at Timbuktu, returned to Kuka (1855), and, alone, his companions having succumbed some years earlier to the attacks of the climate, he returned to Europe by way of Tripoli, after having gathered a great mass of geographical, historical, ethnological, and linguistic materials covering an immense extent of territory, and having made great additions to the map of the central Soudan by astronomical observations which settled for the first time the cartography, until then vague and undetermined, of this mysterious country.

From this memorable six years' journey he brings us, in his "*Reisen und Entdeckungen in Nord und Zentral Afrika*,"¹ the results of a complete and admirable study, both of the country itself, and of the "State of Human Society in Northern Central Africa."

To the name of Barth, which marks the beginning of a new era in the history of African discoveries, we must add that of Vogel, who, following him, had in 1853-56 taken the desert route from Tripoli to Kuka. Vogel marked with his itineraries all the countries about the Tchad, which is now to become more and more the point of rendezvous of the great travelers of the Soudan. From Bornu he went to the Chari, to the Binue, to the great intermediary depression called the lake or marsh of Tuburi, which had been discovered by Barth, and which, according to that illustrious traveler's account, is an extensive marshy flat, changing to a lake at the end of the rainy season, and then uniting the Binue, through the Mayo-Kebbi, to the Chari, through the Logon-Sserbéwuël. He visited another lacustral sheet belonging to the eastern region of the

(1) Gotha, 1857, 5 vols.

Tchad, Lake Fittri, and penetrated into Waday, where he was killed at Wara, in the same year (1856) in which Barth returned to Europe.¹

The disappearance of all his companions, either murdered or overcome by the climate, was certainly well calculated to strike people's imaginations and to throw an almost miraculous light about his own late and solitary return. But they, too, as well as he, made their names forever illustrious. The memory of Vogel, indeed, received an unexpected homage in an English official document, under important circumstances; the memoir submitted to the Berlin conference (1884) by Sir Edward Malet, the English ambassador, represented as a claim of his country to sovereignty over the banks of the Niger the death of Vogel, "who perished in the neighborhood of that river." "Neighborhood" is rather strong, the Niger being separated by a distance of at least seventeen hundred kilometres from the town in Waday where the German explorer perished.

Following the same glorious footsteps, Von Beurmann (1862) also crossed the desert to the Tchad. From Kuka, he pushed toward the southwest, into Baoutchi, as far as Takoba, from which point he turned toward Waday, as Vogel had done. Like Vogel, also, he was killed; Nachtigal found his grave at Mao, a town of Kanem, to the east of the Tchad.

But these individual misfortunes did not dull for a moment the eagerness of explorers; they rather stimulated it. Gerhard Kohlfs (1865-67) in his turn followed the usual desert route, the path of the caravans, penetrating directly from Tripoli toward the Tchad. From this port of the desert, Europe unwearyingly cast its plummet toward the interior of Africa. He reached Kuka, explored the southern part of Bornu, and came out by Lagos.²

Next we come to Nachtigal; all the great names of Soudanese exploration meet us in our investigation. Nachtigal (1869-74) arrived at Kuka by way of Murzouk and Tibesti, explored Kanem and Borku, Baghirmi and Waday, then cutting across Darfour and Kordofan, he came back by way of Egypt. His itineraries completely encircle the Tchad, except to the southeast; they follow Lake Fittri and the Bahr es Salamat, which flows into Lake Tro. In addition to his direct observations he gathered a large mass of new information.³

(1) Wagner, *Vogels Reisen und Entdeckungen, Briefe Vogels, in Zeitschrift für allgemeine Erdkunde*, 1856; *Erinnerungen an einen Verschollenen*, Leipzig, 1863.

(2) *Quer durch Afrika*, 1874-75, 2 vols.

(3) *Sahara und Sudan*, 1879-82, 3 vols.

Like Barth, "Nachtigal left everywhere an imperishable memory," Monteil says. He has given us more information than any one else on the Mohammedanized peoples of these regions, where Islam has built up political organisms by grouping together the elements of authority and of social organization.

Matteucci and Massari, entering Africa by way of Souakim, crossed the central Soudan in 1880-81 in the opposite direction from that taken by Nachtigal, by way of Kordofan, Darfour, Waday, Baghirmi, Kuka, Kano, Bida, and the sea.¹

But, at the time at which we have now arrived, the partition of Africa among European powers comes in to modify the character of African exploration. It had been geographical, scientific, and even humanitarian, for fifty years; now it becomes essentially political.

IV.

Beside the older colonial powers, Portugal, France, and England, which had been established on the coast of Africa for centuries, there comes upon the scene a new power, Germany, whose great statesman, Bismarck, had so long ridiculed the "*furor colonialis*." Immediately the great realist attacks the fictions of African international law, he entirely overthrows the fiction of "nominal occupation," which allowed England to paint long stretches of coast with her colors, without, in fact, exercising over them the least real authority. With an ardor all the more enterprising that it succeeded a disdainful and haughty abstention, this neophyte of colonial politics in a few months established for Germany an empire over seas. He directed his operations upon four or five points of the African coast in succession, investigated the estuaries, the bays, and the inlets, pried his way into the settlements and trading stations of the western coast, and especially into Cameroon, at the extreme point of the Gulf of Guinea, the most favorable indentation of the coast apparently from which to start toward the basin of the Tchad. An exact inventory now becomes all the more imperative because an English syndicate, the Niger Company, soon to be chartered by the crown, has just acquired the French trading stations along this river (1884), and assured itself a commercial monopoly there; and because, also, the French and German stations alternate along the coast of Cameroon as far as the French colony of the Gaboon, the first nucleus of the French Congo. Africa no longer belongs to those who simply claim it, but to those who exploit it. By saying boldly to England "*à propos*" of Lüderitzland (Southwest

(1) *Journal de Matteucci*, 1885.

Africa), "You are doing nothing with this coast, therefore I take it," Bismarck had stated this dilemma, either to enter upon genuine possession, or be dispossessed of vague traditional rights.

The most ardent competition starts up among the colonial powers. The African conference meets at Berlin and signs the act of February 26, 1885, with this object among others, "To prevent the misunderstandings which might arise in the future from the recent acquisitions of territory along the African coast." By virtue of one of its declarations the powers which take possession of a territory or assume a protectorate put themselves under obligation to maintain real authority there (Article 35).

Soon the Declaration of London (August 5, 1890) establishes the respective zones of influence of France and England in the African continent, and designates as a "diaphragm," or separating barrier, the famous line, to be drawn later, from Say on the Niger to Barruwa (or Barua), on Lake Tchad, a line of which so much will be heard in the sequel. In order to reconnoitre, *ex post facto* at least, the region through which this line passes, and especially the kingdom of Sokoto, which by virtue of the agreement was to remain in the zone of action of the English Niger Company with "all that rightfully belongs to it," Monteil (1890-92) started in from St. Louis (Senegal) toward the Soudan, accomplished the first eastward crossing of the curve of the Niger, and reached the Niger at Say; then across the Houssa countries, by way of Sokoto and Kano, he arrived at Kuka, in Bornu. He stayed there four months, from April 10 to August 15, 1892, and then, leaving the basin of the Tchad, he came back across the desert, by way of Murzouk and Tripoli.¹

The famous "diaphragm" had framed off the French and English zones of action. It was now necessary to complete the "diaphragm," to correct, if possible, the defective sketch of it, which British "bluff" had made France accept, unprovided as France was at the time with any correct information, and, finally, to fill it out.

The Committee of French Africa, which was founded at the same time (1890) devoted its chief efforts to uniting on the banks of Lake Tchad the French possessions of the Soudan, Algeria, and French Congo. The heroic Paul Crampel, who had started from the Congo and the Ubangi (also called Mobangi and Dua) "to the conquest of the Tchad,"² intending to explore the region of the Chari, and return by the north,

(1) *De St. Louis à Tripoli par le lac Tchad*, 1895.

(2) Harry Alis, *A la conquête du Tchad*, 1891.

making treaties on the way, had failed in his undertaking. His expedition (1890-91) had been annihilated by the Musselmen who prowl about the southern confines of the Islamite countries, on the borders of the savage and fetish worshiping tribes, in the upper basin of the Chari. Dybowski (1891), sent by the Committee of French Africa to support Crampel, had not carried out his plan.¹ More lucky or more persevering, the Maistre mission (1892-93), starting likewise from the Congo, returned by the Binue and the Niger with treaties which bring the southern part of Bagirmi into the zone of French influence.² Mizon (1890-92), who entered the delta of the Niger in spite of the ill treatment offered him by the Royal Niger Company, had already followed up the Binue and joined this eastern branch of the Niger to French Congo. The action of the English Company was a flagrant violation of the Navigation Act concerning the Niger, which stipulates for freedom of commercial navigation on the river and its branches. It did not interfere, however, with the conclusion of the Franco-German agreement of 1894, which assured, in part at least, the results obtained by the journeys of Mizon and Maistre.

From this agreement between France and Germany, following upon that of 1890 between France and England, dates the partition of the basin of the Tchad among three European powers. The later conventions (1898, with an additional declaration in 1899), made between France and Great Britain, are, so far as concerns the basin of the Tchad, only the development and completion of the famous convention of 1890. The Say-Barua diaphragm, a vague line, the detail of which was to be settled later, is replaced, in the agreement of 1898, by a broken line, artificially composed of parallels and meridians, running along the borders of the Sahara in uninhabited and waterless territory, and ingeniously arranged, it would seem, to make Lake Tchad inaccessible to the French from the upper Niger. If such was, as it appears to have been, the unexpressed purpose of the English negotiators, we must at once recognize that they succeeded perfectly in heaping up practically insurmountable difficulties, that they made new negotiations necessary, and finally that they remained faithful to the spirit which had animated the negotiator of 1890. In laying the Franco-English Convention before the House of Lords, Lord Salisbury had allowed himself certain facetious remarks, in which good taste and diplomatic reserve gave way, in the most unexpected fashion, to the irony of the agriculturist, to the "humour" of the "gentleman-farmer." "It might be thought," Lord Salisbury had said,

(1) *La route du Tchad, De Loango au Chari*, 1895.

(2) *À travers l'Afrique centrale, Du Congo au Niger*, 1895.

pointing to the map and measuring the degrees, "that France has affirmed its right to a vast extent of territory. But you must judge not only by the extent of the territory, but by its value. The territory in question is what a farmer would call *light soil, very light*; in fact, it is the Desert of Sahara, and, therefore, the value of what France acquires is proportionately diminished" (House of Lords, August, 1890).

According to the agreements now in force, England possesses the western basin of the Tchad, with its river Komadugu-Waube. This river, the only important affluent of the Tchad beside the Chari, comes from Kano, and empties into the lake from the west, between Barua and Kuka. This watercourse of upper Algeria, with the river Sokoto, which runs in the opposite direction and empties into the Niger, helps to form a hydrographic connection between the Tchad and the great fluvial basin of the west. The routes of communication between the middle Niger and the Tchad are naturally within reach of this water-line, on which or near which are situated the great centres of the Houssa countries, Gando, Sokoto, Wurno, Katsena, and Kano. The last is the central market of upper Nigeria, the greatest market in fact of central Africa (chiefly for ostrich features, skins, and ivory). By way of Zaria it is connected with the lower Niger.

In lower Nigeria is the line of the Binue, which is far more important. This river, the eastern branch of the lower Niger, is navigable to beyond Yola in Adamawa, that is, all the way across the English territory. Its sources are in German territory, except for one, which is perhaps the most important,—the one which Mizon followed up as far as Bifara,—and which is in French territory. It is the one which perhaps drains the marshes of Tuburi; on the other hand, these may possibly have an outlet into the Logon-Chari.

Whether this supposition, which was called in question by Macdonald,¹ after his exploration of the Mayo-Kebbi at the time of the high waters in 1890, is confirmed or not; whether the Tuburi supplies on the one side the Binue, and on the other flows into the Chari, or is discharged only into one of these watercourses and belongs entirely to the basin of the Niger or to that of the Tchad; or whether it is even an independent basin with no outlet, an immense swamp, a clearly isolated depression; in any case, it would contribute no less toward forming between the Niger and the Tchad a hydrographic connection, either continuous, temporary, or fragmentary; and from the point of view that dominates our investigation, it therefore has a special interest.

(1) *Exploration of the Benue and its Northern Tributary, the Kabby: Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society*, 1892.

In that part of the basin of the Tchad which belongs to Nigeria, British supremacy has not yet made itself felt; the reception at Kuka in 1891 of MacIntosh, the agent of the Royal Niger Company, was not promising. But since then circumstances have changed; the Sultan of Bornu has been overthrown. The recent appointment of a British resident at Yola, on the upper Binue, as an envoy to the Emir of Adamawa, and the negotiations of Nigeria with Fadel-Allah, the son of Rabah, the conqueror of Bornu, are the only indications of the attention paid by English politics to this region.

Germany, which shares with France the marshes of Tuburi, has a foothold in the basin of the lower Chari, of which it possesses the left bank, as well as the southern shores of the Tchad. But, absorbed in organizing its coast establishment and exploiting the territories which are most accessible either by the coast of Cameroon or by the Congo and the French route from Sanga, it has so far taken no more interest than England in what might happen in its part of the basin of the Tchad. This basin is distant from the German base of operations; the exploration of the mountain group of Adamawa, which must be crossed on the way to the Tchad, has not been carried far enough as yet to learn what is the best route.

On a recent occasion, profiting by its neighborly relations with the colony of French Congo, Germany was on the point of undertaking in common with France some united action in the basin of the Tchad. Finally, the whole weight of the enterprise fell upon France alone. Once more, on this occasion, France proved herself the soldier of civilization.¹

V.

By the convention of 1898, England discovered that the north, east, and south banks of Lake Tchad, so far as is included between the point of intersection of the fourteenth degree of latitude (the parallel passing through Barua) with the west bank of the lake, and the point where the Franco-German frontier meets the lake were falling within the French sphere of influence. The additional declaration of 1899 only completed this boundary by explicitly recognizing the kingdom of Waday as belonging to the French sphere. France, in abandoning to England or to the Egyptian Soudan the Bahr el Ghazal, in evacuating the posts which had been founded along the upper Nile and at Fashoda, at least fixed the eastern limits of its basin of the Tchad. In principle, the boundary line, which

(1) Though guilty, it is true, of a "violation of frontier," for which the English and Germans did not fail to reproach her, *Berliner Tagblatt*, November 26, 1901.

first follows the line of division between the watersheds toward the Nile or the Congo, will ultimately be fixed so as to separate the kingdom of Waday from what was the Egyptian province of Darfour.

It was by way of the Congo, following up the Ubangi and crossing the highlands to the north, that France established herself in the basin of the Chari-Tchad. This interior section of central Africa is reached by way of a small branch of the Ubangi, which flows into the great river at its northernmost elbow (fort of Possel). Beyond the indefinite summit line from which the Kemo flows toward the south, the waters are found to run to the north, that is, toward the Chari. In this centre of Africa, which for some thousand kilometres is drained by this inland river with its main bed and its many branches, we meet, in going toward the north, first the different sections of the Soudan, which form a zone of organized countries between the equatorial forest and the desert; then the countries which form a transition from the Soudan to the Sahara, between the country of the blacks (Nigritia) and the territories frequented by the nomads; and finally, for some thousand kilometres further toward Borku, Tibesti, and Aïr, the tracts of the Sahara itself. These last were likewise recognized as belonging to the French sphere by the Franco English Convention of 1899. All these regions, both of the Soudan and the Sahara, have, since 1900, constituted the "military territory of the countries and protectorates of the Tchad." They are contiguous on the west with the territory of Zinder, which belongs to western Africa (Senegal).

As a result of typographical circumstances which have twice been repeated in the course of African exploration and which have had very fortunate results for France, distant coast establishments and small rivers near the coast have opened the way to two great fluvial basins in the interior of the continent. Just as Senegal was her historic route by which to enter the western Soudan and reach the upper and middle Niger, whose mouths and lower course were held by England, so the estuary of Gaboon, and the little river Ogowe, persistently followed up, introduced France, by a side door as it were, to the navigable Congo, and from there the Ubangi pointed the way in one direction to the Nile and in another to the Tchad.

The Gentil mission was entrusted with this last objective point (1895). Gentil carried the steamboat, "Léon-Blot," across from one watershed to the other, and descending the river Chari reached the basin of the lake; on October 30, 1897, the French colors floated on the Tchad.

But at the moment when the newcomers thus penetrated to the heart of North Africa, a tempest had just broken loose there. A Soudanese conqueror, Rabah, at the head of well armed bands, was ranging over

these inland regions and laying them waste. Starting from the Egyptian Soudan, he had conquered Bornu, pillaged and burned the villages and reduced Kuka, "the marvelous ancient capital of Bornu, the city of a hundred thousand inhabitants," to an immense heap of ruins. He seemed to be sent by the Sheik Senoussi, the present Mahdi, chief of the most powerful and active Mohammedan orders, to unite the countries of the Tchad in fanatic hostility against the infidels. He proclaimed himself agent of the Mahdi of Omdurman, and his seal bore these words, "Rabah, Emir of Bornu, in the name of the Mahdi."

For a moment it was to be feared that the route to the Tchad, opened by way of the Chari, would be closed by Islam. Rabah, in fact, had invaded Bagirmi.

The "Rabism" of Bornu was overcome, like the Mahdism of Omdurman, after a series of battles; in one of them seven Europeans were killed and forty-four Senagalese meeting the attack of nearly twelve thousand men, of whom twenty-seven hundred were armed with muskets (Zogbar, 1899); in another battle forty-five per cent of the effective force of Europeans and Senagalese were killed or wounded (at Kouno, 1899). The final struggle against Rabah took place at Kussuri (April 22, 1900), on the lower Chari, the point of junction of the three French missions: that of the Chari under Gentil, that of central Africa under Captain Joalland, and that of the Sahara under Foureay and Major Lamy, which had started separately from the Congo, from Senegal, and from Algeria.¹

To these three missions we owe our most recent information concerning the hydrographic basin of the centre of Africa.

The Chari, subject like all rivers of the inter-tropical region to the alternation of the rainy and dry seasons, is only about twenty metres wide at the point where it is reached by the carry, of more than three hundred kilometres, from the elbow of the Ubangi. But this point (Fort Crampel), at which canoe navigation begins, is not on the Chari itself, but on a branch, the Gribingi; at the junction, this stream, much narrower than the river into which it flows, is not more than sixty metres wide. The Chari, it is a very considerable river even in the season of low water, and has a very broad bed; at the season of high water, it not only becomes a majestic stream as much as six or eight kilometres wide in some places, but it also spreads in every direction over the neighboring plains, where it forms countless temporary pools, lakes, and ponds. Its extreme limits are high banks recognizable from a distance by their

(1) *La Géographie, Bulletin de la Société de géographie*, 1900, No. 12, and 1901, Nos. 5 and 6.

tall wooded growth, which toward the south becomes tropical in appearance. A line of military stations at long intervals dots its course to the Tchad. These stations are connected by the river route; but at low water the navigation of the river is difficult for steamboats.

The Tchad, into which the Chari flows through the numerous arms of its delta, now completely explored, also rises and falls alternately, but can be navigated at all seasons by keeping at a distance of from three to five kilometres from its bank. At this distance the depth, in low water, is more than three metres, and it increases greatly toward the open. At the eastern end sandbanks are numerous but to the west the water is deep. The line of the banks is bordered with reeds; at the east the shore is not approachable, but is broken and deeply indented by lagoons and marshes. The brilliant sheet of the Tchad is studded, in this part, with many islands, forming the archipelago of Budduma. The inhabitants are the robbers and pirates of the Tchad; they also raise cattle, which they take to feed on the shores and bring back to their islands at the least alarm.

The water of the lake, though subject to evaporation, which is intense during the dry season, is even then sweet and very good to drink. Countless herds of antelopes in long, unbroken lines come down to it to drink. Large game in abundance wanders on its shores, elephants are numerous, giraffes, rhinoceroses, and lions are common in the thicket. The banks are piled with the bones of hippopotamuses, crocodiles, and elephants, and with the remains of enormous fishes. The woods and thickets are the haunt of game of all kinds, from the guinea fowl to the rhinoceros.

The Chari also abounds in fish; on its shores and its sandbanks, great animals sport, loll, wade, and splash; some parts of the banks of the Chari are inhabited by elephants. Antelopes and small game literally swarm there.

The basin of the Tchad is prolonged toward the southwest in a sort of lagoon or gulf which is very extensive, the Bahr el Ghazal, and in which, according to the account of the natives, the water advances as much as sixty kilometres inland at the time of high water.

This lacustral sheet, situated at an altitude of two hundred and forty to two hundred and sixty-five metres, with indeterminate boundaries, spreading out very broadly at the time of high water, and shrinking at low water into the deepest hollow of the depression, has, from the limits of the winter season to the limits of the dry season, an area varying from more than fifty thousand to eleven thousand square kilometres, according to Rohlf, and an average area of twenty-seven thousand square kilometres, according to Nachtigal. Overweg, who navigated upon the lake

for nearly two months, found no depth greater than six metres. Its northern bank is arid and deserted; the former permanent inhabitants have fled before the incessant forays of the nomads. Here, it is already the Sahara.

The fetish worshipping and cannibal tribes of the basin of the Congo are contiguous on the north with exclusively pagan tribes which inhabit the basin of the Chari up to the tenth degree of latitude. To the north of the tenth parallel the population is mostly Mohammedan. The delta of the Chari is inhabited by sheep raisers and farmers, Arab-Negro half-breeds, such as are also found along the southern shore of the Tchad to Bahr el Ghazal. To the south of this broad depression, an overflow reservoir, appear the white Arabs, in Khozzam. To the north of the fertile valley of the Bahr el Ghazal, the negroes of Kanem farm a country rich in grain, dates, and cattle; we may well hope to make of this a splendid country, now that it is occupied by France and will no longer be raided at regular intervals by the white Arabs of the north bank of the Tchad, nomad robbers, who raise cattle and live on the blacks of Kanem, and who, because they do not cultivate the ground, are at the mercy of Kanem which feeds them. And finally, beside the white Arabs, in the Sahara, from Zinder to Darfour, and from the Tchad to Fezzan by way of Tibesti, there are the Zebbous, mostly nomads, without chiefs or organization, great robbers and highwaymen.

Bagirmi, Kanem, and Waday are the three great organized sultanates in the French part of the basin of the Tchad. A protectorate has been established over Bagirmi since 1897, and over Kanem since 1899.

This region is rich in cattle and grain of all sorts; moreover its numerous population produces leather and fabrics, and consumes a great quantity of merchandise of European origin, such as cloth, sugar, coffee, tea, hardware, perfumery, soap, and so forth. The organization of the local commerce is entirely in the hands of the Tripolitans. Tripoli is the port of the whole central Soudan; its traders, using the desert routes, are the only furnishers of central Africa. But it is not conceivable that many years should pass before a railroad, starting from some colonial trading station on the coast of Africa, will come in to modify the present state of things, and perhaps to revolutionize the economic conditions of this inland basin. A mixed route, that is to say, one composed of sections of navigable rivers and of railroads uniting them, is being built in western French Soudan. An English railroad starting from Lagos is progressing toward Algeria, with Kano for its objective point. MM. Duponchel, G. Rolland, P. Leroy Beaulieu, and P. Bonnard have for some time advocated lines of railroad across the Sahara or across the

continent, uniting the Mediterranean with the countries of the Tchad. Since the epidemic rivalry of the great powers and the international competition in Africa has suddenly modified the former methods of Europe, and roused it from its inactivity and somnolency, the age of "do-nothingism" must,—under penalty of loss of prestige,—once for all cease in central Africa.

THE PRESENT AND FUTURE OF SPAIN

G. DE AZCARATE

MADRID

I.

IN a discussion of modern Spain two current sayings must be remembered, the one places Spain among the dying nations, the other asserts that the Latin is the race of yesterday, the Anglo-Saxon the race of today, and the Slav that of tomorrow.

Great Britain is extending her rule over an area of thirty-two million square kilometres; Russia has expanded into Europe and Asia, forming a solid block of twenty-two million kilometres. It would seem that Great Britain, utilizing every means toward the conservation of her energies, has set herself to conquer the world and that Russia dreams of possessing the remainder of the two regions in which ancient civilization flourished. The subject of this essay does not cover the expansion of the nation first mentioned nor the imperialism of either country, and there is little need to seek further the reason for the understanding which exists among Anglo-Saxons, between England and the United States.

The Latin countries of Europe, including their colonies and the colonies of America, alone occupy an area exceeding thirty-one million kilometres, and if the Anglo-Saxons rule over three hundred and fifty-three millions of people and the Slavs over one hundred and twenty-nine millions, the Latins count two hundred and nineteen millions, while of the three hundred and fifty-three millions of English and North Americans only one hundred and twenty-one millions belong to the white race. It appears, indeed, at first sight, that a race inhabiting so great a portion of the earth and figuring so large a number of individuals is not destined to die or even to descend from the secular position it occupies at present in the history of civilization; and it should be remembered that W. T. Stead, who is an enthusiastic interpreter and promoter of the Americanization of the world, says, "Although it may seem a paradox, it is a fact that few parts of the world have been less Americanized than South America."

The mission and influence of a race varies with the times, even when the inheritance bequeathed it by other peoples is not taken into account. This inheritance, although disappearing from the external life of the nation, is woven eternally into the fabric of later ages and later

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civilizations. A very clear example is given by Greece and Rome, and aside from these, Italy offers a good demonstration of what we are saying. During the invasion of the Barbarians her mission seemed ended and yet in the Middle Ages she acquits herself of another task of highest importance, standing first among the commercial and religious orders; her culture takes a preëminent place at the time of the Renaissance and in our day, when she appears condemned to irrevocable political decadence, she consummates her union and is admitted to the councils of the great powers.

It is superfluous to speak of France. She has occupied a unique position in all periods of history. First, with the Gauls she brought to light a civilization not then excelled; equally with Spain she received the influence of Rome and assimilated her law and cultivation. Later she became the meeting place of the Salians, Ripuarians, Goths, and Burgundians, and was the country of Charlemagne and one of the principal cradles of feudalism. In the period of the Monarchy she was the country of Louis XIV., and in that of the Revolution the foundress of the epoch of 1789, whose principles, as Lavergne says, constitute the political faith of all cultivated peoples.

But what may be said of Spain? Is it possible that the race, as a whole, can press onward to the ultimate goal of a better civilization and yet leave behind one of its members? If the object of this essay permitted, the legion of Hispanophobes and Hispanofiles might be spoken of opportunely for they have depreciated and exalted their country respectively, giving or stripping away the honors gained in times past. It is enough that, happily in the last century, as Senor Altamira says, "A little before the war of independence and the liberal period which it brought with it, the winds changed in Spain's favor" and now there are few who deny the value of the work that Spain has contributed to the conquests of civilization.

Far from challenging the glory of Spain in the past ages, the present serves to contrast with it her actual condition and further to explain that she has not recovered from the tortuous journeys of former times. The memory of a brilliant past disturbs her, it prompts her to meet the necessity of entering upon new undertakings, she hesitates concerning her future, and this gives occasion for lugubrious prophecies without the realm, and within, the need of what all parties term her regeneration. Is this regeneration possible?

II.

Professor Burgess, in his excellent book on comparative politics,¹

(1) *Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law*, Boston, 1890.

counts as established those European nations which reconcile the three necessary unities, the ethnical, geographical, and political, and in this respect he considers the Iberian Peninsular to be very notable. If we understand the word race as Professor Burgess gives it we find that Spain is homogeneous, with the exception of the Basques, and that the country has very precise boundaries. The construction of a single state according to this view should be reached through the federation of Spain with Portugal at some future time. The natural resources and the situation of the land do not constitute alone a geographical unity but become a guarantee of its existence, because no power would dream of partitioning it, as happened to unfortunate Poland, and one power alone could not obtain possession without the consent of the other nations. The exalted love of independence is another guarantee for the race, a state of feeling that has been demonstrated strenuously in other times, and that has not died away, as some have imagined when viewing the *philosophy* with which, as the "Times" said, Spain supported her recent and disastrous misfortunes. This indifference is engendered from the fact that although for centuries the Spanish people have found these remote wars ending badly for their country, they have preserved at the same time, as a living memory, the glory gained in the Peninsular when their independence was threatened.

III.

Natural resources, territory, and race are the three conditions or elements that constitute a nation and determine its character.

The natural resources of Spain have been the subject of a wide difference of opinion. Some foreign Review maintains that "the nature of the soil and the climatic conditions of Spain produce little that is favorable," but Mr. Gaston Routier affirms, "I have said and have written a hundred times that Spain is able to become the richest country in the world." The case merits neither the disparagement nor the greater praise. A country counting three thousand, five hundred hours of sunshine in the year, while the following countries count respectively, England one thousand, eight hundred, Germany two thousand, one hundred, France two thousand, seven hundred and fifty, and Italy two thousand, nine hundred, and which also has running water in every region, is certainly not favored scantily by nature. Moreover, Mr. Carnegie has said that the future of Great Britain depends upon its mineral wealth, and he has given as an axiom that "*Raw materials have, now, power to attract capital and also to attract and develop labor for their manufacture in close proximity, and that skilled labor is losing the power it once had to attract raw materials to it from afar.*"

This may be taken for granted. The sub-soil of Spain contains an incalculable wealth of mineral of all kinds, especially copper, iron, lead, silver, and anthracite coal, whose exploitation at present is undertaken with great activity. The coal deposit is enormous, and coal is called the *food of industry*. If England's coal should become exhausted in sixty years' the deposits in Spain would last much longer, and again if that other energy, electricity, the so-called white coal, should be substituted before the coal fields become exhausted waterfalls abound throughout the Peninsular and are made easily available. In speaking of the soil it is an illusion to consider Spain as the *granary* of Europe. Cereals must be imported in considerable quantities, nevertheless, the conditions are exceptionally favorable for the production of wine, olive oil, fruits, and live stock.

The real need is that agriculture should become more modernized, machines should have greater patronage, and artificial fertilizers should be used more plentifully; a greater amount of capital should be employed and the routine system of ploughing the ground every half year should be stopped. Above all, the tremendous quantity of water that goes to waste in the sea should serve to convert into irrigated land much that is unnecessarily barren.

When the manufactures and the mercantile industries are taken into consideration no great advance is shown; large quantities of iron ore are exported, wrought iron on the contrary is imported. Yet signs of progress are abundant. A considerable quantity of machines, the instruments of production, are brought into the country together with raw materials to the value of four hundred million pesetas.² A notable gain comes from the consumption of coal and a general movement in the direction of navigation is taking place. Spain today occupies the fifth place among European nations in the number of her ships,—an increase of forty per cent within a few years. Numerous credit and security companies have been formed and companies of navigation, mining, electricity, sugar,

(1) Such is the result of the calculations of Sir W. Armstrong, Stanley, Jevons, the Parliamentary Commissions of 1866 and 1873, and finally of E. Loze in his work, *Les Charbons britanniques et leur epuisement*, Paris, 1902. Also see *The American Journal of Sociology*, July, 1902, page 56.

(2) We do not enter the discussion of the conditions of the Spanish race or, as it is now called, the psychology of the people. Should we attempt this it would be necessary to explain the proper nature of the subject, the diversity among the distinctive regions, the difficulty of distinguishing between the indigenous and the acquired, the transitory and the permanent, and either we should run the risk of finding ourselves in error, or we should be obliged to point out certain contradictory types, as Reclus does, for example, in his geography.

etc., have sprung up. Moreover, a proof that capital is not decreasing lies in the fact that during this very year the loan of three hundred million pesetas made by the government was covered ten times.

IV.

It cannot be said that the Spanish race and the Anglo-Saxons possess the same attributes and herein the Spaniards suffer; according to Boutmy¹ the prime motive with the Anglo-Saxons is a spontaneous and gratuitous love of work for work's sake. An English periodical quoted by W. T. Stead² has been more emphatic, saying, "*in England you work in order to live; in America they live only to work.*" It would be a happy condition if in Spain, many would take for a motto the "*try, try again*" of the English, and the "*go ahead*" of the Americans. Yet if the Spaniards are not hard workers, nevertheless they work. An urgent need among them is to make the social conditions of their work more fruitful and productive, that the energy they expend may lead to something more than provision for the passing moment. Their profits should be made proportionate with the gain acquired from the use of machines and the multiple inventions of modern civilization. The spirit of enterprise that of old led the Spaniards to the conquest of other lands, should turn now toward the conquest of their own territory, in other words, the country should be made in every way as productive as possible. It is true that the intrinsic qualities of the Spaniards, as a people, do not suffer in comparison with any other race; whenever they emigrate they do not allow themselves to be outdistanced by their fellows. When enterprising foreigners have come to employ their capital in the Peninsular they have found expert assistance and above all, as skilled workers and laborers as are found in any other country. Perhaps Spain has shown herself weakest in her politics, that is, the general administration and the government. Since this weakness is most apparent and meets foreigners at first sight, and, moreover, produces most tangible and immediate effects, many have unthinkingly argued that there is a corresponding want of aptitude for other undertakings. Whether there is a remedy for this evil will be considered later.

V.

In considering the culture of Spain, there is no one who does not ask at once what the influence of religion is upon the country.

(1) *Essai d'une Psychologie politique du peuple anglais ou XIX. siècle*, parte i., chap. i.

(4) Work cited, part v., chap. 4.

Religion through her domination here, apparently, produces two effects; prosperity as well as evils are laid to her charge. The remembrance of the Holy Office does not restrain the partizans of the church from their firm belief in its beneficence,—that Inquisition which, according to Cardinal Gibbons, is a heavy burden for the apologist of Christianity.¹ It is a fact that Spain has not emerged greatly from the past, perhaps, indeed, she seems nearer to it than to the actual and vivid present. Some of us who are living remember the day, in the year 1865, when the Catholic doctrine was attacked for the first time, behind closed doors in the Athenæum of Madrid. The proof, however, of the change of feeling that had taken place lay in the confirmation of tolerance by the Restoration. Notwithstanding the outbreak of the Carlist War which was largely aided by religious fanaticism, and in spite of the determined activity of the Roman pontificate together with the entire clergy, who favored the establishment of unity and all its consequences, tolerance became a part of the constitution of 1876, and is law today.

If we observe the figures given by the census, our attention is drawn to the fact that among the eighteen millions of Spain's inhabitants only seven thousand Protestants and ten thousand Rationalists or Free Thinkers are registered. The Protestants are the conquest of some missionaries, chiefly English, who make the empty claim that Spain now completes the cycle, unfinished in the sixteenth century, which would seem to point to a belief that the possibility of leaping from the light of petroleum oil to that of electricity, without a period of gas light, is beyond human credence.

There are many more Rationalists than the statistics show since it is with great repugnance that any one officially declares himself not a Catholic; doubtless many are disaffected and not a few are Free Thinkers, among the working classes and among the scholars as well.

No liberal Catholicism, vigorous and well organized, has been supported by Spain, which is unfortunate. With the exception of this Catholicism before mentioned a Christian solution does not exist save the embryonic

(1) The Council of Castile addressed Philip II. in these words, "This Inquisition troubled the soul with blame, life with afflictions, and honor with the continual need of a declaration of faith." When the celebrated Nebrija was arraigned before the Inquisition by his enemies he exclaimed, "What is this? Where are we? What tyrannical power is this that persecutes genius so terribly? Is it not enough that I imprison my understanding in deference of the faith, can I not speak without giving offence to Christian piety? I am not permitted to publish what I see. Do I say publish? I may not even think, still less write the thought behind closed doors and for myself alone. To reach a greater slavery is impossible!"

and exotic Protestantism before mentioned; the extreme Ultra-Montane party including the clergy remains face to face with a futile and immaterial scepticism foreign to all religious feeling and at times frankly atheistic.

Our fate in this respect would have been different had a sentiment existed in this country resembling that of Cardinal Gibbons and Monseigneur Ireland, or if an attitude of mind inspired by the doctrine of Channing or Parker could have been recognized; then, the claim made by the Ultra-Montanists would have been impossible, which is that all citizens may be classified into two groups, Catholics and Liberals, and perhaps others might have found great satisfaction in a Christianity without dogma or miracles. Liberty and democracy must necessarily struggle against the claim of those who are fighting to bring into practice the doctrines of the Syllabus and the Encyclical *Quanta Cura*, which to Catholics of other countries are nothing more than far away and unattainable ideals.

Good luck, good sense, the natural march of civilization, and outside influences will bring their aid and in proportion as these gain firm control, will come the triumph of the principles already held sacred among all cultivated peoples.

With reference to other elements of culture, it is a well recognized fact that Spain is much less advanced in the material sciences than in art. There is no lack of novelists, sculptors, artists, poets, and orators, whose fame has crossed the frontiers, and whose works have been highly praised by foreigners, but the man of original science and investigation remains unrecognized by the cultured world, except as he is found in the celebrated physiologist, Ramon y Cajal and the illustrious Professor Menendez y Pelayo.

It is well to notice that the unfortunate Professor Leopoldo Alas has spoken of the necessity of advancing everything that produces general culture. He says, "the problem of education is the question in Spain," and Senor Costa emphasizes the subject with this phrase, "in the school and dispensary lie the present and the future of Spain." Many literary workers are engaged upon this task; the highest institutions of learning are the University of Oviedo and the Free Institution of Education. Senor Giner, a professor in this latter named institution and its mainspring, has published in the August number of "La Lectura," an interesting essay on "The Urgent Problem of our National Education," not prompted in that spirit of exaggeration which some conceive to be patriotism and where one is obliged to see every object as rose colored. But Professor Giner presents that other patriotism, which seeks to tell the truth to the people in such a way that, convinced of the reality and extent of its decease, they may be cured by reform and amendment.

In conclusion, the power that circumstances and Philip II. gave to Spain is a thing of the past, and in the future it is to be hoped and desired that the country will be inspired to advance, not by undertaking conquests and spreading religious intolerance as heretofore, but as in other times, when Spanish scholars taught in many universities of Europe. Hitherto an obstacle toward progress was the barrier that monarchy and fanaticism had built between Spain and the rest of Europe; the destruction of this barrier has been the accomplishment of the nineteenth century.

VI.

Are these social conditions bettered or thwarted by the lawgivers and politicians? In other words does the state support or hamper the work of a reform and regeneration coveted by all? We say supported or hampered because the state employs these means to promote the good or harm it can accomplish whenever the main principle of its life, or whatever may determine the social growth, touches at the same time the individual and society. For it is as erroneous to consider the work of the state of little moment, as to suppose that the state alone can change the conditions of a people.

The political revolution begun in the famous Cortes of Cadiz in 1812, with a loftiness of aim and a patriotism that will ever keep its memory alive, was overthrown in 1814; it was renewed in 1820, and three years later the ancient régime of the country was reëstablished. Then, with the death of Ferdinand VII., and the succession of Isabel II., in 1833, absolutism and theocracy were overthrown; three times they were subdued when they had striven to gain headway. Yet the reign of Isabel II., far from securing liberty and normalizing the government, produced a state of affairs that led to the revolutionary movement of 1868. This was the most justifiable, the most decisive, and the most notable of the many revolutions that took place in the nineteenth century and was spoken of by Canova del Castillo, as coming *to continue* the history of Spain and thus form the constitution of 1876, which now is in force and which differs in more than one respect from the constitution of 1845. In one fundamental aspect relative to the royal power, the two coincide. Instead of putting into practice the principles that were carried out in England by Monk, the monarchy and reigning house were maintained firmly as a preëxistent, social power, they were withdrawn from the deliberations of the Cortes and were given consequently a coparticipation in the sovereignty with the people. Hence the constant protest of the democrats who have held faithfully to the cause of the

republic which was attempted without success and failed through the inexperience of its followers. If the Restoration, however, had secured for the country tranquility, well being, and progress, the neutral element, numerous in Spain, would have been on its side and perhaps might have consolidated; instead of this, the systematic falsification of the parliamentary régime continued, beginning with the elections as the base and spreading throughout the entire system. The disordered administration persisted and "caciquism"¹ flourished triumphantly, that form of oligarchy most disliked. In fact, all such errors and blind ways continued, they were apparent in the Separatist War with Cuba and in the war with the United States, the result of a deplorable colonial régime. This serves to show whither the dynastic interest leads when conceived in a manner similar to the ancient paternal government, because the Cuban War was begun and ended in full view of the consequences which would follow for the dynasty in case it did not favor this war or did not conclude it. Then arose, in the outside world, those lugubrious prophecies as to the future of Spain, and in the country itself those numerous voices which have demanded a radical change in the government, in its administrative régime, and in all the organism of the state.

VII.

The difficulties opposed to improvement proceed from such problems as these: the so-called religious, the land, and the regulations concerning banking and financial enterprises.

The clerical problem, inappropriately spoken of as the religious, consists in the claim on the part of the clergy that, in Spain, there should actually exist the doctrine proclaimed by Pius IX., in his famous *Syllabus*. In this syllabus he still dreams of the reëstablishment of religious intolerance confirmed by law, of the obedience of education to the church, and considers civil marriage and the neutrality of cemeteries as heinous. Many have gathered around this standard of the clergy, in the belief that they were obliged to follow, as though this were a question of dogma or morals; they do not observe that these questions are not religious but are judicial and political and that the parliament and not the council should decide upon them. Consequently, in no other part of the world, as in Spain, is there an attempt made to promote the unusual state of affairs where, in addition to a Roman Catholic dogma and a Roman Catholic morality,—philosophy, law, politics, sociology, etc., etc., are

(1) *Cacique* was the title of the Mexican chieftains at the time of the conquest and is applied in Spain to all methods used for furthering a position, be they good or bad, legal or illegal, for one's self or for others, in fact, wire pulling.

alike permeated by popish ideals. And it is singular that the Ultra-Montanists of all shades,—and there are many of these since some are Carlists, others partisans of the imperial rule, and still others indifferent in the matter,—alike claim the conditions of the ancient régime or those of the new according as the question is discussed. That is, they would have granted them, at the same time, the privileges of the Spaniard and the rights and liberties of the North American, for they wish to enjoy the advantages of both, without the inconveniences of either.

Many think the final solution which will put an end to the Concorde system, a dream; but to not a few republicans it is an ideal, to the realization of which it may be necessary to advance more quickly than hitherto seemed prudent. A quick method is the only means of solving some problems, such as the one which excites the people so greatly today. The question of the religious communities is split apart by the seeming impossibility of making laws which, in the words of the French Constituent of 1789, will coördinate and harmonize the individual with the community at large. A protest exists against the multiplication of monkish institutions, whose vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience are the negative of the three laws of human nature, desire of gain, love, and liberty. On one phase of this problem all democrats are agreed, the civil power shall have absolute independence without interference from the ecclesiastical court.

VIII.

The land problem has risen from the exaggerated tendency toward centralization. This was begun in imitation of the French, and as the French destroyed the old boundary lines of Normandy, Brittany, and the other provinces, by dividing the territory arbitrarily into eighty-three departments, so in Spain, the ancient kingdoms of Catalonia, Aragon, Castile, and the rest were changed into forty-nine provinces. At the end of sixty years some of these provinces, notably Catalonia and Biscay reclaim an autonomy, a demand that ranges in meaning from simple decentralization to a quasi-independence. The question would be serious if *separatism* boasted many followers, but the truth is, only an insignificant minority in Catalonia and Biscay cherish an idea so absurd.

Therefore, the question consists in decentralization, as far as is possible, and in recognizing the provinces or districts as live and natural organisms, not mere instruments or means of administration, yet not conceding to them any right that can imply a lack of recognition of the unity of state and country nor lessen the sovereignty of the state.

IX.

The financial problem springs largely from the increase in debt expenditures and the demand of certain ministerial departments brought about by the late wars; in its turn this increase oppresses the especial conditions of the estimates. It is enough to say that the royal house, the debt, the pensions, the ecclesiastical obligations, and the departments of war and marine absorb more than four fifths of the expenses. The debt, however, has been reduced by a tax of twenty per cent, which the creditors accepted with good grace since they feared a larger figure, and the country has more than supported the increased burdens, with the result of a considerable increase in the estimates of 1901. Yet a radical change is necessary to correct old abuses in the governmental machinery; energetic measures should be taken to gain an even and just distribution of taxes in order that some taxpayers may not pay in excess while others are exempt or pay nothing, and a control should be obtained either by reducing or suppressing certain taxes which oppress the people without justice or reason.

The banking problem holds a close relation to the financial aspect of the entire economic question. In 1874, the Bank of Spain was converted into a national bank; this is the only bank of issue. At that time, and in the past, prudent measures were taken to place a rational limit on the note issue; later, in an evil hour, this limit was repealed with the result that the principal function of the bank consisted in lending to the exchequer. This was an easy way of relieving the exigencies of the exchequer, in other words, the *deficit* of the estimates was covered with the notes of the bank. The first consequence of the excessive note issue was an uneasiness in the money market, by virtue of which bimetalism, the legal system, was practically changed to a monometalism of silver, since the gold held by the bank remained in the vaults and did not circulate. This extraordinary fiduciary circulation, the depreciation of silver, and the painful fact of the state treasury actually hoarding money of this metal to obtain the benefit of the difference in its real and nominal value, are considerations that determine another economic aspect of the problem which relates to the foreign bills of exchange. In 1881, these bills of exchange were at par value; they depreciated only four and one third per cent in 1890 and now stand at a depreciation of thirty-two or thirty-three per cent.

Various means have been used to solve these problems. The war debt has been liquidated, an equalization of the estimates has been secured, the accumulation of silver has been suspended, and certain customs house duties have been paid in gold,—at the same time a satisfactory basis has been prepared by which the treasury can settle its accounts with the Bank

of Spain, and some measures have been taken in the right direction to limit the fiduciary circulation. It must be recognized, however, that much remains to be done since what has been accomplished is very little in comparison with the gravity of the situation.

X.

The social problem exists in Spain, although until lately it has not been considered so serious as elsewhere. Anarchism does not hold the importance that has been given it when foreigners view the crimes of Barcelona and the assassination of Cánovas del Castillo, nevertheless it counts numerous disciples in certain districts. Neither is the Socialist party numerous but it is admirably organized and contrasts with the Anarchist in the wisdom and activity of its methods, for it works under the singular regulations of its chief, Paulo Iglesias, a typographer. Recently the demands for shorter hours and the multiplication of the "Societies of Resistance" have given place to a necessity of *doing something*, and hence the publication of some laws, called *social* or *industrial*, and also the proposal of a measure now pending in the Cortes, which provides for the establishment of an Institution of Industry.

The Agrarian question is the gravest of the social problems. There is no fear that this question will arise among the districts where the landed property is greatly divided and where in consequence the peasant farmers are numerous, there such a situation would be impossible. But the situation is very different in other regions, in Andalusia, for instance, where the land has been accumulated into large estates and is worked by farmers who hire many laborers, and make the conditions of these laborers extremely hard. In view of these facts it is unfortunate that circumstance gives the labor party no representation in the parliament. In all other countries, Germany, France, Belgium, and Italy, the labor party is well represented. The Anarchists are not included in this party, because they have refused always to struggle legally. The Socialists, however, are working for a different cause; they have claimed already a representation of raising twenty-five thousand elections at the polls, and would have gained the day in part, at least, if intrigues against them had not been successful.

XI.

None of these problems can be said to be exclusively Spanish. The clerical problem exists in the same degree although with less gravity in France, Italy, and Belgium. The land problem in Great Britain with regard to Ireland is in crying need of solution; the same question is even greater in Austro-Hungary, and appears in France and Italy. The social problem

is found, with most of its attributes and to a most alarming extent, in all of the above named countries, and the economic problem in one or the other of its aspects has existed or exists in many. It cannot be said that the loss of the colonies has made these questions more difficult to solve. If Spain had experienced the loss of her sovereignty over those immense territories of the American continent in the first third of the century hers would have been a happier fortune; instead of becoming weaker, her renovation and growth would have then commenced. What renders this same problem more difficult at the present day? It is not the fault of the social conditions but the vice and deficiency of politics. Senor Silvela, the leader of the conservative party, remarked, in the Congress of Deputies, June 1, 1896, "The people are the better part of our country. If the suffrage is used fraudulently it is not the people who have so used it, nor is it by a perversion of their will, *but by the corruption of the conservative and governing classes who pervert and oppress it.* It is the same with the exercise of the suffrage as with the use of other liberties and the fulfillment of all duties appertaining to the national honor and territory,—*the people act correctly and constitute an excellent raw material, the best that our country offers.*"

Thus there has been brought about a profound divorce between society and state. This is due in part to the same cause to which Mr. Bryce called our attention at the notable conference held in Brooklyn in 1890, where he speaks of the characteristic discontent of our times; the dishonesty and the deceit of parliamentary régime have reached in Spain their greatest development and there is a general lack of faith in the politicians in office. Hence arise the distrust, the inaction, the anæmia of public opinion, and a discouragement, for the people have lost hope in finding a remedy under the present régime and with the personnel which came into power thirty years ago.

At the present time the country is able to place its confidence in the monarchy less than ever before because of this very dishonesty of the parliamentary routine. The condition is an unfortunate one which finds a government *making* its elections, yet the Cortes is the result of the desires of the ministers themselves and since the king names the ministers the entire life of the state comes to depend upon the king. This is the difference between our constitution and that of England, where as Franqueville says, "A sovereign reigns over a people who govern themselves; ministers are charged with executing in the name of the crown the will of the nation, as expressed by parliament."¹

(1) *Les institutions politiques, judiciaires et administratives de l'Angleterre*, book i., chap. ii.

When these facts are taken into consideration, is it not natural that a nation should feel itself distrustful and alarmed at the sight of a function so mighty and of such responsibility falling to the care of a boy of sixteen years?

There is no reason to hope for a remedy from the politicians. For thirty years they have neither known, nor been able, nor have wished to accomplished anything that may profit or advance their country. Neither have they attempted to minimize the traditional vices of our administration and politics. But geniuses were not necessary to fulfil the ideals of good government. Enough could have been accomplished by sincerity, legality, morality, and at all events, arbitrariness, the cause of the hated *caciquism* should have been eliminated from the public system.

The partisans of the Restoration are exhausted and unable to attempt these ideals—they do not count statesmen among their number nor even men of character or will, yet these alone are what the state needs and demands.

Are there none such as these? Their non-appearance is no proof that they may not exist. From the divorce already noted between society and state a good part of the population lives outside and separated completely from the state. The day may come, when according to Professor Burgess, by the intervention of violence, more or less noisy, such as France experienced in 1870, a change of rule will take place. New men will then step forward who will lead the country over the pathway of this regeneration sought and longed for by all. In this way the prophesy will be fulfilled which was made by the illustrious M. Fouillée at the conclusion of an article entitled "El Pueblo Espanol" in the "Revue de Deux Mondes," "Sooner or later new horizons will open for this famous people which has always held grand reserves of resistance and heroism. No one is capable of imagining what great riches are slumbering in the breast of this nation."

THE ADMINISTRATION OF CHARITY IN ENGLAND

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IT is difficult to frame any definition which shall cover all the various charities administered in England today. No review would be complete which failed to take account of such opposed forms of relief as that given by the Poor Law on the one hand, and by mutual benefit societies on the other; yet neither of them are strictly speaking charities from the point of view of the source from which they are derived. And if we try to differentiate a charity from other institutions it is no less difficult. Our first impulse is to say that a charity is designed to meet economic needs, poverty in some one of its many phases; but reflection, or a "Charities Register," soon reminds us of many charities which have other objects at any rate ostensibly foremost.

Perhaps the best way to get a general survey of the field (and we can do no more in the space of an article) will be to consider first the administration of the Poor Law, in its various branches of work. This will give us a centre around which to group the multifarious voluntary and semi-voluntary charities by which its work is supplemented.

In describing the present position and administration of the Poor Law it is necessary to allude briefly to the course of its development in English history. It is customary, and often convenient, to regard it entirely as a product of Elizabethan statesmanship, and to begin its history with the famous Forty-Third Elizabeth C. H. (1601). As a matter of fact the Elizabethan Poor Law was only a differentiation and development of the custom and law which was introduced into England with the feudal system. It is essentially a part of the old theory of society according to which every class in the community had a definite position assigned to it, and definite duties and privileges within that position. Accordingly we find that in its earlier stages the regulations for the relief of the poor are mingled with regulations of a very different kind which appear to us quite unconnected; regulations, e. g., relating to the dress which the people must wear, and the games which they must or must not play. And even to the present day we may find traces of the feudal adscription to the evil in the power of poor law guardians to remove a pauper to the parish in which he has his "settlement." In fact the Poor Law is the most striking, if not the only, remnant of genuine class legislation which has survived the democratic tendencies of the advancing centuries.

The local administration of the Poor Law has been handed on from the day when the unit of administration was the manor, and when the life of the working man was restrained within the manor. It was there that he was forced to work for and under his lord, it was to the lord of the manor that he looked for protection, as well as for direction in all the affairs of his life; and finally it was in the manor, if at all, that he found relief in times of distress. The parish of today represents the manor of old, but the working man has long ago cast off all trace of bondage to it; he is free to seek his work where he will, and his life is regulated only by the law of the land which is the same for all classes. The one trace of serfdom which lingers is his claim upon the parish for relief. "To go on the parish" is indeed the colloquial expression for receiving relief through the Poor Law. For a long time the administration of the parish charities was mainly the affair of the church, and it was only gradually, as society became more complex, that the church proved inadequate to the task and that the state intervened both to regulate the giving of relief, and to enforce contributions from unwilling almsgivers. But before this change took place the state had frequently exerted its authority,—especially and most unsuccessfully in the sixteenth century,—in the attempt to put down vagrancy. Laws of the utmost severity and even cruelty were enacted to force the "masterless man" to reinstate himself in the economic structure, and "put himself to labor as a true man ought." In the reign of Henry VIII., the enforcement of these penal regulations was in the hands of the justices of the peace, who also had the power of granting licenses to beg; and then, too, we find the actual work of relief being gradually transferred to them. By the 27 H. VIII., it is ordained that all the head officers of every city, shire, town, and parish are to most charitably receive their poor, all ministers and governors are to relieve them, and the whole parish is made responsible under penalty of a forfeit. All preachers also are to exhort people to be liberal in giving to the common box, while private almsgiving of the nature of "common or open doles" is prohibited except to travelers who may give by the roadside to the lame, blind, sick, aged, or impotent people. In 1563, it became evident that voluntary charity did not respond adequately to the requirements made of it by the state. An act of this year ordains that on the Sunday before midsummer day notice shall be given to parishioners to prepare themselves on the Sunday next following to come to the church, and there choose collectors for the poor. Besides imposing a fine as penalty for refusal to serve as collector, provision is made for compelling a collector to render his accounts to the dignitaries of the church in company with a justice of the peace. Those who

decline to give are also dealt with, and if any one "of his froward, willful mind shall obstinately refuse to give weekly according to his ability," he is to be exhorted by the various dignitaries of the church in ascending scale; and finally, if these prove unavailing, the obstinate person is to be assessed by the justice of the peace and the churchwardens according to their good discretions. As the penalty for continued refusal is committal to gaol, it is clear that we have here a compulsory, and not a voluntary, maintenance of the poor.

There are four characteristic points which we may note especially at this epoch when the Poor Law first began to be consciously developed and differentiated:—

1. The responsibility of each parish for its own poor.
2. The attempt to confine all relief within the parish to a common centre.
3. The tendency for voluntary contributions to be superseded by a compulsory rate.
4. The tendency to substitute civil for ecclesiastical administration.

If we look now at the present administration of the Poor Law with reference to these points we find in the first place that the responsibility of each parish for its poor has been on the whole maintained, but that there are signs of change in this respect. So far as the applicant for relief is concerned it is still, and will probably continue to be, the parish upon which he makes his claim; but there is a disposition to transfer the responsibility for controlling and providing that relief from local to central authorities. The local government board, which represents the powers of supervision and regulation formerly exercised by the Crown on the Privy Council, has of late years developed a tendency to issue circulars calculated to control the local authorities towards a more lavish distribution of relief, while in the metropolis the creation of a common fund upon which all parishes may draw for certain purposes, seems to throw part of the burden of the poorer parishes on to the richer, and so far to centralize the responsibility. There are, moreover, two sets of "reformers" pressing on the movement towards centralization, though from very different points of view. On the one hand, there are those who clamor for a more lavish distribution of public money, in the shape either of old age pensions or outdoor relief, and think to avoid the burden of the cost by making it a charge upon the national exchequer instead of upon the local rates. On the other hand, there are those who fear the evil results of leaving the administration of relief in the hands of locally elected guardians, often ill qualified for their duties, without the check provided by the burden of finding the money locally. The bad influence

of an uneducated board of guardians is felt already in many districts; without the check of rising rates it might well become disastrous, and from this point of view there is much to be said in favor of a strong central control over poor law relief.

If we look now at the second point, the attempt to confine all relief within the parish to a common centre, nothing could be more complete than its failure. No doubt it was originally thought that by prohibiting almsgiving except through the common box, the benevolent would be sure to give to the common box rather than restrain their benevolence altogether. But benevolence resents constraint, and when the further step was taken of making contributions to the common box compulsory, the result was a complete divorce between official and spontaneous charity. The substitution of civil for ecclesiastical administration lent in effect the sanction of the church to the divorce; for to the payment of the poor rate there attaches none of the flavor of good deeds, or the hidden hope of future reward, which accompanies charity when under the auspices of the church. Thus it comes about that the attempt to improve secular control upon the rock of relief has resulted in the production of two distinct forms of relief: that which is regulated, compulsory, and a part of the civil administration of the parish, and that which is spontaneous, often wildly unregulated, and largely though not wholly controlled by the church.

Every parish in England, then, has at least two agencies, or groups of agencies, engaged upon the task of maintaining and relieving its poorer inhabitants; and I propose now to consider the administration and spheres of these two sets of agencies, with their respective influence for good or evil. But first we must note that the civil and ecclesiastical parishes have ceased to be identical in area, the latter being by far the most numerous. The change has come about partly by the grouping together of ecclesiastical parishes into "unions," for the purposes of civil administration; partly by the breaking up of the old ecclesiastical parishes into sub-divisions as the people became too numerous for the care of the mother church. But it still remains true that the whole country is mapped out into accurately defined ecclesiastical parishes, which makes the church in many ways the most convenient organization for the purposes of voluntary relief.

We may now consider poor law institutions as the type of what the nation considers indispensable for its poor, and then pass on to consider the relations of this indispensable minimum to the freer and more varied institutions of voluntary charity.

The administration of the Poor Law is now carried on by a board of

guardians, elected on a democratic basis, in each civil parish or union of parishes. (The clergy frequently sit upon this board but only in their private capacity as parishioners). It sits for three years, and is served by a staff of paid officials, including a clerk who is an expert in the technicalities of the law. During office it is responsible only to the local government board, which can, if the guardians exceed their legal powers, refuse to allow any expenses so incurred to be paid out of the rates. But that the discretion allowed to boards of guardians is very wide can be seen by the very different policies of relief pursued by them in different parishes.

The duty of the guardians which is perhaps most in evidence is that of determining the nature and amount of relief to be given to individual applicants. Its relief committee sits periodically, and before it all applications are laid by the relieving officers, whose business it is to ascertain particulars in each case and report upon them to the guardians. The guardians then determine whether they will grant "out-relief" (money or food to be given to the applicant in his own home), or will "offer the house," i. e., say that relief will be given only in the workhouse or infirmary. According as a board favors one or the other of these policies it is known as "lax" or "strict" in its administration. There are, indeed, alternatives between these two extremes; if an applicant is ill they may grant medical relief, or if a widow is left with children they may offer to undertake the maintenance of the children in their schools; but on the whole the distinction drawn is between an out-relief policy and a non-out-relief policy.

There is a very marked difference in the moral effect upon a district of the two policies. In an out-relief union we shall find that practically any old person can have out-relief (not always adequate) for the asking; that a large number of widows are in receipt of it; and that there is a tendency to give it in all cases of illness; and we shall further find a prevailing disinclination on the part of the wage-earners to provide for economic emergencies. In a "strict" union, on the other hand, out-relief is the exception, and sometimes is not given at all; medical relief is granted only on loan; widows are expected to maintain some of their children and the others are sent to the schools; and the old people understand that unless they or their friends or private charity make some provision for their old age they must go into the workhouse. *Prima facie* one expects that in these unions the workhouses will be crowded, while in out-relief unions they will be empty, and it always strikes one afresh as a paradox to find that the tendency is altogether the other way. Out-relief, in fact, as all experienced administrators know, is the great school for pauperism,

and in a parish where the people have been taught to look to the Poor Law in all emergencies many more are driven to take final refuge in the workhouse than in a parish where they have been taught to rely upon their own exertions and to be mutually helpful.

Another important function of the guardians lies in their management of the various institutions by means of which they supplement, or offer a substitute for, out-relief. The parent institution, from which the others have been gradually differentiated, is the workhouse; but the workhouse itself is an amalgamation of several older institutions. It represents both the house of correction, the parish workshop, and the almshouse of the past, and to some extent still combines their functions, though that of the almshouse now largely predominates. In the workhouse we find those who are permanently unable to maintain themselves, either by age or by physical or mental defect, and, also, those of the able bodied who prefer the task of the workhouse to the more strenuous work of the outside world, inducing large numbers of "ins-and-outs," men and women who vacillate between dependence and independence, and for whom the workhouse is "the poor man's hotel."

In close connection with the workhouse is the "casual ward" where the tramp or vagrant can find food and shelter for the night, and can leave at shorter notice than that which is necessary in the workhouse. He is, however, legally required to do a task of work before leaving, and upon the extent to which this task is enforced depends the popularity of the different casual wards.

Next we have the poor law infirmary, which is now practically a hospital for those of the poor who cannot have the necessary nursing and medical attendance in their own homes. The desire to make the conditions of a pauper's life "deterrent," such as still prevails to some extent in the administration of the workhouse, is entirely abandoned in the infirmary, which is conducted solely with a view to the needs of the patients, and is becoming a very popular institution. In the eyes of the patients it has the great advantage over the larger hospitals that it is not utilized as a medical school.

Another institution which aims at being purely constructive is the poor law school. It may be said to have become a generally accepted principle that the child brought up by the guardians should find himself under no disadvantage on his entry into life, as compared with the child brought up by his parents. It is true that fierce controversies rage as to the best means of attaining this end, whether by way of large schools, scattered homes, or boarding-out, but when due allowance has been made for the partisan spirit elicited in the controversy it is clear that all are

aiming at the same end,—that the sins or misfortunes of the parents shall not be visited upon the children. And the disinterested observer cannot doubt that in this one department of poor law work extraordinary success has been achieved. Apart from the inheritance of any definite physical or mental disability, it is of the rarest occurrence that those children of economic failures who have been brought up by the guardians are themselves failures.

In dealing with special classes of the infirm, such as lunatics, imbeciles, crippled, deaf and dumb, the guardians do not as a rule maintain special institutions of their own, but utilize institutions provided by other agencies. Thus an imbecile or lunatic may either be kept in the workhouse, or be paid for in some institution supported by the state or by voluntary charity. So, too, the epileptic or deformed may be maintained by the guardians in some voluntary institution which has been certified as suitable. But it should be noted that accommodation for most of these classes of the afflicted is very insufficient, and many of them remain in the workhouse without the special care and training which might alleviate their misfortunes.

This, then, is the minimum work deemed essential under the Poor Law: that maintenance shall be provided for the destitute, either in or out of the workhouse, medical treatment and a hospital for the sick, entire provision and education for destitute children, and to a small but increasing extent special treatment for the specially afflicted. To this we must add the powers of the guardians to compel those relatives of paupers who are legally liable to contribute towards their maintenance, powers which are not always exercised as fully as might be desired.

We may now consider how far this legal provision for the poor is supplemented or superseded by voluntary charity. If the development of charity had been conscious and reflective one would expect to find it devoted to those branches of work which are not covered by the Poor Law, and many of which could not be wisely undertaken by the Poor Law. To some extent this is no doubt the case, but many private almsgivers are merely engaged in doing less methodically, and often less effectively, the work which they are already paying to have done through the rates. This is especially the case with the greater part of the relief work which gathers round church and chapel; every religious institution, almost without exception, has its little band of workers, "district visitors," "mission women," "deaconesses," who are busily engaged in collecting money from the rich and dispersing it in small doles, which generally differ from out-relief only in being less adequate and more irregular. Generally speaking there is no attempt at any

division of work, or intelligent coöperation between these private almsgivers and the poor law officials; they may, indeed, hardly know of each other's existence. The gifts of the almsgiver often go to the same people who are receiving parish relief, and the guardians sometimes make it an excuse for granting ridiculously inadequate allowances that the recipients are also probably getting charitable help. It is inevitable that this confusion and mutual ignorance frequently causes the recipients great hardship, who may, indeed, be getting more than they require, but also may be getting much less.

In some parishes, and notably in London through the local committees of the Charity Organization Society, an attempt is made to reduce the chaos to order, and to mark out a special sphere of action for voluntary charity. Where the attempt succeeds charitable workers agree that cases of chronic destitution shall be left to the guardians to deal with in their institutions, while they undertake the more constructive work of restoring to independence those families or individuals who have fallen under the stress of some special misfortune, or of granting pensions to those among the old whose circumstances claim special consideration. In this way they concentrate their assistance upon the class known in old endowments as "the second poor," and prevent their falling into the ranks of pauperism. For work of this sort voluntary charity, working through the unofficial visitor, is in many ways far better adapted than the Poor Law, owing partly to its greater privacy, partly to its greater elasticity and power of initiating and carrying through the special treatment required under the particular circumstances. On the other hand, the legal powers of the guardians to deal sternly with idlers and ruffians make them far more suitable to undertake this part of the work than the private almsgiver who is only too likely to become their prey.

But though this attempt at organization gains slowly in public estimation, it cannot be said to have had any great measure of success. Even when it has been adopted in some particular parish, it is always liable to be broken down by a change of clergymen, or by the introduction of a new set of church or chapel workers, who prefer the aimless irresponsibility of the old want of method. And there are other and still more irresponsible almsgivers who seem quite beyond the reach of rational control. Every winter calls forth a number of these in connection with some hastily organized "fund," who invade the poorer districts of the towns, and do incalculable harm by the expectations they arouse. The worst offenders in this respect are the daily newspapers, for which it has become a recognized form of advertisement to start a "special fund," and which know neither law nor order in the dispensing of it.

Besides this fluctuating charity of the day, almost every parish of any antiquity has its endowed charities, left by ancient benefactors for very various purposes, but many of them designed for the assistance of "the second poor," i. e., those above the level of the recipients of poor law relief. These are not subject to the same fluctuations as the ephemeral charity we have just noticed, though many of them change in value as the years pass on, but they are frequently quite as ill regulated in their distribution. It is notable that there is a great tendency for the number of paupers to be abnormally high in those towns which are encumbered with large endowed charities; sometimes because the prospect of benefiting from them has attracted to the town an unduly large proportion of people for whom there is not sufficient work; and in general because they encourage the habit of dependence.

The history of the administration of endowed charities is full of interest and perplexities. That any man, however benevolent, should have it in his power to determine how a portion of the wealth of the country shall be applied hundreds of years after his death (or as he fondly hopes, forever), whether he favors petticoats for old women or a classical education, is in itself a perplexity, if not a paradox, and perhaps the doctrine of *cy-près* is only the first step in the assertion of the rights of the living to revise or revoke the testamentary dispositions of the dead in the interests of the living:—

"No ground of policy or expediency can be assigned for allowing (the founder) to dictate forever, or for centuries, the mode in which his property shall be used. No human being, however wise and good, is able to foresee the special needs of society even for one or two generations. And yet the law says that anybody, although he may be a person whose opinion we should never think of taking in any subject whatever during his life, may compel us to take for all time property with almost any amount or kind of conditions not positively immoral. They may be foolish at the outset; change of circumstances may have made them useless or hurtful; still we must obey them. We do not allow such things to be done when the gift is to individuals or to families. An individual legatee, if he dislikes the condition, may decline the gift. * * * The consequences of so absurd a law are such as might be expected. The fruit is as the tree is. We have managed our endowments according to the fortuitous views of myriads of testators, and the result is that until quite recently nearly the whole of these endowments were, and still a very large portion is, mismanaged so far as to produce in some cases no good, and in others positive injury, to the persons affected by them."

The state is gradually strengthening its hold upon these charities by means of the charity commissioners, officials of high standing, with powers of partial revision and diversion of charitable endowments to

(1) Sir Arthur Hobhouse, quoted in the *Charities Registry*.

kindred objects. The management of the income of endowed charities lies always with the local trustees, but the commissioners "have power to inquire into the administration of charitable trusts, to compel the production of accounts, to supplement the powers of trustees, to secure safe custody of property, to extend the doctrine of *cy-près*,—that is, of diverting funds devoted to obsolete or mischievous purposes to useful objects akin to the intention of the founder,—and to control legal expenses. Their powers are considerable over trusts whose income does not exceed fifty pounds. When the income exceeds this sum, the consent of trustees is required. Subject to these conditions, they are empowered to promulgate schemes for the administration of endowed funds."¹

It is interesting to note the general direction which this diversion of endowed charities takes, as indicating the view,—not, indeed, of public opinion, but of educated opinion. By those who have studied their effects "dole charities" are universally condemned in favor of such matters of public interest as education, public spaces, and latterly the granting of liberal pensions to old people not in receipt of poor law relief. On the other hand the dole charity recommends itself to many trustees as affording frequent occasions for patronage, and still continues to an extent which is very injurious. It is possible that the powers of supervision and control placed since 1894 in the hands of parish councils in rural districts may serve in time to counteract this mischievous element of personal patronage, and introduce a more responsible sense of public expediency.

If we sum up now the sources of what we may call casual relief in a parish we find the out-relief given by the Poor Law, the doles given by more or less irresponsible almoners, and the "gifts" of the endowed charities. To these we may add the relief given through the friendly societies, though strictly speaking this is not charity at all, but mutual insurance. But so far as administration is concerned, and the need for some division of work, they should be mentioned here. The funds of these societies are administered by the members themselves, and their chief problem lies in determining when applicants for allowances are really ill enough to be qualified for sick benefit, and when they are merely "malingering." The relation between the friendly societies and the Poor Law must always be one of mutual exclusion, for the societies never thrive where a law administration tempts men away from independence, while members of the societies rarely have recourse to poor law relief. Nevertheless from time to time attempts are made, probably ill judged, to bring about a relation between the two, by providing that

(1) Mackay, *Public Relief of the Poor*, p. 169.

members of friendly societies shall be dealt with more generously by the guardians than non-members in regard to out-relief.

But generally speaking, between these different sources of relief there is no organization, no division of work, no general policy or plan of action. Is it beyond the powers of modern statesmanship to remedy this grave defect? There are two possible lines of action which might lead to the desired result. The first is that of complete central control. It is conceivable that the central authority should enforce a definitely strict administration of the Poor Law in all districts, and that the control of the charity commissioners over the endowed charities should be made complete. It is less conceivable that any effective control should be established over the almsgiving of church and chapel, and of irresponsible almsgivers in general. The prohibition of the "common dole" was probably never successful even under the autocratic rule of the Tudors; it could not be enforced now.

The other line of policy lies in the education of those who undertake relief work to understand its responsibilities and duties. In this education guardians, trustees of endowed charities, and all who systematically engage in the work of relief might well be required to partake. And if such an education became general it is likely that public opinion would ultimately condemn such extravagances as "newspaper funds."

We may next consider in what way the work of voluntary charity corresponds to that of the poor law institutions.

In so far as the workhouse is a refuge for the aged it shares this function with the numerous almshouses which have always been a favorite form of charitable endowment. As a rule election to residence in these almshouses carries with it an adequate money allowance, while in other cases the rules stipulate that a sufficient income shall be forthcoming from other sources. As regards the social standing of the inmates of these almshouses no very marked line could be drawn between them and the inmates of the workhouses; but on the whole they belong no doubt more distinctly to "the second poor," while the workhouses contain a larger proportion of those whose lives have been unsatisfactory. There is no doubt that well managed almshouses, together with well contrived local pension schemes, play an important and necessary part in supplementing the work of the Poor Law.

Where the workhouse deals with the able bodied, whether in the casual ward or in "the body of the house," we find its relation to voluntary charity less satisfactory. What is needed here is, that there shall be an ultimate refuge for the homeless, combined with great strictness of administration to avoid the danger of increasing the numbers of those

who choose a vagrant life. This danger is so great, and the existence of the vagrant class such an evil, that it would be well to leave this branch of work entirely to the guardians, for in whatever other direction the poor law guardians may err, experience speedily cures him of sentimentality here. But as a matter of fact there is hardly any branch of "social work" which appeals so strongly to the imagination of the benevolent, and the life of the vagrant is facilitated by the numerous "shelters" and so-called "labor homes" which abound in our large towns. Sometimes a more or less nominal charge is made in these; generally speaking, food is given, and a certain amount of spiritual exhortation. The managers claim that the institutions are the means of restoring many to an independent life, but the numbers with which they deal are so great, and their knowledge of individuals so slight, that very little reliance can be placed upon their estimates. In any case it is certain that their regenerative work, in so far as effectual, could be carried on just as well in connection with poor law institutions, and if that were organized the shelter charity might safely be abandoned as a source of great temptation to the morally weak, and of serious danger to the community. For there is no question here of dealing with a different class of people from that dealt with by the Poor Law; the charitable shelters and refuges are a mere repetition of the casual ward and workhouse, without their deterrent discipline, and so merely offer another inducement to forsake the ways of independence.

A similar branch of work, though one much longer established than the shelter, is that which carries on the numerous refuges and homes for fallen women. With these again the difficulty is that beyond question they make more easy the very way of life which they are designed to combat, being used largely in order to tide over some time of special difficulty. On the other hand, under good management they may afford an opportunity to members of a class which has quite peculiar difficulties to contend with in regaining a position of independence. Their justification must lie entirely in the extent to which they actually supplement the work which can be done for the same people by means of the workhouse, and do not merely multiply the facilities for a life which vacillates between vice and dependence.

If we pass now to poor law infirmaries, we may find their voluntary counterpart in the hospitals which play so large a part in the charitable work of the country. The relation between the work of the two institutions is determined less by any difference in the social standing or economic circumstances of the patient, than by the nature of his complaint. The tendency is for grave cases, and those of special interest to

the medical profession, to be received into the hospitals, and the less interesting or chronic cases are left to the Poor Law. Generally speaking, this involves no hardship to the latter, as there is little to choose, in point of comfort and efficiency, between the modern infirmary and the hospital. It is true that in the hospital the highest medical or surgical skill is available when necessary; but in the great majority of infirmary cases there is nothing to call for this very special skill, and the ordinary medical staff is fully competent to its duties. This differentiation of cases is made important by the fact that many of the most important hospitals serve also as medical schools.

But there is another branch of hospital work which trespasses far more seriously on the sphere of poor law operation, and with evil results for all concerned. I refer to the comparatively modern development of the out-patient and casualty departments. Originally the only out-patients treated at the hospitals were those dismissed from the wards before their cure was complete. Now the doors are open to all who like to come and receive advice and physic gratis; and the numbers of those who avail themselves of the charity are enormous, in some of the larger hospitals exceeding one hundred and fifty thousand a year. Unfortunately the number of patients has been made a matter of rivalry between the various hospitals, and however much the system may be deplored, none will be the first to withdraw from it. If one of the London hospitals pleads in the daily press for contributions on the ground that it has helped one hundred and odd thousand patients, another immediately writes to assert that its numbers are still larger; and they even descend to such grotesque absurdities as enumerating the millions of pills and miles of plaster which they dispense yearly. Meanwhile it is impossible for the hospital staff to make even a pretence of dealing adequately with the numbers seen; a few seconds is all that can be given to such patients, and for the sake of this and the medicines poured gratis into their own bottles the patients, many of whom have come long distances, have to undergo weary hours of waiting amongst a crowd of indisposed people. The majority are suffering from ailments which under the circumstances would be far better treated by the parish doctor or the local practitioner; but the more a hospital advertises its numbers, the more the people believe in it and throng its doors.

What the people really need in the ordinary ailments of life is treatment from a local practitioner who knows their surroundings, can visit as occasion requires in the home, advise as to habits and diet, and provide proper nourishment through the Poor Law if necessary. This treatment they can get in several ways; they may employ the ordinary local practi-

tioner whose fees in poor districts range from sixpence upwards; they may belong to a sick benefit or friendly society which ensures medical attendance as well as a money allowance during illness; they may subscribe for themselves and their families to a provident medical association; or finally they can apply to the guardians and call in the parish doctor. At present the hospitals compete with all of these agencies, and to the first three are a great discouragement. The local practitioner complains bitterly of the charity-supported competition which robs him of his patients, and the attempts of the working class to provide for their own needs without the intervention of charity suffer in the same way, while the patients themselves derive a minimum of benefit. In fact, the out-patient side of hospital work is a system which benefits few and injures many.

Those who are interested in the reform of the hospitals maintain that their true function is to provide completely for those patients who are suffering from extraordinary illness, and need expert treatment which they can neither pay for directly nor through insurance. They urge that for ordinary illness home treatment from the local practitioner (whether paid by fee or through some provident society) is the best, but that the local practitioner should have the power of recommending selected cases for hospital treatment. The hospitals might then close their doors to out-patients, and devote themselves to their in-patients, and (such of them as are also medical schools) to their students.

Meanwhile it seems certain that nothing short of strong central control will suffice to put an end to the rivalry between the hospitals, and the still more injurious rivalry with other agencies. There are those who urge that their management and maintenance should be transferred from private control to that of the state; in this case they would approximate still more closely to the poor law infirmaries, which are indeed nothing other than state hospitals. Others, again, press for a central hospital board, and it is likely that from one or another of the bodies engaged in collecting funds for the hospitals in general such a board may one day be developed. Notwithstanding the vast numbers dealt with by the hospitals as out-patients, there are also innumerable medical missions and charitable dispensaries, granting medical aid quite indiscriminately and frequently to just the same class of people as those dealt with by the Poor Law. They have no special functions to fulfil, unless we count as such the fact that some of them make attendance at a religious service compulsory upon the patients.

There is yet another institution which must be mentioned in connection with the medical charities, and that is the convalescent home. This stands

on a very different footing, and is really supplementary to the work both of the hospitals and of the poor law infirmaries. In our large towns especially the need is obvious for some place where the patient on leaving the doctor's hands, may recruit his strength with quiet, fresh air, and good food, before returning to work. Their value increases as they become differentiated according to the needs of the patients, and how greatly they are appreciated by the working classes is proved by the fact that they are beginning to provide them for themselves in connection with their friendly societies.

Perhaps the most striking reduplication of poor law institutions is to be found in the numerous charitable agencies for dealing with destitute children. Some of these are designed for the children of parents definitely above the class of those who apply to the Poor Law, and so far they certainly supply a want. But the greater number, and certainly those dealing with the greater number of children, are attempting exactly the same work as the guardians, and generally are not doing it as well. It is not to be expected that they should do it so well, for although no branch of poor law work is subject to so much scrutiny and criticism (a society has been formed for the express purpose, in addition to the numerous official inspectors) the glamor which always surrounds a charity leaves the voluntary homes and schools practically uncontrolled, with the exception of those special homes which are certified for use by the guardians. I do not suggest that in any of them there are grave abuses, only that generally speaking the management is less efficient and more autocratic than that of the poor law schools. Moreover, inasmuch as they have not the legal powers of the guardians in prosecuting those parents who desert their children, while many of them are influenced by the desire for numbers, they do undoubtedly encourage a culpable neglect on the part of parents towards their children.

The position is different of those homes or schools which deal with children suffering from some special drawback or defect. The care of the crippled, the blind, the deaf and dumb, the feeble minded, and epileptic is largely undertaken by voluntary charity. To some extent the poor law guardians are also beginning to differentiate their treatment of these various classes, and to provide appropriate homes and training for each, while sometimes, also, they pay for their cases in the charitable institutions. But the natural process seems to be for the more specialized forms of charity to be initiated by private enterprise, which is more elastic and has a greater power of trying experiments; and only when they have been proved successful should they be taken up by the public authorities and made more universal in their application. This is notably the case

with the treatment of the epileptic and feeble minded. At present there is no special provision made for these two classes under the Poor Law; the afflicted may find a refuge in the workhouse, and that is all. But voluntary charity is busy devising schemes of treatment in private homes and colonies, and when these schemes have proved themselves successful there is little doubt that they will find a place in poor law treatment also.

There is such a large field open to voluntary charity in this supplementary and pioneer work, that it is deplorable to see it wasting its energies and resources in doing less efficiently the work which the machinery of the Poor Law has been created to do. The waste of money and energy, the rivalry between different agencies, the constant temptation to the poor to patronize some one or more of the many charities competing for their favor, call urgently for some means of organization, of introducing order and symmetry into the present chaos. No very rigid control could be attempted, for experience has taught us that charity will rather die than submit itself to authority, while the spontaneity and elasticity of voluntary charity is of the greatest value in finding out new needs and devising new remedies. But some advisory board there might be to modify the present waste and confusion, to coördinate the various charities so as to cover the whole field, and to lay down definite lines of demarcation between the work of the Poor Law and that of voluntary charity. Such a central "Charities Board" might include the "Hospitals Board," and be closely connected with the central poor law authority and the charity commissioners, so that a consistent policy should run through all our treatment of poverty, and it might be an important part of its work to devise and promulgate the education in which charitable and poor law workers should be expected to partake. Even without legal powers of control such a board would have great and increasing influence over the management of charitable institutions of all kinds, as the subscribing public came to appreciate its advice and recommendations.

THE SWEAT-SHOP AND ITS REMEDIES

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IT is a frequent fact in economic history that independent producers become dependent, economically as well as socially, upon other manufacturers or upon dealers. The latter are called in German "Verleger," in French "entrepotitaires." The nearest applicable term in English is middlemen.

The existence of such middlemen can be traced back a considerable period. As early as the Middle Ages, especially during the thirteenth century, in large Italian export industries, many manufacturers ceased dealing directly with the final sellers of their products or with the consumer, and became dependent upon merchants, who disposed of the goods at wholesale. From the beginning of the sixteenth century this industrial transformation became more and more apparent in Europe, because of the improved roads, greater safety of travel, the decrease of duties, and the development of fairs. Many retail dealers were now forced to look for their supply to a single merchant. His sales directly affected production, which he thus controlled and unified, and this was the first historical manifestation of wholesale production.

During the nineteenth century this tendency acquired new vigor. It arose from two causes, which are of great economic importance, namely, the rapid growth of large cities and improved methods in transportation, which had first seemed fabulous.

These conditions made possible much larger sales in industries where previously sales directly to the consumer had been the rule; for example, in cabinet making, tailoring, shoe making. Such manufactured articles could now be produced in sufficient quantities to justify storing them for the supply of the ever lively demand of a modern metropolis, and herein lies the origin of the modern shop and bazaar. From this constant stock of goods foreign people of less culture could be supplied, and their export began. The present age thus sees industries formerly unacquainted with any wholesale production dependent upon the middleman and working under his control.

In the Middle Ages, as well as in modern times, the "raison d'être" of the middleman is the same, namely, the possibility of a larger sale. Formerly, export trade sought the intervention of the middleman. In the nineteenth century the same tendency was observed in any local trade, and the latter was often extended so as to become an export trade.

The goods are produced by artisans, in the workrooms of small masters or individual workmen, but are sold by merchants and larger masters, who control the production. Whenever export trade is dull an effort can be made to dispose of the goods at home, in city or country.

The producers are economically and socially dependent upon the seller of the goods, who in a way occupies the position of manager and "entrepreneur," but exercises no direct technical superintendence. The immediate superintendent is an employed master or a single craftsman,—in the words of the last century, "supplied with outside work."

The middleman who employs such laborers outside of his own shop, or is the buyer of their products, is not necessarily a mere tradesman, but may also himself be a producer employing outworkers. We have, furthermore, a combination of the middleman producer and merchant, namely, the dealer in ready-made clothes, shoes, or underwear, who has the cloth, leather, or linen cut and prepared in his own factory, but sends the work out to be finished.

The following figures will furnish a striking illustration of the rapidity and universality with which artisans become dependent upon middlemen in large cities. The Paris Chamber of Commerce counted 55,000 foremen and workmen dependent upon the middleman in the year 1860. There are said to have been 60,000 such workers employed in New York in 1893. In Berlin there were, according to the German trade census, more than 35,000 in 1882, and 48,000 in 1895. According to the trade census of 1895, the industrial organizations employing not more than five assistants, control 2,000,000 hands, of which half a million are employed in domestic workshops. The proportion of independent workmen to the latter, however, is not in reality as three to one, inasmuch as many dependent workers are undoubtedly counted among the independent. The Vienna Chamber of Commerce and Industry showed in June, 1902, about 28,000 homeworkers in Vienna toiling for middlemen.

In Austria, also, the middleman system furnishes to a large extent the basis of important branches of production outside of the cities. The manufacture of ordinary glass ware and hollow ware, the silk, cotton, cloth, and linen weaving industries, as well as the wood and small iron industries, are almost exclusively, or to a large part, carried on according to this system. The system is, furthermore, used in many less important industries, as may also be seen from investigations of the factory inspection conducted from 1897 to 1899.

It is very difficult to procure exact statistics with regard to the number of dependent masters and homeworkers. One thing, however, is evident, that in cities dependent workers of different types are more and

more taking the place of the earlier independent workmen. With increased transportation facilities, the workshops themselves are being transferred to the country. Unsuccessful employers leave the city, or employees return to their homes. Then industries are established in the country by speculating merchants, in farming districts, where work of this sort had hitherto not been undertaken by the peasantry or at least not as a matter of business; country people are induced by foremen or overseers to take up some industry, like basket making or button turning, or they are taught to use the knitting machine or to manufacture hair-nets. But the middleman finds an opportunity to develop homework also in cities, where the manufacture of all sorts of needlework, of hand painting for industrial purposes, etc., are introduced anew as homework. All this work is sent to dealers as well as directly to consumers, at home or abroad, by the middleman, who may be an agent, a merchant, or even a manufacturer.

Experience leads me to a recognition of the following conditions under which dependent workers are found:—

I. The work is carried on in a shop under the supervision of a dependent *small master*. The latter is formally an independent workman, and as such is licensed and pays taxes and works with his assistants and apprentices in his own shop. He is not, however, free in the purchase of raw material and in the choice of his products, and does not dispose of the latter as an independent “entrepreneur,” but he adjusts his production to the wishes of a certain circle of dealers. These supply his orders or are his constant buyers, and they dictate the buying price or furnish the raw material, accessories, samples, and tools, and consequently his remuneration is often merely wages. Such masters are found in the city as well as in the country, the latter being dependent upon middlemen in the country or upon dealers and large tradesmen in the city.

II. Closely related to this type is the so-called *contractor* or *sweater*. These sweaters, who are often women, take orders from middlemen, for example, from dealers in shoes, scarfs, underwear, or clothing, and receive the cut-out pieces in large quantities as well as all accessories, or else simply the raw material, as in the case of the mother-of-pearl industry. The work thus secured is then let out to others at lower wages, the sweaters occasionally assisting in the work.

Dependent small masters as well as these sweaters take advantage of the difference between the wages received from the middleman and those paid the laborers. In both groups the master may supply his assistants or apprentices with a workroom and board. The only difference between the two types is found in the fact that the dependent small master

possesses a formal master's license and generally a workroom distinct from his livingroom, whereas the contractor-sweater has no special workroom and is often not licensed. Dependent shoe makers and tailors, who work for exporters, wholesale dealers, market houses, or industrial masters, belong partly to the first, partly to the second type. In cities we occasionally find the wives of petty officials acting as contractors. These employ female laborers at home to manufacture scarfs, sew laundry, etc., the employees sometimes lodging with the contractor.

III. A type of workman frequently encountered is that of the dependent *individual employee*.

In this category we may distinguish three groups: (1.) The individual homemaker, who is employed by a master or manufacturer outside of the workshop or factory. He generally has no master's license, his trade is not taxed, and he works alone. In the country his wife cultivates a little land, raises pigs, or keeps goats or a cow.

(2.) Often his entire family lends a helping hand. The wife, assisted by the children, sews on finished buttons, winds thread, etc. In the winter male and female servants help the farmer with the tailoring of ready-made clothes, and sometimes assistants and apprentices are engaged.

(3.) We have thirdly the outworker, who does not labor in his own home, but hires a working place from a third party. These workers are sometimes found among the groups of the next class. Hundreds of glass cutters in Bohemia, for instance, hire a place in one of the numerous cutting mills, where they cut rings, prisms, buttons, and the like.

IV. The last of the important types to be considered consists in a merely external or an economic *union of homeworkers*.

(1.) A purely external type is furnished when homeworkers, each one of whom owns or has hired the tools of his trade, dwell together. In this case one is the nominal tenant, who formally sublets to the others. As regards the delivery of their work, they may be independent of one another or else they may have a share in large orders, each one receiving a remuneration for his own work. These are coördinate fellow workers.

(2.) The formation of a group may be due to the renting of appliances by one homemaker from another. Turners who work in the room of a fellow workman and use his lathes, pay him a so-called bench or place fee. In case they lodge with the proprietor of the lathe, a lodging tax is added. Here we have a case of landlord and tenant. Besides the rent, the proprietor assumes other burdens; he must furnish heat, light, and material, but the tenant helps to defray the expenses for the latter by paying more rent. The lodger is also required to furnish some of the material, as for example, a drill, acid, and rags.

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(3.) As an illustration of the fourth category we may regard the central organization of the Swiss tailors in Geneva, Lausanne, and Zürich, and of the mother-of-pearl button workers, the pipe turners, and meerschäum carvers in Vienna, or of the corn turners in Rumburg in Austria, into trade-union shops. These are organizations of outworkers, who have undertaken to erect a joint shop at their own risk, in order to guard against the industrial, social, and economic evils of local isolation.¹

The most important types have been given above. The middleman is a common factor of all four classes and characterizes them as a special system of production. Along with the perfect type of dependent or homeworker we always find the middleman, the one that gives the order, upon whom the former are dependent. The middleman, together with his agent and superintendents, occupies a position midway between the dependent workman and the retail dealer, that is to say, between the producer and the consumer. The middleman purchases the goods, places the orders, furnishes the raw material and the samples, and even the tools. And since the middleman develops this activity as a dealer, since he independently finds a market for the goods that have been bought up on his orders, and of which he is the sole buyer, or at least one of the few existing professional buyers, he stands to the workman as the real master spirit of the enterprise. The commercial management of the middleman and the practical superintendence of the industrial workman supplement each other, but the independence of the latter is a myth.

To be sure the large department stores and wholesale dealers make even manufacturers dependent upon them. The large factory owner, however, is not regarded today as a dependent "entrepreneur." To constitute a dependent industry the majority of the producers must work at home and follow some handicraft. The use of an electric motor does not alter their economic status. In case there should be such a development in methods of electrical power transmission as to render the application of motor power in the decentralized shops of weavers, turners, and joiners profitable, the use of electricity would lend a new impulse to dependent or homework, but the position of the homeworker would not be altered.

In this sense, then, we must regard a dependent industry as the industrial manufacture of raw materials by united or individual producers, handicraftsmen, who are economically and socially dependent upon the sellers of their products, these latter constituting an essential element of their industry.

(1) For further details regarding these types and municipal aided trade-union shops for homeworkers, see, Schwiedland, *Ziele und Wege einer Heimarbeitsgesetzgebung*, second enlarged edition, Vienna, 1902, pp. 320-49.

The above are the forms of the industries depending on middlemen in Europe. When we speak of *sweated trades*, we immediately think of low wages, immoderately long hours, unsanitary workshops, and all manner of objectionable features incident to the employment of women and children. The British House of Lords gave the following definition in a report, "The sweating system means earnings barely sufficient to sustain existence; hours of labor such as to make the lives of the workers periods of almost ceaseless toil; sanitary conditions injurious to the health of the persons employed, and dangerous to the public." Similar conditions prevail among the producers discussed above, for their economic position being weak, and isolated as they are from one another, they really belong to a grade of workers lower than those who have the power to combine together to control the conditions of their work. These isolated workers respond to every pressure of their employers; they render organization difficult for workers in workshops, and by introducing an element of sharp competition, frustrate every effort of the latter to improve their condition. They have no conception of solidarity and are content during bad times to work for a mere pittance. This class is firmly established in the East End of London as well as among the wretched immigrants in New York.

To be sure the homeworkers carry on their trade at home, in the bosom of the family. They are spared the trip to the factory and can call upon their families for help and here the middleman takes advantage of the worker's dire need, exercising his own superior power by shamefully lowering the rate of wages. In this way the lengthened working day, originally made long for material reasons, is soon regarded as the normal day, and there is no corresponding increase made in the rate of wages. Many children are forced to enter upon this deleterious work early in life, and having no opportunity to learn anything better, they frequently remain slaves to a trade that offers no prospects for the future. The middleman certainly employs cheap labor and saves rent, light, and fuel; moreover, as his laborers are not visible, he can often get along with a smaller tax than a manufacturer who employs the same number of workmen in a shop or factory. Since, therefore, he runs no risk, he has absolutely no scruples about enlarging quickly his business in good times, or about throwing a number of workmen out of employment at the first indication of trade depression. The element of risk being absent from the development of this business, the rate of wages even in good times is apt to be very low. On the occasion of a crisis the competition of the great mass of the unemployed enters effectively into the question, and the rate of wages is now lowered to a sum acceptable to the least needy

of the unemployed. The public, which is exposed to sanitary dangers by unclean and often unhealthy conditions of homework, can provide the only remedy by influencing legislation.

The number of small dependent masters increases rapidly under this pernicious system. "Entrepreneurs" with scarcely any capital can establish themselves as middlemen; all they need is enough to pay the rent of a small shop and the first installment of wages, and to purchase some furniture and note-paper; the raw material can be obtained on credit. Their first task is to procure the cheapest labor possible in order to be able to underbid existing competitors. The rate of wages is bound to suffer from the new element of competition, for the existing middlemen and contractors will attempt to lower their rate in order to meet the new-comer upon an equal footing.

The evils attendant upon this system are not far to seek, and in consequence, states of the old world, as well as of the new, have been exhorted to intervene. Legislatures have been asked to interfere, that the sons and daughters of the people may not be compelled to do an immoderate amount of miserably paid industrial work in dusty, smoky, foul chambers that serve as sitting room, kitchen, lavatory, and bedroom combined,—work, that sooner or later leads to destruction,—that their children may not be called upon to bear such heavy burdens before their time and pass through youth strangers to its pleasures, but may enjoy a measure of freedom and receive proper instruction.

In order to satisfy the claims of the consumer as well as those of the workers, various legislatures,—particularly in Australia, the United States, and Switzerland,—have enacted measures for the regulation of that dependent labor. Although new ideas are always in demand, the existing legal restrictions, when logically considered, form the basis of a series of proposals for the relief of the situation. The condition of the dependent worker can be improved in various ways, either by legislation and self-help, by governmental measures applied to particular cases, or by considerations of humanity in its widest sense, including relief of the poor and the bestowal of charity.

The demand for legislative interference grew out of special abuses, which the legislators have taken into account. But even if the regulation of homework be demanded on general principles, we must inquire whether the measures adopted can be applied with equal success to all dependent trades or only to certain special ones.

I. The first step taken to prepare the way for appropriate legislation may be the *registration of homeworkers*. The question arises here, whether every homeworker and contractor or only a certain number are to regis-

ter. The registration itself may be either private or official. (1.) Various North American States require contractors to keep private lists of their outworkers. (2.) Australia, as well as England, enters them in official registers.

New York, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin, Illinois, Missouri, and the province of Ontario in Canada compel the contractors in certain trades to keep lists of the names and addresses of their outworkers, which lists must be submitted to factory inspectors or sanitary officers, and a copy sent to the factory inspector on demand.

In New Zealand every owner of a workroom and every commercial contractor in textile industries who engages outworkers must keep a list of their employees. In South Australia, New South Wales, and Queensland *every* employer of outworkers must do the same. The list must contain the names and addresses of the workmen, together with a description of the work assigned to them and a statement of the rate of wages.

In England official registers are kept. In Victoria private registration is supplemented in clothing industries by personal notices served to the factory inspection department by the outworkers, which are delivered post-free and upon the basis of which official registers are prepared.

It is my opinion that private registers are apt to be more exact than official ones, since every change of the workmen, addresses, or other items can be entered at once. But the official register suffices for the factory inspector, provided it be renewed twice a year according to the notification of the contractors. Moreover, many contractors would perhaps shrink more from a systematic written denial of outworkers than from the submission of incomplete private lists upon the inspector's visit to the shop. And besides, for purposes of inspection, the local distribution of homeworkers can be more readily ascertained from registers compiled by the authorities than from lists made up by individual contractors. All that the official register need consist of is a compilation of the contractors' lists. Everything, of course, depends upon the regularity with which these lists are furnished.

There is no reason why there should not also be a regulation requiring registration by the homeworkers themselves, by giving notice to the factory inspector. In this case both contractor and workers would be obliged to furnish the names and addresses to the inspector of the district at regular intervals.

The workers might receive a *certificate* whereby registration could be controlled. Landlords, then, ought to demand a certificate from every tenant contemplating the establishment of an industrial enterprise.

Mr. C. Booth of London recommends that the certificate of regis-

tration be issued in triplicate, one copy to be furnished to the landlord, the second to the worker, and the third to the inspector. The worker should post his copy in a conspicuous place in the workroom. Not only the landlord, but also the employees of the contractor would thus be able to control his proper registration.

A further control would be provided by making the registry lists public. This would enable every citizen to determine whether a workroom is registered or not.

This control could be made even more effective by providing the properly registered shop or factory with some *official sign*. The public would then be given an opportunity for far-reaching influence and could considerably facilitate the official control of the registration of workrooms. By this means an interest in such registration could be aroused mechanically among the people. But the importance of this little sign must not be over estimated. The homeworkers constitute a fluctuating element of the population and the sign would possess no absolute value as a proof of the registration of the workroom. Its function would be more directly to indicate the existence of a dependent business in the house, that is, it would serve as a means to invite the attention of inspectors. It is, therefore, in a way immaterial whether the sign is used by a non-registered newcomer or whether the homemaker attaches it to a non-registered dwelling; it would then no longer serve as a mere control of registration, but would presuppose the extension of inspection to all homework.

The private and official registration, the publicity of the registry lists, and more especially the official signs in the house or at the entrance of the workroom would assume much importance, if legal labor protection were extended to homework. Yet these regulations would be serviceable under any circumstances, since they would considerably advance the free organization of homeworkers.

II. No doubt the American reader is aware of the fact that Bismarck introduced the principle of the *insurance of working men*, as distinguished from the principle of self-help embodied in the trade-unions. The expenses are borne by the "entrepreneur" and the workmen, in part also by the state. By thus advocating the interests of the working man the political communities (cities, towns, villages) were to a considerable extent relieved of the burden of providing for the poor. In Germany there are insurances for workmen and certain other classes of persons, against accident, sickness, infirmity, and old age. Austria has copied the two former and France is about to introduce some remarkable innovations in this field. Up to the present time, however, insurance has been made obligatory upon

the homeworker only in rare instances, and the development of workmen's insurance in this direction would undoubtedly be extremely beneficial. It would comport with the principle of working man's insurance which has hitherto wrongfully excluded some classes of *dependent workers*. If we are to regard this principle as an integral element in the progress of civilization, it behooves us to extend this assistance also to the lower classes of workmen, instead of withdrawing a helping hand from the very class that needs it most. This argument applies particularly to the dependent worker, since his position is too precarious to guarantee complete success by private means.

This problem does not materially affect the situation in America, as there the element of insurance does not enter into consideration. Another remedy for sweated trades, however, has a specifically American origin, the regulations of the *sanitary police*.

III. We have here to distinguish between dwelling inspection, workshop inspection, and the marking of such products of homework as are questionable from a sanitary point of view.

The influence of legislation in the field of dwelling reform may be positive, that is, by requiring the construction of sanitary dwellings and shops at moderate rentals; and this is a highly important function. It must, however, exercise also a repressive influence by forbidding the use of rooms that do not comply with the regulations. The modern dwelling laws, like the corresponding building regulations, are based upon the principle of holding the landlord responsible for the unhealthy condition of his building, and necessitates an effective inspection. As an aid to the latter, the city of Glasgow has adopted a regulation that all dwellings consisting of from one to three small rooms must be provided with an official sign, upon which the maximum number of persons permitted to inhabit such dwellings is stated. The control is exercised by the police inspector, who is empowered to inspect at any hour of the day or night. The landlord is entirely responsible for infractions of the law.

As regards the inspection of workshops and factories, the registration of dependent workers would prove an effective aid in this direction. This inspection is intended primarily to safeguard the consumer, who is to be protected against dangers accruing from the use of articles prepared in a sweat-shop infected with contagion. This has led to the introduction of frequent sanitary inspection, in consequence of which special regulations are enforced in the presence of contagious diseases. An inspection should be instituted wherever workroom and dwellingroom are one or are directly connected, and especially in the case of the underwear and clothing industries, since textile materials are such effective spreaders of disease. New

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Zealand and England, and most of the States of the Union, have enacted laws directed against the danger of contagion. Unsanitary goods are disinfected or simply destroyed. Consequently the homeworker will endeavor to conceal the existence of disease, for the destruction of the goods injures the contractor and himself no less, since he runs the risk of losing his wages for finished goods or of being thrown out of work during his illness or even longer. The prohibition of work in rooms infested with contagious diseases will be carried out only when the contractor is held responsible for the unsanitary conditions, or the workers are in a measure reimbursed for the loss of work. Only in this way can the temptation to conceal the presence of disease be removed. It is, nevertheless, in the interest of contractor, homeworker, and consumer alike, to adopt protective measures against contagion. The contractor is not anxious to have his goods confiscated and the consumer is on the lookout for disease germs. The workers, however, should demand the establishment of obligatory insurance and some insurance against loss of wages due to destruction of goods or lack of employment, in order that they may not be tempted or forced to conceal attacks of disease. The workers could be forced to report illness only by licensing their business and withdrawing the license upon failure to report.

IV. The *introduction of a license* should go beyond the simple registration of all homeworkers and the licensing should not be undertaken until after an examination of the premises with regard to their adaptability for industrial labor. The license would then replace the registration certificate; work without a license or the employment of non-licensed workmen would be regarded as an infraction of the industrial law. The significance of the entire measure would be to prevent the carrying on of industrial work of a definite kind in totally unsuitable places. The late chief English factory inspector, Mr. Oram, made a similar plea as early as 1892. He was of the opinion that the possession of a license assures the registration of all workrooms and their inspection by the sanitary police.

New Zealand and Victoria have had recourse to more radical measures in this direction than any other states. In New Zealand every workroom must, under the factory law, be registered anew each year. No entry is made until the inspector has confirmed in writing that the premises in question are suitable for a factory or shop. If the inspector fails to point out defects within ten days after receipt of the plan and a detailed description, his consent is assumed. In case he finds a non-fulfilment or infraction of the legal requirements, he must inform the "entrepreneur" of the circumstance in writing and forbid the continuation of work until the

stated requirement shall have been complied with. Similar orders are contained in the Factory Act of Queensland.

In Victoria, the board of health in pursuance of the factory law of 1896, adopted most effective regulations for the buildings used for industrial purposes, a non-compliance with which is equivalent to forfeiting registration.

In these states the factory laws apply to many little shops, as for example, in New Zealand, to every room in which at least two persons are employed at industrial labor for which they receive wages in return; in Victoria four or more persons or one Chinaman.

If every homework room were compelled to take out a license,—as is the case in a number of trades in New York, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Wisconsin, and certain workshops in some trades in Massachusetts,—simple registration of homeworkers would not be necessary unless it were retained merely as an aid in control.

V. It is strange that free organization has not taken hold upon homeworkers in an era that has witnessed the origin of powerful trade-unions. A German professor maintained that the only way to assure the fulfilment of laws enacted for the protection of homework and to improve the conditions of life of these working men, is to interest the workers themselves. But the workmen of this class are far too humble, far too poor, and far too isolated from one another to enable free organization to make any progress among them. To be sure, factory hands are organized, but their leaders cannot extend the organization to homeworkers. Even if they so wished, it would soon be apparent that the factory hand and the woman who does sewing at home are two distinct psychological entities. The homeworker must look to the upper classes of society for aid. In Berlin an organization of charitably inclined ladies by personal endeavors procured a list of women homeworkers, whom they then invited to attend meetings for mutual discussion held in the different districts. As a direct consequence of this movement, there now exists in four sections of the city a trade-union of women homeworkers of ready-made clothing and linen under the supervision of women teachers, ladies, and clergymen. This union endeavors to facilitate the purchase of sewing machines as well as of fuel cakes, and to establish all sorts of provident funds. The practical ladies of the United States may discover here an opportunity for noble and efficient social work.¹

Even though the workmen be insured against sickness, accident,

(1) An extensive description of the Berlin work is given in my paper, *Comment il est possible d'organiser les ouvrières en chambre*, in the *Revue d'Économie Politique*, Paris, August, 1902.

and infirmity, though they become subject to factory legislation, this does not directly influence the rate of wages, and that, after all, is the most important factor of their standard of life. No victories can be won in the war against starvation wages, if no impetus is given to the organization of the workers. It does not, therefore, seem at all strange that after an investigation of existing conditions the proposition has been made to women homeworkers,—particularly in Lyons,—to organize into trade-unions. Mr. C. Booth, before the English Royal Labor Commission, recommended the regulation of homework on the ground that this would render the activity of the unions simpler and more effective. The organization of labor would be facilitated, if it were generally known where workmen are to be found, for they would then be more accessible to the unions. Mr. Booth expressly and properly emphasized that in this case more favorable conditions of labor might be had. Homeworkers would then seek occasion to guard their own interests more jealously than hitherto; they would become bolder and more capable of pleading their own cause, and the first consequence of the organization of homeworkers would manifest itself in a more rigid enforcement of the general legal, sanitary, and industrial regulations. The organization of workmen is, therefore, he holds, by far the most effective remedy that has yet been proposed. The same view is entertained by others,—for example, by John Burnett, the labor leader.

In face of the unfavorable conditions under which the homeworker toils, and they are characteristic of all dependent industry, the working class with its live organization and propaganda seems qualified to undertake the enormous task of elevating its position, if the homeworkers can be taken in tow by the organized workmen employed in large industries and in small trades. By means of their organization they can abolish the traditional relation to the contractor, and organize, lead, and support strikes. The state, under the influence of the *vis inertiae*, endeavors to retain the existing social status. To be sure, it follows social events, but it does not command them, and can only to a small extent anticipate actual relations of power. Thus the working class furnishes the propulsive force of social advance. Legislation against homework will be most effective if it forms the basis for the continued conspicuous activity of the workmen themselves.

VI. A very important question to be considered is whether labor laws may be applied to homework.

The application of legal labor protection to homework is a postulate continually advanced by working men and sociologists. The demand for this extension arises from the very principle of legal labor protection, and is

made not alone with regard to the homemaker, but also with regard to the persons within the protection of the labor laws. For as long as homework is not included in the regulations for the protection of labor, an increase in the protection of working men in industry and handicraft will accentuate the development of unprotected homework, to which all organized workmen are so strenuously opposed. This phase of the matter was fully discussed in the German Reichstag, and a delegate to the congress for the protection of labor held in Zürich in 1897 demanded that married women be forbidden to engage in factorywork, and in homework as well; for without the latter injunction their work would simply be removed to cellar or garret. And for this same reason this congress stamped dependent work as a great hindrance to the effective application of legal protection to workroom people. This tendency of protective legislation for workroom people to advance the further development of unprotected dependent industries will appear in a more striking light, as the development of methods of electric power transmission make the use of the motor general in homework.

Granted that laws should be enacted for the protection of homeworkers we must understand clearly that it will by no means suffice to make the homeworkers themselves primarily responsible for the fulfilment of the law,—not because of any theoretical considerations of their dependence, but purely on account of practical reasons. Even the regulations applying to small trades can be carried out only with difficulty, because it is impossible to subject small trades to an effective control by factory inspectors. Knowing this, I some time ago opposed the proposal to extend merely factory and workroom legislation to homework. Since the existing labor laws, in so far as they deal with small industrial workshops, are not strictly enforced in England or upon the continent, it is scarcely to be expected that their application to dependent industries will render them practicable.

However, English legislation has discovered a point of attack. It has *declared* the employer responsible (thus far only in theory) when his outworkers are employed in a place that is detrimental or injurious to their health, and has actually *held* him responsible for having articles of clothing manufactured, mended, or cleaned in a house containing scarlet fever or smallpox patients. And Mrs. Sidney Webb was no doubt right when she objected to my former scruples and declared that if the contractors as well as the landlords were held responsible for the proper compliance with legal regulations as applied to the work of their employees or tenants, an important point would be gained and other regulations could more easily be instituted. Of course, the regulations themselves

should be adapted to the special evils that the sweated trades show.

In this way the contractor and the landlord, and also the janitor, would become amenable to police inspection. As soon as these persons run the risk of punishment in consequence of a notice or chance visit from the factory inspector, because certain legal requirements have been disregarded, they will endeavor to see that the law is enforced. As for the contractors, a number of fashionable tailors in London years ago ordered their agents to report any contagious disease they might find in the families of the pieceworkers, in order that their customers might be protected. Paragraph 6 of the English factory law of 1895 required such protection of the consumer in the case of the tailors for the poor. We are concerned, however, with the legal protection of the homeworker himself.

If this is to be attained, every room in which contract work is carried on must be entered on the list of the inspector. On account of the large number of such rooms, it will be found impracticable to visit them all every year, or even once in two years, even though the number of inspectors be increased,—say by the employment of working men and women inspectors,—and their work be specialized. Consequently the creation of an army of voluntary inspectors in the persons of the contractors or landlords would be of the utmost importance. They should control the enforcement of the general legal requirements for homework and the regulations of the inspectors.

This responsibility could be shared, first, by the landlord or agent, secondly, by the contractor, or, thirdly, by both. I shall not treat these questions in detail. They are sufficiently discussed in my memoir originally written for the Austrian government, entitled “Ziele und Wege einer Heimarbeitsgesetzgebung.”¹ Disregarding the measures providing for the enforcement of general labor laws, the content of these regulations is of great importance, including prohibitory as well as mandatory orders. I must refer the reader once again to the volume just cited, and shall content myself with enumerating the three essential factors to be recognized. In the first place, additions should be made to existing factory legislation in the interests of factory hands who work at home; secondly, there should be new regulations intended primarily for homeworkers, and, finally, effective changes should be made in existing factory regulations in order to adapt them also to homework.

VII. Hitherto the organized workroom laborers, who have to compete against homework, have demanded that *homework be prohibited*. Two measures having in view the limitation of homework may be

(1) Manz, editor, Vienna, second enlarged edition, 1903.

demanding from this standpoint of labor protection,—namely, workroom laborers should not be permitted to take work home from their shops, and again, dependent workmen should be prohibited from employing other homeworkers, that is, from becoming sub-contractors. A similar limitation could be effected, thirdly, by the compulsory marking of all articles manufactured by dependent workmen, since this would curtail the sales of goods.

Two more radical measures, even, have been proposed,—the prohibition of homework in some industries, and the prohibition of *all* homework irrespective of the nature of the article manufactured. It seems doubtful whether even the former could be rendered effective, and whether its application would prove expedient. The latter measure on its face appears chimerical.

The demand for the abolition of homework has been made by English laborers. Early in the nineties the shoe makers in Leeds, Kingswood, Leicester, Bristol, Norwich, and other cities,—particularly in London,—forced a large number of “entrepreneurs” to provide shops for the lasters and finishers, who previously worked dependently. The strike was the weapon used by the laborers to compel the contractors to institute this reform. A similar movement was set on foot by the tailors in England, but they were far less successful. In Germany the dress makers in 1895 demanded permanent workrooms of the contractors, and engaged in an unsuccessful strike in the winter of 1896. The tailors in Chicago as well as in New York made preparations for a similar struggle.

In the course of the war waged by the English tailors for workrooms, an assembly of trade-union delegates discussed the abolition of the middleman sweater. During the debate, attention was called to the unfavorable condition of the dependent worker and the injury suffered by the consignor by reason of the fact that the accessories furnished by him are sold and replaced by cheaper material. As a result of the meeting, only a resolution was adopted in which the trade-union men were asked to purchase their clothes of firms owning their own workrooms.

Nevertheless the English labor leaders are desirous of limiting dependent work. Their representatives at the Zürich congress for the protection of labor in 1897 offered a resolution demanding the complete abolition of homework, which was seconded by a German labor leader. They wished to have homework abolished or at least limited. To accomplish this, contractors were to be compelled by law to furnish workrooms for their employees. But these proposals were rejected and the committee proposed that, in consideration of the fact that the limitation and final abolition of homework in all its forms is absolutely

necessary in the interests of hygiene, of civilization, and particularly of labor organization, the question of homework and the intimately related question of working men's homes be discussed at the next congress. The congress itself considered "homework a mode of employment that carries with it serious social and sanitary evils, and is a great obstacle to the progress of labor organization and the enforcement of effective labor protection. The congress refers the detailed discussion of this question to the next congress." Even Greulich, the radical Swiss labor secretary, regarded it as a Utopian idea to endeavor simply to abolish such a widespread form of production, while Liebknecht declared emphatically that homework could not be abolished in Germany by mere decree; "such a decision would only make us a laughing stock," he said. And similarly Bebel in the German Reichstag, in reply to the statement that his party wished to prohibit homework said, "We do not wish anything of the sort; that would be hard and cruel."

Certainly legislation alone cannot entirely abolish homework. Experience has sufficiently demonstrated that the law-maker cannot assume the rôle of sovereign dictator,—least of all in political and economic matters, and a system that has developed the strength now possessed by homework can surely not be eradicated by a mere prohibition. The lack of regard shown for other industrial regulations leads indisputably to this conclusion. Legislative enactments can control economic life only to a moderate degree and at the most only where the direction and the force of the sociological development is recognized and taken into account. The law-maker consequently can do no better than follow the advice of a deep-thinking writer and content himself with creating centres of crystallization for the social formations going on before his eyes (E. Steinbach).

Moreover, if homework were prohibited by law, what would become of the hundreds and thousands of homeworking families in all quarters of the land deprived of their means of livelihood, for whom no employment could be found in shops or factories, and who would thus be deprived of their means of livelihood, their productivity not being sufficient to enable the contractor to assume the expense of establishing a workroom and supply tools and instruments?

The immense number of homeworkers will prove an almost insurmountable obstacle to the attempt to abolish homework absolutely. Therefore, even if the measure could be enforced, it would scarcely be advisable to adopt such a drastic method of relief.

On the other hand, it is not at all necessary to abolish homework in all its phases. For example, what objection could be raised to factories in the country supplying married women with light homework at the rate

of wages prevailing in the factory itself? Moreover, I doubt very much whether a prohibitory decree directed against any one particular class of homework would be productive of good results, unless an attempt were made to prohibit homework in industries that employ relatively few people.

The total abolition of homework would be equivalent to a positive mandate requiring every contractor to open his own shop or factory at a moment's notice; many contractors would be driven out of business, and many workmen would in consequence be thrown out of employment.

VIII. In the United States it has been proposed to impose a heavy *tax upon the contractor* for every employee, the object being to increase the cost of conducting business of this nature. Such taxation of homework could be rendered effective more easily than a direct abolition. Even though this mode of employment may gradually be suppressed, a large body of laborers will always be thrown out of work, and the difficult problem of providing for the workers still remains.

The experience of Victoria has clearly shown that even an indirect abolition of homework cannot be effected without friction. A short time ago compulsory minimum wages were introduced for certain trades (for example, dress making and shoe making), in order to increase the cost of homework to the contractor by establishing a somewhat higher rate for the piece wages of homeworkers than for the time wages of workroom employees. A death-blow had been dealt to homework, but many workers who could not go to the factory, or who were not accepted, remained out of employment. Only competent workmen found employment and an impetus was given to the use of machinery. Thus the reduction of the large profits derived from homework killed it, and many workmen came to grief.

IX. A more practical measure for the limitation of homework is the specific *marking of home-made products*. In New York, Massachusetts, and New Zealand this is done for sanitary reasons. Those goods are marked which originate in unlicensed workrooms in rear tenements, or which are made under unclean or unhealthy conditions. The product is thereby stigmatized. The purpose of this measure is the direct opposite of that of the trade-union clause, according to which goods bearing the well known union label are recommended to the buyer as made under fair conditions. The American Consumers' League by the use of its label and white list promote the same result.

X. Coöperative societies may also attempt to exclude goods from their shops which are not made under proper conditions and for suitable wages. An ineffective attempt to introduce a "Trade-Union Label" was made by the English congress of coöperative societies held at Glas-

gow in 1892 in connection with the federation of English trade-unions.

XI. *Public corporations* in so far as they are *consumers* have an important yet simple task to perform in this connection. As such they can exclude products of homework and can prescribe fair rates of wages for the goods to be furnished. England has set the pace in this direction.

During the past few years the war against homework has become more energetic. In the beginning of the year 1894, it is stated in a report of the fair wages committee of the British parliament, that homework is excluded from all government contracts for clothes upon pain of heavy punishment. The report emphasized that the payment of the wages agreed upon by the trade-unions and the observance of the hours of labor and other conditions could be prescribed by law and really carried out. The feasibility of such measures depends, in very large part,—and this seems quite proper,—upon the watchfulness of the labor-unions. Experience has shown, however, that the unions are not only wide awake in this direction, but also that “entrepreneurs” in general are very anxious to fulfil the conditions prescribed in the contract.

At present, homework is expressly forbidden by the London County Council in all its contracts relating to the supply of articles of clothing, and a minimum rate of wages is established for workmen of all sorts. The purveyors of clothes, shoes, hats, and capes must produce the articles in their own factories. Every infraction of the regulations is punished by a penalty of one hundred pounds sterling, which may be collected from the contractor in a civil action, or the sum may be deducted from his bill. This example has thus far been followed in England by more than two hundred administrative bodies; in France, Belgium, and Holland, also, there has been a marked tendency to impose labor conditions upon public purveyors.

XII. It is doubtful whether the existing evils could be alleviated to any extent by the organization of *placement*. The more rapid placement of the unemployed might prevent many from being driven to homework, but if “entrepreneurs” are able to procure factory help more easily, they will feel inclined less often to rely upon a contractor. On the other hand, placement would perhaps, in a measure, advance the organization of homeworkers, because they would meet on common ground the employment bureaus, and the lists kept there would be of valuable service for organization purposes.

XIII. The question of the erection of *central shops* for homeworkers deserves serious attention. In middle sized cities where dress making plays but a small rôle in tailoring, as in Geneva and Lausanne, the homeworkers of the custom tailors could be placed together; during dull times they could also be employed by sellers of ready-made clothing.

As early as 1897 the city council of Berne discussed the proposition of establishing free sanitary workrooms for homeworkers in those trades which were most menacing to health. It was decided to examine the situation and to call for estimates for the erection of shops from the unions of such trades as are mostly concerned with the question of homework. At the present moment the erection of a shoe maker's shop is being planned. We are dealing here with a public subsidy of central shops. The same step has been successfully taken by the Vienna Chamber of Commerce and Industry with regard to the unions of turners, meerscham workers, and mother-of-pearl workers.

The economic basis of such a union may consist in the establishment of a fixed rate of wages and a fixed selling price, in the introduction of machine production, or in other advantages which are guaranteed by the existence of labor groups, and compensate them for the expenses involved in the union of individual work. The central shop would attain its highest development by being transformed into a productive association.

XIV. In states where homework is mainly carried on by poor immigrants, as for example, in the United States, *immigration restrictions* have been repeatedly proposed as a remedy. The excessive supply of labor when times are good, but more particularly in bad times, forms one of the main causes of the miserable condition of homeworkers.

At the twelfth annual meeting of the Association of United States Factory Inspectors, held in the fall of 1898, it was resolved in their annual reports to request the governors of the various States to influence Congress to adopt measures for the effectual restriction of the immigration of such workmen as underbid domestic labor rates.

XV. Australian colonies have also attempted to abolish the evils of homework by establishing obligatory *minimum wages* in certain industries. This was not done in order to prevent future underbidding of the minimum, but to establish such obligatory minimum wages as would represent an increase over the average existing rates. Victoria and South Australia have created special boards for this purpose, while New Zealand, New South Wales, and West Australia possess compulsory state arbitration courts, which have the power to fix minimum wages in the case of industrial disputes between employers and employees.

This attempt has clearly demonstrated that in case piece wages and time wages are not duly proportioned, the lower the wages the more flourishing will be the mode of production, that is, homework will increase with relatively low piece wages, whereas shopwork will increase with relatively low time wages. The abolition of homework, however, deprives many families of their sole means of subsistence, because only

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the most competent workmen are employed in the shops, and furthermore, because many persons can work only at home. It was further shown that whenever the establishment of minimum wages tends to increase the rate to a considerable extent, it will result in the dismissal of the less efficient hands and in the introduction of more machinery. The number of the machines increases,—but the dismissed workman starves. He is thus forced secretly to underbid the obligatory wages, or else he will work on his own account and sell goods to the contractor.

To be sure, in industries which need not fear interlocal competition, as, for example, baking, custom tailoring, etc., even a considerable increase in wages will involve no difficulties.

Aside from conditions due to competition,—the amount of increase and the relation between standards for time work and piece work,—the enforcement of minimum wages is fraught with certain difficulties with regard to persons who are unable to answer the minimum or normal requirements of any chosen labor category, as, for example, semi-invalids. In order not to injure this class, standards below the normal minimum wages have to be adopted by special agreement. The measures above suggested as remedies for the homework system presuppose *legal interference* or the personal interest of the homemaker or the consumer. These, however, must be supplemented by additional measures, which cannot be promulgated in the form of mere regulations and prescriptions and which can be evolved only by a superior and zealous *administration*. This should determine the causes of the concrete evils in each particular case, and its beneficial activity should be directed into individual channels. The methods of governmental authority are just as necessary for the accomplishment of the object as the material support and the sagacity of the business circles involved. Relief may be obtained through various channels, by means of technical instruction, by the furnishing of better models and samples, or of cheaper raw material, by non-interest bearing loans to individual producers, by the ordering of good machines or the offering of prizes for good work. These measures, which can be applied by a wise philanthropist, serve only as illustrations of what can be done. Their application constitutes a Colbertism on a small scale,—not in the sense of technical regulation, but of productive economic suggestion. Russia and Hungary employ it to advance the homework there localized in the country, and in Austria also it is frequently encountered.

Finally, we may add to the economic, legislative, and administrative regulations, and to the self-help of the workman and consumer the element of *social assistance*, the voluntary aid rendered by the upper classes of society to the lower.

In this connection we must mention, first, the building of dwellings for the people. The houses erected by the County Council of London in the East End, a typical homework district, are furnished with small shops in the courts, which are provided with skylights. These lighted sheds are rented to the tenants of the front tenements, which are several stories in height, at low rates, in order to induce them to do their work outside of the home.

In Lyons, Marseilles, and elsewhere there are societies that find work for unemployed women. Occasionally they provide work out of the house or in a special shop, thereby lessening partially the burden of hard times as well as the lack of employment due to other causes.

Loan, legal aid, coöperative, and all other beneficial societies which serve the working man in general may be of assistance to the homeworker. At present the latter is often forced into the poorhouse or the hospital, and this might be avoided by applying social aid here and there.

The main remedies, to be sure, will always be sought in legislation, self-help, and administration. The elevation of homeworkers, who may be considered members of the fifth class, is a stupendous problem, the gradual solution of which even under the most favorable conditions will take many years. We can no longer maintain with justice that no relief is possible for the terrible evils of the sweat-shop for today we are not only confronted by the problem, but means of solution are at hand.

A complete cure for the numerous evils attendant upon homework cannot, however, be expected from a single remedy. Just as the development of the commercial relations of a country is not dependent upon a single formula of action, and domestic trade can be quickened and export trade advanced only by several coöperative measures, so in the question under discussion, a single legislative idea cannot furnish satisfactory relief. A striving for social improvement must animate the legislature and the administration, and a system of "small causes" must be carried into effect, since the world can be improved only step by step.

Before a remedy is applied, whether it is to affect all industries or only a single industry, careful observations must first be made of the concrete evils as well as of the economic foundations of the respective industries. In order to enact acceptable laws, the economic conditions of the home country should first be thoroughly understood.

What is more, if we wish to transform into action a fruitful thought based upon positive knowledge, we must allow personal judgment to mature and must not content ourselves with bringing about a compromise between two conflicting interests. The knowledge and wishes of all the groups concerned should constitute the basis for this judgment; its value,

however, should go even further. The creator of such regulations should not blindly adopt the opinions in inspectors' reports, but should regard these merely as the basis for original researches and thus lend the results of personal experience to the discussion. I have attempted in this essay to give a general view of the remedies applied in various states, and also to give some deductions from personal experience.

The measures to be adopted by different states will, of course, depend upon economic, social, and political factors, upon the importance of the position acquired by industry and the influence gained by the laboring class, and, finally, upon the seriousness of the economic and social obstacles that hinder the enforcement of such regulations as may be adopted.

THE PACIFICATION OF BATANGAS

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TO fully understand the question in all of its phases and particularly in those that show the need of the concentration system, it will be necessary to explain the methods which enabled the insurgents to keep up their warfare and also to explain the kind of warfare that it was. In submitting this explanation to the people of the United States I shall draw from captured insurrecto correspondence and papers that came into my office during active operations, and I shall also quote from declarations submitted to the provost marshal of the brigade by the leading men of Batangas. After showing the means whereby the insurrecto officials raised the funds necessary to carry on the war, and the readiness with which these calls for funds were responded to, this explanation will then show when and how the concentration system was started, its effect upon the natives to whom it was applied, and its result upon the war.

At the time General Bell assumed command of the Third Separate Brigade, about December 1, 1901, all the provinces of the brigade which included Batangas, Laguna, Tayabas, Cavite, and the Island of Mandoro, as well as some adjoining provinces, were in a state of insurrection under the chief, Miguel Malvar. In a wordy declaration after the capture of Aguinaldo, Malvar declared himself Jefe Superior, April 19, 1901, and as such was recognized by other chiefs, and by the Hongkong Junta, which organization, on receipt of Malvar's declaration, put out on May 31, 1901, a large placard with the head lines "Malvar no se Rinde," Malvar does not surrender.

Malvar, on April 28, 1901, issued a general order, called General Dispositions and Instructions, that was to be followed in Luzon and in the other islands under his command. This was the first of a series of such general orders that were issued by him from April 28, 1901, to December 19, 1901. The second of these General Dispositions and Instructions dated June 25, 1901, deals largely with the means of collecting money, supplies, and arms, and is given here in full and also some extracts from the first order issued April 28, 1901.

The American authorities were acquainted with these papers, copies of them having fallen into the hands of the military at different times, and the entire set, some of them the originals, was secured by Captain Bamford when he captured General Noriel and came so near getting Malvar, on March 23, 1902, as to secure his papers and personal effects.

In the First General Disposition we find the following:—

“Chiefs of zones or provinces are empowered to accept monthly as an ordinary war contribution seventy cents from each man and thirty cents from each woman, which contributions will not affect the extraordinary contributions which are required by abnormal circumstances.”

The Second General Disposition is as follows:—

“In order to cover the losses produced by the continued desertions, from this time on, in any pueblo not having an organized force of our army, the citizen who is able to get together from eight to ten rifles to fight the enemy will be considered a second lieutenant of infantry; eleven to twenty-four rifles, first lieutenant; twenty-five to forty-nine rifles, captain; fifty to ninety-nine rifles, major; without other requisites than that of notifying these headquarters. These organizations will be governed by dispositions and instructions of the headquarters. All appointments heretofore made by Senor Aguinaldo, and from these headquarters are confirmed, even when the number of rifles does not correspond to the above category.

“The officer who shows the most prestige and sympathy in his zone or province and shows the most intelligent activity, energy, and honor, will be commander of the same.

“In addition to the ordinary contributions to the war in metal, the military administrator will collect ten per cent of the crops for the army and national defence, collecting by force if necessary.

“The priests will contribute one dollar and fifty cents monthly for every thousand souls under their charge. No one will be allowed to marry without having contributed one or more rifles according to his position and fortune.

“Any one turning over arms to the enemy after July 10, in addition to being considered a traitor will be obliged to turn over the number of arms he has surrendered, and if he cannot do this two hundred and fifty dollars will be collected for every rifle surrendered, and in case of insolvency his lands or property will pass into the hands of the military administrator and will be used for the purchase of new arms and for the assistance of the widows, parents, and sons, of our soldiers killed in the defence of the country, or wounded in the same.”

In addition to these, extraordinary contributions were levied for the national defence, and many of the subordinate chiefs levied contributions to supply their immediate needs and those of their soldiers. These taxes were collected by “pangolas,” tax collectors in each barrio, a barrio being something like our township only much smaller in area. These pangolas were required to return a sum depending upon the wealth and number of people in their barrios.

Forced enlistments were also made, though an individual was exempted from military service on the payment of an amount varying from ten to twenty pesos. Licenses were also issued, even in towns where troops were stationed, and the cockpits were regular contributors to the *insurrecto* fund. A tax was also levied on the officials of the pueblos and the

provinces and an official often found himself in sore straits, having to furnish a goodly portion of his salary to the *insurrectos*.¹

This system of taxation was in full operation on December 1, 1901, and was being forced in every town not excepting the towns where military government under the American troops was established.

When Malvar surrendered, he was required to report every morning at the office of the brigade provost marshal (Captain Boughton), where questions were continually coming up that he could answer better than any one else. The first morning I took from him a statement regarding affairs in the Third Brigade and also in all the territory commanded by him. He gave me the following information respecting his system of conducting the war.

He had, during the latter part of 1901, about two thousand, five hundred effective guns. This would require two thousand, five hundred soldiers actually armed with guns. According to the insurgent method, one additional man armed with a bolo accompanied each rifleman to take the rifle in case the rifleman was wounded.² This would require five thousand men actually in the field belonging to the regular force. In addition each barrio had a company of bolo men varying from ten men upwards, armed with bolos, and every able bodied man above the age of sixteen not thus employed was classed among the reserves and was liable to be ordered out at any moment.

The theatre of war was divided into zones, corresponding somewhat to our departments or brigades, only very much smaller, and over each zone was a general or colonel and in some cases a lieutenant-colonel. The following are the zones actually under Malvar and the commanders who worked under his orders:—

ZONE.	COMMANDER.	RANK.
Oriental Batangas,	Casala,	Colonel.
Occidental Batangas,	Marasigan,	Lieut.-Col.
Lipa and Binan,	Gonzales,	General.
Laguna,	Caballes,	Colonel.
Morong,	Asuncion,	Colonel.
Oriental Tayabas,	Marques,	Colonel.
Occidental Tayabas,	Mayo,	Lieut.-Col.
Alaminos, Bay, Calauang,	Ramos,	Colonel.

(1) See extracts from the declaration of Pedro Pastor, given later.

(2) The writer found this system carried out in a small engagement he had with the insurgents in Tayabas during February, 1902.

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ZONE.	COMMANDER.	RANK.
Mindoro,	Atienza,	Colonel.
Department of the South,	Lucban,	General.
Visayan Islands,	Maxilom,	General.
Cavite,	Noriel,	General.
Infanta,	Ascarraga,	General.

These commanders probably never had more than two hundred and fifty to three hundred men in one place at any one time but were simply carrying on guerilla warfare. In General Dispositions No. 1 Malvar ordered that engagements be abstained from until there was notice of a general movement. They realized the truth and acted upon the advice of Pedro Pastor, that regular battle should never be given the Americans because they would always conquer and annihilate the insurgents. They never made an attack unless they occupied superior advantages as regards position and they never engaged in an open fight.

Moreover the men we fought today would probably be the amigos in the streets tomorrow, their guns and bolos hidden, and they themselves back in town until again called out by their chiefs. Should the Americans come upon an insurrecto, unless caught red handed with a gun in his hand, he would plead that he was a friend and was simply working in the fields or else passing to market, or one and all of a thousand specious lies invented to deceive the Americans.

I quote quite freely from the confession of the presidente of Batangas, Jose Villaneuva, one of the ablest Filipinos in the islands, and also from the confession of Pedro Pastor, clerk of the court of the first instance for the seventh judicial district. They are but samples of what was being done continually throughout the brigade; the provost marshal's desk is full of similar ones from the leading men of Batangas, and the provost judges of other towns have taken them from the leading men of their sections. A collection of them would make a large book and one scarcely to be equaled in the tales of treachery and deceit that surrounded the American troops during their entire stay in the islands, and made success impossible in any system of warfare except the concentration system which cut off supplies and contributions formerly enforced by the insurgents.

Extract from the declaration of Villaneuva, who was presidente of Batangas under the insurgent government:—

“Before the entrance of the Americans, the Filipino military men requested all the arms and ammunition of the police and also the members of the force. I had charge of only one corporal and four or five guards for the transmission of messages. After the entrance of the Americans (into Batangas), I sent these police with a letter to the military commander consenting that they enter the service of the insurgents and

if they did not they could leave their guns in the mountains where Colonel Rillo was stationed.¹ A Mauser rifle, my property, was given to the corporal who had stayed by my side till the entrance of the Americans. Another gun, a carbine which I had in trust for Father Jacinto, curé of this city, was afterwards lost in a deep fissure in the mountains.

"From the time of my surrender to Colonel Anderson I was sometimes in an anomalous condition, as in the meantime other presidentes of some cities continued in their office or with the military, but I considered I was without authority and fit only for agriculture. Many citizens notwithstanding recognized me yet as before and also some cabezas (heads of barrios) came to me for consultation.

"I received an order from Colonel Rillo convoking a great conference and ordering me to attend. I went to the said conference in the mountains in the vicinity of the barrio of San Miguel and there met Senor Rillo, who did not wish or care to leave his hiding place and only took office to preside at the meeting to determine, if I do not forget, the form of collecting contributions for a war fund.² In all there was much said to the people which tended to reunite their respect for property, fraternity, and constancy in their work, as there had been many excesses committed on this class. It was agreed to collect from the citizens a contribution equal to the cedula tax in the time of the Spaniards.

"In one of the conferences which I attended I turned over to Captain Nicomedes seventy pesos which came, as I remember, from the local fund which was in charge of Pedro Pastor.

"I returned to live in the fields to avoid being thought an Americanista because at that time the papers were beginning to speak of these as well qualified for laudable assassination.

"Some time after this, one or two months, I received a communication from Crisanto Borruel, major of insurgents, requesting that the cabeza of the barrio of either Tinga or San Pedro, I do not now remember which, should be displaced on account of poor services. I answered conforming to this in everything as I did not feel able to tell them that I would have nothing to do with them. About this time I received an order for money to the value of twenty pesos, as I remember, but I gave only fifteen pesos and about a month later I received another order to which I replied by giving eight pesos.

"In March, which is the month for harvesting sugar cane, I received notice about an order from General Malvar requesting sugar by way of contribution for the troops, from all owners of sugar mills. My father then prepared under my orders a pair of kerosene oil cans full for this contribution, and unquestionably it was given though I never received a receipt.

"In April or May of the same year, 1900, the lieutenant of the barrio collected a contribution of palay (rice in the husk). I sent five pesos in place of palay and my father sent two cavans of rice.³

"In June of the same year I went to Manila to procure a new stock for my drug store in this city. This had hardly been well established to advantage when I received

(1) Colonel Rillo at this time was chief of the Oriental zone of Batangas. He died shortly afterward and was succeeded by Casala.

(2) This was before Malvar assumed command.

(3) A cavan is about one hundred and forty pounds.

a message from the insurgents requesting a long list of medicines, signed, if I remember correctly, by Colonel Casala or by Major Cantos. This I concluded to be a bad beginning for my business. If the whole list had been filled it would have cost fifty or sixty pesos, but making the excuse that I did not have many of the articles which figured in the list I gave only antipyrine, quinine, iodoform, and other medicaments of common use, to the value of twenty to twenty-four pesos. When later they sent to me requesting saltpetre and sulphur for the manufacture of powder I considered it serious indeed for these things were considered contraband of war. I could freely give medicaments, morally from a humanitarian standpoint, but in this I could not oblige them, giving the excuse that I had hardly one hundred grammes of saltpetre. This drug is but little used in pharmacy and on account of the state of war was prohibited from being sold in large quantities in Manila.

"In the month of February, 1901, I was greatly surprised at being elected president of the Federal party. Though at another time I would covet this exceedingly yet I could not incur the hate of the insurgents toward the Federals. At last I decided to accept the presidency and to insure my personal safety on my farm where there were no guards, I took the remedy of writing to Colonel Casala asking permission to accept this and if not given, for him to come and capture me so that I could be away from the party. Excessive congratulations were in his answer, which was in effect an order that I should continue as president of the Federal party.

"Some time in the fall of 1901 I received a package of copies of letters of the revolutionary committee of Hongkong signed by Galicano Apacible. In these letters General Malvar was much applauded. The capture of Aguinaldo was much lamented and also the surrender of many generals at the same time which tended much to reduce the patriotism of the Filipinos. Yet Malvar was above all this and in him the committee congratulated themselves that they still had a native land if he did not surrender."

Extract from the declaration of Pedro Pastor, then municipal secretary, but now clerk of the court of first instance for the seventh judicial district:—

"In the time of Colonel Rillo, when the Americans entered the city, Tuesday, January 16, 1900, at 9 o'clock A. M., I was tax collector of this district and the money in the local treasury of the city under my authority, collected from December 31, 1899, when I rendered my last account to the provincial treasurer, was about one hundred and fifty pesos. This was taken from me by an American lieutenant who stopped me inside the town as I was proceeding on horseback to take this money to the insurgents. In my building in the barrio of Mahabangdahilig, Batangas, there was deposited some money of the provincial treasury, which I think amounted to about six hundred pesos. I took this money from the place two or three days after the entrance of the Americans and turned it over to the insurgent tax collector.

"Beginning in the month of February and continuing to the end of April, I accepted the accounts of all the municipal officers to the amount of two hundred pesos and turned it all over to Colonel Rillo.

"Beginning about January 14, 1900, I charged a tax of one peseta (twenty cents mex.) on every document, credentials of ownership, and transfers of stock, until the

actual establishment of the municipality on May 22, and this fund was used to purchase articles for Colonel Rillo and Colonel Casala.

"I maintained written and verbal correspondence under the assumed name of 'Sinampaloc' with Rillo, who used the name 'Loray,' with Nicomedes Yrineo who signed 'Dimas-Upil,' and with Casala, alias 'Lasac,' sending them papers and also told them never to attack the city as they could not be victorious and to content themselves with a guerilla warfare, existing on the American ammunition and rations and to be careful and not let any misfortune overtake their persons, to hide well so as not to be captured, and to prolong the war for an indefinite period because only by endurance could the nationalist cause hope to triumph.

"To the above mentioned chiefs I took contributions in money of which I do not know the exact amount but which did not exceed two hundred pesos, and forty cavans of palay, for the months of February and March, 1900. Later to the company of Yrineo I sent twenty pesos in money and medicines to the value of seventeen pesos.

"Martin Cabrera (colonel and predecessor of Marasigan as chief of the Occidental zone of Batangas) asked me for rice for his soldiers at Taal but I did not send him any, replying that I had sent three hundred pesos to the government of Malolos before the breaking out of hostilities. Ramon Atienza at Taal wrote me and asked for contributions on three different occasions before he went to take command in Mindoro. The first time I sent him twenty pesos, the second time ten pesos, and the third five pesos, all in bank notes.

"During the sugar season of this year I sent the insurgents two ollas of sugar from each of my sugar mills.¹

"On December 24, 1900, Manuel Scarella, captain, asked me for a pair of patent leather shoes as a Christmas present. I did not answer but I sent to the camp ten pesos for the poor soldiers.

"In January and February, 1901, I sent to Casala seven pesos with a letter requesting that Bernardo Andal be exempted from service as a soldier as he had but recently married. In the same months I also sent Casala twenty-five pesos requesting the exemption from service of an agent of my uncle, which request was granted. Later I sent Soriano, captain, four large mats that he had requested and also two hundred pesos to Casala.

"In June, 1901, I received notice from Casala that the third part of my salary as municipal secretary should be sent him and I answered that on account of my money resources being almost exhausted, in place of the third part of my pay I would give him six cavans of palay each month and I suggested that he take it from my place in the barrio of San Augustin, Ibaan, and I gave orders to my agent in the said barrio that he should always have six cavans of palay in readiness each month to be given when he should be shown the name 'Lasac.' Casala wrote me in October that on account of the difficulty in transportation he had not at that date gotten any palay, and he asked me to hold a proportionate amount in readiness for him in my place in the barrio of Mahabangdahilig, Batangas, and I accordingly gave orders to this effect in that barrio.

"During all this time, from January, 1900, to November, 1901, I had frequent correspondence with the insurgents, both verbal and written. I had regular messen-

(1) An olla is about one hundred pounds.

gers in my house and among other things I told the chiefs that regular battle should never be given the Americans because they would always conquer and annihilate the insurgents. On two or three occasions I sent notice to the insurgents when an American expedition was to set out, to what place it was going, and for what purpose. At other times I gave data about the location of the Americans inside the city, for example, that there was one company in the convent, another in the house of Rameriz, another in the house of Genato, another in that of Felipe Borbon, and also their change in location in the city, and that they had their rations in the government building and their war munitions in the lower part of the convent."

At the risk of repetition, let me again call the attention of the reader to the fact that the actions of these two men, the presidente and the secretary of the town, living in the town, and supposed to be friendly to the Americans, are but examples of nearly every inhabitant of the Third Brigade at the time General Bell took command. The man who received the Americans with the greatest protestations of friendship was quite sure to be the worst spy in town. All that were met or seen were amigos of the Americans and had never done anything to help the insurgent cause. One of the stoutest to deny all accusations of correspondence with the insurgents was this very Pedro Pastor, who continued in his denials until confronted by Captain Boughton, the provost marshal, with undeniable proofs which were found in some captured correspondence in spite of Pedro's excessive carefulness.

Men and squads of men without commission, without being part or portion of the regularly organized hostile army, without sharing continuously in the war, but with intermittent returns to their homes and avocations, and with frequent assumptions of the semblance of peaceful pursuits, divesting themselves of the character and appearance of soldiers, committed hostilities by fighting and making raids of various kinds, after which they concealed their arms and returned to their homes, posing as peaceful citizens and secretly and often openly living in the same towns with garrisons of our troops. They accepted local offices from the government and took the oath of allegiance solely for the purpose of improving their opportunities and facilities to deceive the Americans and to treacherously aid and assist the cause of the insurrection. In proof of these statements one has only to look at the convictions before military commissions of the crime of the violation of the oath of allegiance.

Should any one ask me why these men, in towns garrisoned by American troops, furnished this money and these supplies, I could answer in no better way than by quoting General Orders, No. 259, Headquarters Division of the Philippines, 1901, which fully explains the reason, and which has been hinted at above in Villaneuva's declaration.

"HEADQUARTERS DIVISION OF THE PHILIPPINES.

"General Orders, }
No. 259. }

MANILA, P. I., September 7, 1901.

"Before a military commission which convened at Binan, Laguna, was arraigned and tried:—

"Euligio Alomia, alias Toyo, a native.

"Charge 1: 'Kidnapping.'

"Specification: In that he, Euligio Alomia, alias Toyo, native, did, in the pueblo of Binan, Province of Laguna, Luzon, P. I., then as now, occupied by United States troops, at a time, then as now, of insurrection, in company with other natives, unlawfully, by force and with intent to do bodily harm, kidnap and carry away Mateo Carabo, native.

"This in the pueblo of Binan, Laguna Province, on or about July 8, 1900.

"Charge 2: 'Murder.'

"Specification: In that he, Euligio Alomia, alias Toyo, native, on or about July 8, 1900, then as now, a time of insurrection, at or near Binan, Province of Laguna, Luzon, P. I., a place then, as now, under the military government of the United States, did wilfully, feloniously, and with malice aforethought, kill and murder one Mateo Carabo, native, by stabbing him, the said Mateo Carabo, inflicting thereby wounds whereof he, the said Mateo Carabo, then and there died.

"Plea—'Not Guilty.'

"Finding—'Guilty.'

"Sentence:—

"And the commission does therefore sentence him, Euligio Alomia, alias Toyo, native, to confinement at hard labor, at such place as the reviewing authority may direct, for the period of thirty years.

"In the foregoing case it appears that this accused, Euligio Alomia, alias Toyo, at the pueblo of Binan, Province of Laguna, P. I., about July 8, 1900, kidnapped from his house one Mateo Carabo, and thereafter killed him with a dagger. It further appears that the accused was one of the official executioners appointed by and acting under the orders of Lieut.-Col. Fustacio Castelltor, but the crime was not committed in the immediate presence of said Castelltor, and it does not appear that the accused had not ample opportunity to avoid obedience to this illegal order and seek protection from the American authorities.

"As illustrative of the methods pursued by his superior officers, the following quotation is taken from a written confession of the accused, made in the presence of witnesses, prior to his trial and admitted by him on his trial to be true and correct:—
'I carried a letter of authorization * * * to act as a special agent, which means authority to commit murder. Each time a murder was ordered, a letter was sent to one of four men (above named), by one of the chiefs (naming them). Afterwards this letter was taken up and burned. If a man did not pay his contributions to the

insurgent tax collector, he was ordered to be killed.' This confession is so in line with numberless well established cases that its substantial truth may be accepted with little doubt.

"The sentence approved by the department commander is confirmed and will be duly executed at the Presidio de Manila to which the prisoner will be sent under proper guard.

"By command of Major-General Chaffee ;

"W. P. Hall,

"Assistant Adjutant-General."

As late as July 2, 1902, the writer forwarded and approved the death sentence passed upon three natives, soldiers of Gonzales' column, who went into the open market place of Tanauan, Batangas Province, and killed the native interpreter of the American troops in that place. There was no motive other than that he was an Americanista and, though they did not claim so openly, they were ordered to kill this man as did the accused in the order above given. In fact it has been quite a delicate question for commissions and reviewing authorities to determine upon the guilt and the amount of punishment to be meted out to murderers that acted under orders from insurrecto officers.

Against such treachery as this the American army had been waging war unsuccessfully for over two years. And this failure was not due to any lack of activity or ability on the part of the American troops. But many times the number of troops that were employed would never have been able to track down the guerilla bands, for beside the mountain topography, the insurrecto soldiers at night would have slipped out of the corner in which they found themselves and disappeared, and the following day there would be none but friendly natives when the troops returned to their towns. Such warfare as we had been waging in the Philippines was not successful. The army, under the most trying circumstances, had fought a foe quite savage in its instincts, for the massacre at Balangiga was under control of Lucban, Malvar's general in Samar. In fact, the war in the Philippine Islands, due to a desire of the American people to carry on the theoretical dream of a humanitarian war, had become more or less of a failure and this was taken by the insurgents as a sign of weakness.

Grown weary of a war that reflected little credit upon American arms, except for the wonderful examples of individual bravery and the remarkable state of discipline shown by the troops in not taking harsh measures, either by retaliation or otherwise, the unequaled Wheaton determined to wage war as it had been waged by Grant and Sherman, when, after three years of fighting, they decided to crush the rebellion in 1864. He chose as his lieutenant the youngest and most energetic

brigadier in the islands, Gen. J. Franklin Bell, and ordered him to carry out drastic measures in Batangas and Laguna, the hotbeds of the insurrection.

It is unfortunate that the people of the United States have derived their ideas of a concentration system from the reconcentrado policy of General Weyler in Cuba, when a Cuban junta in Washington spread broadcast over our land the awful pictures of starvation in the Cuban camps. And the people either could not or would not dissociate these pictures from the true state of affairs in Batangas, and papers in the States, supposed to be reputable, began printing pictures of Weyler when publishing articles on General Bell's campaign in Batangas.

The concentration was ordered by General Bell on December 8, 1901, by Telegraphic Circular No. 2, which is as follows:—

“Telegram.

Batangas, December 8, 1901.

“Telegraphic Circular, No. 2.

“To all Station Commanders:—

“In order to put an end to all enforced contributions now levied by insurgents upon the inhabitants of sparsely settled and outlying barrios and districts, by means of intimidation and assassination, commanding officers of all towns now existing in the provinces of Batangas and Laguna, including those at which no garrison is stationed at present, will immediately specify and establish plainly marked limits surrounding each town, bounding a zone within which it may be practicable with an average sized garrison to exercise supervision over and furnish protection to inhabitants (who desire to be peaceful), against the depredations of armed insurgents. These limits may include barrios which exist sufficiently near the town to be given protection and supervision by the garrison, and should include some ground on which live stock could graze, but so situated that it can be patrolled and watched. All ungarrisoned towns will be garrisoned as soon as troops become available.

“Commanding officers will also see that orders are at once given and distributed to all the inhabitants within the jurisdiction of towns over which they exercise supervision, informing of the danger of remaining outside of these limits and that unless they move by December 25 from outlying barrios and districts with all their moveable food supplies, including rice, palay, chickens, live stock, etc., to within the limits of the zone established at their own or nearest town their property (found outside of said zone at said date) will become liable to confiscation or destruction. The people will be permitted to move houses from outlying districts should they desire to do so or to construct temporary shelter for themselves on any land vacant within the zones without compensation to the owner, and no owner will be permitted to deprive them of the privilege of doing so.

“In the discretion of commanding officers the price of necessities may also be regulated in the interest of those thus seeking protection.

“As soon as peaceful conditions have been established in the brigade these persons will be encouraged to return to their homes and such assistance will be rendered them as may be found practicable.

“(Sgd.) J. F. Bell,

“Brigadier-General, Commanding.”

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This order was carried out by commanding officers in the spirit in which it was given. People came into the towns, bringing all their provisions and household effects with them, and were sheltered in the houses of relatives and friends or else made shelter for themselves. After this order was issued, parties were sent out, mostly natives guarded by small detachments, to gather the palay and food stuffs of the neighborhood and whatever was found was brought into the towns, and after giving a certain portion to the gatherers, the rest was stored under guard for future issue to the poor. In the inaccessible parts of mountains, the palay that could not be reached by caribou train was destroyed. Telegraphic Circular No. 7 is given to show the working of the system:—

“Telegram.

Batangas, P. I., December 15, 1901.

“Telegraphic Circular, No. 7.

“To all Station Commanders:—

“Though section 17 G. O. 100 authorizes the starving of unarmed hostile belligerents, as well as armed ones, provided it leads to a speedier subjection of the enemy, it is considered neither justifiable nor desirable to permit any persons to starve who have come into towns under our control seeking protection. Although many of these persons can unquestionably be classed as enemies with perfect justice, it is too difficult to discriminate between the hostile and those who really desire peace, to inaugurate or permit any policy of starvation under such circumstances. Every proper effort will be made at all times to deprive those in arms in the mountains of food supplies, but in order that those who have assembled in the towns may not be reduced to want it is absolutely essential to confiscate, transport to garrisoned towns, and save for future contingencies, whenever possible, every particle of food supplies which may be found concealed in the mountains for insurgents or abandoned at a distance from towns.

“Therefore instead of destroying animals and food products, found by troops under such circumstances, commanding officers will make every possible effort to see that such animals and food are brought into the nearest town and kept under the control of the military authorities for future use. In accomplishing this, all means of transportation may be seized and every able bodied male impressed and marched under guard to transport such food products into towns.

“Though it is recognized that it may be difficult at times to accomplish the above instructions, it is expected that every reasonable effort will be made to do so, even at the expense of time, care, and labor, and that no rice or food will be destroyed except where absolutely impracticable to get it into towns. It should not take more than a week to completely clear out all outlying districts of food products. Station commanders will begin at once to hunt for and bring in these supplies. Food abandoned may be given to those town people who will bring it in, if impossible to get it in for the government.

“Storehouses in which to store these products will be taken possession of, or when none are available the presidente will be required to build one with labor and material of the town without compensation from the government. These products will be carefully preserved by the garrison for future use in accordance with a system to

be announced hereafter. The rice of persons believed to be disloyal, beyond an amount necessary for themselves and dependents, may be confiscated and preserved for the same purpose.

“No rice or food supplies thus seized will be fed to public animals, nor will any of it be consumed by troops except in case of emergency and necessity. None of this food will be issued gratis to well-to-do people who have means and property on which they can raise money to buy it, but when such people have no rice and are unable to purchase it elsewhere, these government stores may be sold in small quantities at a reasonable rate. The money thus accumulated will be used to purchase other rice in Manila to be transported by the government and resold at the same price or issued gratis to paupers.

“The utmost care will be taken in registering paupers and the members of their families, in order that frauds may be prevented in the gratuitous issue of food.

“In the discretion of sub-district commanders, after consulting station commanders, a uniform scale may be established, regulating the prices that may be charged by merchants for ordinary and necessary food supplies. Sub-district commanders may also transfer any surplus of government stores from one town to another that needs it worse.

“It is the purpose of this order to place the burden of feeding the poor upon the wealthy classes whose disloyalty has brought on and maintained this war, and upon those who still remain disloyal, especially upon those who are actively sympathizing, contributing to, and otherwise assisting the insurrection. See provisions of sections 21, 37, 38, and 156, G. O. 100.

“(Sgd.) J. F. Bell,

“Brigadier-General, Commanding.”

In the city of Batangas, the provost marshal established a poorhouse, called the poor hospital, where the people that were brought in sick were kept, fed, and treated by an army medical officer until they were well. There was, however, little sickness in any of the camps of the brigade. This poorhouse in Batangas became a refuge for families whose heads still remained in the field and it excited the admiration of all who cared to investigate the concentration system. It is to be noticed that General Malvar, in giving to the world the reasons for his surrender, did not, nor could he truthfully, give as one of his reasons, compassion for the people inside the zones. They needed no compassion. They were fed, provided with shelter, poor funds arose in every town out of the sale of palay and rice, and the only people suffering were the insurgents in the field, that with almost mulish stubbornness remained out long after the end was a foreseen conclusion.

One advantageous feature of bringing the people into the towns was that they became acquainted with the Americans. Probably sixty per cent of the people of Batangas had never seen an American and as they came in touch with us they found they were not maltreated, as they had been told by the insurgents that they would be, they found they were fed and housed, they found their personal rights were not interfered

with, and their individual liberty only restricted as was necessary under war measures.

When Malvar surrendered on April 16, 1902, the zones were broken, prison doors flew open to all but criminals, and General Bell and his officers set to work to help repair the homes and camotes, while seed corn and seed palay were furnished from the poor fund for planting. Families returned to their homes, fields were put under cultivation, and peaceful vocations were once more resumed. Rice was furnished at a nominal cost, and as it was cheaper than the people had known it to be for years, it was readily sold. Money appeared, some of it bearing evidence of having been buried in the earth, and the Filipinos recognized that the United States government was not as bad as they had feared. Rice is still being sold to the people by the government, they paying for it in money, or lime, or by working on the roads. No suffering in Batangas that I have seen has been due to a scarcity of food and the other day it was found impossible to hire boys to work on the plaza in front of the church at pulling weeds. Boys were playing in the streets but they did not want to work. Such is a true picture of Bleeding Batangas.

And now what did the concentration system accomplish?

In a little less than four months it put an end to a guerilla warfare that otherwise would have continued for years, with ladrones terrorizing the people; it compelled the surrender of Malvar who would not otherwise have surrendered; it made possible a civil government which, under native governors, took control in both Laguna and Batangas on the first and fourth of July; it brought peace to a ladrone-ridden race, with less suffering than could have been expected; it made the Filipinos acquainted with the Americans and made them realize that the army of the United States is here simply to bring peace and development to them and open for them a road to a civilization and a pursuit of happiness such as the brown people have never dreamed. They have felt the weight of the mailed fist it is true, but it was not harsh, and it was laid upon them by as gentle a hand and guided by as humane a heart as American civilization has ever produced.

ARE AMERICAN LEGISLATURES DECLINING?

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MR. MASSINGHAM'S very interesting and instructive essay in the last number of the "Quarterly," on "The Decline of Parliamentary Power," suggests the question of whether or not there has been a decline in like power in the United States. He confines his discussion to the English parliament, but previous writers in the same field have taken a more comprehensive view and have reached the conclusion that there is no country in the world, living under parliamentary government, in which there is not complaint of the decline in the quality of its legislators. The same causes are cited everywhere,—withdrawal of the more intelligent classes from legislative duties, and the performance of those duties by men of inferior intelligence and often of indifferent moral principles. Thus Lecky, in his "Democracy and Liberty," says:—

"I do not think there is any single fact which is more evident to impartial observers than the declining efficiency and lowered character of parliamentary government. The evil is certainly not restricted to England. All over Europe, and, it may be added, in a great measure in the United States, complaints of the same kind may be heard. A growing distrust and contempt for representative bodies has been one of the most characteristic features of the closing years of the nineteenth century. In some countries the parliamentary system means constantly shifting government, ruined finances, frequent military revolts, the systematic management of constituencies. In most countries it has proved singularly sterile of high talent. It seems to have fallen more and more under the control of men of an inferior stamp; of skilful talkers or intriguers; of sectional interests or small groups; and its hold upon the affection and respect of nations has visibly diminished."

In the same strain Lavelle notes that a sigh of relief is felt in many lands when a parliament is prorogued, and commends as wise the action of many American States in restricting their legislatures to biennial sessions. He remarks, with dry cynicism, that Italy has a special advantage in her capital in that the Roman malaria effectually abridges the sessions of her parliament. There is no doubt about the "sigh of relief" at adjournment, both of Congress and of nearly or quite every state legislature in this country. It is always heard, but is it a modern manifestation? Complaint of decline began very early in the last century, almost immediately, in fact, after the present form of government was put in operation. It is an established truth that the expectation of the framers of the constitution, as set forth in "The Federalist," that our

legislative bodies would "in general be composed of the most enlightened and respectable citizens," was realized for only a very short time, if realized at all. When M. de Tocqueville visited this country in the summer of 1831, he wrote after his return to France:—

"When you enter the House of Representatives, you are struck with the vulgar aspect of this great assembly. The eye looks often in vain for a celebrated man. Nearly all its members are obscure personages, whose names suggest nothing to the mind. They are for the most part village lawyers, dealers, or even men belonging to the lower classes. In a country in which education is almost universal, it is said that there are representatives of the people who cannot always write correctly. Two steps away opens the hall of the Senate, whose narrow area encloses a large part of the celebrities of America. They are eloquent advocates, or distinguished generals, or able magistrates, or well known statesmen. Every word uttered in this great assembly would do honor to the greatest parliamentary debates in Europe."

M. de Tocqueville attributed the contrast between the two bodies to the fact that while the members of the House of Representatives were chosen by popular vote, the members of the Senate were chosen by the state legislatures. Putting aside for the moment the question of the relative merits of the membership of the two houses, it is interesting to compare what M. de Tocqueville says of the intellectual quality of the lower house with current estimates of the same. Precisely similar comments are heard today by persons who visit Congress for the first time, as they have been heard at any time during the period that has elapsed since De Tocqueville's visit. The golden age of congressional eloquence and intellectual power has been in the past quite steadily for fully three quarters of a century, and it remains there today. The eye of the visitor, it is true, does not look in vain always for a celebrated man. At certain periods, he is to be found in the speaker's chair, and at other times specimens of him are to be found on the floor. When he is in the speaker's chair, in the person of a Blaine or a Colfax or a Reed, criticism of his character, of his methods, and of the quality of the body under him is scarcely more favorable than was M. de Tocqueville's. Whatever is done in the House is almost invariably compared unfavorably with what was done there in the earlier days. The refrain is always the same,—decline, decline, decline!

Does it follow that because the expectations of the framers of the constitution in regard to the composition of Congress were not realized that decline began almost immediately and has continued to the present day? Their expectations about the function which the electoral college was to perform in the selection of a president have been completely frustrated. Instead of having any choice whatever, the members of the

college are simply recording agents of the choice of the people. Yet nobody considers this failure of the intent and expectation of the founders of the government a decline. Lecky, in the same work in which he speaks of decline in parliamentary government, treats as absurd the expectation that any different results could have been obtained under the democratic theory of government, that is, with universal suffrage. He argues that the democratic theory places the ultimate source of power, the supreme right of appeal and control, in the hands of the majority of the nation, told by the head, or, in other words, in the hands of the poorest, the most ignorant, and the most incapable, who are necessarily the most numerous. "Nothing," he says, "in ancient alchemy was more irrational than the notion that increased ignorance in the elective body will be converted into increased capacity for good government in the representative body; that the best way to improve the world and secure rational progress is to place government more and more under the control of the least enlightened classes. The day will come when it will appear one of the strangest facts in the history of human folly that such a theory was regarded as liberal and progressive." So far as the United States is concerned, Lecky holds that the power of this unenlightened majority to do harm in Congress is restricted, first, by a Senate that does not rest on a democratic basis; second, by a president chosen by manhood suffrage "who exercises an independent power vastly greater than a modern British sovereign"; and, thirdly, by a "written constitution under the protection of a great, independent law court, which makes it impossible for it to violate contracts, or to infringe any fundamental liberty of the people, or to carry any constitutional change, except when there is the amplest evidence that it is the clear, settled wish of an overwhelming majority of the people."

Lecky's conclusion is, in substance, that in spite of the inferior quality of legislators because of unrestricted suffrage, the lower house of Congress is under such limitation and restraint by the constitution and the Senate and the president that it has not declined so hopelessly as the parliamentary bodies of other countries. This is a more favorable view than that which most American commentators take. It is impossible to read the latter, especially those of them whose views are set forth in permanent form, and escape the conviction that in their estimation all change is decline. They hold almost invariably that there has been a steady and virtually unbroken deterioration for nearly a century, and that the Congress today is in intelligence and morals inferior to that of the early days of the republic. Every change in the intervening period, every departure from old methods, is set down as a decline. Is this true?

May it not be that what is often regarded as decline is nothing more than the necessary adaptation of methods to meet modern requirements? It will be recalled by all observers of political development that when Thomas B. Reed was speaker of the House of Representatives in 1890, he made a radical departure from established custom in the matter of conducting the business of the House, and that his course at the time was assailed with great bitterness, he being denominated a czar and his methods declared to be destructive of the system of parliamentary government which had existed since the adoption of the constitution. Yet today his course is universally recognized as both justifiable and commendable. In giving the reasons which prompted him to adopt it, he said in a review article which he published two years later:—

“For fifty years, they (the Democrats) and their kind had been building up against the will of the people barriers so complicated, so diverse, so numerous, and so closely interwoven with the prejudices and customs of many generations that the Citadel of Do Nothing seemed unapproachable from sea or shore. The veto power of the minority, enhanced at every opportunity by the decisions of Democratic speakers, was something of which the nation had no conception, and such as was never tolerated in any other legislative body. Obstructions of the will of the people had even become the plaything of an angry hour. Unless the House could be emancipated from the bad traditions of fifty years, there was no hope of legislation. But fortunately for the country the House was strong enough to meet its duties, and, amid shouts and outcries which already seem strange and incomprehensible, broke down the barriers of custom and reestablished the right of the majority to rule. This was its greatest achievement, for which it will have a name in history. After the lapse of only two years the fierce fire of reproach and clamor has all died away, and out of the mouths of its most strenuous opponents its praises are perfected. The Supreme Court of the United States has followed the judgment of every other tribunal that ever passed upon the question, and pronounced with the same unanimity which characterized the others that a ‘present quorum’ is the only quorum contemplated by the constitution of the United States.”

That is the established truth of history. The House of Representatives had reached a point at which nothing except radical and violent change was adequate to arrest decline. Its ability to transact business was completely paralyzed because power had passed from the majority to the minority. Mr. Reed restored the power to the hands in which it was vested by the constitution, and the courts sustained him in his conduct, though in accomplishing the result he defied the rules which the House itself had adopted for its management and ignored even views which he himself had expressed previously upon the subject. He was charged with violating both established procedure and his own record, but he was not influenced thereby a particle since he had made up his mind that the time for change had come. He acted upon the maxim of the elder

Disraeli that the "masters of the human intellect teach us to think and also to unthink." Having realized that his previous reasoning had been erroneous, he did not hesitate to unthink it. Any one who will take the trouble to revert to the published criticism of Mr. Reed's course at the time will be astonished to see how hysterical and even absurd it reads in the light of subsequent developments. Much of it sounds more like the incoherent ravings of unbalanced minds than the expression of rational and trained intellects.

This surely was an instance in which salutary change was mistakenly pronounced decline. May it not be a typical rather than an exceptional case? Times change and parliamentary methods must change with them. The Congress of today is not only a very different body from the Congress of the early days of the republic, but a vastly different body from any which the imagination of the framers of the constitution could depict; as much so, in fact, as is the country in which they lived as that in which we are living. To say that they were capable of laying down hard and fast rules for parliamentary guidance which should never be changed or modified or abolished is an obvious absurdity. For this reason much of current criticism because congressional business is coming more and more to be transacted in committees is beside the mark. It would be sheer impossibility to transact any business whatever if the committees did not act, as they do, as sifters of the huge mass of legislation, keeping a large proportion of it from ever getting before the House at all. If all measures were to be debated fully and unrestrictedly on the floor, there would be a clog that would defeat all legislation. The committee system undoubtedly has its abuses, it undoubtedly at times even fosters corruption, but it is an absolute necessity of the times. While a great deal of committee business, the bulk of it, indeed, is done in secret, there is enforced publicity on all measures commanding keen popular interest, and when this is secured the chances for unworthy influences to prevail are virtually annihilated.

So far as corruption is concerned in Congress, there are no signs that there is more of this now than there has been heretofore. A great deal is heard about it, but for several years there has been no great scandal. Nothing approaching the Credit Mobilier scandal of 1867-8 has occurred since that date. There are from time to time disclosures of individual indiscretions and more or less definite indications of stock-jobbing propensities on the part of members of both houses, but taken all in all, it is not possible to say that there is evidence of a moral decline in the membership of the two houses. It is currently believed that many members of the Senate owe their presence in that body to their posses-

sion of large wealth and to the use they have made of the same in securing for themselves political preferment. The Senate is frequently called the "Millionaires' Club," and it is probably true that the proportion of very rich men in it is larger than at any previous time in its history. Nevertheless, it is true that today the Senate is the dominating power in Congress. A sure indication of this is found in the conduct of the newspaper correspondents toward the two houses. In the days of Speaker Reed, the correspondents of all the leading journals of the land spent most of their time in the reporters' gallery of the House, devoting small attention to the Senate. During the last two sessions of Congress conditions have been reversed and these correspondents have spent nearly all their time in the gallery of the Senate. The reason has been that the men to whom the country was listening and who were really shaping legislation were in the Senate. Whatever else this may indicate, it does not betoken a decline in the Senate. So far as volume of business done is concerned, the record of achievement by the last session of Congress, completed during the brief extra session of the Senate, shows that modern methods are far from being inefficient, severely as they are criticized. Few congresses during the past quarter of a century have accomplished more in so short a period. An Isthmian Canal treaty, an Alaskan boundary treaty, and a Cuban reciprocity treaty were ratified; a series of trust regulation laws, a new army organization law, a law providing a gold basis currency system for the Philippine Islands, and a law providing for five new battleships for the navy, were enacted in addition to the regular business of the session. In all these measures the influence of the President was felt, but they were carried through both houses chiefly because the leaders in both stood squarely with the President and used their control of the committee organizations and of the methods of procedure to accomplish their purposes.

The most familiar argument that one hears in support of the contention that the Senate, as well as the House, has declined is in substance that there are no men in Congress today who can be compared for a moment with Webster and Clay and Calhoun and the other great debaters and orators of the past. This is indisputably true, but does it necessarily indicate a decline? Times have changed and men as well as methods have changed with them. The modern press has had a powerful influence in destroying both the influence of and the interest in parliamentary debates. All public measures and questions are discussed by the newspapers with a fulness and comprehensiveness never dreamed of in the earlier days. Complaint is habitually made by all writers on parliamentary decline that reports of the proceedings of Congress which the newspapers

publish grow briefer each year, and this is true. It is becoming the practice in England also, for with the exception of the London "Times," scarcely a journal in Great Britain publishes parliamentary proceedings in full any longer, whereas until recently every daily journal in London did so. The reason is that the modern newspaper recognizes it as a part of its function to spare the reader the burden of reading the proceedings in full. As in all other matters of current news, the editor digests this for the reader, selects what would be most likely to interest him, and condenses it for him. This is the explanation of the short summaries of congressional news in this country. The average reader gets what he desires in the Washington despatches, regular and special, and finds in the editorial columns the points of all the most important measures under consideration, together with an explanation of what their intent is and what their effect as law would be. Naturally these are colored more or less according to the political character of the paper, but they suit the reader and content him as well. He would not take the trouble to read a full report of proceedings if it were to be printed, and it is because the editor knows this that he does not burden the columns of his paper with it.

When it comes to considering the character of latter-day state legislatures, the evidences of decline are much more convincing than in the case of Congress; yet here, also, it is well to ask if there ever was a time when these bodies really met the high standard which most critics assume that they occupied in the early days of the republic. Surely no member of the present generation can recall the time when there was not general complaint of both the intelligence and the honesty of these bodies. Each one, especially in States having large cities within their borders, has for nearly or quite half a century been spoken of regularly every year as "one of the worst we have ever had." Seldom has the complaint been without justification. That the decline has been steady, with no check to the vicious or positively corrupt qualities which appear in them, it would be difficult to maintain. In the State of New York, for example, there have been extremes of depravity, but no unbroken line of decadence. Between 1820 and 1854, when the so-called "Albany Regency" was supreme, there was almost continuously an unscrupulous partisan use of the legislative power which has rarely been equaled. Later, between 1863 and 1870, in the Tweed days, there was a depth of defiant corruption touched which was below anything which has been reached since. There was a distinct improvement after Tweed's downfall, and for several years instead of a decline, there was an advance. Much the same record has been made by the legislatures of the other States. They recede in character to a certain point, and a reaction almost invariably

follows. They lose for a time, then gain for a time; but it would be difficult to maintain that the net result is decline.

Of course, methods change with each reaction from the low level. The political corrupters of legislative bodies are constantly inventing new ways by which to retain their control and accomplish their purposes. It may be that the methods employed by the modern boss are more demoralizing than any of those existing for similar purposes previous to his advent. He surely poisons the fountain at its source, for he goes far back of the legislature as an existing body and secures ownership of its members in the primaries and nominating conventions. In this way, by controlling nearly or quite all the nominating machinery, the boss not only gets his own men into the legislature, but he keeps men of character and ability out. Few such get before the electors at all, and the result is that with two rival political bosses working the machinery in the nominating conventions of both parties, the voters are compelled when they go to the polls to choose between two sets of incompetent or unworthy candidates. This unquestionably has lowered the character of the modern legislative body, but it is not the only influence that has been working to that end. As a general rule, men of good ability do not care to go to the legislature for the simple reason that they have better uses for their time. There is very little inducement to go there under the most favorable conditions, and none at all when the majority is well nigh certain to be composed of men of inferior intelligence and often indifferent moral principles. A lawyer in good practice, or an active and prosperous business man, cannot afford to give up several months of the year to the public service, or thinks he cannot, and the result is that the legislative bodies in many States are composed largely of men who have either failed in one career after another, or have never seriously attempted to follow any profession or calling, or have gone into politics for "what there is in it" for themselves. An examination of the careers of the men whom the most astute and expert of our modern bosses select for the legislature will show that a large proportion of them have failed in life in some calling or other. These, for obvious reasons, furnish the most malleable material out of which to make a pliant legislator. From the nature of the case, it is very difficult to trace out and prevent corruption in the primaries and nominating conventions. It is accomplished in ways that are always secret and always insidious. The controlling factor is the campaign fund. This is in the hands of the boss who decides just how much shall go to each constituency to be expended in the election of a candidate. The man who is selected as the candidate is sent for and when he accepts the position, and the amount of money he is to be

allowed for campaign expenses has been agreed upon, he thereby becomes the property of the party organization. It is the first article of the agreement whereby he is made the candidate, that he shall vote as he is ordered to on every question that comes within the scope of party policy. He has not been bought outright, but he will owe his election to the use of money in his behalf by the party organization, and he must live up to the obligation. If he is in debt at the time of his nomination, or has a mortgage on his property, it happens not infrequently that the campaign fund is used to free him from his financial burdens. If after election he endeavors to act independently, to "set up for himself" as the political phrase is, he knows to a certainty that he thereby makes his renomination impossible and that the end of his public career will arrive with the end of his term.

Undoubtedly this method of corruption has been aggravated and extended by the desire of very rich men to get into the United States Senate. A few years ago one of them was refused admission to the Senate because of proof of bribery in his election by the legislature. After his rejection, he returned to his State and put in operation the modern method,—that is, applied his money to the primaries and nominating conventions. In that way he had a sure majority in his favor when the new legislature assembled, was elected without difficulty and without scandal, and was allowed to take his seat. The Senate had no power to go behind the legislature and investigate anything that had been done before that body assembled. If there had been corruption in the primaries and nominating conventions, it was outside the jurisdiction of the Senate and could only be investigated by the legislature itself in deciding upon the qualifications of its own members.

The remedy is with the people, for Lecky and other writers of his school are right when they say that the evils complained of in our parliamentary bodies are traceable directly to unrestricted suffrage in a democracy. The members of the lower house of Congress and of the state legislatures are the representatives of the people. If the political bosses select most of them, the people acquiesce in that selection. It is well known in all those States in which bosses are supreme that they have taken into their hands for their own uses the nominating power. The work, though done in the dark, is a matter of common knowledge. Why is there popular acquiescence in it? Mainly because in most instances the persons selected meet the popular requirements, come up substantially to the standard of fitness which the popular taste demands. It cannot be denied that there are in all our large cities constituencies that, when left to themselves, choose men of precisely the same type that the boss selects for them. This is representative government in a democ-

racy. Where the bosses do most harm is in forcing upon more intelligent constituencies candidates who fall far below the popular standard which prevails there, but who are accepted because of the indifference or indolence of the people upon whom they are forced. But this is the fault of the people who can prevent it at any time by making the necessary effort.

Is Lecky also right in his contention that government in a democracy is destined to be bad because control is placed in the hands of the least enlightened classes? His argument, reduced to its simplest form is: The average man in a democracy is inferior in intelligence, dull in his moral perceptions, and ordinary in all his tastes. Multiply this man by eighty millions and what is the result? Is it any different from what exists in the average man? The answer to that, so far as the United States is concerned, is found in this republic's history. Long before Lecky, Macaulay predicted that this experiment in popular government would fail when our numbers became so great that those who had nothing would discover that they outnumbered those who had something and would rise in their might and overthrow law and order. That prediction has failed utterly. We have had two great national contests on that plain, direct issue and in each instance the result has been an unequivocal demonstration that in a nation of seventy millions those who have something and know how to guard it are in the majority. Lecky's mistake lies in failing to see that in the American republic the average citizen is growing steadily more enlightened and is raising steadily higher his standards of taste and judgment. It is the fact that he is a citizen, and is thereby led to take an active interest in public affairs, that compels this growth. Universal suffrage thus works out its own salvation. The consciousness that he is a freeman with a freeman's right, makes a better laborer of the working man and a better farmer of the tiller of the soil, and also a better citizen. Every foreign student of our material growth and industrial development bears this testimony. American working men produce larger results because they are something more than laboring men,—they are citizens of the republic with an equal chance with all other citizens. This is the testimony of two eminent Englishmen who have visited this country recently for the express purpose of studying these questions, Alfred Moseley and John Foster Fraser. We are unquestionably in the power of numbers and are destined to remain so for all time, but with the numbers advancing steadily in intelligence and in comprehension of the duties of citizenship, there is at least more ground for hope than for despair. What seems to be decline may be merely change, merely the undulations of an onward movement as the world moves forward to meet and surmount new conditions.

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